RSSL-Iskrizzjonijiet kollha fil- "Il-Libanu" Kategorija

L-Għarab Għarbi

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Ottubru 6, 1981, kien maħsub li jkun jum ta’ ċelebrazzjoni fl-Eġittu. Immarka l-anniversarju tal-akbar mument ta’ rebħa tal-Eġittu fi tliet kunflitti Għarab-Iżraeljani, meta l-armata underdog tal-pajjiż imbuttat tul il-Kanal ta 'Suez fil-ġranet tal-ftuħ tal- 1973 Il-Gwerra ta’ Yom Kippur u bagħtet truppi Iżraeljani tkebbib f’irtir. Fuq jibred, filgħodu bla sħab, l-istadium tal-Kajr kien ippakkjat bil-familji Eġizzjani li kienu ġew biex jaraw il-militar jissawwab il-hardware tiegħu.Fuq l-istand tar-reviżjoni, President Anwar el-Sadat,il-perit tal-gwerra, raw b'sodisfazzjon kif irġiel u magni parad quddiemu. Kont fil-qrib, korrispondent barrani li għadu kif wasal.F’daqqa waħda, wieħed mit-trakkijiet tal-armata waqaf direttament quddiem l-istand tar-reviżjoni eżatt kif sitt ġettijiet Mirage ħarġu fuq rashom fi prestazzjoni akrobatika, pittura s-sema bi traċċi twal aħmar, isfar, vjola,u duħħan aħdar. Sadat qam bil-wieqfa, milli jidher qed jipprepara biex jiskambja tislima ma’ kontinġent ieħor ta’ truppi Eġizzjani. Huwa għamel lilu nnifsu mira perfetta għal erba’ assassini Iżlamiċi li qabżu minn fuq it-trakk, daħlet fuq il-podju, u mifni ġismu bil-balal. Hekk kif il-qattiela komplew għal dik li dehret eternità biex isprejjaw l-istand bin-nar fatali tagħhom, Jien ikkunsidrajt għal instant jekk għandux nolqot l-art u nirriskjax li niġi maqtula sal-mewt minn spettaturi ippanikjati jew jekk nibqax bil-mixi u nirriskja li nieħu balla mitlufa. L-istint qalli biex nibqa’ fuq saqajja, u s-sens ta’ dmir ġurnalistiku tiegħi ġegħluni biex immur insir naf jekk Sadat kienx ħaj jew mejjet.

Challenging Authoritarianism, Kolonjaliżmu, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Partikolarment, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Għalhekk, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, but
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). Madankollu, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Minn naha l-ohra, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Tabilħaqq,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, il

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Madankollu, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Fratellanza) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, madankollu, il-Fratellanza għandha
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
reġim: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Sekulariżmu, Ermenewtika, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation

Saba Mahmood

Since the events of September 11, 2001, against the

backdrop of two decades of the ascendance of global religious politics, urgent
calls for the reinstatement of secularism have reached a crescendo that cannot
be ignored. The most obvious target of these strident calls is Islam, partikolarment
those practices and discourses within Islam that are suspected of fostering fundamentalism
and militancy. It has become de rigueur for leftists and liberals alike
to link the fate of democracy in the Muslim world with the institutionalization

of secularism — both as a political doctrine and as a political ethic. This coupling
is now broadly echoed within the discourse emanating from the U.S. State
Department, particularly in its programmatic efforts to reshape and transform
“Islam from within.” In this essay, I will examine both the particular conception
of secularism that underlies the current consensus that Islam needs to be
reformed — that its secularization is a necessary step in bringing “democracy” to
the Muslim world — and the strategic means by which this programmatic vision is
being instituted today. Insomuch as secularism is a historically shifting category
with a variegated genealogy, my aim is not to secure an authoritative definition of
secularism or to trace its historical transformation within the United States or the
Dinja Musulmana. My goal here is more limited: I want to sketch out the particular
understanding of secularism underlying contemporary American discourses on
Iżlam, an understanding that is deeply shaped by U.S. security and foreign policy
concerns in the Muslim world.

Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .

Kultura Politika Iżlamika, Demokrazija, u Drittijiet tal-Bniedem

Daniele. Prezz

Ġie argumentat li l-Iżlam jiffaċilita l-awtoritarjaniżmu, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. Konsegwentement, studjużi, kummentaturi, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. Din il-fehma, madankollu, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Teorija politika Islamika, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, li ma jqisux fatturi oħra. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, bħal dawk ta’ reliġjonijiet oħra,

jistgħu jintużaw biex jappoġġjaw varjetà ta’ sistemi u politiki politiċi. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Għalhekk, approċċ ġdid għall-istudju tal-

konnessjoni bejn l-Islam u l-politika hija mitluba.
Nissuġġerixxi, permezz ta’ evalwazzjoni rigoruża tar-relazzjoni bejn l-Islam,

demokrazija, u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem fil-livell transnazzjonali, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, influwenzi ekonomiċi, qsim etniku,

u l-iżvilupp tas-soċjetà, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Kultura Politika Iżlamika, Demokrazija, u Drittijiet tal-Bniedem

Daniele. Prezz

Ġie argumentat li l-Iżlam jiffaċilita l-awtoritarjaniżmu, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Konsegwentement, studjużi, kummentaturi, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. Din il-fehma, madankollu, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Teorija politika Islamika, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, li ma jqisux fatturi oħra. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, bħal dawk ta’ reliġjonijiet oħra,
jistgħu jintużaw biex jappoġġjaw varjetà ta’ sistemi u politiki politiċi. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Għalhekk, approċċ ġdid għall-istudju tal-
konnessjoni bejn l-Islam u l-politika hija mitluba.
Nissuġġerixxi, permezz ta’ evalwazzjoni rigoruża tar-relazzjoni bejn l-Islam,
demokrazija, u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem fil-livell transnazzjonali, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, influwenzi ekonomiċi, qsim etniku,

u l-iżvilupp tas-soċjetà, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Partiti tal-Oppożizzjoni Iżlamiċi u l-Potenzjal għall-Impenn tal-UE

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Fid-dawl tal-importanza dejjem tikber tal-movimenti Iżlamiċi fid-dinja Musulmana u

il-mod kif ir-radikalizzazzjoni influwenzat avvenimenti globali mill-bidu tas-seklu, dan

huwa importanti għall-UE li tevalwa l-politiki tagħha lejn atturi fi ħdan dak li jista' jkun laxk

imsejħa d-'dinja Islamika'. Huwa partikolarment importanti li wieħed jistaqsi jekk u kif jimpenja ruħu

mad-diversi gruppi Iżlamiċi.

Dan jibqa’ kontroversjali anke fi ħdan l-UE. Xi wħud iħossu li l-Iżlamiċi jgħollu dan

jinsabu wara partiti Iżlamiċi huma sempliċement inkompatibbli mal-ideali tal-punent tad-demokrazija u

drittijiet umani, filwaqt li oħrajn jaraw l-ingaġġ bħala ħtieġa realistika minħabba t-tkabbir

importanza domestika tal-partiti Iżlamiċi u l-involviment dejjem akbar tagħhom fil-qasam internazzjonali

affarijiet. Perspettiva oħra hija li d-demokratizzazzjoni fid-dinja Musulmana tiżdied

sigurtà Ewropea. Il-validità ta’ dawn u argumenti oħra dwar jekk u kif il-

L-UE għandha timpenja ruħha tista' tiġi ttestjata biss billi tistudja l-movimenti Iżlamiċi differenti u

iċ-ċirkostanzi politiċi tagħhom, pajjiż b’pajjiż.

Id-demokratizzazzjoni hija tema ċentrali tal-azzjonijiet tal-politika barranija komuni tal-UE, kif imqiegħda

fl-Artikolu 11 tat-Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea. Ħafna mill-istati kkunsidrati f'dan

rapport mhumiex demokratiċi, jew mhux kompletament demokratiku. F'ħafna minn dawn il-pajjiżi, Iżlamiku

partiti u movimenti jikkostitwixxu oppożizzjoni sinifikanti għar-reġimi prevalenti, u

f’xi wħud jiffurmaw l-akbar blokk ta’ oppożizzjoni. Id-demokraziji Ewropej ilhom jagħmlu

jittrattaw reġimi governattivi li huma awtoritarji, iżda huwa fenomenu ġdid għall-istampa

għal riforma demokratika fi stati fejn l-aktar benefiċjarji probabbli jista' jkollhom, minn

l-opinjoni tal-UE, approċċi differenti u kultant problematiċi għad-demokrazija u tagħha

valuri relatati, bħall-minoranzi u d-drittijiet tan-nisa u l-istat tad-dritt. Dawn il-ħlasijiet huma

spiss imqiegħda kontra movimenti Iżlamiċi, għalhekk huwa importanti għal dawk li jfasslu l-politika Ewropej li

ikollhom stampa preċiża tal-politiki u l-filosofiji tal-imsieħba potenzjali.

Esperjenzi minn pajjiżi differenti għandhom it-tendenza li jissuġġerixxu li l-iżlamista aktar libertà

partijiet huma permessi, aktar ikunu moderati fl-azzjonijiet u l-ideat tagħhom. F'ħafna

każi partiti u gruppi Iżlamiċi ilhom li tbiegħdu mill-għan oriġinali tagħhom

tat-twaqqif ta’ stat Iżlamiku rregolat mil-liġi Iżlamika, u waslu biex jaċċettaw bażiku

prinċipji demokratiċi tal-kompetizzjoni elettorali għall-poter, l-eżistenza ta’ politika oħra

kompetituri, u pluraliżmu politiku.

Islam politiku fil-Lvant Nofsani

Huma Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, fi

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

armi kontra l-istat, u aktar rari, pajjiżi barranin. L-użu tal-vjolenza politika huwa

mifruxa fil-Lvant Nofsani, imma la hija illoġika u lanqas irrazzjonali. F'ħafna każijiet anke

Gruppi Iżlamiċi magħrufa għall-użu tagħhom tal-vjolenza ġew trasformati f’politiċi paċifiċi

partiti li kkontestaw b’suċċess l-elezzjonijiet muniċipali u nazzjonali. Madankollu, l-Iżlamista

qawmien mill-ġdid fil-Lvant Nofsani jibqa’ parzjalment mhux spjegat minkejja numru ta’ teoriji li qed ifittxu

kont għat-tkabbir tagħha u l-appell popolari. Ġeneralment, il-biċċa l-kbira tat-teoriji jsostnu li l-Iżlamiżmu huwa a

reazzjoni għal deprivazzjoni relattiva, speċjalment l-inugwaljanza soċjali u l-oppressjoni politika. Alternattiva

teoriji jfittxu t-tweġiba għall-qawmien mill-ġdid Iżlamiku fil-konfini tar-reliġjon nnifisha u l-

qawwija, potenzjal evokattiv tas-simboliżmu reliġjuż.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

tas-sezzjonijiet ifqar tas-soċjetà imma wkoll tal-klassi tan-nofs.

Partiti Iżlamiċi : why they can’t be democratic

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, demokrazija, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. Il-propensità li jitwettaq riformi bħal dawn huwa dak

Nara bħala nieqes fl-Iżlam politiku. L-interess dikjarat tiegħi stess—bħala Għarbija-

Teorist u prattikant tal-prodemokrazija Musulmana - huwa li jippromwovi l-istabbiliment

tad-demokrazija sekulari fl-ambitu taċ-ċivilizzazzjoni Iżlamika.

Sabiex tgħin tneħħi l-konfużjoni li ħafna drabi madwar

dan is-suġġett, Se nagħmel diversi punti bażiċi li wieħed għandu jżomm f'moħħu. L-ewwel huwa

dak, s'issa, Il-prattiċi tal-Punent vis-`a-vis l-Islam politiku kienu difettużi

għaliex ma kellhomx is-sostenn ta’ valutazzjoni b’bażi tajba.

Sakemm ma tintervjenix ix-xorti għomja, ebda politika ma tista' tkun aħjar mill-valutazzjoni

li fuqha hija bbażata. Valutazzjoni xierqa hija l-bidu ta '

kull għerf prattiku.

STRATEĠIJI GĦALL-IMPENĠĠ TAL-IŻLAM POLITIKU

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

L-Iżlam Politiku huwa l-aktar forza politika waħda attiva fil-Lvant Nofsani llum. Il-futur tagħha huwa marbut mill-qrib ma’ dak tar-reġjun. Jekk l-Istati Uniti u l-Unjoni Ewropea huma impenjati li jappoġġaw ir-riforma politika fir-reġjun, se jkollhom bżonn ifasslu l-konkrit, strateġiji koerenti għall-involviment ta' gruppi Iżlamiċi. Madankollu, l-U.S. ġeneralment ma kienx lest li jiftaħ djalogu ma’ dawn il-movimenti. Bl-istess mod, L-impenn tal-UE mal-Iżlamisti kien l-eċċezzjoni, mhux ir-regola. Fejn jeżistu kuntatti ta’ livell baxx, huma prinċipalment iservu għal skopijiet ta' ġbir ta' informazzjoni, mhux għanijiet strateġiċi. L-U.S. u l-UE għandhom għadd ta’ programmi li jindirizzaw l-iżvilupp ekonomiku u politiku fir-reġjun – fosthom l-Inizjattiva ta’ Sħubija fil-Lvant Nofsani (MEPI), il-Korporazzjoni tal-Isfida tal-Millenju (MCC), l-Unjoni għall-Mediterran, u l-Politika Ewropea tal-Viċinat (ENP) – iżda ftit għandhom xi jgħidu dwar kif l-isfida tal-oppożizzjoni politika Iżlamista tidħol fi ħdan objettivi reġjonali usa'. L-Istati Uniti. u l-assistenza u l-ipprogrammar tad-demokrazija tal-UE huma diretti kważi kollha kemm lejn gvernijiet awtoritarji nfushom jew gruppi sekulari tas-soċjetà ċivili b’appoġġ minimu fis-soċjetajiet tagħhom stess..
Wasal iż-żmien għal valutazzjoni mill-ġdid tal-politiki attwali. Mill-attakki terroristiċi ta’ Settembru 11, 2001, l-appoġġ għad-demokrazija fil-Lvant Nofsani ħa importanza akbar għal dawk li jfasslu l-politika tal-Punent, li jaraw rabta bejn in-nuqqas ta’ demokrazija u l-vjolenza politika. Attenzjoni akbar ġiet iddedikata għall-fehim tal-varjazzjonijiet fi ħdan l-Islam politiku. L-amministrazzjoni l-ġdida Amerikana hija aktar miftuħa biex twessa’ l-komunikazzjoni mad-dinja Musulmana. Sadanittant, il-maġġoranza l-kbira tal-organizzazzjonijiet Islamisti mainstream – inkluż il-Fratellanza Musulmana fl-Eġittu, Front ta’ Azzjoni Iżlamika tal-Ġordan (IAF), Partit tal-Ġustizzja u l-Iżvilupp tal-Marokk (PJD), il-Moviment Kostituzzjonali Iżlamiku tal-Kuwajt, u l-Jemen Islah Party – għamlu dejjem aktar l-appoġġ għar-riforma politika u d-demokrazija komponent ċentrali fil-pjattaformi politiċi tagħhom. Barra minn hekk, ħafna wrew interess qawwi fil-ftuħ ta’ djalogu mal-U.S. u l-gvernijiet tal-UE.
Il-futur tar-relazzjonijiet bejn in-nazzjonijiet tal-Punent u l-Lvant Nofsani jista’ jkun iddeterminat fil-biċċa l-kbira mill-grad sa liema l-ewwel jimpenjaw partiti Iżlamiċi mhux vjolenti fi djalogu wiesa’ dwar interessi u għanijiet kondiviżi.. Kien hemm proliferazzjoni riċenti ta 'studji dwar l-involviment mal-Iżlamisti, iżda ftit jindirizzaw b'mod ċar x'jista' jinvolvi fil-prattika. Bħala Zoe Nautre, sħabi viżitatur fil-Kunsill Ġermaniż dwar ir-Relazzjonijiet Barranin, tpoġġiha, “l-UE qed taħseb dwar l-impenn iżda ma tafx verament kif.”1 Bit-tama li tiċċara d-diskussjoni, niddistingwu bejn tliet livelli ta’ “ingaġġ,” kull wieħed b’mezzi u għanijiet differenti: kuntatti ta’ livell baxx, djalogu strateġiku, u sħubija.

MOVIMENTI IŻLAMISTI U L-PROĊESS DEMOKRATIKU FID-DINJA Għarbija: Nesploraw iż-Żoni Griżi

Nathan J. Kannella, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

Matul l-aħħar għaxar snin, Il-movimenti Iżlamiċi stabbilixxew lilhom infushom bħala atturi politiċi ewlenin fil-Lvant Nofsani. Flimkien mal-gvernijiet, Movimenti Iżlamiċi, moderat kif ukoll radikali, se jiddetermina kif il-politika tar-reġjun tiżvolġi fil-futur prevedibbli. Urew il-ħila mhux biss li jfasslu messaġġi b'appell popolari mifrux iżda wkoll, u l-aktar importanti, biex jinħolqu organizzazzjonijiet b'bażijiet soċjali ġenwini u jiġu żviluppati strateġiji politiċi koerenti. Partijiet oħra,
b'mod ġenerali, fallew fuq il-kontijiet kollha.
Il-pubbliku e fil-Punent u, partikolarment, l-Istati Uniti, sar konxju biss tal-importanza tal-movimenti Iżlamiċi wara avvenimenti drammatiċi, bħar-rivoluzzjoni fl-Iran u l-qtil tal-President Anwar al-Sadat fl-Eġittu. L-attenzjoni kienet ferm aktar sostnuta mill-attakki terroristiċi ta’ Settembru 11, 2001. B'riżultat ta 'dan, Il-movimenti Iżlamiċi huma ġeneralment meqjusa bħala perikolużi u ostili. Filwaqt li tali karatterizzazzjoni hija preċiża fir-rigward tal-organizzazzjonijiet fl-aħħar radikali tal-ispettru Iżlamiku, li huma perikolużi minħabba r-rieda tagħhom li jirrikorru għal vjolenza indiskriminata biex isegwu l-għanijiet tagħhom, mhijiex karatterizzazzjoni preċiża tal-ħafna gruppi li rrinunzjaw jew evitaw il-vjolenza. Għax organizzazzjonijiet terroristiċi joħolqu immedjat
theddida, madankollu, dawk li jfasslu l-politika fil-pajjiżi kollha taw attenzjoni sproporzjonata lill-organizzazzjonijiet vjolenti.
Huwa l-organizzazzjonijiet Islamisti mainstream, mhux dawk radikali, li se jkollu l-akbar impatt fuq l-evoluzzjoni politika futura tal-Lvant Nofsani. L-għanijiet grandjużi tar-radikali li jerġgħu jistabbilixxu kalifat li jgħaqqad id-dinja Għarbija kollha, jew saħansitra li jiġu imposti fuq pajjiżi Għarab individwali liġijiet u drawwiet soċjali ispirati minn interpretazzjoni fundamentalista tal-Iżlam huma sempliċement 'il bogħod wisq mir-realtà tal-lum biex jiġu realizzati. Dan ma jfissirx li l-gruppi terroristiċi mhumiex perikolużi—jistgħu jikkawżaw telf kbir ta’ ħajjiet anke fl-insegwiment ta’ miri impossibbli—iżda li x’aktarx ma jbiddlux il-wiċċ tal-Lvant Nofsani.. L-organizzazzjonijiet Islamisti mainstream huma ġeneralment kwistjoni differenti. Diġà kellhom impatt qawwi fuq id-drawwiet soċjali f'ħafna pajjiżi, iwaqqaf u jreġġa’ lura x-xejriet sekularisti u jbiddel il-mod kif ħafna Għarab jilbsu u jġibu ruħhom. U l-għan politiku immedjat tagħhom, biex issir forza qawwija billi tipparteċipa fil-politika normali ta’ pajjiżhom, mhix waħda impossibbli. Diġà qed jiġi realizzat f'pajjiżi bħall-Marokk, Il-Ġordan, u anke l-Eġittu, li għadha tipprojbixxi l-organizzazzjonijiet politiċi Iżlamiċi kollha iżda issa għandha tmienja u tmenin Musulmani Brother fil-Parlament. Politika, mhux vjolenza, huwa dak li jagħti lill-Iżlamisti mainstream l-influwenza tagħhom.

Iżlam Politiku u Politika Barranija Ewropea

L-IŻLAM POLITIKU U L-POLITIKA EWROPEA TAL-Viċinat

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Peress li 2001 u l-avvenimenti internazzjonali li seħħew in-natura tar-relazzjoni bejn il-Punent u l-Iżlam politiku saret kwistjoni ta' definizzjoni għall-politika barranija. F'dawn l-aħħar snin sar ammont konsiderevoli ta' riċerka u analiżi dwar il-kwistjoni tal-Iżlam politiku. Dan għen biex jikkoreġi xi wħud mis-suppożizzjonijiet simplistiċi u allarmisti li qabel kienu miżmuma fil-Punent dwar in-natura tal-valuri u l-intenzjonijiet Iżlamiċi.. Parallel għal dan, l-Unjoni Ewropea (UE) żviluppat għadd ta’ inizjattivi ta’ politika primarjament il-Politika Ewropea tal-Viċinat(ENP) li fil-prinċipju jimpenjaw ruħhom għal djalogu u impenn aktar profond kollha(mhux vjolenti) atturi politiċi u organizzazzjonijiet tas-soċjetà ċivili fil-pajjiżi Għarab. Madankollu ħafna analisti u dawk li jfasslu l-politika issa jilmentaw minn ċertu trofew kemm fid-dibattitu kunċettwali kif ukoll fl-iżvilupp tal-politika. Ġie stabbilit li l-Iżlam politiku huwa pajsaġġ li qed jinbidel, affettwati ħafna minn firxa ta’ ċirkostanzi, imma d-dibattitu ta’ spiss jidher li żamm fuq il-kwistjoni simplistika ta’ ‘huma l-Iżlamisti demokratiċi?’ Ħafna analisti indipendenti madankollu kienu favur l-involviment mal-Iżlamisti, iżda l-avviċinament attwali bejn il-gvernijiet tal-Punent u l-organizzazzjonijiet Iżlamiċi għadu limitat .

DEĊIŻJONIJIET IŻLAMIĊI DWAR IL-GWERRA

Youssef H. Aboul-Enein
Sherifa zuhur

L-Istati Uniti bla dubju se tkun involuta fil-Lvant Nofsani għal bosta deċennji. Biex tkun ċert, is-soluzzjoni tat-tilwima Iżraeljana-Palestinjana jew it-tnaqqis tal-faqar jistgħu jgħinu biex jitrażżnu l-mewġ tar-radikaliżmu Iżlamiku u s-sentiment anti-Amerikan. Imma fuq livell ideoloġiku, irridu niffaċċjaw interpretazzjoni speċifika tal-liġi Iżlamika, l-istorja,u l-iskrittura li hija periklu kemm għall-Istati Uniti kif ukoll għall-alleati tagħha. Biex tirbaħ dik il-gwerra ideoloġika, irridu nifhmu s-sorsi kemm tar-radikaliżmu Iżlamiku kif ukoll tal-liberaliżmu. Irridu nifhmu aktar bir-reqqa l-modi li bihom il-militanti jinterpretaw ħażin u jippervertu l-Iskrittura Iżlamika. L-Al-Qaeda pproduċiet il-grupp tagħha ta’ kelliema li jippruvaw jipprovdu leġittimità reliġjuża lin-nihiliżmu li jippridkaw. Ħafna spiss jikkwotaw mill-Quran u l-hadith (il-kliem u l-għemil tal-Profeta Muhammad) b’mod preġudikat biex iġibu ġustifikazzjoni għall-kawża tagħhom. Logutenent Kmandant Youssef Aboul-Enein u Dr. Sherifa Zuhur tidħol fil-Koran u l-hadith biex tartikola mezz li bih il-militanza Iżlamika tista’ tiġi miġġielda ideoloġikament, jiġbdu ħafna mill-għarfien tagħhom minn dawn u testi Islamiċi klassiċi oħra. Meta tagħmel hekk, jesponu kontradizzjonijiet u approċċi alternattivi fil-prinċipji ewlenin li jħaddnu gruppi bħall-al-Qaeda. L-awturi sabu li l-użu xieraq tal-Iskrittura Iżlamika fil-fatt jiskredita t-tattiċi tal-al-Qaeda u organizzazzjonijiet ġiħadisti oħra. Din il-monografija tipprovdi bażi biex tħeġġeġ lill-alleati Musulmani tagħna biex jisfidaw it-teoloġija appoġġjata mill-militanti Iżlamiċi. Żerriegħa ta’ dubju mħawla fl-imħuħ tal-bombi suwiċida jistgħu jiddiswaduhom milli jwettqu l-missjonijiet tagħhom. L-Istitut tal-Istudji Strateġiċi bi pjaċir joffri dan l-istudju dwar id-deċiżjonijiet Iżlamiċi dwar il-gwerra lill-komunità tad-difiża nazzjonali bħala sforz biex jikkontribwixxi għad-dibattitu li għaddej dwar kif tegħleb il-militanza Iżlamika.

From Rebel Movement to Political Party

Alastair Crooke

The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. Barra minn hekk, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.

Arab Reform Bulletin

group of researchers


L-Eġittu: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?

Amr hamzawy


The Muslim Brotherhood’s draft party platform sends mixed signals about the movement’s political views

and positions. Although it has already been widely circulated, the document does not yet have final
approval from the movement’s guidance bureau.
The platform’s detailed treatment of political, social, and economic issues marks a significant departure
from previously less developed positions, articulated inter alia in a 2004 reform initiative and the 2005
electoral platform for Brotherhood parliamentary candidates. This shift addresses one of the most
important criticisms of the Brotherhood, namely its championing of vague ideological and religious

slogans and inability to come up with specific policy prescriptions.
The document raises troubling questions, madankollu, regarding the identity of a future Brotherhood

political party as well as the group’s position on several political and social issues. Released in the
context of an ongoing stand-off between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood, it reveals significant
ambiguities and perhaps regression in the movement’s thinking.
L-ewwel, the drafters chose not to address the future relationship between the party and the movement. Fil

doing so, they have deliberately ignored important ideas recently discussed within the movement,
especially among members of the parliamentary bloc. Inspired by the experiences of Islamist parties in
Il-Marokk, Il-Ġordan, and Yemen, these members advocate a functional separation between a party and
the movement, with the former focused mainly on political participation and the latter on religious
activism. In addition to its superficial treatment of the nature of the party and its internal organization, il
platform includes no clear statement on opening party membership to all Egyptians regardless of their
religion, one of the requirements for establishing a political party according to the Egyptian constitution.
It-tieni, the draft Brotherhood platform identifies implementation of sharia as one of the party’s main

goals. Although this is consistent with the group’s interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution
(“Islam is the religion of the state, and Islamic law is the main source of legislation”), it departs from the
pragmatic spirit of various Brotherhood statements and initiatives since 2004 in which less emphasis
was given to the sharia issue. The return to a focus on sharia in the platform has led to positions
fundamentally at odds with the civil nature of the state and full citizenship rights regardless of religious
affiliation.