RSSAll Entries in the "Libanas" Category

Arabų rytoj

DAVIDAS B. OTAVEJUS

Spalio mėn 6, 1981, turėjo būti švenčiama Egipte. Ji pažymėjo didžiausios Egipto pergalės trijuose arabų ir Izraelio konfliktuose metines, kai šalies nepalankioji armija veržėsi per Sueco kanalą atidarymo dienomis 1973 Jom Kipuro karas ir išsiuntė Izraelio karius besitraukiančius. Ant vėsaus, debesuotas rytas, Kairo stadionas buvo sausakimšas egiptiečių šeimų, atvykusių pažiūrėti kariškių. Ant apžvalgos stendo, Prezidentas Anwaras el-Sadatas,karo architektas, su pasitenkinimu stebėjo, kaip prieš jį demonstruoja vyrai ir mašinos. Aš buvau šalia, ką tik atvykęs užsienio korespondentas.Staiga, vienas iš armijos sunkvežimių sustojo tiesiai prieš apžvalgos stendą, kai šeši „Mirage“ reaktyviniai lėktuvai riaumoja virš galvos ir atliko akrobatinį pasirodymą., dangų nudažius ilgais raudonos spalvos takais, geltona, violetinė,ir žali dūmai. Sadatas atsistojo, matyt, ruošiasi keistis sveikinimais su dar vienu egiptiečių karių kontingentu. Jis tapo puikiu taikiniu keturiems islamistams, iššokusiems iš sunkvežimio, šturmavo podiumą, ir apipylė jo kūną kulkomis.Kai žudikai tęsė, atrodytų, amžinybę, apipurškę stovą mirtina ugnimi., Akimirksniu svarsčiau, ar atsitrenkti į žemę ir rizikuoti, kad panikuoti žiūrovai mane mirtinai sutryps, ar likti toliau ir rizikuoti paimti užklydusią kulką. Instinktas liepė man stovėti ant kojų, ir mano žurnalistinės pareigos jausmas paskatino mane eiti išsiaiškinti, ar Sadatas gyvas, ar miręs.

Challenging Authoritarianism, Kolonializmas, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida

Ahmedas Ali Salemas

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. In particular, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Todėl, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, bet
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). However, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. On the other hand, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Iš tikrųjų,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, į

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. However, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Brolija) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, however, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Sekuliarizmas, Hermeneutika, ir imperija: Islamo reformacijos politika

Saba Mahmood

Nuo rugsėjo įvykių 11, 2001, prieš

dviejų dešimtmečių pasaulinės religinės politikos pakilimo fone, skubus
raginimai atkurti sekuliarizmą pasiekė pusiausvyrą, kurios nepavyksta
būti ignoruojamas. Akivaizdžiausias šių griežtų skambučių taikinys yra islamas, ypač
tas islamo praktikas ir diskursus, kurie, kaip įtariama, skatina fundamentalizmą
ir karingumas. Tai tapo de rigueur tiek kairiesiems, tiek liberalams
susieti demokratijos likimą musulmoniškame pasaulyje su institucionalizacija

pasaulietiškumo - ir kaip politinės doktrinos, ir kaip politinės etikos. Šis sukabinimas
dabar plačiai aidi diskursas, kilęs iš JAV. Valstija
Departamentas, ypač savo programinėmis pastangomis pertvarkyti ir pertvarkyti
„Islamas iš vidaus“. Šioje esė, Panagrinėsiu abi konkrečias sampratas
pasaulietiškumo, kuris grindžia dabartinį sutarimą, kad islamas turi būti
reformuota - kad jos sekuliarizacija yra būtinas žingsnis įvedant „demokratiją“
musulmonų pasaulis - ir strateginės priemonės, kuriomis yra ši programinė vizija
įsteigiama šiandien. Nepaisant to, kad sekuliarizmas yra istoriškai besikeičianti kategorija
su marga genealogija, mano tikslas nėra užtikrinti autoritetingą
sekuliarizmą ar atsekti jo istorinę transformaciją JAV ar JAV
Musulmonų pasaulis. Mano tikslas čia yra ribotesnis: Noriu nubrėžti konkretų
pasaulietiškumo supratimas, kuriuo grindžiami šiuolaikiniai Amerikos diskursai
Islamas, supratimas, kurį giliai formuoja JAV. saugumas ir užsienio politika
musulmonų pasaulyje.

Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .

Islamic Political Culture, Demokratija, and Human Rights

Daniele. Kaina

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, however, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,

can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,

democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islamic Political Culture, Demokratija, and Human Rights

Daniele. Kaina

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, however, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islamistų opozicijos partijos ir ES įsitraukimo potencialas

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Atsižvelgiant į didėjančią islamistinių judėjimų svarbą musulmonų pasaulyje ir

radikalėjimas nuo amžių pradžios paveikė pasaulinius įvykius, tai

Svarbu, kad ES įvertintų savo politiką, susijusią su veikėjais, kurie gali būti laisvi

vadinamas „islamo pasauliu“. Ypač svarbu paklausti, ar ir kaip užsiimti

su įvairiomis islamistų grupuotėmis.

Tai tebėra prieštaringa net ES viduje. Kai kurie mano, kad islamas tai vertina

gulėti už islamistų partijų yra tiesiog nesuderinami su vakarietiškais demokratijos idealais ir

Žmonių teisės, o kiti mano, kad įsitraukimas yra reali būtinybė dėl augančio

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, ir

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

spręsti valdančius režimus, kurie yra autoritariniai, bet tai naujas reiškinys, kurį reikia spausti

demokratinėms reformoms tose valstybėse, kuriose naudos gali gauti labiausiai tikėtini asmenys, nuo

ES požiūriu, skirtingi ir kartais problemiški požiūriai į demokratiją ir ją

susijusios vertybės, mažumų ir moterų teisės bei teisinės valstybės principai. Šie mokesčiai yra

dažnai prieštarauja islamistiniams judėjimams, todėl Europos politikos formuotojams svarbu tai padaryti

turėti tikslų potencialių partnerių politikos ir filosofijos vaizdą.

Įvairių šalių patirtis rodo, kad kuo daugiau laisvės yra islamistų

vakarėliai leidžiami, tuo jie nuosaikesni savo veiksmuose ir idėjomis. Daugelyje

islamistų partijos ir grupės jau seniai nukrypo nuo savo pirminio tikslo

islamo valstybės, valdomos pagal islamo teisę, įkūrimo, ir atėjo priimti pagrindinius

demokratiniai rinkiminės konkurencijos dėl valdžios principai, kitų politinių egzistavimą

konkurentai, ir politinis pliuralizmas.

Political Islam in the Middle East

Ar Knudsenas

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, į

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

Islamist Parties : why they can’t be democratic

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, democracy, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

POLITINIO ISLAMO DALYVAVIMO STRATEGIJOS

SHADI HAMIDAS

AMANDA KADLEC

Politinis islamas šiandien yra vienintelė aktyviausia politinė jėga Artimuosiuose Rytuose. Jos ateitis glaudžiai susijusi su regiono ateitimi. Jeigu Jungtinės Valstijos ir Europos Sąjunga yra įsipareigojusios remti politines reformas regione, jiems reikės sugalvoti betoną, nuoseklios islamistų grupių įtraukimo strategijos. Dar, Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos. paprastai nenorėjo pradėti dialogo su šiais judėjimais. Panašiai, ES bendradarbiavimas su islamistais buvo išimtis, ne taisyklė. Kur yra žemo lygio kontaktai, jie daugiausia skirti informacijos rinkimo tikslams, ne strateginiai tikslai. Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos. ir ES turi daugybę programų, skirtų ekonominiam ir politiniam vystymuisi regione, įskaitant Artimųjų Rytų partnerystės iniciatyvą. (MEPI), Tūkstantmečio iššūkio korporacija (MKC), Viduržemio jūros šalių sąjunga, ir Europos kaimynystės politika (ENP) – tačiau jie turi mažai ką pasakyti apie tai, kaip islamistų politinės opozicijos iššūkis dera su platesnio pobūdžio regioniniais tikslais. JAV. ES parama demokratijai ir programavimas beveik vien yra nukreipti arba pačioms autoritarinėms vyriausybėms, arba pasaulietinėms pilietinės visuomenės grupėms, turinčioms minimalią paramą savo visuomenėse..
Atėjo laikas iš naujo įvertinti dabartinę politiką. Nuo rugsėjo mėnesio teroristinių išpuolių 11, 2001, Artimųjų Rytų demokratijos rėmimas Vakarų politikos formuotojams tapo svarbesnis, kurie mato ryšį tarp demokratijos stokos ir politinio smurto. Didesnis dėmesys buvo skirtas politinio islamo skirtumų supratimui. Naujoji Amerikos administracija yra atviresnė bendravimui su musulmonų pasauliu. Tuo tarpu, didžioji dauguma pagrindinių islamistų organizacijų, įskaitant Musulmonų broliją Egipte, Jordanijos islamo veiksmų frontas (IAF), Maroko teisingumo ir plėtros partija (PJD), Kuveito islamo konstitucinis judėjimas, ir Jemeno Islah partija – vis dažniau rėmimą politinėms reformoms ir demokratijai padarė pagrindiniu savo politinių platformų komponentu.. Papildomai, daugelis parodė didelį susidomėjimą pradėti dialogą su JAV. ir ES vyriausybės.
Vakarų šalių ir Artimųjų Rytų santykių ateitį gali daugiausia nulemti tai, kiek pirmosios šalys įtrauks nesmurtines islamistų partijas į platų dialogą apie bendrus interesus ir tikslus.. Pastaruoju metu padaugėjo tyrimų apie bendradarbiavimą su islamistais, tačiau nedaugelis aiškiai nurodo, ką tai gali reikšti praktiškai. Kaip Zoe Nautre, kviestinis bendradarbis Vokietijos užsienio santykių taryboje, įdeda, „ES galvoja apie dalyvavimą, bet iš tikrųjų nežino, kaip tai padaryti“.1 Tikėdamasi paaiškinti diskusiją, skiriame tris „įsitraukimo“ lygius,“ kiekvienas su įvairiomis priemonėmis ir tikslais: žemo lygio kontaktai, strateginis dialogas, ir partnerystę.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Natanas Dž. Ruda, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, however, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordanija, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politika, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE

Youssefas H. Abulas-Eneinas
Sherifa zuhur

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.

From Rebel Movement to Political Party

Alastairas Crooke'as

The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement („Hamas“). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. Papildomai, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.

Arab Reform Bulletin

group of researchers


Egiptas: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?

Amr hamzawy


The Muslim Brotherhood’s draft party platform sends mixed signals about the movement’s political views

and positions. Although it has already been widely circulated, the document does not yet have final
approval from the movement’s guidance bureau.
The platform’s detailed treatment of political, social, and economic issues marks a significant departure
from previously less developed positions, articulated inter alia in a 2004 reform initiative and the 2005
electoral platform for Brotherhood parliamentary candidates. This shift addresses one of the most
important criticisms of the Brotherhood, namely its championing of vague ideological and religious

slogans and inability to come up with specific policy prescriptions.
The document raises troubling questions, however, regarding the identity of a future Brotherhood

political party as well as the group’s position on several political and social issues. Released in the
context of an ongoing stand-off between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood, it reveals significant
ambiguities and perhaps regression in the movement’s thinking.
First, the drafters chose not to address the future relationship between the party and the movement. Į

doing so, they have deliberately ignored important ideas recently discussed within the movement,
especially among members of the parliamentary bloc. Inspired by the experiences of Islamist parties in
Marokas, Jordanija, and Yemen, these members advocate a functional separation between a party and
the movement, with the former focused mainly on political participation and the latter on religious
activism. In addition to its superficial treatment of the nature of the party and its internal organization, į
platform includes no clear statement on opening party membership to all Egyptians regardless of their
religion, one of the requirements for establishing a political party according to the Egyptian constitution.
Second, the draft Brotherhood platform identifies implementation of sharia as one of the party’s main

goals. Although this is consistent with the group’s interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution
(“Islam is the religion of the state, and Islamic law is the main source of legislation”), it departs from the
pragmatic spirit of various Brotherhood statements and initiatives since 2004 in which less emphasis
was given to the sharia issue. The return to a focus on sharia in the platform has led to positions
fundamentally at odds with the civil nature of the state and full citizenship rights regardless of religious
affiliation.