RSS모든 항목 "레바논" 범주

아랍의 내일

데이비드 B. 오타웨이

십월 6, 1981, 이집트에서 축하의 날이 될 예정이었습니다.. 세 번의 아랍-이스라엘 분쟁에서 이집트가 승리한 가장 위대한 순간의 기념일이었습니다., 국가의 약자 군대가 개항일에 수에즈 운하를 가로질러 진격했을 때 1973 욤 키푸르 전쟁과 이스라엘 군대가 후퇴하도록 보냈습니다.. 멋진, 구름 없는 아침, 카이로 경기장은 군대가 철물을 뽐내고 있는 모습을 보기 위해 온 이집트 가족들로 가득 찼습니다., 안와르 엘 사다트 대통령,전쟁의 건축가, 사람과 기계가 그의 앞에서 행진하는 것을 만족스럽게 지켜보았다.. 나는 근처에 있었다, 새로 도착한 외신기자.갑자기, 6대의 미라지 제트기가 곡예 공연을 펼치며 머리 위에서 포효하는 동안 군용 트럭 중 하나가 심사대 바로 앞에서 멈췄다., 긴 붉은 궤적으로 하늘을 그리다, 노란색, 자주색,그리고 녹색 연기. 사다트가 일어섰다, 또 다른 이집트 군대와 경례를 교환할 준비를 하고 있는 것 같다.. 그는 트럭에서 뛰어내린 4명의 이슬람 암살자들의 완벽한 표적이 되었습니다., 연단을 습격했다, 그리고 그의 몸을 총알로 뒤덮었습니다. 살인자들은 그들의 치명적인 불을 스탠드에 뿌리기 위해 영원할 것 같았습니다., 나는 순간적으로 땅에 부딪혀 패닉에 빠진 관중들에게 짓밟혀 죽을지, 아니면 발을 헛디디며 길 잃은 총알을 맞을지 고민했다.. 본능은 내 발에 머물라고 말했다, 저널리스트로서의 의무감으로 인해 사다트가 살았는지 죽었는지 알아보러 가야 했습니다..

권위주의에 도전, 식민주의, 그리고 분열: 알-아프가니와 리다의 이슬람 정치 개혁 운동

아흐메드 알리 살렘

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. 특히, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
그러므로, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, 하지만
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). 하나, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. 반면에, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. 물론,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, 그만큼

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. 하나, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




이집트 무슬림 형제단의 조직적 연속성

테스 리 아이젠 하트

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (형제간) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, 하지만, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
정권: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

세속주의, 해석학, 그리고 제국: 이슬람 개혁의 정치

Saba Mahmood

Since the events of September 11, 2001, against the

backdrop of two decades of the ascendance of global religious politics, urgent
calls for the reinstatement of secularism have reached a crescendo that cannot
be ignored. The most obvious target of these strident calls is Islam, 특별히
those practices and discourses within Islam that are suspected of fostering fundamentalism
and militancy. It has become de rigueur for leftists and liberals alike
to link the fate of democracy in the Muslim world with the institutionalization

of secularism — both as a political doctrine and as a political ethic. This coupling
is now broadly echoed within the discourse emanating from the U.S. State
Department, particularly in its programmatic efforts to reshape and transform
“Islam from within.” In this essay, I will examine both the particular conception
of secularism that underlies the current consensus that Islam needs to be
reformed — that its secularization is a necessary step in bringing “democracy” to
the Muslim world — and the strategic means by which this programmatic vision is
being instituted today. Insomuch as secularism is a historically shifting category
with a variegated genealogy, my aim is not to secure an authoritative definition of
secularism or to trace its historical transformation within the United States or the
무슬림 세계. My goal here is more limited: I want to sketch out the particular
understanding of secularism underlying contemporary American discourses on
이슬람교, an understanding that is deeply shaped by U.S. security and foreign policy
concerns in the Muslim world.

헤즈볼라의 정치 선언문 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .

이슬람 정치 문화, 민주주의, 및 인권

다니엘. 가격

이슬람이 권위주의를 조장한다는 주장이 있다., contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. 따라서, 학자, 해설자, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. 이 보기, 하지만, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, 이슬람 정치 이론, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, 다른 요인을 고려하지 않는 것. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, 다른 종교와 마찬가지로,

다양한 정치 시스템과 정책을 지원하는 데 사용할 수 있습니다.. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. 따라서, 연구에 대한 새로운 접근

이슬람과 정치의 연결이 필요하다.
나는 제안한다, 이슬람과의 관계에 대한 엄격한 평가를 통해,

민주주의, 그리고 국가적 차원의 인권, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, 경제적 영향, 인종 분열,

사회 발전, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

이슬람 정치 문화, 민주주의, 및 인권

다니엘. 가격

이슬람이 권위주의를 조장한다는 주장이 있다., contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. 따라서, 학자, 해설자, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. 이 보기, 하지만, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, 이슬람 정치 이론, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, 다른 요인을 고려하지 않는 것. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, 다른 종교와 마찬가지로,
다양한 정치 시스템과 정책을 지원하는 데 사용할 수 있습니다.. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. 따라서, 연구에 대한 새로운 접근
이슬람과 정치의 연결이 필요하다.
나는 제안한다, 이슬람과의 관계에 대한 엄격한 평가를 통해,
민주주의, 그리고 국가적 차원의 인권, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, 경제적 영향, 인종 분열,

사회 발전, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

이슬람 야당과 EU 참여 가능성

토비 아처

하이디 후우타 넨

이슬람 세계에서 이슬람주의 운동의 중요성이 증가함에 따라

급진화가 세기의 전환 이후 세계적 사건에 영향을 미친 방식, 그것

EU가 느슨하게 허용되는 범위 내에서 행위자에 대한 정책을 평가하는 것이 중요합니다.

'이슬람 세계'라 불리는. 참여 여부와 방법을 묻는 것이 특히 중요합니다.

다양한 이슬람 단체들과.

이는 EU 내에서도 여전히 논란의 여지가 있습니다.. 어떤 사람들은 이슬람이

이슬람 정당의 배후는 서구의 민주주의 이상과 양립할 수 없다.

인권, 다른 사람들은 성장으로 인해 참여를 현실적인 필요성으로 보고 있습니다.

이슬람 정당의 국내적 중요성과 국제사회에 대한 그들의 증가하는 참여

사무. 또 다른 관점은 이슬람 세계의 민주화가 증가할 것이라는 것이다.

유럽 ​​보안. 여부와 방법에 대한 이들 및 기타 주장의 타당성

EU가 참여해야 하는 것은 다양한 이슬람주의 운동과

그들의 정치적 상황, 나라별.

민주화는 EU의 공동 외교 정책의 핵심 주제입니다., 누워서

기사에서 11 유럽 ​​연합 조약의. 이 문서에서 고려되는 많은 주

보고는 민주적이지 않다, 완전히 민주적이지 않거나. 대부분의 국가에서, 이슬람주의자

정당과 운동은 지배적인 체제에 대한 상당한 반대를 구성한다., 과

일부에서는 가장 큰 야당 블록을 형성합니다.. 유럽 ​​민주주의 국가들은 오랫동안

권위주의적인 통치 체제를 다루다, 그러나 그것을 누르는 것은 새로운 현상입니다.

가장 가능성 있는 수혜자가 있을 수 있는 주에서 민주적 개혁을 위해, ~로부터

EU의 관점, 민주주의와 민주주의에 대한 다양하고 때로는 문제가 되는 접근 방식

관련 가치, 소수자와 여성의 권리, 법치와 같은. 이러한 요금은

종종 이슬람 운동에 반대, 따라서 유럽의 정책 입안자들이

잠재적 파트너의 정책과 철학에 대한 정확한 이해.

다른 나라의 경험은 이슬람이 더 자유로워진다는 것을 암시하는 경향이 있습니다.

파티 허용, 그들의 행동과 생각이 온건할수록. 많은 곳에서

이슬람 정당과 단체가 원래의 목적에서 벗어난 지 오래입니다.

이슬람 법에 의해 통치되는 이슬람 국가를 수립하는 것, 그리고 기본을 받아들이게 되었습니다.

권력을 위한 선거 경쟁의 민주주의 원칙, 다른 정치적 존재

경쟁자, 그리고 정치적 다원주의.

중동의 정치적 이슬람

Are Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, 안에

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. 그럼에도 불구하고, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

이슬람 정당 : 그들이 민주적이지 못한 이유

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, 민주주의, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

정치적 이슬람 참여를 위한 전략

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. 비슷하게, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. 우리. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. 게다가, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

아랍 세계의 이슬람 운동과 민주주의 과정: 회색 영역 탐색

나단 J. 갈색, Amr Hamzawy,

마리나 오타 웨이

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, 이슬람 운동, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, 하지만, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, 요르단, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. 정치, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

정치적 이슬람과 유럽 외교

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

전쟁에 대한 이슬람의 판결

유세프 H. Aboul-Enein
셰리 파 주 후르

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. 그리고 그의 느낌, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.

반란운동에서 정당으로

알라 스테 어 크룩

The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (하마스). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. 게다가, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.

아랍 개혁 회보

group of researchers


이집트: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?

Amr hamzawy


The Muslim Brotherhood’s draft party platform sends mixed signals about the movement’s political views

and positions. Although it has already been widely circulated, the document does not yet have final
approval from the movement’s guidance bureau.
The platform’s detailed treatment of political, social, and economic issues marks a significant departure
from previously less developed positions, articulated inter alia in a 2004 reform initiative and the 2005
electoral platform for Brotherhood parliamentary candidates. This shift addresses one of the most
important criticisms of the Brotherhood, namely its championing of vague ideological and religious

slogans and inability to come up with specific policy prescriptions.
The document raises troubling questions, 하지만, regarding the identity of a future Brotherhood

political party as well as the group’s position on several political and social issues. Released in the
context of an ongoing stand-off between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood, it reveals significant
ambiguities and perhaps regression in the movement’s thinking.
먼저, the drafters chose not to address the future relationship between the party and the movement. ~ 안에

doing so, they have deliberately ignored important ideas recently discussed within the movement,
especially among members of the parliamentary bloc. Inspired by the experiences of Islamist parties in
모로코, 요르단, and Yemen, these members advocate a functional separation between a party and
the movement, with the former focused mainly on political participation and the latter on religious
activism. In addition to its superficial treatment of the nature of the party and its internal organization, 그만큼
platform includes no clear statement on opening party membership to all Egyptians regardless of their
religion, one of the requirements for establishing a political party according to the Egyptian constitution.
둘째, the draft Brotherhood platform identifies implementation of sharia as one of the party’s main

goals. Although this is consistent with the group’s interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution
(“Islam is the religion of the state, and Islamic law is the main source of legislation”), it departs from the
pragmatic spirit of various Brotherhood statements and initiatives since 2004 in which less emphasis
was given to the sharia issue. The return to a focus on sharia in the platform has led to positions
fundamentally at odds with the civil nature of the state and full citizenship rights regardless of religious
affiliation.