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Il Domani arabo

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

ottobre 6, 1981, doveva essere un giorno di festa in Egitto. Ha segnato l'anniversario del più grande momento di vittoria dell'Egitto in tre conflitti arabo-israeliani, quando l'esercito sfavorito del paese attraversò il Canale di Suez nei giorni di apertura del 1973 Yom Kippur War e ha inviato le truppe israeliane in ritirata. Su un fresco, mattina senza nuvole, lo stadio del Cairo era gremito di famiglie egiziane venute a vedere i militari che si pavoneggiavano sul suo hardware, Presidente Anwar el-Sadat,l'architetto della guerra, osservava con soddisfazione gli uomini e le macchine che sfilavano davanti a lui. Ero nelle vicinanze, un corrispondente estero appena arrivato, uno dei camion dell'esercito si fermò proprio davanti al banco di prova proprio mentre sei jet Mirage ruggivano in alto in un'esibizione acrobatica, dipingendo il cielo con lunghe scie di rosso, giallo, viola,e fumo verde. Sadat si alzò, apparentemente si preparava a scambiare saluti con un altro contingente di truppe egiziane. Si è reso un bersaglio perfetto per quattro assassini islamisti che sono saltati dal camion, ha preso d'assalto il podio, e crivellò il suo corpo di proiettili, mentre gli assassini continuavano per quella che sembrava un'eternità a spruzzare il supporto con il loro fuoco mortale, Ho considerato per un istante se toccare il suolo e rischiare di essere calpestato a morte da spettatori in preda al panico o restare a piedi e rischiare di prendere un proiettile vagante. L'istinto mi ha detto di restare in piedi, e il mio senso del dovere giornalistico mi spinse a scoprire se Sadat fosse vivo o morto.

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| Settembre 26, 2010 | Commenti 0

Challenging Authoritarianism, Colonialismo, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first

quarter of the twentieth century. In particolare, the Ottoman Empire’s

power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.

But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and

sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.

Therefore, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called

for political reform even before the European encroachment upon

Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, ma

also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). Tuttavia, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. D'altro canto, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Infatti,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, il

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Tuttavia, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, quale

emphasized education and undermined politics.

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| Settembre 02, 2010 | Commenti 0

Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Fratelli Musulmani, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular

regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social

welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Ikhwan) has thrived in a

parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with

ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, però, the Brotherhood has

dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in

the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest

oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly

1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder

for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian

regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the

Arab world?

This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past

decade.

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| Settembre 01, 2010 | Commenti 0

Laicità, Ermeneutica, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation

Saba Mahmood

Since the events of September 11, 2001, against the

backdrop of two decades of the ascendance of global religious politics, urgent

calls for the reinstatement of secularism have reached a crescendo that cannot

be ignored. The most obvious target of these strident calls is Islam, in particolar modo

those practices and discourses within Islam that are suspected of fostering fundamentalism

and militancy. It has become de rigueur for leftists and liberals alike

to link the fate of democracy in the Muslim world with the institutionalization

of secularism — both as a political doctrine and as a political ethic. This coupling

is now broadly echoed within the discourse emanating from the U.S. State

Department, particularly in its programmatic efforts to reshape and transform

“Islam from within.” In this essay, I will examine both the particular conception

of secularism that underlies the current consensus that Islam needs to be

reformed — that its secularization is a necessary step in bringing “democracy” to

the Muslim world — and the strategic means by which this programmatic vision is

being instituted today. Insomuch as secularism is a historically shifting category

with a variegated genealogy, my aim is not to secure an authoritative definition of

secularism or to trace its historical transformation within the United States or the

Muslim world. My goal here is more limited: I want to sketch out the particular

understanding of secularism underlying contemporary American discourses on

Islam, an understanding that is deeply shaped by U.S. security and foreign policy

concerns in the Muslim world.

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| Ago 27, 2010 | Commenti 0

Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.

The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become a “western expanding strategy” that turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,

national, economic as well as social theft .

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| Ago 27, 2010 | Commenti 0

Islamic Political Culture, Democrazia, and Human Rights

Daniel E. Prezzo

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, però, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,

can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.

I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,

democrazia, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

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| Ago 24, 2010 | Commenti 0

Islamic Political Culture, Democrazia, and Human Rights

Daniel E. Prezzo

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, però, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,

can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.

I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,

democrazia, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

ZD Scribd iPaper

| Ago 22, 2010 | Commenti 0

I partiti islamisti di opposizione e il potenziale di coinvolgimento dell'UE

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Alla luce della crescente importanza dei movimenti islamisti nel mondo musulmano e

il modo in cui la radicalizzazione ha influenzato gli eventi globali dall'inizio del secolo, esso

è importante che l'UE valuti le sue politiche nei confronti degli attori all'interno di ciò che può essere vagamente

chiamato il "mondo islamico". È particolarmente importante chiedersi se e come impegnarsi

con i vari gruppi islamisti.

Questo rimane controverso anche all'interno dell'UE. Alcuni ritengono che l'Islam apprezzi questo

mentire dietro i partiti islamisti sono semplicemente incompatibili con gli ideali occidentali di democrazia e

diritti umani, mentre altri vedono l'impegno come una necessità realistica a causa della crescita

importanza interna dei partiti islamisti e il loro crescente coinvolgimento in ambito internazionale

affari. Un'altra prospettiva è che la democratizzazione nel mondo musulmano aumenterebbe

sicurezza europea. La validità di questi e altri argomenti sul se e come il

L'impegno dell'UE può essere messo alla prova solo studiando i diversi movimenti islamisti e

loro circostanze politiche, paese per paese.

La democratizzazione è un tema centrale delle azioni di politica estera comune dell'UE, come previsto

fuori nell'art 11 del Trattato sull'Unione Europea. Molti degli stati considerati in questo

rapporto non sono democratici, o non del tutto democratico. Nella maggior parte di questi paesi, islamista

partiti e movimenti costituiscono un'opposizione significativa ai regimi prevalenti, e

in alcuni formano il più grande blocco di opposizione. Le democrazie europee hanno dovuto farlo da tempo

affrontare regimi di governo che sono autoritari, ma è un fenomeno nuovo da premere

per la riforma democratica negli stati in cui potrebbero averne i beneficiari più probabili, dal

Il punto di vista dell'UE, approcci diversi e talvolta problematici alla democrazia e alla sua

valori correlati, come i diritti delle minoranze e delle donne e lo stato di diritto. Queste accuse sono

spesso contro i movimenti islamisti, quindi è importante che i responsabili politici europei lo facciano

avere un quadro accurato delle politiche e delle filosofie dei potenziali partner.

Esperienze provenienti da diversi paesi tende a suggerire che la maggiore libertà islamista

sono ammesse feste, più sono moderati nelle loro azioni e idee. In molti

casi I partiti ei gruppi islamisti si sono da tempo allontanati dal loro scopo originario

di stabilire uno Stato islamico governato dalla legge islamica, e sono arrivato ad accettare di base

principi democratici della competizione elettorale per il potere, l'esistenza di altri politici

concorrenti, e pluralismo politico.

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| Ago 21, 2010 | Commenti 0

Political Islam in the Middle East

Se Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, nel

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

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| Ago 20, 2010 | Commenti 0

Islamist Parties : why they can’t be democratic

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, democrazia, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

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| Ago 20, 2010 | Commenti 0

STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA Kadlec

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Allo stesso modo, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. Stati Uniti. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.

The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (Pjd), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.

The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

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| Ago 19, 2010 | Commenti 0

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. Marrone, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Movimenti islamisti, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,

by and large, have failed on all accounts.

Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate

threat, però, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.

It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Giordania, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politica, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

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| Ago 18, 2010 | Commenti 0

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

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| Ago 17, 2010 | Commenti 0

ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE

H Youssef. Aboul-Enein

Sherifa Zuhur

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.

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| Ago 13, 2010 | Commenti 0

From Rebel Movement to Political Party

Alastair Crooke

The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. In addition, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.

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| Ago 02, 2010 | Commenti 0

Arab Reform Bulletin

group of researchers

Egitto: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?

Amr hamzawy

The Muslim Brotherhood’s draft party platform sends mixed signals about the movement’s political views

and positions. Although it has already been widely circulated, the document does not yet have final

approval from the movement’s guidance bureau.

The platform’s detailed treatment of political, social, and economic issues marks a significant departure

from previously less developed positions, articulated inter alia in a 2004 reform initiative and the 2005

electoral platform for Brotherhood parliamentary candidates. This shift addresses one of the most

important criticisms of the Brotherhood, namely its championing of vague ideological and religious

slogans and inability to come up with specific policy prescriptions.

The document raises troubling questions, però, regarding the identity of a future Brotherhood

political party as well as the group’s position on several political and social issues. Released in the

context of an ongoing stand-off between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood, it reveals significant

ambiguities and perhaps regression in the movement’s thinking.

First, the drafters chose not to address the future relationship between the party and the movement. In

doing so, they have deliberately ignored important ideas recently discussed within the movement,

especially among members of the parliamentary bloc. Inspired by the experiences of Islamist parties in

Marocco, Giordania, and Yemen, these members advocate a functional separation between a party and

the movement, with the former focused mainly on political participation and the latter on religious

activism. In addition to its superficial treatment of the nature of the party and its internal organization, il

platform includes no clear statement on opening party membership to all Egyptians regardless of their

religion, one of the requirements for establishing a political party according to the Egyptian constitution.

Second, the draft Brotherhood platform identifies implementation of sharia as one of the party’s main

goals. Although this is consistent with the group’s interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution

(“Islam is the religion of the state, and Islamic law is the main source of legislation”), it departs from the

pragmatic spirit of various Brotherhood statements and initiatives since 2004 in which less emphasis

was given to the sharia issue. The return to a focus on sharia in the platform has led to positions

fundamentally at odds with the civil nature of the state and full citizenship rights regardless of religious

affiliation.

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| Ago 01, 2010 | Commenti 0