All Entries in the "Liban" Category
Arab demen an
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
Oktòb 6, 1981, te vle di yo dwe yon jou selebrasyon nan peyi Lejip. Li te make anivèsè pi gwo moman viktwa peyi Lejip la nan twa konfli Arab-Izrayèl, lè lame moun ki pa gen anyen nan peyi a t'ap travèse Kanal Suez la nan premye jou yo 1973 Yom Kippur Lagè ak voye twoup Izrayelyen yo anroule nan retrè. Sou yon fre, maten san nyaj, estad Cairo a te chaje ak fanmi moun peyi Lejip yo ki te vin wè militè a strut pyès ki nan konpitè li yo.Sou kanpe revizyon an., Prezidan Anwar el-Sadat,achitèk lagè a, te gade ak satisfaksyon kòm moun ak machin parad devan l '. Mwen te tou pre, yon korespondan etranje ki fèk rive.Switdenly, one of the army trucks halted directly in front of the reviewing stand just as six Mirage jets roared overhead in an acrobatic performance, painting the sky with long trails of red, yellow, purple,and green smoke. Sadat stood up, apparently preparing to exchange salutes with yet another contingent of Egyptian troops. He made himself a perfect target for four Islamist assassins who jumped from the truck, stormed the podium, and riddled his body with bullets.As the killers continued for what seemed an eternity to spray the stand with their deadly fire, I considered for an instant whether to hit the ground and risk being trampled to death by panicked spectators or remain afoot and risk taking a stray bullet. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.
Challenging Authoritarianism, Kolonyalis, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida
Ahmed Ali Salem
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Lwa Islamik). Sepandan, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,
they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic
sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s
teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)
unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Nan lòt men an, they realized the
need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Vreman vre,
their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the
following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led
caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing
a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity
and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating
a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the
Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. Sepandan, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which
emphasized education and undermined politics.
Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
Tess Lee Eisenhart
Sekularite, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation
Saba Mahmood
Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009
Kilti politik Islamik, Demokrasi, ak Dwa Moun
Daniele. Pri
Kilti politik Islamik, Demokrasi, ak Dwa Moun
Daniele. Pri
Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Political Islam in the Middle East
Èske Knudsen
Pati Islamis yo : why they can’t be democratic
Bassam Tibi
ESTRATEJI POU ANGAJE ISLAM POLITIK
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA KADLEC
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones
Natan J.. Brown, Amr Hamzawy,
Marina Ottaway
Islam politik ak politik etranjè Ewopeyen an
ISLAM POLITIK AK POLITIK PWOZINAT Ewopeyen an
MICHAEL EMERSON
RICHARD YOUNGS
Depi 2001 ak evènman entènasyonal yo ki te swiv nati a nan relasyon ki genyen ant Lwès la ak Islam politik te vin tounen yon pwoblèm defini pou politik etranjè.. Nan dènye ane yo, yon kantite lajan konsiderab nan rechèch ak analiz yo te eskize sou pwoblèm nan nan Islam politik. Sa a te ede korije kèk nan sipozisyon senplist ak alarmis yo te deja te fèt nan Lwès la sou nati valè ak entansyon Islamis yo.. Paralèl ak sa a, Inyon Ewopeyen an (Inyon Ewopeyen) te devlope yon kantite inisyativ politik prensipalman politik Ewopeyen an katye(ENP) ki nan prensip angaje nan dyalòg ak pi fon angajman tout(ki pa vyolan) aktè politik ak òganizasyon sosyete sivil nan peyi Arab yo. Men, anpil analis ak mizisyen politik kounye a plenyen de yon sèten trofe nan tou de deba konseptyèl ak devlopman politik. Li te etabli ke Islam politik se yon peyizaj k ap chanje, pwofondman afekte pa yon seri sikonstans, men deba souvan sanble yo te kole sou kesyon an senplist nan 'Èske Islamis yo demokratik?' Anpil analis endepandan te defann angajman ak islamis yo, men rapwòchman aktyèl ant gouvènman Lwès yo ak òganizasyon islamis yo rete limite .
ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE
The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.
From Rebel Movement to Political Party
Alastair Crooke
The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Epitou, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. An plis, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.
Arab Reform Bulletin
group of researchers
Peyi Lejip: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?
Amr hamzawy