Todas as entradas no "Líbano" Categoría

O mañá árabe

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Outubro 6, 1981, estaba destinado a ser un día de celebración en Exipto. Foi o aniversario do maior momento de vitoria de Exipto en tres conflitos árabe-israelís, cando o exército desfavorecido do país atravesou a canle de Suez nos primeiros días do 1973 Guerra de Yom Kippur e enviou as tropas israelís en retirada. Ao fresco, mañá sen nubes, o estadio do Cairo estaba ateigado de familias exipcias que viñeron a ver como os militares pavoneaban o seu hardware., O presidente Anwar el-Sadat,arquitecto da guerra, observaba con satisfacción como homes e máquinas desfilaban diante del. Estaba preto, un correspondente estranxeiro recén chegado.De súpeto, un dos camións do exército detívose directamente diante do posto de revisión xusto cando seis avións Mirage rugían sobre a cabeza nunha actuación acrobática., pintando o ceo con longas estelas de vermello, amarelo, roxo,e fume verde. Sadat levantouse, aparentemente preparándose para intercambiar saúdos con outro continxente de tropas exipcias. Fíxose un branco perfecto para catro asasinos islamitas que saltaron do camión, asaltou o podio, e acribillaron o seu corpo de balas. Mentres os asasinos continuaron durante o que parecía unha eternidade rociando o posto co seu lume mortal., Penseime por un instante se chocar contra o chan e correr o risco de ser pisoteado por espectadores aterrorizados ou permanecer a pé e arriscarse a recibir unha bala perdida.. O instinto díxome que me quedara de pé, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

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| setembro 26, 2010 | comentarios 0

Desafiando o autoritarismo, colonialismo, e Desunión: Os movementos de reforma política islámica de al-Afghani e Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

O declive do mundo musulmán precedeu á colonización europea da maioría

Terras musulmás no último cuarto do século XIX e no primeiro

cuarto do século XX. En particular, do Imperio Otomán

o poder e o status mundial foron deteriorando dende o século XVII.

Pero, máis importante para os eruditos musulmáns, deixara de reunirse

algúns requisitos básicos da súa posición como califato, o supremo e

entidade política soberana á que todos os musulmáns deberían ser leais.

Polo tanto, algúns dos eruditos e intelectuais musulmáns do imperio chamaron

para a reforma política mesmo antes da invasión europea

Terras musulmás. As reformas que contemplaban non eran só islámicas, pero

tamén otomán – dende o marco otomán.

Estes reformadores percibiron o declive do mundo musulmán en xeral,

e do Imperio Otomán en particular, ser o resultado dun aumento

desconsiderar a aplicación da Sharia (Dereito islámico). con todo, dende o

finais do século XVIII, un número crecente de reformadores, ás veces apoiado

polos sultáns otománs, comezou a pedir a reforma do imperio

liñas europeas modernas. O fracaso do imperio para defender as súas terras e para

responder con éxito aos desafíos de Occidente só alimentou aínda máis esta convocatoria

para "modernizar" a reforma, que alcanzou o seu apoxeo no movemento Tanzimat

na segunda metade do século XIX.

Outros reformadores musulmáns pediron un curso medio. Por un lado,

admitían que o califato debía modelarse segundo o islámico

fontes de orientación, especialmente o Corán e o do profeta Mahoma

ensinanzas (Sunnah), e que a ummah (a comunidade musulmá mundial)

a unidade é un dos piares políticos do Islam. Por outra banda, déronse conta do

necesidade de rexuvenecer o imperio ou substituílo por outro máis viable. Por suposto,

incluídas as súas ideas creativas sobre modelos futuros, pero non se limitaron a, o

seguindo: substituíndo o Imperio Otomán liderado polos turcos por un liderado polos árabes

califato, construír un califato musulmán federal ou confederado, establecendo

unha mancomunidade de nacións musulmás ou orientais, e reforzar a solidariedade

e cooperación entre países musulmáns independentes sen crear

unha estrutura fixa. Estas e ideas similares foron máis tarde referidas como o

Modelo de liga musulmá, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. con todo, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, que

emphasized education and undermined politics.

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| setembro 02, 2010 | comentarios 0

Continuidade organizativa nos Irmáns Musulmáns de Exipto

Tess Lee Eisenhart

Como o movemento de oposición máis antigo e destacado de Exipto, a Sociedade de

Irmáns musulmáns, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, supuxo durante moito tempo un desafío aos sucesivos seculares

réximes ao ofrecer unha visión integral dun Estado islámico e unha ampla visión social

servizos asistenciais. Dende a súa fundación en 1928, a Irmandade (irmán) prosperou nun

sector relixioso e dos servizos sociais paralelos, en xeral evitando a confrontación directa con

réximes gobernantes.1 Máis recentemente durante as dúas últimas décadas, con todo, a Irmandade ten

incursionado co partidismo no ámbito político formal. Este experimento culminou

a elección dos oitenta e oito Irmáns á Asemblea Popular en 2005, a maior

bloque de oposición na historia moderna exipcia—e as detencións posteriores de case

1,000 Irmáns.2 O avance electoral na política dominante proporciona forraxe abundante

para que os estudiosos poñan a proba teorías e fagan predicións sobre o futuro do exipcio

réxime: recaerá na oposición islamita ou seguirá sendo un faro de laicismo no

mundo árabe?

Esta tese evita facer especulacións tan amplas. Pola contra, explora

a medida en que os Irmáns Musulmáns se adaptaron como organización no pasado

década.

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| setembro 01, 2010 | comentarios 0

secularismo, hermenéutica, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation

Saba Mahmood

Since the events of September 11, 2001, against the

backdrop of two decades of the ascendance of global religious politics, urgent

calls for the reinstatement of secularism have reached a crescendo that cannot

be ignored. The most obvious target of these strident calls is Islam, particularmente

those practices and discourses within Islam that are suspected of fostering fundamentalism

and militancy. It has become de rigueur for leftists and liberals alike

to link the fate of democracy in the Muslim world with the institutionalization

of secularism — both as a political doctrine and as a political ethic. This coupling

is now broadly echoed within the discourse emanating from the U.S. State

Department, particularly in its programmatic efforts to reshape and transform

“Islam from within.” In this essay, I will examine both the particular conception

of secularism that underlies the current consensus that Islam needs to be

reformed — that its secularization is a necessary step in bringing “democracy” to

the Muslim world — and the strategic means by which this programmatic vision is

being instituted today. Insomuch as secularism is a historically shifting category

with a variegated genealogy, my aim is not to secure an authoritative definition of

secularism or to trace its historical transformation within the United States or the

Muslim world. My goal here is more limited: I want to sketch out the particular

understanding of secularism underlying contemporary American discourses on

Islam, an understanding that is deeply shaped by U.S. security and foreign policy

concerns in the Muslim world.

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| Agosto 27, 2010 | comentarios 0

Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.

The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become a “western expanding strategy” that turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,

national, economic as well as social theft .

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| Agosto 27, 2010 | comentarios 0

Islamic Political Culture, democracia, and Human Rights

Daniel e. prezo

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. En consecuencia, scholars, commentators, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, con todo, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,

can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.

I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,

democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

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| Agosto 24, 2010 | comentarios 0

Islamic Political Culture, democracia, and Human Rights

Daniel e. prezo

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. En consecuencia, scholars, commentators, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, con todo, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,

can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.

I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,

democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

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| Agosto 22, 2010 | comentarios 0

Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, it

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

dereitos humanos, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamista

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, e

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

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| Agosto 21, 2010 | comentarios 0

Political Islam in the Middle East

son Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, en

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). Isto

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

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| Agosto 20, 2010 | comentarios 0

Islamist Parties : why they can’t be democratic

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, posúe

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, democracy, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

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| Agosto 20, 2010 | comentarios 0

ESTRATEXIAS PARA IMPLICAR O ISLAM POLÍTICO

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA Kadlec

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. similarmente, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. U.S. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.

The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. Ademáis, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.

The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

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| Agosto 19, 2010 | comentarios 0

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. marrón, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,

by and large, have failed on all accounts.

Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate

threat, con todo, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.

It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Xordania, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. política, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

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| Agosto 18, 2010 | comentarios 0

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (ME) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

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| Agosto 17, 2010 | comentarios 0

ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE

H Youssef. Abul-Enein

Sherifa Zuhur

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.

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| Agosto 13, 2010 | comentarios 0

Do Movemento Rebelde ao Partido Político

Alastair Crooke

Moitos en Occidente opinaron que a transformación dun movemento de resistencia armada a un partido político debería ser lineal, debería ir precedido dunha renuncia á violencia, debería ser facilitada pola sociedade civil e axudada por políticos moderados ten pouca realidade para o caso do Movemento de Resistencia Islámica (Hamas). Isto non quere dicir que Hamas non foi sometido a unha transformación política: posúe. Pero esa transformación conseguiuse a pesar dos esforzos occidentais e non foi facilitada por eses esforzos. Mantendo un movemento de resistencia, Hamás converteuse no goberno da Autoridade Palestina e modificou a súa postura militar. Pero esta transformación ten un rumbo diferente ao exposto nos modelos tradicionais de resolución de conflitos. Hamas e outros grupos islamistas seguen a verse como movementos de resistencia, pero cada vez ven a posibilidade de que as súas organizacións poidan evolucionar cara a correntes políticas centradas na resistencia non violenta. Os modelos de resolución de conflitos normais dependen bastante da experiencia occidental na resolución de conflitos e adoitan ignorar as diferenzas de enfoque na historia islámica de facer paz.. Non en balde, o enfoque de Hamas para a negociación política é diferente ao occidental. Tamén, como movemento islamista que comparte a óptica máis ampla do impacto de Occidente nas súas sociedades, Hamas ten uns requisitos de autenticidade e lexitimidade dentro da súa propia circunscrición, que destacan a importancia que ten para manter unha capacidade armada. Estes factores, xunto co efecto abafante do conflito a longo prazo na psicoloxía dunha comunidade (aspecto que recibe pouca atención nos modelos occidentais que poñen peso preponderante na análise política), suxire que o proceso de transformación de Hamas foi moi diferente da transformación dos movementos de armas na análise tradicional. Ademáis, a dura paisaxe do conflito israelí - palestino dá ás experiencias do Hamás as súas características especiais. O Hamas está no medio dunha importante transformación, senón as correntes políticas dentro de Israel, e dentro da rexión, fan que o resultado desta transformación sexa imprevisible. Moito dependerá do curso da política occidental (a súa "Guerra Mundial contra o Terror") e como esa política afecta a grupos islamistas revivalistas como Hamas, grupos que apostan por eleccións, reforma e bo goberno.

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| Agosto 02, 2010 | comentarios 0

Boletín árabe de reforma

grupo de investigadores

Exipto: A regresión na plataforma do partido dos Irmáns Musulmáns?

Amr hamzawy

A redacción da plataforma de partidos dos Irmáns Musulmáns envía sinais sobre as opinións políticas do movemento

e posicións. Aínda que xa foi moi difundido, o documento aínda non ten final

aprobación do gabinete de orientación do movemento.

O tratamento detallado da política sobre a plataforma, social, e as cuestións económicas marcan unha importante partida

desde posicións anteriormente menos desenvolvidas, articulado entre outras cousas a 2004 iniciativa de reforma e a 2005

plataforma electoral para os candidatos parlamentarios da Irmandade. Esta quenda aborda un dos máis

críticas importantes á Irmandade, é dicir, a súa promoción de vagos ideolóxicos e relixiosos

lemas e incapacidade de elaborar prescricións específicas de políticas.

O documento suscita problemas preocupantes, con todo, respecto á identidade dunha futura Irmandade

partido político, así como a posición do grupo en varias cuestións políticas e sociais. Lanzado no

contexto de permanente desfasamento entre o réxime exipcio e a Irmandade, revela significativo

ambigüidades e quizais regresión no pensamento do movemento.

Primeira, os redactores optaron por non abordar a relación futura entre o partido e o movemento. En

facendo iso, ignoraron intencionadamente ideas importantes discutidas recentemente no movemento,

especialmente entre os membros do bloque parlamentario. Inspirado nas experiencias dos partidos islamistas en

Marrocos, Xordania, e Iemen, estes membros propugnan unha separación funcional entre un partido e

o movemento, co primeiro centrouse principalmente na participación política e o segundo en relixiosos

activismo. Ademais do seu tratamento superficial da natureza do partido e da súa organización interna, o

A plataforma non inclúe ningunha declaración clara sobre a apertura de membros a todos os exipcios, independentemente da súa situación

relixión, un dos requisitos para establecer un partido político segundo a constitución exipcia.

Segundo, o borrador da plataforma Brotherhood identifica a implementación de sharia como un dos principais do partido

obxectivos. Aínda que isto é coherente coa interpretación do artigo do grupo 2 da Constitución exipcia

(“O islam é a relixión do estado, e o dereito islámico é a principal fonte de lexislación”), parte do

espírito pragmático de diversas declaracións e iniciativas da Irmandade desde entón 2004 en que menos énfase

deuse a cuestión da sharia. O regreso a un foco na sharia na plataforma provocou posicións

fundamentalmente contra o carácter civil do estado e os dereitos de cidadanía con independencia relixiosa

afiliación.

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| Agosto 01, 2010 | comentarios 0