All Entries in the "Lebanon" Category
Yr Arab Yfory
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
October 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, gohebydd tramor newydd gyrraedd.Suddenly, ataliodd un o dryciau'r fyddin yn union o flaen y stondin adolygu wrth i chwe jet Mirage ruo uwchben mewn perfformiad acrobatig, paentio'r awyr gyda llwybrau hir o goch, melyn, porffor,a mwg gwyrdd. Safodd Sadat i fyny, yn paratoi i gyfnewid cyfarchion â mintai arall eto o filwyr yr Aifft. Gwnaeth ei hun yn darged perffaith ar gyfer pedwar llofrudd Islamaidd a neidiodd o'r lori, ymosododd ar y podiwm, ac yn britho ei gorff â bwledi. Wrth i'r lladdwyr barhau am yr hyn a oedd yn ymddangos yn dragwyddoldeb i chwistrellu'r eisteddle â'u tân marwol, Fe wnes i ystyried am amrantiad p’un ai i daro’r llawr ac mewn perygl o gael fy sathru i farwolaeth gan wylwyr panig neu aros ar y gweill a mentro cymryd bwled strae.. Dywedodd greddf wrthyf am aros ar fy nhraed, ac roedd fy synnwyr o ddyletswydd newyddiadurol yn fy ysgogi i fynd i ddarganfod a oedd Sadat yn fyw neu'n farw.
Herio Awdurdodaeth, gwladychiaeth, ac Anundod: Mudiadau Diwygio Gwleidyddol Islamaidd al-Afghani a Rida
Ahmed Ali Salem
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). However, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,
they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic
sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s
teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)
unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. On the other hand, they realized the
need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Yn wir,
their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, yr
following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led
caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing
a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity
and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating
a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the
Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. However, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which
emphasized education and undermined politics.
Parhad Sefydliadol ym Mrawdoliaeth Fwslimaidd yr Aifft
Tess Lee Eisenhart
seciwlariaeth, esboniadaeth, ac Ymerodraeth: The Politics of Islamic Reformation
Saba Mahmood
Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009
Islamic Political Culture, Democratiaeth, and Human Rights
daniel E. Price
Islamic Political Culture, Democratiaeth, and Human Rights
daniel E. Price
Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Islam gwleidyddol yn y Dwyrain Canol
yn Knudsen
Pleidiau Islamaidd : pam na allant fod yn ddemocrataidd
Bassam Tibi
STRATEGAETHAU AR GYFER YMGYSYLLTU ISLAM GWLEIDYDDOL
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA KADLEC
SYMUDIADAU ISLAMAIDD A'R BROSES DEMOCRATAIDD YN Y BYD ARAB: Archwilio'r Parthau Llwyd
Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy,
Marina Ottaway
Islam gwleidyddol a Pholisi Tramor Ewropeaidd
POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
MICHAEL EMERSON
RICHARD YOUNGS
Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .
RHEOLAU ISLAMIG AR RHYBUDD
Heb os, bydd yr Unol Daleithiau yn cymryd rhan yn y Dwyrain Canol am ddegawdau lawer. I fod yn sicr, gallai setlo anghydfod Israel-Palestina neu liniaru tlodi helpu i atal llanw radicaliaeth Islamaidd a theimlad gwrth-Americanaidd. Ond ar lefel ideolegol, rhaid inni wynebu dehongliad penodol o gyfraith Islamaidd, hanes,a'r ysgrythur sy'n berygl i'r Unol Daleithiau a'i chynghreiriaid. I ennill y rhyfel ideolegol hwnnw, rhaid inni ddeall ffynonellau radicaliaeth Islamaidd a rhyddfrydiaeth. Mae angen i ni ddeall yn fwy trylwyr y ffyrdd y mae milwriaethwyr yn camddehongli ac yn gwyrdroi ysgrythur Islamaidd. Mae Al-Qaeda wedi cynhyrchu ei grŵp ei hun o lefarwyr sy'n ceisio darparu cyfreithlondeb crefyddol i'r nihiliaeth y maen nhw'n ei bregethu. Mae llawer yn dyfynnu o'r Quran a'r Hadith yn aml (dywediadau a gweithredoedd y Proffwyd Muhammad) mewn modd rhagfarnllyd i dynnu cyfiawnhad dros eu hachos. Is-gapten Youssef Aboul-Enein a Dr.. Mae Sherifa Zuhur yn ymchwilio i'r Quran a Hadith i fynegi ffordd y gellir gwrthweithio milwriaeth Islamaidd yn ideolegol, gan dynnu llawer o'u mewnwelediadau o'r rhain a thestunau Islamaidd clasurol eraill. Wrth wneud hynny, maent yn datgelu gwrthddywediadau a dulliau amgen yn yr egwyddorion craidd y mae grwpiau fel al-Qaeda yn eu hebrwng. Mae'r awduron wedi darganfod bod defnydd cywir o'r ysgrythur Islamaidd mewn gwirionedd yn difrïo tactegau al-Qaeda a sefydliadau jihadistiaid eraill. Mae'r monograff hwn yn darparu sylfaen ar gyfer annog ein cynghreiriaid Mwslimaidd i herio'r ddiwinyddiaeth a gefnogir gan filwriaethwyr Islamaidd. Gallai hadau amheuaeth a blannwyd ym meddyliau bomwyr hunanladdiad eu rhwystro rhag cyflawni eu cenadaethau. Mae'r Sefydliad Astudiaethau Strategol yn falch o gynnig yr astudiaeth hon o ddyfarniadau Islamaidd ar ryfela i'r gymuned amddiffyn genedlaethol fel ymdrech i gyfrannu at y ddadl barhaus ynghylch sut i drechu milwriaeth Islamaidd.
O Symudiad Rebel i Blaid Wleidyddol
Alastair Crooke
The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. In addition, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.
Bwletin Diwygio Arabaidd
group of researchers
Yr Aifft: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?
Amr hamzawy