RSSTotes les entrades al "Líban" Categoria

El demà àrab

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Octubre 6, 1981, havia de ser un dia de celebració a Egipte. Va marcar l'aniversari de la victòria més gran d'Egipte en tres conflictes àrabs-israelians, quan l'exèrcit desfavorit del país va creuar el canal de Suez en els primers dies de la 1973 La guerra del Yom Kippur i va enviar tropes israelianes en retirada. En un fresc, matí sense núvols, l'estadi del Caire estava ple de famílies egípcies que havien vingut a veure com l'exèrcit posava el seu maquinari. A l'estand de revisió, President Anwar el-Sadat,l'arquitecte de la guerra, observava amb satisfacció com homes i màquines desfilaven davant seu. Estava a prop, un corresponsal estranger acabat d'arribar.De sobte, un dels camions de l'exèrcit es va aturar directament davant de l'estand de revisió just quan sis avions Mirage rugien per sobre en una actuació acrobàtica., pintant el cel amb llargs estels de vermell, groc, porpra,i fum verd. Sadat es va aixecar, aparentment es prepara per intercanviar salutacions amb un altre contingent de tropes egípcies. Es va convertir en un objectiu perfecte per a quatre assassins islamistes que van saltar del camió, va assaltar el podi, i va cridar el seu cos amb bales. Mentre els assassins van continuar durant el que va semblar una eternitat ruixant el suport amb el seu foc mortal., Vaig pensar per un instant si topar a terra i arriscar-me a ser trepitjat fins a la mort per espectadors en pànic o romandre a peu i arriscar-me a agafar una bala perduda.. L'instint em va dir que em mantingués de peu, i el meu sentit del deure periodístic em va impulsar a anar a saber si Sadat era viu o mort.

desafiant autoritarisme, colonialisme, i la desunió: Els moviments islàmics la reforma política d'al-Afgani i Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. En particular, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
Però, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Per tant, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, but
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (La llei islàmica). malgrat això, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. On the other hand, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. En efecte,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, la

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. malgrat això, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, quin

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Llegeix Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Des de la seva fundació a 1928, the Brotherhood (germà) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, malgrat això, la Germandat té
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
règim: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. En canvi, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

laïcisme, hermenèutica, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation

Saba Mahmood

Since the events of September 11, 2001, against the

backdrop of two decades of the ascendance of global religious politics, urgent
calls for the reinstatement of secularism have reached a crescendo that cannot
be ignored. The most obvious target of these strident calls is Islam, particularly
those practices and discourses within Islam that are suspected of fostering fundamentalism
and militancy. It has become de rigueur for leftists and liberals alike
to link the fate of democracy in the Muslim world with the institutionalization

of secularism — both as a political doctrine and as a political ethic. This coupling
is now broadly echoed within the discourse emanating from the U.S. State
Department, particularly in its programmatic efforts to reshape and transform
“Islam from within.” In this essay, I will examine both the particular conception
of secularism that underlies the current consensus that Islam needs to be
reformed — that its secularization is a necessary step in bringing “democracy” to
the Muslim world — and the strategic means by which this programmatic vision is
being instituted today. Insomuch as secularism is a historically shifting category
with a variegated genealogy, my aim is not to secure an authoritative definition of
secularism or to trace its historical transformation within the United States or the
Muslim world. My goal here is more limited: I want to sketch out the particular
understanding of secularism underlying contemporary American discourses on
Islam, an understanding that is deeply shaped by U.S. security and foreign policy
concerns in the Muslim world.

Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, tecnologia, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .

Cultura política islàmica, democràcia, i Drets Humans

Daniel I. preu

S'ha argumentat que l'islam facilita l'autoritarisme, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. conseqüentment, erudits, comentaristes, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. Aquesta vista, malgrat això, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Teoria política islàmica, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, que no tenen en compte altres factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, com els d'altres religions,

es pot utilitzar per donar suport a una varietat de sistemes i polítiques polítiques. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Per tant, un nou enfocament de l'estudi de la

Es demana connexió entre l'islam i la política.
suggereixo, mitjançant una avaluació rigorosa de la relació entre l'Islam,

democràcia, i els drets humans a nivell transnacional, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, influències econòmiques, clivages ètnics,

i desenvolupament de la societat, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Cultura política islàmica, democràcia, i Drets Humans

Daniel I. preu

S'ha argumentat que l'islam facilita l'autoritarisme, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. conseqüentment, erudits, comentaristes, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. Aquesta vista, malgrat això, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Teoria política islàmica, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, que no tenen en compte altres factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, com els d'altres religions,
es pot utilitzar per donar suport a una varietat de sistemes i polítiques polítiques. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Per tant, un nou enfocament de l'estudi de la
Es demana connexió entre l'islam i la política.
suggereixo, mitjançant una avaluació rigorosa de la relació entre l'Islam,
democràcia, i els drets humans a nivell transnacional, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, influències econòmiques, clivages ètnics,

i desenvolupament de la societat, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, això

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

drets humans, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, islamista

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, i

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

tractar amb règims de govern que són autoritaris, però és un fenomen nou de premsa

per a la reforma democràtica als estats on els beneficiaris més probables podrien tenir, des del

punt de vista de la UE, enfocaments diferents i de vegades problemàtics de la democràcia i la seva

valors relacionats, com ara els drets de les minories i de les dones i l'estat de dret. Aquests càrrecs són

sovint contra els moviments islamistes, per tant, és important que els responsables polítics europeus ho facin

tenir una imatge precisa de les polítiques i les filosofies dels possibles socis.

Les experiències de diferents països tendeixen a suggerir que més llibertat és islamista

es permeten festes, més moderats són en les seves accions i idees. En molts

casos, els partits i grups islamistes fa temps que s'han allunyat del seu objectiu original

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

Political Islam in the Middle East

són Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, en

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. No obstant això, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

Partits islamistes : why they can’t be democratic

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, Té

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, democràcia, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

ESTRATÈGIES PER A IMPLICAR L'ISLAM POLÍTIC

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA ECOM

L'islam polític és avui la força política més activa a l'Orient Mitjà. El seu futur està íntimament lligat al de la regió. Si els Estats Units i la Unió Europea es comprometen a donar suport a la reforma política a la regió, hauran d'elaborar el formigó, estratègies coherents per implicar grups islamistes. No obstant això, Els EUA. generalment no ha volgut obrir un diàleg amb aquests moviments. De la mateixa manera, El compromís de la UE amb els islamistes ha estat l'excepció, no la regla. On hi ha contactes de baix nivell, serveixen principalment per a la recollida d'informació, no objectius estratègics. Els EUA. i la UE tenen una sèrie de programes que aborden el desenvolupament econòmic i polític a la regió, entre ells la Iniciativa d'Associació per a l'Orient Mitjà. (MEPI), la Corporació del Desafiament del Mil·lenni (MCC), la Unió per la Mediterrània, i la Política Europea de Veïnatge (ENP) No obstant això, tenen poc a dir sobre com el repte de l'oposició política islamista s'ajusta als objectius regionals més amplis. nosaltres. i l'assistència i la programació de la democràcia de la UE es dirigeixen gairebé completament als propis governs autoritaris o a grups laics de la societat civil amb un suport mínim a les seves pròpies societats..
És el moment d'una reavaluació de les polítiques actuals. Des dels atemptats terroristes de setembre 11, 2001, el suport a la democràcia de l'Orient Mitjà ha assumit una importància més gran per als responsables polítics occidentals, que veuen un vincle entre la manca de democràcia i la violència política. S'ha dedicat més atenció a la comprensió de les variacions dins de l'islam polític. La nova administració nord-americana està més oberta a ampliar la comunicació amb el món musulmà. Mentrestant, la gran majoria de les organitzacions islamistes principals, inclosa la Germandat Musulmana a Egipte, Front d'Acció Islàmica de Jordània (IAF), Partit de la Justícia i el Desenvolupament del Marroc (PJD), el Moviment Constitucional Islàmic de Kuwait, i el Partit Iemenita d'Islah, han fet que cada cop més el suport a la reforma política i la democràcia sigui un component central de les seves plataformes polítiques.. A més, molts han manifestat un gran interès a obrir un diàleg amb els EUA. i els governs de la UE.
El futur de les relacions entre les nacions occidentals i l'Orient Mitjà pot estar determinat en gran mesura pel grau en què els primers impliquen els partits islamistes noviolents en un ampli diàleg sobre interessos i objectius compartits.. Hi ha hagut una proliferació recent d'estudis sobre el compromís amb els islamistes, però pocs aborden clarament el que pot suposar a la pràctica. Com Zoe Nautre, becari visitant al Consell Alemany de Relacions Exteriors, ho posa, "La UE està pensant en el compromís, però realment no sap com."1 Amb l'esperança d'aclarir la discussió, distingim entre tres nivells de “complicació,” cadascun amb diferents mitjans i finalitats: contactes de baix nivell, diàleg estratègic, i col·laboració.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. marró, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, en particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Com a resultat, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, malgrat això, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, que tindrà el major impacte en la futura evolució política de l'Orient Mitjà. Els grandiosos objectius dels radicals de restablir un califat que uneixi tot el món àrab, o fins i tot d'imposar als països àrabs individuals lleis i costums socials inspirats en una interpretació fonamentalista de l'islam estan simplement massa allunyats de la realitat actual per ser realitzats.. Això no vol dir que els grups terroristes no siguin perillosos —podrien causar grans pèrdues de vides fins i tot en la recerca d'objectius impossibles—, sinó que és poc probable que canviïn la cara de l'Orient Mitjà.. Les organitzacions islamistes principals són generalment una qüestió diferent. Ja han tingut un impacte poderós en els costums socials de molts països, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordània, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. política, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

Islam polític i política exterior europea

L'ISLAM POLÍTIC I LA POLÍTICA EUROPEA DE BARRI

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD JOVES

Des de 2001 i els esdeveniments internacionals que van seguir la naturalesa de la relació entre Occident i l'islam polític s'ha convertit en un tema definitori per a la política exterior. En els últims anys s'ha dut a terme una quantitat considerable d'investigació i anàlisi sobre la qüestió de l'islam polític. Això ha ajudat a corregir algunes de les suposicions simplistes i alarmistes que es feien anteriorment a Occident sobre la naturalesa dels valors i intencions islamistes.. Paral·lelament a això, la Unió Europea (EU) ha desenvolupat una sèrie d'iniciatives polítiques, principalment la Política Europea de Veïnatge(ENP) que en principi es comprometen amb el diàleg i un compromís més profund de tots(no violent) actors polítics i organitzacions de la societat civil dels països àrabs. No obstant això, molts analistes i responsables polítics es queixen ara d'un cert trofeu tant en el debat conceptual com en el desenvolupament de polítiques. S'ha establert que l'islam polític és un panorama canviant, profundament afectat per una sèrie de circumstàncies, però el debat sovint sembla que s'ha quedat en la qüestió simplista de "els islamistes són democràtics".?No obstant això, molts analistes independents han defensat el compromís amb els islamistes, però l'acostament real entre els governs occidentals i les organitzacions islamistes segueix sent limitat .

ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE

Youssef H. Aboul-Enein
sherifa Zuhur

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, història,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.

Del Moviment Rebel al Partit Polític

Alastair Crooke

La visió de molts a Occident que la transformació d'un moviment de resistència armada a un partit polític hauria de ser lineal, hauria d'anar precedit d'una renúncia a la violència, hauria de ser facilitat per la societat civil i mediat per polítics moderats té poca realitat per al cas del Moviment de Resistència Islàmica (Hamas). Això no vol dir que Hamàs no hagi estat objecte d'una transformació política: Té. Però aquesta transformació s'ha aconseguit malgrat els esforços occidentals i no facilitada per aquests esforços. Encara que segueix sent un moviment de resistència, Hamàs s'ha convertit en el govern de l'Autoritat Palestina i ha modificat la seva postura militar. Però aquesta transformació ha pres un curs diferent del que es descriu en els models tradicionals de resolució de conflictes. Hamàs i altres grups islamistes continuen veient-se com a moviments de resistència, però cada cop veuen més la perspectiva que les seves organitzacions puguin evolucionar cap a corrents polítics centrats en la resistència no violenta. Els models estàndard de resolució de conflictes es basen en gran mesura en l'experiència occidental en la resolució de conflictes i sovint ignoren les diferències d'enfocament en la història islàmica de la construcció de la pau.. No és d'estranyar, l'enfocament de Hamàs a la negociació política és diferent en estil al d'Occident. També, com un moviment islamista que comparteix l'òptica més àmplia de l'impacte d'Occident en les seves societats, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. A més, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Molt dependrà del curs de la política occidental (la seva "Guerra Global contra el Terror") i com aquesta política afecta els grups islamistes revivalistes com Hamàs, grups que estan compromesos amb les eleccions, reforma i bon govern.

Arab Reform Bulletin

group of researchers


Egipte: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?

Amr hamzawy


The Muslim Brotherhood’s draft party platform sends mixed signals about the movement’s political views

and positions. Although it has already been widely circulated, the document does not yet have final
approval from the movement’s guidance bureau.
The platform’s detailed treatment of political, socials, and economic issues marks a significant departure
from previously less developed positions, articulated inter alia in a 2004 reform initiative and the 2005
electoral platform for Brotherhood parliamentary candidates. This shift addresses one of the most
important criticisms of the Brotherhood, namely its championing of vague ideological and religious

slogans and inability to come up with specific policy prescriptions.
The document raises troubling questions, malgrat això, regarding the identity of a future Brotherhood

political party as well as the group’s position on several political and social issues. Released in the
context of an ongoing stand-off between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood, it reveals significant
ambiguities and perhaps regression in the movement’s thinking.
Primer, the drafters chose not to address the future relationship between the party and the movement. a

doing so, they have deliberately ignored important ideas recently discussed within the movement,
especially among members of the parliamentary bloc. Inspired by the experiences of Islamist parties in
Marroc, Jordània, and Yemen, these members advocate a functional separation between a party and
the movement, with the former focused mainly on political participation and the latter on religious
activism. In addition to its superficial treatment of the nature of the party and its internal organization, la
platform includes no clear statement on opening party membership to all Egyptians regardless of their
religion, one of the requirements for establishing a political party according to the Egyptian constitution.
Segon, the draft Brotherhood platform identifies implementation of sharia as one of the party’s main

goals. Although this is consistent with the group’s interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution
(“Islam is the religion of the state, and Islamic law is the main source of legislation”), it departs from the
pragmatic spirit of various Brotherhood statements and initiatives since 2004 in which less emphasis
was given to the sharia issue. The return to a focus on sharia in the platform has led to positions
fundamentally at odds with the civil nature of the state and full citizenship rights regardless of religious
affiliation.