Alle inskrywings in die "Libanon" Kategorie
Die Arabiese Môre
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
Oktober 6, 1981, was bedoel as 'n dag van viering in Egipte. Dit was die herdenking van Egipte se grootste oomblik van oorwinning in drie Arabies-Israelitiese konflikte, toe die land se onderhondleër oor die Suezkanaal in die openingsdae stoot 1973 Yom Kippur-oorlog en stuur Israelitiese troepe om terug te trek. Op 'n koelte, wolklose oggend, die Kaïro-stadion was propvol Egiptiese gesinne wat die militêre stut sy hardeware gaan sien het, President Anwar el-Sadat,die oorlog se argitek, met tevredenheid dopgehou terwyl mans en masjiene voor hom staan. Ek was naby, 'n nuut aangekome buitelandse korrespondent. Skielik, een van die weermagvragmotors het direk voor die beoordeelstalletjie gestop net toe ses Mirage-jets in 'n akrobatiese vertoning oorhoofs gebrul het, die lug skilder met lang rooi roetes, geel, pers,en groen rook. Sadat staan op, klaarblyklik voor te berei om hulde met nog 'n kontingent Egiptiese troepe te ruil. Hy het homself 'n perfekte teiken gemaak vir vier Islamitiese sluipmoordenaars wat uit die vragmotor gespring het, storm die podium af, en hy het sy lyf met koeëls toegeslaan. Soos die moordenaars voortgegaan het vir 'n ewigheid om die erf met hul dodelike vuur te spuit., Ek het 'n oomblik oorweeg of ek op die grond moet slaan en waag om deur die toeskouers van paniekbevange afgetrap te word of om aan die gang te wees en die risiko om 'n verdwaalde koeël te neem. Instink het my aangesê om op my voete te bly, en my gevoel van joernalistieke plig het my gedwing om uit te vind of Sadat lewend of dood was.
Uitdagende outoritarisme, Kolonialisme, en Onenigheid: Die Islamitiese Politieke Hervormingsbewegings van al-Afghani en Rida
Ahmed Ali Salem
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamitiese wet). Egter, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,
they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic
sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s
teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)
unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Aan die ander kant, they realized the
need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Inderdaad,
their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, die
following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led
caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing
a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity
and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating
a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the
Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. Egter, they disagreed on certain aspects
en metodes, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which
emphasized education and undermined politics.
Organisatoriese Kontinuïteit in Egipte se Moslem-broederskap
Tess Lee Eisenhart
Secularisme, Hermeneutiek, en Ryk: Die politiek van die Islamitiese Hervorming
Saba Mahmood
Hizbollah se Politieke Manifes 2009
Islamitiese politieke kultuur, Demokrasie, en Menseregte
Daniel E. Prys
Islamitiese politieke kultuur, Demokrasie, en Menseregte
Daniel E. Prys
Islamistiese opposisiepartye en die potensiaal vir EU -betrokkenheid
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Politieke Islam in die Midde -Ooste
Is Knudsen
Islamitiese partye : hoekom hulle kan nie demokratiese
Bassam Tibi
STRATEGIEë VIR innemende politieke Islam
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA KADLEC
ISLAMISTIESE BEWEGINGS EN DIE DEMOKRATIESE PROSES IN DIE ARABIESE WÊRELD: Verken die grys sones
Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy,
Marina Ottaway
Politieke Islam en die Europese buitelandse beleid
POLITIEKE ISLAM EN DIE EUROPESE BUURT-BELEID
MICHAEL EMERSON
RICHARD YONGES
Sedert 2001 en die internasionale gebeure wat die aard van die verhouding tussen die Weste en politieke Islam gevolg het, het 'n bepalende kwessie vir buitelandse beleid geword. In onlangse jare is 'n aansienlike hoeveelheid navorsing en ontleding oor die kwessie van politieke Islam onderneem. Dit het gehelp om sommige van die simplistiese en alarmistiese aannames wat voorheen in die Weste gehou is oor die aard van Islamitiese waardes en bedoelings reg te stel. Parallel hiermee, die Europese Unie (EK) het 'n aantal beleidsinisiatiewe ontwikkel, hoofsaaklik die Europese Buurtbeleid(ENP) wat in beginsel verbind tot dialoog en dieper betrokkenheid almal(nie gewelddadig nie) politieke akteurs en burgerlike organisasies binne Arabiese lande. Tog kla baie ontleders en beleidmakers nou oor 'n sekere trofee in beide konseptuele debat en beleidsontwikkeling. Daar is vasgestel dat politieke Islam 'n veranderende landskap is, diep geraak deur 'n reeks omstandighede, maar debat blyk dikwels vas te hou oor die simplistiese vraag van 'is Islamiete demokraties'?' Baie onafhanklike ontleders het nietemin betrokkenheid by Islamiete voorgestaan, maar die werklike toenadering tussen Westerse regerings en Islamitiese organisasies bly beperk .
ISLAMIESE BESLISSINGS OOR OORLOGVOEG
The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. Deur dit te doen, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.
Van Rebellebeweging tot Politieke Party
Alastair Crooke
Die siening van baie in die Weste dat transformasie van 'n gewapende weerstandsbeweging na politieke party lineêr moet wees, moet voorafgegaan word deur 'n afstanddoening van geweld, moet deur die burgerlike samelewing gefasiliteer word en deur gematigde politici bemiddel word, het min werklikheid vir die geval van die Islamitiese Weerstandsbeweging (Hamas). Dit beteken nie dat Hamas nie aan 'n politieke transformasie onderwerp is nie: dit het. Maar daardie transformasie is behaal ten spyte van Westerse pogings en nie deur daardie pogings gefasiliteer nie. Terwyl hy 'n weerstandsbeweging bly, Hamas het die regering van die Palestynse Owerheid geword en het sy militêre houding gewysig. Maar hierdie transformasie het 'n ander koers geneem as die een wat in tradisionele konflikoplossingsmodelle uiteengesit word. Hamas en ander Islamitiese groepe sien hulself steeds as weerstandsbewegings, maar toenemend sien hulle die vooruitsig dat hul organisasies kan ontwikkel in politieke strominge wat op nie-gewelddadige weerstand gefokus is. Standaard konflikoplossingsmodelle maak sterk staat op Westerse ervaring in konflikoplossing en ignoreer dikwels die verskille van benadering in die Islamitiese geskiedenis van vredemaak. Nie verbasend, die Hamas-benadering tot politieke onderhandeling is anders in styl as dié van die Weste. Ook, as 'n Islamitiese beweging wat die wyer optiek van die impak van die Weste op hul samelewings deel, Hamas het vereistes van egtheid en legitimiteit binne sy eie kiesafdeling wat verband hou met die belangrikheid wat daaraan geheg word om 'n gewapende vermoë te handhaaf. Hierdie faktore, saam met die oorweldigende effek van langtermynkonflik op 'n gemeenskap se sielkunde (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. Daarby, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.
Arabiese Hervorming Bulletin
group of researchers
Egipte: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?
Amr hamzawy