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Ісламісцкія партыі : A boon or a bane for democracy?

Амр Hamzawy

Натан Дж. карычневы

What role do Islamist movements play in Arab politics? With their popular messages and broad followings within Arab societies, would their incorporation as normal political actors be a boon for democratization or democracy’s bane? For too long, we have tried to answer such questions solely by speculating about the true intentions of these movements and their leaders. Islamist political movements in the Arab world are increasingly asked—both by outside observers and by members of their own societies—about their true intentions.
But to hear them tell it, leaders of mainstream Arab Islamist movements are not the problem. They see themselves as democrats in nondemocratic lands, firmly committed to clean and fair electoral processes, whatever outcomes these may bring. It is rulers and regimes that should be pressed to commit to democracy, say the Islamists, not their oppositions. We need not take such Islamist leaders at their word. Сапраўды, we should realize that there is only so much that any of their words can do to answer the question of the relationship between these movements and the prospects for democracy.
While their words are increasingly numerous (Islamist movements tend to be quite loquacious) and their answers about democracy increasingly specific, their ability to resolve all ambiguities is limited. Па-першае, as long as they are out of power—as most of them are, and are likely to remain for some time—they will never fully prove themselves. Many Islamist leaders themselves probably do not know how they would act were they to come to power.

The Mismeasure of Political Islam

Марцін Крамер

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are theextremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led bymoderatesorreformists.” Thesemoderatescan be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.

ІСЛАМІСТСКІЯ РУХІ І ДЭМАКРАТЫЧНЫ ПРАЦЭС У АРАБСКІМ СВЕЦЕ: Вывучэнне шэрых зон

Натан Дж. карычневы, Амр Hamzawy,

Марына Ottaway

На працягу апошняга дзесяцігоддзя, Ісламісцкія рухі зарэкамендавалі сябе як асноўныя палітычныя гульцы на Блізкім Усходзе. Разам з урадамі, Ісламісцкія руху, умераны, а таксама радыкальны, вызначыць, як будзе развівацца палітыка рэгіёну ў агляднай будучыні. Яны прадэманстравалі здольнасць не толькі распрацоўваць паведамленні з шырока распаўсюджанай папулярнасцю, але і, і самае галоўнае, ствараць арганізацыі з сапраўднай сацыяльнай базай і распрацоўваць узгодненыя палітычныя стратэгіі. Іншыя партыі,
па вялікім рахунку, праваліліся па ўсіх рахунках.
Грамадскасць на Захадзе і, у прыватнасці, ЗША, усвядоміў важнасць ісламісцкіх рухаў толькі пасля драматычных падзей, такія як рэвалюцыя ў Іране і забойства прэзідэнта Анвара аль-Садата ў Егіпце. Увага была значна больш прыцягнутай пасля тэрактаў у верасні 11, 2001. У выніку, Ісламісцкія рухі шырока разглядаюцца як небяспечныя і варожыя. У той час як такая характарыстыка дакладная ў дачыненні да арганізацый, якія знаходзяцца ў радыкальным канцы ісламісцкага спектру, якія небяспечныя сваёй гатоўнасцю звяртацца да неразборлівага гвалту ў дасягненні сваіх мэтаў, гэта не дакладная характарыстыка многіх груп, якія адмовіліся ад гвалту альбо пазбягалі яго. Таму што тэрарыстычныя арганізацыі ствараюць неадкладную дапамогу
пагроза, Аднак, палітыкі ва ўсіх краінах звярнулі непрапарцыйную ўвагу на гвалтоўныя арганізацыі.
Гэта асноўныя ісламісцкія арганізацыі, не радыкальныя, што акажа найбольшы ўплыў на будучую палітычную эвалюцыю Блізкага Усходу. Грандыёзныя мэты радыкалаў - узнавіць халіфат, які аб'ядноўвае ўвесь арабскі свет, ці нават навязванне асобным арабскім краінам законаў і сацыяльных звычаяў, натхнёных фундаменталісцкай інтэрпрэтацыяй ісламу, проста занадта далёка ад сённяшняй рэальнасці, каб быць рэалізаваным. Гэта не азначае, што тэрарыстычныя групоўкі не небяспечныя - яны могуць прывесці да вялікай гібелі людзей нават у дасягненні немагчымых мэтаў, - але наўрад ці яны зменяць аблічча Блізкага Усходу. Агульныя ісламісцкія арганізацыі, як правіла, розныя пытанні. Яны ўжо моцна паўплывалі на сацыяльныя звычаі многіх краін, спыненне і зварот секулярысцкіх тэндэнцый і змяненне спосабу адзення і паводзін многіх арабаў. І іх непасрэдная палітычная мэта, стаць магутнай сілай, удзельнічаючы ў нармальнай палітыцы сваёй краіны, не з'яўляецца немагчымым. Гэта ўжо рэалізуецца ў такіх краінах, як Марока, Іарданія, і нават Егіпет, які па-ранейшаму забараняе ўсе палітычныя арганізацыі ісламістаў, але цяпер у парламенце восемдзесят восем братоў-мусульман. палітыка, не гвалт, гэта тое, што дае ўплыў асноўных ісламістаў.

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
РЫЧАРД МАЛАДЫ
МІХАЙЛ ЭМЕРСАН

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

ISLAM, ISLAMISTS, AND THE ELECTORAL PRINCIPLE I N THE MIDDLE EAST

Джэймс Piscatori

For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing

number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated

a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western

European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess

their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own

rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,

with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow

for flexible politics and participatory government?

The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative

that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story

concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary

story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual

baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has

become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,

the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,

and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.

The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood

Роберт S. аспект

Стывен Брук

The Muslim Brotherhood is the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization. It is also the most controversial,
condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East. American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers “radical Islamists” and “a vital component of the enemy’s assault forcedeeply hostile to the United States.” Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at them for “lur[інж] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for electionsinstead of into the lines of jihad.” Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy. These positions seem to make them moderates, the very thing the United States, short on allies in the Muslim world, seeks.
But the Ikhwan also assails U.S. знешняя палітыка, especially Washington’s support for Israel, and questions linger about its actual commitment to the democratic process. Over the past year, we have met with dozens of Brotherhood leaders and activists from Egypt, Францыя, Іарданія, Іспанія, Сірыя,Туніс, and the United Kingdom.

The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, Мусульманскае братэрства ", and State Power in Jordan

Фейсал Горы

In his first book, The Management of Islamic Activism, Quintan Wiktorowicz examines the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis through the lens of social movement theory. Unlike some political scientists who dismiss Islamic movements because of their informal networks, Wiktorowicz contends that social movement theory is an apt framework through which Islamic movements can be examined and studied. In this regard, his work leads the field. Yet for all its promise, this book largely fails to deliver.
The book is divided into four primary sections, through which he tries to construct his conclusion: Jordanian political liberalization has occurred because of structural necessities, not because of its commitment to democratization. У дадатак, the state has been masterful in what he dubs the “management of collective action, (p. 3) which has, for all practical purposes, stifled any real opposition. While his conclusion is certainly tenable, given his extensive fieldwork, the book is poorly organized and much of the evidence examined earlier in the work leaves many questions unanswered.

What Leads Voters to Support the Opposition under Authoritarianism ?

Майкл D.H. Robbins

Elections have become commonplace in most authoritarian states. While this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in reality elections play an important role in these regimes. While elections for positions of real power tend to be non-competitive, шмат
elections—including those for seemingly toothless parliaments—can be strongly contested.
The existing literature has focused on the role that elections play in supporting the regime. Напрыклад, they can help let off steam, help the regime take the temperature of society, or can be used to help a dominant party know which individuals it should promote (Schedler 2002; Blaydes 2006). Усё ж, while the literature has focused on the supply-side of elections in authoritarian states, there are relatively few systematic studies of voter behavior in these elections (see Lust-Okar 2006 for an exception). Rather, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995). While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. На самай справе, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to
significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. Усё ж, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the
рэжым.

why are there no arab democracies ?

Лары Дайманд

During democratization’s “third wave,” democracy ceased being a mostly Western phenomenon and “went global.” When the third wave began in 1974, the world had only about 40 democracies, and only a few of them lay outside the West. By the time the Journal of Democracy began publishing in 1990, there were 76 electoral democracies (accounting for slightly less than half the world’s independent states). By 1995, that number had shot up to 117—three in every five states. By then, a critical mass of democracies existed in every major world region save one—the Middle East.1 Moreover, every one of the world’s major cultural realms had become host to a significant democratic presence, albeit again with a single exception—the Arab world.2 Fifteen years later, this exception still stands.
The continuing absence of even a single democratic regime in the Arab world is a striking anomaly—the principal exception to the globalization of democracy. Why is there no Arab democracy? Сапраўды, why is it the case that among the sixteen independent Arab states of the Middle East and coastal North Africa, Lebanon is the only one to have ever been a democracy?
The most common assumption about the Arab democracy deficit is that it must have something to do with religion or culture. After all, the one thing that all Arab countries share is that they are Arab.

дэмакратыя, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World

F. Рыгор Gause

The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. Таму, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? Іншымі словамі, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; і 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

POLICY AND PRACTICE NOTES

KENNETH рОТ

Сёння, virtually every government wants to be seen as a democracy, but many resist allowing the basic human rights that would make democracy meaningful because that might jeopardize their grasp on power. Замест гэтага, governments use a variety of subterfuges to manage or undermine the electoral process. Their task is facilitated by the lack of a broadly accepted definition of ‘democracy’ akin to the detailed rules of international human rights law. But much of the problem lies in the fact that, because of commercial or strategic interests, the world’s established democracies often close their eyes to electoral manipulation, making it easier for sham democrats to pass themselves off as the real thing. That acquiescence undermines the efforts to promote human rights because it can be more difficult for human rights organizations to stigmatize a government for its human rights violations when that government can hold itself up as an accepted ‘democracy.’ The challenge facing the human rights movement is to highlight the ploys used by dictatorial regimes to feign democratic rule and to build pressure on the established democracies to refuse to admit these pretenders into the club of democracies on the cheap. Keywords: civil society, democracy promotion, dictatorship, выбары,
electoral manipulation, political violence Rarely has democracy been so acclaimed yet so breached, so promoted yet so disrespected, so important yet so disappointing. Democracy has become the key to legitimacy. Few governments want to be seen as undemocratic. Yet the credentials of the claimants have not kept pace with democracy’s
growing popularity. These days, even overt dictators aspire to the status conferred by the democracy label. Determined not to let mere facts stand in their way, these rulers have mastered the art of democratic rhetoric which bears
little relationship to their practice of governing.
This growing tendency poses an enormous challenge to the human rights movement. Human rights groups can hardly oppose the promotion of democracy, but they must be wary that the embrace of democracy not become a subterfuge for avoiding the more demanding standards of international human rights law. Human rights groups must especially insist that their natural governmental allies – the established democracies – not allow competing interests and short-sighted strategies to stand in the way of their
embrace of a richer, more meaningful concept of democracy.

Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

The Islamic movement in Jordan came to international attention in thewake of the April 1989 disturbances and the subsequent November 1989 parliamentary elections. These developments highlighted the movement’s political clout and raised the spectre in the West of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in Jordan, fuelled by radical Islamic movements such as those of Egypt and the Maghrib. While various political trends competed for influence during the months prior to the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood had a clear advantage; its infrastructure in the mosques, the Qur’anicschools and the universities gave it a ready-made political base. The leftistand pro-regime groups, on the other hand, had to create de facto politicalparties—still legally banned—and to build their organizational base almostex nihilo, or to transform a clandestine infrastructure into an overt politicalone. There should have been very little surprise, Таму, when the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist candidates won a windfall of 32 of the 80seats in Parliament.Politicization of Islam is not new in Jordan.1 Since the foundation of the Emirate of Trans jordan by ‘Abdallah, Islam has served as one of the building blocks of regime legitimacy and of nation-building. The genealogy of the Hashemite family as scions of the Prophet’s tribe was an important source of legitimacy for its rule in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, as it had been inthe Hijaz. The ideology of the “Great Arab Revolt” was no less Islamic than it was Arab, and the control of Jerusalem after 1948 was interpretedby the regime as an Islamic responsibility and not only an Arab one.2King ‘Abdallah and his grandson Hussein, took care to present themselvesas believing Muslims, appearing at rituals and prayers, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and embellishing their speeches with Islamic motifs.3The status of Islam in the Kingdom was also formalized in the Jordanian constitution (1952) by stipulating that Islam is the religion of the kingdom and that the king must be a Muslim and of Muslim parents. Ісламскае права(Shari‘a) is defined in the constitution as one of the pillars of legislation in the kingdom, while family law is in the exclusive hands of the Shari‘a courts.

Ад паўстанцкага руху да палітычнай партыі

Аластер Крук

Меркаванне многіх на Захадзе аб тым, што пераход ад узброенага руху супраціву да палітычнай партыі павінен быць лінейным, павінна папярэднічаць адмова ад гвалту, павінна спрыяць грамадзянская супольнасць, а пасрэдніцтва ўмераных палітыкаў мае мала рэчаіснасці ў выпадку ісламскага руху супраціву (ХАМАС). Гэта не азначае, што ХАМАС не падвяргаўся палітычнай трансфармацыі: яно ёсць. Але гэта пераўтварэнне было дасягнута, нягледзячы на ​​намаганні Захаду, а не садзейнічанне гэтым намаганням. Застаючыся рухам супраціву, ХАМАС стаў урадам Палестынскай аўтаноміі і змяніў сваю ваенную позу. Але гэтая трансфармацыя прыняла іншы курс, чым той, што акрэслены ў традыцыйных мадэлях дазволу канфліктаў. Хамас і іншыя ісламісцкія групоўкі працягваюць разглядаць сябе як руху супраціву, але яны ўсё часцей бачаць перспектыву таго, што іх арганізацыі могуць перарасці ў палітычныя плыні, якія арыентаваны на негвалтоўны супраціў. Стандартныя мадэлі дазволу канфліктаў у значнай ступені абапіраюцца на заходні вопыт урэгулявання канфліктаў і часта ігнаруюць адрозненні падыходаў у ісламскай гісторыі міратворчасці.. Нядзіўна, падыход ХАМАС да палітычных перамоваў па стылі адрозніваецца ад падыходу Захаду. Таксама, як ісламісцкі рух, які падзяляе больш шырокую аптыку ўздзеяння Захаду на іх грамадства, Хамас патрабуе сапраўднасці і законнасці ў межах сваёй выбарчай акругі, якія адбіваюцца на важнасці, якая надаецца падтрыманню ўзброенай здольнасці. Гэтыя фактары, разам з пераважным эфектам доўгатэрміновых канфліктаў на псіхалогію супольнасці (аспект, на які ўдзяляецца мала ўвагі заходнім мадэлям, які надае перавагу палітычнаму аналізу), мяркуе, што працэс трансфармацыі ХАМАС значна адрозніваўся ад трансфармацыі рухаў зброі пры традыцыйным аналізе. У дадатак, суровы ландшафт ізраільска-палестынскага канфлікту надае вопыту "Хамасу" свае асаблівыя характарыстыкі. Хамас знаходзіцца ў самым разгары важнай трансфармацыі, але палітычныя плыні ў Ізраілі, і ў межах рэгіёна, робяць вынік гэтай трансфармацыі непрадказальным. Шмат што будзе залежаць ад курсу заходняй палітыкі ("глабальная вайна з тэрорам") і як гэтая палітыка ўплывае на адраджэнскія ісламісцкія групоўкі, такія як ХАМАС, групы, прыхільныя выбарам, рэформы і добрае кіраванне.

AN INQUIRY INTO A WESTERN FEAR

і Jahn

If one can point to an overarching characteristic of our time, concern with justice would surely be
near the top of the list. Never in the history of man has there been such a quest for justice, a quest
pursued by both individuals and groups in all walks of life and around the world. In this quest,
religions have played a vital role, while at the same time, religious movements are continually misunderstood
and mis-characterized by opposing groups. The Muslim movements which the Western
media refer to as representative of a dangerous Islamic fundamentalism with militant overtones
is one example where a misunderstanding has resulted in widespread fear and prohibited
what could potentially be a useful partnership. It is not an exaggeration to say that upon hearing
the words ‘Muslim Brotherhood’, many otherwise educated Westerners tend to think only of a
terrorist organization, and it is not inconceivable to think that some Muslims may in fact look at
the World Council of Churches as yet another example of Western imperialism. The truth is that
although Islamic fundamentalism or perhaps more appropriately ‘revivalism’ does have its extremists,
a major focal point of some Muslim movements is an attempt to balance the scales of
social justice in much the same way that the Christians of the West–through the World Council of
Churches–are attempting to rectify situations of poverty, abuse of human rights and other social
issues. This is not to dismiss the violence inherent in some Islamic fundamentalist movements,
merely to show that the terrorist like activities of these movements are emphatically not the
movements’ main program of action, and are, for instance in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood,
more a reaction to events of the time that many organizations, including the Brotherhood,
responded to in a violent manner.

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Егіпет: Рэгрэс у партыйнай платформе "Братоў-мусульман"?

Амр хамзавы


Праект партыйнай платформы "Братоў-мусульман" пасылае неадназначныя сігналы аб палітычных поглядах руху

і пасады. Хаця ён ужо шырока распаўсюджаны, дакумент яшчэ не мае канчатковага
узгадненне з кіраўніцтвам бюро руху.
Падрабязнае стаўленне платформы да палітычнага, сацыяльная, і эканамічныя праблемы азначае значны адыход
з раней менш развітых пазіцый, сфармуляваны між іншым у а 2004 ініцыятыва рэформаў і 2005
выбарчая платформа для кандыдатаў у дэпутаты Брацтва. Гэтая змена звяртаецца да адной з самых
важная крытыка Брацтва, менавіта адстойванне расплывістых ідэалагічных і рэлігійных

лозунгі і немагчымасць прыдумаць канкрэтныя палітычныя прадпісанні.
Дакумент выклікае хвалюючыя пытанні, Аднак, адносна асобы будучага Брацтва

палітычная партыя, а таксама пазіцыя групы па некалькіх палітычных і сацыяльных пытаннях. Вызвалены ў
кантэкст пастаяннага супрацьстаяння паміж егіпецкім рэжымам і брацтвам, гэта выяўляе значнае
неадназначнасці і, магчыма, рэгрэс у мысленні руху.
Па-першае, распрацоўшчыкі вырашылі не разглядаць будучыя адносіны паміж партыяй і рухам. У

робячы так, яны наўмысна ігнаравалі важныя ідэі, якія нядаўна абмяркоўваліся ў руху,
асабліва сярод членаў парламенцкага блока. Натхнёны досведам ісламісцкіх партый у
Марока, Іарданія, і Емен, гэтыя члены выступаюць за функцыянальнае падзел паміж партыяй і
руху, прычым першы арыентаваўся ў асноўным на палітычны ўдзел, а другі - на рэлігійны
актыўнасць. У дадатак да павярхоўнага стаўлення да прыроды партыі і яе ўнутранай арганізацыі, the
платформа не ўтрымлівае дакладнай заявы аб адкрыцці сяброўства ў партыі для ўсіх егіпцян, незалежна ад іх
рэлігія, адно з патрабаванняў стварэння палітычнай партыі ў адпаведнасці з егіпецкай канстытуцыяй.
Па-другое, праект платформы братэрства вызначае ўвядзенне шарыяту ў якасці адной з галоўных партый

мэты. Хоць гэта супадае з інтэрпрэтацыяй артыкула групай 2 Канстытуцыі Егіпта
(“Іслам - гэта рэлігія дзяржавы, а ісламскае права з'яўляецца асноўнай крыніцай заканадаўства”), ён адыходзіць ад ст
прагматычны дух розных заяў і ініцыятыў Брацтва з тых часоў 2004 у якіх менш акцэнту
было аддадзена пытанню шарыяту. Вяртанне да платформы акцэнту на шарыяце прывяло да пазіцый
прынцыпова супярэчыць грамадзянскаму характару дзяржавы і поўным правам грамадзянства, незалежна ад рэлігійных
прыналежнасць.

Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition

John L. Эспазіта

In the 1990s political Islam, what some callIslamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Іран, Sudan, Афганістан), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Турцыя, Іран, Ліван, Kuwait, Yemen, Іарданія, Пакістан, Бангладэш, Малайзія, Інданезія, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.