Vsi vnosi v "Jordan" Kategorija
Arabska Jutri
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
Oktober 6, 1981, je bil v Egiptu mišljen kot dan praznovanja. Obeležili so obletnico največjega trenutka zmage Egipta v treh arabsko-izraelskih konfliktih, ko je podcenjena državna vojska v prvih dneh vdrla čez Sueški prekop 1973 Jomkipurska vojna in poslala izraelske čete v umik. Na hladnem, jutro brez oblačka, stadion v Kairu je bil nabito poln egipčanskih družin, ki so si prišle ogledat vojsko, kako postavlja svojo opremo. Na stojnici za pregled, Predsednik Anwar el-Sadat,vojni arhitekt, z zadovoljstvom gledal, kako pred njim paradirajo ljudje in stroji. Bil sem v bližini, novoprispeli tuji dopisnik.Nenadoma, eden od vojaških tovornjakov se je ustavil neposredno pred pregledovalno stojnico ravno v trenutku, ko je nad glavami v akrobatski izvedbi zarjovelo šest letal Mirage, slikanje neba z dolgimi sledmi rdeče barve, rumena, vijolična,in zeleni dim. Sadat je vstal, očitno se pripravlja na izmenjavo pozdravov s še enim kontingentom egiptovskih vojakov. Postal je odlična tarča za štiri islamistične atentatorje, ki so skočili s tovornjaka, vdrl na stopničke, in njegovo telo prerešetali s kroglami. Ko so morilci nadaljevali, kar se je zdelo večnost, škropili tribuno s svojim smrtonosnim ognjem, Za trenutek sem premišljeval, ali naj udarim ob tla in tvegam, da me panični gledalci poteptajo do smrti, ali pa ostanem na nogah in tvegam, da me bo zadela zalutala krogla.. Instinkt mi je govoril, naj ostanem na nogah, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.
| sep 26, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islam, Politični islam in America
Arabska Insight
Ali je »bratstvo« z Ameriko možno?
khalil al-anani
"Ni nobene možnosti komuniciranja z vsemi zunaj ZDA. administracije, dokler ZDA ohranjajo svoj dolgoletni pogled na islam kot resnično nevarnost, pogled, ki Združene države postavlja v isti čoln kot cionistični sovražnik. Nimamo nobenih vnaprejšnjih predstav o ameriških ljudeh ali ZDA. družbe ter njenih civilnih organizacij in možganskih trustov. Nimamo težav pri komuniciranju z ameriškim ljudstvom, vendar ni vloženih ustreznih naporov, da bi nas zbližali,” je dejal dr. Issam al-Iryan, vodja političnega oddelka Muslimanske bratovščine v telefonskem intervjuju.
Al-Iryanove besede povzemajo poglede Muslimanske bratovščine na Američane in ZDA. vlada. Drugi člani Muslimanske bratovščine bi se strinjali, tako kot pokojni Hassan al-Banna, ki je skupino ustanovil v 1928. Al- Banna je na Zahod gledal predvsem kot na simbol moralnega propada. Drugi salafisti – islamska miselna šola, ki se opira na prednike kot vzorne modele – so zavzeli enako stališče do ZDA, vendar nimajo ideološke prožnosti, ki jo zagovarja Muslimanska bratovščina. Medtem ko Muslimanska bratovščina verjame v vključitev Američanov v civilni dialog, druge skrajne skupine ne vidijo smisla v dialogu in trdijo, da je sila edini način za obravnavo Združenih držav.
| sep 15, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islamism revisited
MAHA AZZAM
There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 leta, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 julij 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.
| sep 06, 2010 | Komentarji 0
ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW
Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld
In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. Ob istem času, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.
| sep 06, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islamska politična kultura, demokracija, in človekove pravice
Daniel E. Cena
Trdimo, da islam olajša avtoritarnost, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Posledično, učenjaki, komentatorji, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. Ta pogled, vendar, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamska politična teorija, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, ki ne upoštevajo drugih dejavnikov. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, kot druge religije, se lahko uporablja za podporo različnih političnih sistemov in politik. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Od tod tudi, nov pristop k preučevanju
zahteva se povezava med islamom in politiko.
predlagam, s strogo oceno odnosa med islamom, demokracija, in človekove pravice na mednarodni ravni, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, ekonomski vplivi, etnične razcepe, in družbeni razvoj, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institucije, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| sep 06, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islam and Democracy
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
| sep 04, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Challenging Authoritarianism, kolonializem, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida
Ahmed Ali Salem
The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most
Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Še posebej, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
Ampak, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet
some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Zato, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, ampak
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamsko pravo). Vendar pa, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,
they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic
sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s
teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)
unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Po drugi strani, they realized the
need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Prav zares,
their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the
following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led
caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing
a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity
and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating
a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the
Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. Vendar pa, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which
emphasized education and undermined politics.
| sep 02, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Egypt at the Tipping Point ?
David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 do 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.
| sep 02, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
Tess Lee Eisenhart
As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of
Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Od svoje ustanovitve l 1928, the Brotherhood (brat) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, vendar, bratovščina ima
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
režim: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Namesto tega, it explores
the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.
| sep 01, 2010 | Komentarji 0
A Muslim Archipelago
Max L. bruto
This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.
| avgust 27, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Democracy in Islamic Political Thought
Azzam S. Tamimi
Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, v 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, v 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.
| avgust 27, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islamska politična kultura, demokracija, in človekove pravice
Daniel E. Cena
Trdimo, da islam olajša avtoritarnost, nasprotuje
vrednote zahodnih družb, in pomembno vpliva na pomembne politične rezultate
pri muslimanskih narodih. Posledično, učenjaki, komentatorji, in vlada
uradniki pogosto navajajo, da je naslednji "islamski fundamentalizem"
ideološka grožnja liberalnim demokracijam. Ta pogled, vendar, temelji predvsem na
o analizi besedil, Islamska politična teorija, in ad hoc študije
posameznih držav, ki ne upoštevajo drugih dejavnikov. Moja trditev je
da so besedila in tradicije islama, kot druge religije,
se lahko uporablja za podporo različnih političnih sistemov in politik. Država
specifične in opisne študije nam ne pomagajo najti vzorcev, ki bodo pomagali
razložimo različna razmerja med islamom in politiko po vsej Evropi
države muslimanskega sveta. Od tod tudi, nov pristop k preučevanju
zahteva se povezava med islamom in politiko.
predlagam, s strogo oceno odnosa med islamom,
demokracija, in človekove pravice na mednarodni ravni, da preveč
poudarek je na moči islama kot politične sile. Jaz prvi
uporabi primerjalne študije primerov, ki se osredotočajo na dejavnike, ki se nanašajo na medsebojno delovanje
med islamskimi skupinami in režimi, ekonomski vplivi, etnične razcepe,
in družbeni razvoj, razložiti odstopanje v vplivu
Islam o politiki v osmih državah.
| avgust 24, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islamska politična kultura, demokracija, in človekove pravice
Daniel E. Cena
Trdimo, da islam olajša avtoritarnost, nasprotuje
vrednote zahodnih družb, in pomembno vpliva na pomembne politične rezultate
pri muslimanskih narodih. Posledično, učenjaki, komentatorji, in vlada
uradniki pogosto navajajo, da je naslednji "islamski fundamentalizem"
ideološka grožnja liberalnim demokracijam. Ta pogled, vendar, temelji predvsem na
o analizi besedil, Islamska politična teorija, in ad hoc študije
posameznih držav, ki ne upoštevajo drugih dejavnikov. Moja trditev je
da so besedila in tradicije islama, kot druge religije,
se lahko uporablja za podporo različnih političnih sistemov in politik. Država
specifične in opisne študije nam ne pomagajo najti vzorcev, ki bodo pomagali
razložimo različna razmerja med islamom in politiko po vsej Evropi
države muslimanskega sveta. Od tod tudi, nov pristop k preučevanju
zahteva se povezava med islamom in politiko.
predlagam, s strogo oceno odnosa med islamom,
demokracija, in človekove pravice na mednarodni ravni, da preveč
poudarek je na moči islama kot politične sile. Jaz prvi
uporabi primerjalne študije primerov, ki se osredotočajo na dejavnike, ki se nanašajo na medsebojno delovanje
med islamskimi skupinami in režimi, ekonomski vplivi, etnične razcepe,
in družbeni razvoj, razložiti odstopanje v vplivu
Islam o politiki v osmih državah.
| avgust 22, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islamistične opozicijske stranke in potencial za sodelovanje v EU
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Glede na vse večji pomen islamističnih gibanj v muslimanskem svetu in
način, kako je radikalizacija vplivala na svetovne dogodke od preloma stoletja, to
Pomembno je, da EU oceni svoje politike do akterjev znotraj tistega, kar je lahko ohlapno
imenovan "islamski svet". Še posebej pomembno je vprašati, ali in kako se vključiti
z različnimi islamističnimi skupinami.
To ostaja sporno tudi v EU. Nekateri menijo, da islamske vrednote to
ležijo za islamističnimi strankami preprosto niso združljive z zahodnimi ideali demokracije in
človekove pravice, medtem ko drugi zaradi naraščajočega vidika angažiranost vidijo kot realno potrebo
domačega pomena islamističnih strank in njihovega vse večjega vključevanja v mednarodne
zadeve. Druga perspektiva je, da bi se demokratizacija v muslimanskem svetu povečala
Evropska varnost. Veljavnost teh in drugih argumentov glede tega, ali in kako
EU bi se morala vključiti v preizkus le s preučevanjem različnih islamističnih gibanj in
njihove politične okoliščine, po državi.
Demokratizacija je osrednja tema skupnih zunanjepolitičnih ukrepov EU, kot je bilo položeno
v členu 11 Pogodbe o Evropski uniji. Pri tem so upoštevale številne države
Poročilo ni demokratično, ali ne povsem demokratičen. V večini teh držav, Islamistični
stranke in gibanja predstavljajo veliko nasprotovanje prevladujočim režimom, in
v nekaterih tvorijo največji opozicijski blok. Evropske demokracije so že dolgo morale
ukvarjajo se z vladnimi režimi, ki so avtoritarni, vendar je nov pritisk nov
za demokratično reformo v državah, v katerih imajo najverjetnejši upravičenci, Iz
Stališče EU, različni in včasih problematični pristopi k demokraciji in njeni
povezane vrednosti, kot so manjšinske in ženske pravice ter pravna država. Te obtožbe so
pogosto nasprotovan islamističnim gibanjem, zato je pomembno, da evropski oblikovalci politike to storijo
imeti natančno sliko o politikah in filozofijah potencialnih partnerjev.
Izkušnje iz različnih držav kažejo, da je islamistično več svobode
zabave so dovoljene, bolj zmerni so v svojih dejanjih in idejah. V veliko
primeri, ko se islamistične stranke in skupine že zdavnaj odmikajo od svojega prvotnega cilja
o ustanovitvi Islamske države, ki jo ureja islamsko pravo, in sprejeli osnovne
demokratična načela volilne konkurence za oblast, obstoj drugih političnih
tekmovalci, in politični pluralizem.
| avgust 21, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Politični islam na Bližnjem vzhodu
so Knudsen
To poročilo predstavlja uvod v izbrane vidike pojava
imenovani "politični islam". Poročilo daje poseben poudarek na Bližnjem vzhodu, v
zlasti levantinske države, in opisuje dva vidika islamističnega gibanja, ki lahko
velja za polarna nasprotja: demokracija in politično nasilje. V tretjem delu poročila
pregleda nekatere glavne teorije, ki se uporabljajo za razlago islamskega vstajenja na Bližnjem vzhodu
(Slika 1). V pismu, poročilo kaže, da islam ni treba združiti z demokracijo in
da je pogosto zanemarjati dejstvo, da so bile številne države Bližnjega vzhoda
vključeni v brutalno zatiranje islamističnih gibanj, jih povzroča, nekateri trdijo, da se lotijo
orožje proti državi, in redkeje, tuje države. Uporaba političnega nasilja je
razširjena na Bližnjem vzhodu, vendar ni niti nelogičen niti neracionalen. V mnogih primerih celo
Islamistične skupine, znane po uporabi nasilja, so se spremenile v mirne politične
stranke, ki uspešno kandidirajo na občinskih in državnih volitvah. Kljub temu, islamisti
oživitev na Bližnjem vzhodu ostaja deloma nepojasnjena kljub številnim teorijam, ki si jih prizadevajo
za njegovo rast in priljubljenost. Na splošno, večina teorij meni, da je islamizem a
reakcija na relativno pomanjkanje, zlasti socialna neenakost in politično zatiranje. Alternativa
teorije iščejo odgovor na islamistični preporod znotraj meja same religije in
močan, evokativni potencial verske simbolike.
Zaključek trdi v prid prehodu iz pristopa "mračnost in usoda"
predstavlja islamizem kot nelegitimen politični izraz in potencialno grožnjo Zahodu ("Star
Islamizem ”), in bolj zatemnjenega razumevanja sedanje demokratizacije islamistov
gibanje, ki se zdaj odvija po vsem Bližnjem vzhodu ("Novi islamizem"). Tole
pomembnost razumevanja ideoloških korenin "novega islamizma" je v ospredju
skupaj s potrebo po temeljitem poznavanju islamističnih gibanj in njihovih izkušenj iz prve roke
pristaši. Kot družbena gibanja, Trdimo, da je treba dati večji poudarek
razumevanje načinov, kako so lahko uresničevali težnje ne le
revnejših slojev družbe, pa tudi srednjega razreda.
| avgust 20, 2010 | Komentarji 0
STRATEGIJE ZA UPORABO POLITIČNEGA ISLAMA
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA KADLEC
Politični islam je danes najbolj aktivna politična sila na Bližnjem vzhodu. Njegova prihodnost je tesno povezana z prihodnostjo regije. Če bi se ZDA in Evropska unija zavezali podpirati politične reforme v regiji, morali bodo izmisliti beton, skladne strategije za vključevanje islamističnih skupin. Pa vendar, ZDA. na splošno ni želel odpreti dialoga s temi gibanji. podobno, Izjema je bila sodelovanje EU z islamisti, ne pravilo. Tam, kjer obstajajo stiki na nizki ravni, služijo predvsem za zbiranje informacij, ne strateških ciljev. ZDA. EU ima številne programe, ki se ukvarjajo z gospodarskim in političnim razvojem v regiji - med njimi pobuda za partnerstvo na Bližnjem vzhodu (MEPI), korporacijo Millennium Challenge (MCC), Unija za Sredozemlje, in evropsko sosedsko politiko (ENP) - vendar pa le malo govorijo o tem, kako se izziv islamistične politične opozicije ujema s širšimi regionalnimi cilji. zunaj ZDA. Pomoč in programiranje demokracije v EU so skoraj v celoti usmerjeni bodisi k avtoritarnim vladam bodisi bodisi sekularnim skupinam civilne družbe z minimalno podporo v njihovih družbah..
Prišel je čas za ponovno oceno trenutnih politik. Od septembra septembra 11, 2001, podpiranje demokracije na Bližnjem vzhodu je dobilo večji pomen za zahodne oblikovalce politike, ki vidijo povezavo med pomanjkanjem demokracije in političnim nasiljem. Večja pozornost je bila namenjena razumevanju različic političnega islama. Nova ameriška administracija je bolj odprta za širjenje komunikacije z muslimanskim svetom. Medtem, velika večina osrednjih islamističnih organizacij - tudi Muslimanska bratovščina v Egiptu, Jordanska fronta islamske akcije (IAF), Maroška stranka pravičnosti in razvoja (PJD), islamsko ustavno gibanje Kuvajta, in jemenska stranka Islama - so podpora politični reformi in demokraciji vedno bolj osrednja sestavina njihovih političnih platform. Poleg tega, mnogi so izrazili veliko zanimanje za odpiranje dialoga s ZDA. in vlade EU.
Prihodnost odnosov med zahodnimi državami in Bližnjim vzhodom je lahko v veliki meri odvisna od stopnje, v kateri prvi vključujejo nenasilne islamistične stranke v širok dialog o skupnih interesih in ciljih. V zadnjem času se je razširilo število raziskav o povezanosti z islamisti, toda le malo jih jasno obravnava, kaj bi lahko pomenilo v praksi. Kot Zoé Nautré, gostujoči kolega na nemškem svetu za zunanje odnose, postavlja, „EU razmišlja o angažmaju, vendar ne ve, kako.“ 1 V upanju, da razpravlja razpravo, ločimo med tremi stopnjami „angažiranosti,"Vsak z različnimi sredstvi in konci: stiki na nizki ravni, strateški dialog, in partnerstvo.
| avgust 19, 2010 | Komentarji 0
IkhwanScope na Facebook
IkhwanScope Na Scribd
IkhwanScope Na Twitterju