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The Arab Tomorrow

DAVID B. ÚTTAKA

október 6, 1981, átti að vera hátíðardagur í Egyptalandi. Það markaði afmæli stórkostlegustu sigurstundar Egyptalands í þremur átökum araba og Ísraela., þegar fátækur her landsins lagðist yfir Súez-skurðinn á opnunardögum landsins 1973 Yom Kippur-stríðið og sendi ísraelska hermenn að hörfa. Á svala, skýlaus morgun, Kaíró leikvangurinn var troðfullur af egypskum fjölskyldum sem höfðu komið til að sjá herinn stinga vélbúnaði sínum., Anwar el-Sadat forseti,arkitekt stríðsins, horfði með ánægju þegar menn og vélar gengu fram fyrir hann. Ég var nálægt, nýkominn erlendur fréttaritari.Skyndilega, einn af herflutningabílunum stöðvaði beint fyrir framan yfirlitssýninguna rétt þegar sex Mirage þotur öskruðu yfir höfuð í loftfimleikum, að mála himininn með löngum rauðum slóðum, gulur, fjólublár,og grænan reyk. Sadat stóð upp, að því er virðist að búa sig undir að skiptast á kveðjum við enn einn lið egypskra hermanna. Hann gerði sig að fullkomnu skotmarki fyrir fjóra íslamista morðingja sem stukku úr vörubílnum, ruddist inn á pallinn, og þeytti líkama hans með byssukúlum. Þegar morðingjarnir héldu áfram í það sem virtist heila eilífð að úða stallinum með banvænum eldi sínum, Ég velti því fyrir mér í augnabliki hvort ég ætti að lenda í jörðu og eiga á hættu að verða troðinn til bana af skelfingu lostnum áhorfendum eða halda áfram og eiga á hættu að taka villandi byssukúlu. Eðlishvöt sagði mér að halda mér á fætur, og blaðamannaskylda mín varð til þess að ég fór að komast að því hvort Sadat væri á lífi eða dáinn.

Íslam, Stjórnmála Íslam og Ameríku

Arab Insight

Er „Bræðralag“ með Ameríku mögulegt?

khalil al-anani

„Það er enginn möguleiki á að eiga samskipti við nein Bandaríkin. stjórnsýslu svo framarlega sem Bandaríkin halda við langvarandi skoðun sinni á íslam sem raunverulegri hættu, skoðun sem setur Bandaríkin í sama bát og óvinur zíonista. Við höfum engar fyrirfram gefnar hugmyndir varðandi bandarísku þjóðina eða Bandaríkin. samfélaginu og borgaralegum samtökum þess og hugveitum. Við eigum ekki í neinum vandræðum með að eiga samskipti við bandarísku þjóðina en ekki er reynt að færa okkur nær,“ sagði Dr. Issam al-Iryan, yfirmaður stjórnmáladeildar Bræðralags múslima í símaviðtali.
Orð Al-Iryan draga saman skoðanir Bræðralags múslima á bandarísku þjóðinni og Bandaríkjunum. ríkisstjórn. Aðrir meðlimir Bræðralags múslima myndu taka undir það, eins og hinn látni Hassan al-Banna, sem stofnaði hópinn í 1928. Al- Banna leit á Vesturlönd að mestu leyti sem tákn um siðferðisbrot. Aðrir salafistar – íslamskur hugsunarskóli sem treystir á forfeður sem fyrirmyndir – hafa tekið sömu skoðun á Bandaríkjunum, en skortir þann hugmyndafræðilega sveigjanleika sem Bræðralag múslima aðhyllist. Þó að Bræðralag múslima trúi því að Bandaríkjamenn taki þátt í borgaralegum viðræðum, aðrir öfgahópar sjá engan tilgang í viðræðum og halda því fram að hervald sé eina leiðin til að eiga við Bandaríkin.

Íslamismi endurskoðaður

Maha AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 ár, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Júlí 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

ISLAM OG LÖGREGLU

Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld

Í nútíma vestrænu samfélagi okkar, ríkisskipulögð lögfræðileg kerfi draga venjulega sérstaka línu sem aðgreinir trúarbrögð og lög. Öfugt, það eru fjöldi íslamskra svæðisbundinna samfélaga þar sem trú og lög eru eins nátengd og samtvinnuð í dag eins og þau voru fyrir upphaf nútímans. Á sama tíma, það hlutfall sem trúarlög eru í (shariah á arabísku) og almannarétt (lögin) eru blandaðir mismunandi eftir löndum. Hvað er meira, staða íslams og þar af leiðandi einnig íslamskra laga. Samkvæmt upplýsingum frá Samtökum íslamska ráðstefnunnar (OIC), það eru eins og er 57 Íslamsk ríki um allan heim, skilgreind sem lönd þar sem íslam er trúarbrögð (1) ríkið, (2) meirihluti íbúanna, eða (3) mikill minnihluti. Allt þetta hefur áhrif á þróun og form íslamskra laga.

Íslamsk stjórnmálamenning, Lýðræði, og mannréttindi

Daniel E. Verð

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Þar af leiðandi, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, þó, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

Islam and Democracy

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Að ögra forræðishyggju, Nýlendustefnunnar, og sundurlyndi: Íslamskar stjórnmálaumbótahreyfingar al-Afghani og Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Einkum, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
En, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Þess vegna, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, but
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). Hins vegar, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. On the other hand, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Einmitt,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Hins vegar, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Egyptaland á Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 til 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.

Skipulagssamfella í múslimska bræðralagi Egyptalands

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Frá stofnun þess í 1928, the Brotherhood (Ikhwan) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, þó, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
stjórn: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Múslímskur eyjaklasi

Max L. Gross

This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.

Democracy in Islamic Political Thought

Azzam S. Tamimi

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, í 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, í 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

Íslamsk stjórnmálamenning, Lýðræði, og mannréttindi

Daniel E. Verð

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. Þar af leiðandi, scholars, commentators, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, þó, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,

can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,

democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Íslamsk stjórnmálamenning, Lýðræði, og mannréttindi

Daniel E. Verð

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Þar af leiðandi, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, þó, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB, Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB. Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB.

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB. Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

mannréttindi, Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum.

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum 11 innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, Íslamista

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, og

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg. takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg.

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg. takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum, að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum

að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum, að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum

að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum, að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum.

Pólitískt íslam í Miðausturlöndum

Eru Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, í

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Mynd 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Engu að síður, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

STEFNI TIL AÐ TAKA PÓLITÍSKA ÍSLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Samt, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Á sama hátt, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The US. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. US. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. Auk, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.