Kaikki merkinnät "Jordan" Luokka
Arabi huomenna
Arabi huomenna. Arabi huomenna
Arabi huomenna 6, 1981, Arabi huomenna. Arabi huomenna, Arabi huomenna 1973 Arabi huomenna. Arabi huomenna, Arabi huomenna, Arabi huomenna, Arabi huomenna,Arabi huomenna, Arabi huomenna. Arabi huomenna, Arabi huomenna, yksi armeijan kuorma-autoista pysähtyi suoraan tarkasteluosaston eteen, kun kuusi Mirage-suihkukonetta jyrisi pään yläpuolella akrobaattisessa esityksessä, yksi armeijan kuorma-autoista pysähtyi suoraan tarkasteluosaston eteen, kun kuusi Mirage-suihkukonetta jyrisi pään yläpuolella akrobaattisessa esityksessä, yksi armeijan kuorma-autoista pysähtyi suoraan tarkasteluosaston eteen, kun kuusi Mirage-suihkukonetta jyrisi pään yläpuolella akrobaattisessa esityksessä, yksi armeijan kuorma-autoista pysähtyi suoraan tarkasteluosaston eteen, kun kuusi Mirage-suihkukonetta jyrisi pään yläpuolella akrobaattisessa esityksessä,yksi armeijan kuorma-autoista pysähtyi suoraan tarkasteluosaston eteen, kun kuusi Mirage-suihkukonetta jyrisi pään yläpuolella akrobaattisessa esityksessä. yksi armeijan kuorma-autoista pysähtyi suoraan tarkasteluosaston eteen, kun kuusi Mirage-suihkukonetta jyrisi pään yläpuolella akrobaattisessa esityksessä, yksi armeijan kuorma-autoista pysähtyi suoraan tarkasteluosaston eteen, kun kuusi Mirage-suihkukonetta jyrisi pään yläpuolella akrobaattisessa esityksessä. yksi armeijan kuorma-autoista pysähtyi suoraan tarkasteluosaston eteen, kun kuusi Mirage-suihkukonetta jyrisi pään yläpuolella akrobaattisessa esityksessä, yksi armeijan kuorma-autoista pysähtyi suoraan tarkasteluosaston eteen, kun kuusi Mirage-suihkukonetta jyrisi pään yläpuolella akrobaattisessa esityksessä, yksi armeijan kuorma-autoista pysähtyi suoraan tarkasteluosaston eteen, kun kuusi Mirage-suihkukonetta jyrisi pään yläpuolella akrobaattisessa esityksessä, yksi armeijan kuorma-autoista pysähtyi suoraan tarkasteluosaston eteen, kun kuusi Mirage-suihkukonetta jyrisi pään yläpuolella akrobaattisessa esityksessä. yksi armeijan kuorma-autoista pysähtyi suoraan tarkasteluosaston eteen, kun kuusi Mirage-suihkukonetta jyrisi pään yläpuolella akrobaattisessa esityksessä, ja journalistisen velvollisuuden tunteeni pakotti minut lähtemään selvittämään, oliko Sadat elossa vai kuollut.
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toteutettiin Baselin yliopistossa, Poliittinen islam ja Amerikka
Arab Insight
toteutettiin Baselin yliopistossa?
toteutettiin Baselin yliopistossa
toteutettiin Baselin yliopistossa. toteutettiin Baselin yliopistossa, näkemys, joka asettaa Yhdysvallat samaan veneeseen sionistivihollisen kanssa. Meillä ei ole ennakkokäsityksiä amerikkalaisista tai Yhdysvalloista. yhteiskunta ja sen kansalaisjärjestöt ja ajatushautomot. Meillä ei ole ongelmia kommunikoida amerikkalaisten kanssa, mutta riittäviä ponnisteluja ei ryhdytä lähentämään meitä," sanoi Dr. Issam al-Iryan, Muslimiveljeskunnan poliittisen osaston päällikkö puhelinhaastattelussa.
Al-Iryanin sanat tiivistävät Muslimiveljeskunnan näkemykset amerikkalaisista ja Yhdysvalloista. hallitus. Muut Muslimiveljeskunnan jäsenet olisivat samaa mieltä, kuten edesmennyt Hassan al-Banna, joka perusti ryhmän vuonna 1928. Al- Banna piti länttä enimmäkseen moraalisen rappeutumisen symbolina. Muut salafit – islamilainen ajatuskoulu, joka luottaa esivanhempiin mallimalleina – ovat ottaneet saman näkemyksen Yhdysvalloista., mutta heiltä puuttuu Muslimiveljeskunnan kannattama ideologinen joustavuus. Muslimiveljeskunta uskoo saavansa amerikkalaiset mukaan kansalaisvuoropuheluun, muut ääriryhmät eivät näe vuoropuhelussa mitään järkeä ja väittävät, että voima on ainoa tapa käsitellä Yhdysvaltoja.
| ja journalistisen velvollisuuden tunteeni pakotti minut lähtemään selvittämään, oliko Sadat elossa vai kuollut 15, 2010 | Kommentit 0
Islamism revisited
MAHA Azzam
There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 vuotta, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Heinäkuu 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.
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ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW
Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld
In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. Samaan aikaan, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.
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Islamic Political Culture, Demokratia, and Human Rights
Daniel E. Hinta
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, kuitenkin, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
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Islam and Democracy
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
Mutta joidenkin muslimitutkijoiden mukaan, demokratia on edelleen tärkeä ihanne islamissa, sillä varauksella, että se on aina uskonnollisen lain alainen. Shari'an tärkeimmän paikan korostaminen on osa melkein jokaista islamilaista hallintoa koskevaa kommenttia, maltillinen tai äärimmäinen. Vain jos hallitsija, joka saa valtansa Jumalalta, rajoittaa toimintansa "shari'an hallinnon valvontaan", onko häntä toteltava. Jos hän tekee muuta kuin tämän, hän ei ole uskovainen ja sitoutuneiden muslimien tulee kapinoida häntä vastaan. Tässä on oikeutus suurelle osalle väkivaltaa, joka on vaivannut muslimimaailmaa sellaisissa taisteluissa kuin Algeriassa 90-luvulla.
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Haastava autoritaarisuus, Kolonialismi, ja eripuraisuus: Al-Afganin ja Ridan islamilaiset poliittiset uudistusliikkeet
Ahmed Ali Salem
Muslimimaailman taantuminen edelsi useimpien eurooppalaisten kolonisaatiota
Muslimimaita 1800-luvun viimeisellä neljänneksellä ja ensimmäisellä
1900-luvun neljännes. Erityisesti, ottomaanien valtakunnan
valta ja maailmantila olivat heikentyneet 1600-luvulta lähtien.
Mutta, tärkeämpää muslimitutkijoille, se oli lakannut tapaamasta
joitakin perusvaatimuksia sen asemalle kalifaattina, ylin ja
suvereeni poliittinen kokonaisuus, jolle kaikkien muslimien tulee olla uskollisia.
Siksi, Jotkut imperiumin muslimitutkijat ja -intellektuellit kutsuivat
poliittiseen uudistukseen jo ennen Euroopan tunkeutumista
muslimien maat. Heidän suunnittelemansa uudistukset eivät olleet pelkästään islamilaisia, mutta
myös ottomaanien – ottomaanien puitteissa.
Nämä uudistajat ymmärsivät muslimimaailman rappeutumisen yleisesti,
ja erityisesti Ottomaanien valtakunnasta, olla seurausta lisääntymisestä
piittaamattomuus sharia'an täytäntöönpanosta (Islamilainen laki). Kuitenkin, vuodesta lähtien
1700-luvun lopulla, kasvava määrä uudistajia, joskus tuettu
Ottomaanien sulttaanien toimesta, alkoi vaatia valtakunnan uudistamista
moderneja eurooppalaisia linjoja. Imperiumin epäonnistuminen puolustaa maitaan ja
Vastaaminen menestyksekkäästi lännen haasteisiin vain lisäsi tätä kutsua
uudistuksen "modernisoimiseksi"., joka saavutti huippunsa Tanzimat-liikkeessä
1800-luvun jälkipuoliskolla.
Muut muslimien uudistajat vaativat keskitietä. Toisaalta,
he myönsivät, että kalifaatti olisi mallinnettava islamin mukaan
opastuksen lähteitä, erityisesti Koraani ja profeetta Muhammed
opetuksia (Sunnah), ja se umma (maailman muslimiyhteisö)
yhtenäisyys on yksi islamin poliittisista pilareista. Toisaalta, he ymmärsivät
tarve nuorentaa valtakuntaa tai korvata se elinkelpoisemmalla. Todellakin,
heidän luovia ideoitaan tulevista malleista, mutta eivät rajoittuneet, the
seurata: Turkin johtaman ottomaanien valtakunnan korvaaminen arabien johtamalla
kalifaatti, liittovaltion tai konfederaation muslimikalifaatin rakentaminen, perustamisesta
muslimi- tai itämaisten kansojen yhteisö, ja solidaarisuuden vahvistaminen
ja yhteistyö itsenäisten muslimimaiden välillä luomatta
kiinteä rakenne. Näitä ja vastaavia ideoita kutsuttiin myöhemmin nimellä
Muslimien liigan malli, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. Kuitenkin, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, joka
emphasized education and undermined politics.
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Egypt at the Tipping Point ?
David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 että 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.
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Egyptin muslimiveljeskunnan organisaation jatkuvuus
Tess Lee Eisenhart
As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of
Muslimi Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Ikhwan) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, kuitenkin, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores
the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.
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A Muslim Archipelago
Max L. Brutto
This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.
| elokuu 27, 2010 | Kommentit 0
Demokratia islamilaisessa poliittisessa ajattelussa
Azzam S. Tamimi
Demokratia on askarruttanut arabien poliittisia ajattelijoita modernin arabien renessanssin kynnyksellä noin kaksi vuosisataa sitten. Siitä lähtien, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, sisään 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, sisään 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.
| elokuu 27, 2010 | Kommentit 0
Islamic Political Culture, Demokratia, and Human Rights
Daniel E. Hinta
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the
values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, kuitenkin, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,
and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of
Islam on politics across eight nations.
| elokuu 24, 2010 | Kommentit 0
Islamic Political Culture, Demokratia, and Human Rights
Daniel E. Hinta
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the
values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, kuitenkin, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,
and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of
Islam on politics across eight nations.
| elokuu 22, 2010 | Kommentit 0
Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and
the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, se
is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely
termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage
with the various Islamist groups.
This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that
lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and
ihmisoikeudet, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing
domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international
affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase
European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the
EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and
their political circumstances, country by country.
Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid
out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this
report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist
parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, ja
in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to
deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press
for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the
EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its
related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are
often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to
have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.
Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist
parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many
cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim
of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic
democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political
competitors, and political pluralism.
| elokuu 21, 2010 | Kommentit 0
Political Islam in the Middle East
Ovatko Knudsen
This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly
referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, sisään
particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may
be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report
reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East
(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and
that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been
engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up
arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is
widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even
Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political
parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist
revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to
account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a
reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative
theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the
powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.
The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that
portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old
Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist
movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This
importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded
along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their
adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on
understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only
of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.
| elokuu 20, 2010 | Kommentit 0
STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA Kadlec
Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Vielä, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Eikä toisin kuin perinteisessä antisemitismin asiakirjassa esitetyt syytökset, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. USA. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordanian islamilainen toimintarintama (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.
| elokuu 19, 2010 | Kommentit 0
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