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Арапската утре

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

October 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, a newly arrived foreign correspondent.Suddenly, one of the army trucks halted directly in front of the reviewing stand just as six Mirage jets roared overhead in an acrobatic performance, painting the sky with long trails of red, yellow, purple,and green smoke. Sadat stood up, apparently preparing to exchange salutes with yet another contingent of Egyptian troops. He made himself a perfect target for four Islamist assassins who jumped from the truck, stormed the podium, and riddled his body with bullets.As the killers continued for what seemed an eternity to spray the stand with their deadly fire, I considered for an instant whether to hit the ground and risk being trampled to death by panicked spectators or remain afoot and risk taking a stray bullet. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

Тоталитаризмот на џихад исламизам и предизвик во Европа и во исламот

Басо Tibi

При читањето на мнозинството на текстови кои се огромно литература која е објавена од страна самопрогласени експерти на политичкиот ислам, тоа е лесно да се пропушти фактот дека ново движење има појавено. Further, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, сепак, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty
in the history of politics since it has its roots in two parallel and related phenomena: first, the culturalisation of politics which leads to politics being conceptualised as a cultural system (a view pioneered by Clifford Geertz); and second the return of the sacred, or ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, as a reaction to its intensive secularisation resulting from globalisation.
The analysis of political ideologies that are based on religions, and that can exert appeal as a political religion as a consequence of this, involves a social science understanding of the role of religion played by world politics, especially after the bi-polar system of the Cold War has given way to a multi-polar world. In a project conducted at the Hannah Arendt Institute for the application of totalitarianism to the study of political religions, I proposed the distinction between secular ideologies that act as a substitute for religion, and religious ideologies based on genuine religious faith, which is the case in religious fundamentalism (see note
24). Another project on ‘Political Religion’, carried out at the University of Basel, has made clearer the point that new approaches to politics become necessary once a religious faith becomes clothed in a political garb.Drawing on the authoritative sources of political Islam, this article suggests that the great variety of organisations inspired by Islamist ideology are to be conceptualised both as political religions and as political movements. The unique quality of political Islam lies is the fact that it is based on a transnational religion (see note 26).

исламот, Политичкиот ислам и Америка

Арапски Insight

Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?

khalil al-anani

"Не постои можност за комуникација со било U.S. administration so long as the United States maintains its long-standing view of Islam as a real danger, a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have no pre-conceived notions concerning the American people or the U.S. society and its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chief of the political department of the Muslim Brotherhood in a phone interview.
Al-Iryan’s words sum up the Muslim Brotherhood’s views of the American people and the U.S. government. Other members of the Muslim Brotherhood would agree, as would the late Hassan al-Banna, who founded the group in 1928. Al- Banna viewed the West mostly as a symbol of moral decay. Other Salafis – an Islamic school of thought that relies on ancestors as exemplary models – have taken the same view of the United States, but lack the ideological flexibility espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood believes in engaging the Americans in civil dialogue, other extremist groups see no point in dialogue and maintain that force is the only way of dealing with the United States.

Либералната демократија и политички ислам: Потрага по заедничка основа.

Mostapha Benhenda

Овој труд се обидува да воспостави дијалог помеѓу демократските и исламските политички теории.1 Врската меѓу нив е збунувачка: на пример, со цел да се објасни односот што постои помеѓу демократијата и нивното сфаќање за идеалното исламско политичко
режим, пакистанскиот научник Абу Ала Маудуди го измислил неологизмот „теодемократија“, додека францускиот научник Луис Масињон предложил оксиморон „секуларна теократија“. Овие изрази сугерираат дека некои аспекти на демократијата се оценуваат позитивно, а други се оценуваат негативно. На пример, Муслиманските научници и активисти често го поддржуваат принципот на отчетност на владетелите, што е дефинирачка карактеристика на демократијата. Напротив, тие често го отфрлаат принципот на поделба помеѓу религијата и државата, што честопати се смета за дел од демократијата (барем, на демократијата како што е познато во Соединетите држави денес). Со оглед на оваа мешана проценка на демократските принципи, се чини интересно да се одреди концепцијата за демократија која лежи во основата на исламските политички модели. Со други зборови, треба да се обидеме да откриеме што е демократско во „теодемократијата“. За таа цел, меѓу импресивната разновидност и плуралност на исламските традиции на нормативната политичка мисла, ние во суштина се фокусираме на широката струја на размислување што се враќа на Абу Ала Маудуди и египетскиот интелектуалец Сајед Кутб.8 Овој посебен тренд на размислување е интересен затоа што во муслиманскиот свет, лежи во основата на некои од најпредизвикувачките спротивставувања на дифузијата на вредностите што потекнуваат од Западот. Врз основа на верските вредности, овој тренд разработи политички модел алтернатива на либералната демократија. Широко кажано, концепцијата на демократијата вклучена во овој исламски политички модел е процедурална. Со некои разлики, оваа концепција е инспирирана од демократските теории што ги застапуваат некои уставници и политички научници.10 Таа е тенка и минималистичка, до одредена точка. На пример, не се потпира на ниту еден поим за народен суверенитет и не бара никакво раздвојување помеѓу религијата и политиката. Првата цел на овој труд е да ја разработи оваа минималистичка концепција. Ние правиме детално повторување на тоа со цел да ја изолираме оваа концепција од нејзината морална (либерален) темели, кои се контроверзни од посебната исламска гледна точка разгледани овде. Навистина, демократскиот процес обично се изведува од принципот на лична автономија, што не е одобрено од овие исламски теории.11 Еве, покажуваме дека таквиот принцип не е неопходен за да се оправда демократски процес.

Принципот на поместување во структурата на исламот

Dr. Мухамед Икбал

Како културно движење исламот отфрла старата статичен поглед на универзумот, и достигнува динамичен преглед. Како емоционална систем на обединување ја признава вредноста на поединецот како таков, и ги отфрла bloodrelationship како основа на човечкото единство. Blood-relationship is earthrootedness. The search for a purely psychological foundation of human unity becomes possible only with the perception that all human life is spiritual in its origin.1 Such a perception is creative of fresh loyalties without any ceremonial to keep them alive, and makes it possible for man to emancipate himself from the earth. Christianity which had originally appeared as a monastic order was tried by Constantine as a system of unification.2 Its failure to work as such a system drove the Emperor Julian3 to return to the old gods of Rome on which he attempted to put philosophical interpretations. A modern historian of civilization has thus depicted the state of the civilized world about the time when Islam appeared on the stage of History: It seemed then that the great civilization that it had taken four thousand years to construct was on the verge of disintegration, and that mankind was likely to return to that condition of barbarism where every tribe and sect was against the next, and law and order were unknown . . . На
old tribal sanctions had lost their power. Hence the old imperial methods would no longer operate. The new sanctions created by
Christianity were working division and destruction instead of unity and order. It was a time fraught with tragedy. Civilization, like a gigantic tree whose foliage had overarched the world and whose branches had borne the golden fruits of art and science and literature, stood tottering, its trunk no longer alive with the flowing sap of devotion and reverence, but rotted to the core, riven by the storms of war, and held together only by the cords of ancient customs and laws, that might snap at any moment. Was there any emotional culture that could be brought in, to gather mankind once more into unity and to save civilization? This culture must be something of a new type, for the old sanctions and ceremonials were dead, and to build up others of the same kind would be the work
of centuries.’The writer then proceeds to tell us that the world stood in need of a new culture to take the place of the culture of the throne, and the systems of unification which were based on bloodrelationship.
It is amazing, he adds, that such a culture should have arisen from Arabia just at the time when it was most needed. There is, сепак, nothing amazing in the phenomenon. The world-life intuitively sees its own needs, and at critical moments defines its own direction. This is what, in the language of religion, we call prophetic revelation. It is only natural that Islam should have flashed across the consciousness of a simple people untouched by any of the ancient cultures, and occupying a geographical position where three continents meet together. The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity in the principle of Tauhâd.’5 Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature. The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to regulate its collective life, for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of perpetual change.

Исламската реформацијата

Аднан Кан

Италијанскиот премиер, Силвио Берлускони се пофали по настаните во 9/11:
„... ние мора да бидеме свесни за супериорноста на нашата цивилизација, систем кој гарантирал

благосостојба, почитување на човековите права и – за разлика од исламските земји – почит

за верски и политички права, систем кој има свои вредности разбирање за различноста

и толеранција… Западот ќе ги освои народите, како да го освои комунизмот, дури и ако е тоа

значи конфронтација со друга цивилизација, исламскиот, заглави каде беше

1,400 пред години… ”1

И во А. 2007 пријавете го институтот РАНД прогласен:
„Борбата што се одвива низ поголемиот дел од муслиманскиот свет во суштина е војна

идеи. Неговиот исход ќе го одреди идниот правец на муслиманскиот свет “.

Градење умерени муслимански мрежи, Институт РАНД

Концептот на „Ислах“ (реформи) е концепт непознат за муслиманите. Никогаш не постоела во текот на

историја на исламската цивилизација; никогаш не било расправано, па дури и разгледувано. Последен поглед на класиката

Исламската литература ни покажува дека кога класичните научници ги поставиле темелите на узулот, и кодифицирано

нивните исламски пресуди (фикх) тие само гледаа на разбирање на исламските правила со цел да

примени ги. Слична ситуација се случи и кога беа утврдени правилата за хадисот, тафер и

Арапски јазик. Научници, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time

understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined

principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of

study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Those who became

smitten by Greek philosophy such as the Muslim philosophers and some from amongst the Mut’azilah

were considered to have left the fold of Islam as the Qur’an ceased to be their basis of study. Thus for

any Muslim attempting to deduce rules or understand what stance should be taken upon a particular

issue the Qur’an is the basis of this study.

Првиот обид за реформа на исламот се случил кон крајот на 19 век. До крајот на

век, Уммата беше во долг период на опаѓање, кога глобалниот баланс на моќта се смени

од Хилафа до Велика Британија. Монтажните проблеми го зафатија Хилафа додека беше Западна Европа

среде индустриската револуција. Уммата започна да го губи чистото разбирање за исламот, и

во обид да се сврти падот што ги опфаќа утманите (Османлиите) некои муслимани беа испратени во

Вест, и како резултат станаа поразени од она што го видоа. Рифа’а Рафи ’ал-Тахтави од Египет (1801-1873),

на враќање од Париз, напишал биографска книга наречена Тахлис ал-ибриз ила такхис Бариз (На

Извлекување на злато, или преглед на Париз, 1834), фалејќи ја нивната чистота, loveубов кон работата, и погоре

целиот општествен морал. He declared that we must mimic what is being done in Paris, advocating changes to

the Islamic society from liberalising women to the systems of ruling. This thought, and others like it,

marked the beginning of the reinventing trend in Islam.

ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION

IBRAHIM KALIN

In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.

Исламот на Запад

Jocelyne Cesari

The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. Овие нови ситуации повлекуваат теоретски и методолошки предизвици за проучување на современиот ислам, и стана клучно да избегнеме суштинско значење или на исламот или на муслиманите и да се спротивставиме на реторичките структури на дискурсите кои се преокупирани со безбедноста и тероризмот.
Во овој напис, Јас тврдам дека исламот како религиозна традиција е тераса инкогнита. Прелиминарна причина за оваа ситуација е тоа што не постои консензус за религијата како предмет на истражување. Религија, како академска дисциплина, се распадна меѓу историските, социолошки, и херменевтички методологии. Со исламот, ситуацијата е уште посложена. На Запад, изучувањето на исламот започна како гранка на ориенталистичките студии и затоа следеше посебен и карактеристичен пат од проучувањето на религиите. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.

професија, колонијализмот, апартхејд?

Советот за истражување на хуманистичките науки

Истражувања на Советот за човекови науки на Јужна Африка овластена оваа студија да се тестира хипотезата поставени од страна на професорот Џон Dugard во извештајот што го претстави пред Советот за човекови права на ОН во јануари 2007, во својство на специјален известувач на ОН за состојбата на човековите права во палестинските територии окупирани од Израел (имено, на Западниот Брег, вклучувајќи ги и Источен Ерусалим, и
Газа, во понатамошниот текст OPT). Професорот Dugard постави прашањето: Израел е јасно во воена окупација на OPT. Во исто време, елементи на професијата претставуваат облици на колонијализам и апартхејд, кои се во спротивност со меѓународното право. Кои се правните последици од режимот на продолжен окупација со карактеристики на колонијализам и апартхејд за зафатени луѓе, окупаторска сила и трети земји?
Со цел да се разгледа овие последици, оваа студија е утврдено да се испита законски просториите на прашањето професор Dugard е: е Израел носителот на OPT, и, ако така, се елементи на окупацијата на овие територии изнесува колонијализам или апартхејд? Јужна Африка има очигледен интерес за овие прашања со оглед на горчливата историја на апартхејдот, која бараше одбивање на selfdetermination
на мнозинството на населението и, за време на окупацијата на Намибија, продолжување на апартхејдот на таа територија која Јужна Африка ефикасно бара да се колонизираат. Овие незаконски практики не смее да се повтори и на други места: другите народи не смее да трпи во начинот на популациите на Јужна Африка и Намибија претрпеле.
Да се ​​истражуваат овие прашања, меѓународен тим на научници е составен. Целта на овој проект беше да се изанализира ситуацијата од непартиска гледна точка на меѓународното право, наместо да се вклучат во политичкиот дискурс и реторика. Оваа студија е исходот од петнаесет месеци колаборативен процес на интензивни истражувања, консултација, пишување и преглед. Во него се заклучува и, тоа е да се надеваме, убедливо тврди и јасно покажува дека Израел, од 1967, е воинствените окупаторска сила во OPT, и дека окупацијата на овие територии стана колонијални претпријатие, кое се спроведува систем на апартхејд. Воинствените окупација по себе не е противправно ситуација: тоа е прифатено како можна последица на вооружен конфликт. Во исто време, според законот на вооружен конфликт (исто така познат како меѓународното хуманитарно право), занимање е наменета да биде само привремена состојба на работите. Меѓународното право забранува еднострано анексија или постојано стекнување на територија, како резултат на закана или употреба на сила: Ако се случи ова, ниту една држава може да го препознае или поддршка како резултат на незаконско ситуација. За разлика од окупацијата, и колонијализам и апартхејд секогаш се незаконски и навистина се смета за особено сериозни прекршувања на меѓународното право, бидејќи тие се суштински спротивно на основните вредности на меѓународниот правен поредок. Колонијализмот го нарушува принципот на самоопределување,
кој Меѓународниот суд на правдата (Меѓународниот суд на правдата) ја потврди како "еден од основните принципи на современото меѓународно право '. Сите држави имаат обврска да ги почитуваат и унапредуваат самоопределување. Апартхејд е влошена случај на расната дискриминација, која се состои во согласност со Меѓународната конвенција за сузбивање и казнување на злосторството апартхејд (1973,
"Апартхејд Конвенцијата во понатамошниот текст) со "нехумани дела извршени со цел воспоставување и одржување на доминација на една расна група на лица над било која друга расна група на лица и систематски ќе ги угнетува". Практиката на апартхејдот, Згора на тоа, е меѓународен криминал.
Професорот Dugard во својот извештај до Советот за човекови права на ОН во 2007 смета дека треба да се бара советодавно мислење за правните последици од однесувањето на Израел од Меѓународниот суд на правдата. Ова советодавно мислење несомнено ќе се надополнуваат на мислење дека Меѓународниот суд на правдата донесено во 2004 на правните последици од изградба на ѕид во окупираните палестински територии (во понатамошниот текст "Ѕидот советодавно мислење"). Овој курс за правно дејство не ја исцрпува опции се отворени за меѓународната заедница, ниту, пак обврските на трети земји и меѓународни организации, кога тие се оценети дека некоја друга држава е ангажирана во практиките на колонијализам или апартхејд.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Абдула Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Moreover, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, имено, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, САД, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Хенри Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. За жал, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Islamism revisited

МАХА Азам

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 јули 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW

Биргит Krawietz
Хелмут Reifeld

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. Во исто време, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.

Islamic Political Culture, демократија, and Human Rights

Даниел Е. цена

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, сепак, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, ако така, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (квота)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; и (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD

Ibtisam Ибрахим

What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, вера, opinion, сопственост, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracyin addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participationcontains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Саад Един Ибрахим (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. However, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. However, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elementsaccountability, competition, and some degree of participationwhich have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.