RSS中的所有条目 "阿尔及利亚" 类别

参与政治伊斯兰的策略

沙迪哈米德

阿曼达·卡德莱克（AMANDA KADLEC）

政治伊斯兰教是当今中东地区最活跃的政治力量. 它的未来与该地区的未来密切相关. 如果美国和欧盟致力于支持该地区的政治改革, 他们需要设计具体的, 参与伊斯兰团体的连贯战略. 然而, 美国. 普遍不愿意与这些运动展开对话. 相似地, 欧盟与伊斯兰主义者的接触是个例外, 不是规则. 存在低级联系人的地方, 它们主要用于信息收集目的, 不是战略目标. 美国. 和欧盟有许多解决该地区经济和政治发展的计划——其中包括中东伙伴关系倡议 (美皮), 千年挑战公司 (中冶), 地中海联盟, 和欧洲睦邻政策 (ENP) - 然而，他们对伊斯兰政治反对派的挑战如何适应更广泛的区域目标几乎没有什么可说的. 我们. 和欧盟的民主援助和规划几乎完全针对威权政府本身或世俗的民间社会团体，在他们自己的社会中得到的支持很少.
重新评估现行政策的时机已经成熟. 自九月恐怖袭击以来 11, 2001, 支持中东民主对西方政策制定者来说具有更大的重要性, 谁看到了缺乏民主和政治暴力之间的联系. 人们更加关注理解政治伊斯兰内部的变化. 美国新政府更愿意扩大与穆斯林世界的交流. 同时, 绝大多数主流伊斯兰组织——包括埃及的穆斯林兄弟会, 约旦的伊斯兰行动阵线 (印度空军), 摩洛哥正义与发展党 (PJD), 科威特伊斯兰立宪运动, 和也门伊斯兰党——越来越多地将支持政治改革和民主作为其政治纲领的核心组成部分. 此外, 许多人表示有兴趣与美国展开对话. 和欧盟政府.
西方国家与中东关系的未来可能在很大程度上取决于前者与非暴力伊斯兰政党就共同利益和目标进行广泛对话的程度. 最近有大量关于与伊斯兰主义者接触的研究, 但很少有人清楚地说明它在实践中可能需要什么. 佐伊·诺特, 德国外交关系委员会访问学者, 把它, “欧盟正在考虑参与，但并不真正知道如何参与。”1 希望澄清讨论, 我们区分了三个级别的“参与度”,”每个都有不同的手段和目的: 低级接触, 战略对话, 和伙伴关系.

| 八月 19, 2010 | 评论 0
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伊斯兰政党 : 三种动作

塔玛拉·科夫曼（Tamara Cofman）

Between 1991 和 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Today, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
尽管如此, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.

| 八月 18, 2010 | 评论 0
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伊斯兰政党 : 民主的福音或祸害?

阿姆·哈姆扎维（Amr Hamzawy）

内森J. 棕色

What role do Islamist movements play in Arab politics? With their popular messages and broad followings within Arab societies, would their incorporation as normal political actors be a boon for democratization or democracy’s bane? For too long, we have tried to answer such questions solely by speculating about the true intentions of these movements and their leaders. Islamist political movements in the Arab world are increasingly asked—both by outside observers and by members of their own societies—about their true intentions.
But to hear them tell it, leaders of mainstream Arab Islamist movements are not the problem. They see themselves as democrats in nondemocratic lands, firmly committed to clean and fair electoral processes, whatever outcomes these may bring. It is rulers and regimes that should be pressed to commit to democracy, say the Islamists, not their oppositions. We need not take such Islamist leaders at their word. 的确, we should realize that there is only so much that any of their words can do to answer the question of the relationship between these movements and the prospects for democracy.
While their words are increasingly numerous (Islamist movements tend to be quite loquacious) and their answers about democracy increasingly specific, their ability to resolve all ambiguities is limited. First, as long as they are out of power—as most of them are, and are likely to remain for some time—they will never fully prove themselves. Many Islamist leaders themselves probably do not know how they would act were they to come to power.

| 八月 18, 2010 | 评论 0
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对政治伊斯兰教的误判

马丁·克拉默

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are the “extremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led by “moderates” or “reformists.” These “moderates” can be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.

| 八月 18, 2010 | 评论 0
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伊斯兰运动和阿拉伯世界的民主进程: 探索灰色地带

内森J. 棕色, 阿姆·哈姆扎维（Amr Hamzawy）,

玛丽娜·奥特韦（Marina Ottaway）

在过去的十年中, 伊斯兰运动已成为中东地区的主要政治参与者. 与政府一起, 伊斯兰运动, 温和的和激进的, 将决定该地区的政治在可预见的未来如何展开. 他们不仅展示了制作具有广泛大众吸引力的信息的能力，而且, 最重要的是, 创建具有真正社会基础的组织并制定连贯的政治战略. 其他方,
总的来说, 所有帐户都失败了.
西方公众和, 尤其是, 美国, 在发生戏剧性事件后才意识到伊斯兰运动的重要性, 例如伊朗革命和埃及总统安瓦尔·萨达特被暗杀. 自 9 月的恐怖袭击以来，注意力更加持久 11, 2001. 因此, 伊斯兰运动被广泛认为是危险和敌对的. 虽然这种描述对于伊斯兰极端组织的组织来说是准确的, 这很危险，因为他们愿意在追求目标时不分青红皂白地使用暴力, 这不是对许多放弃或避免暴力的群体的准确描述. 因为恐怖组织构成了直接
威胁, 然而, 所有国家的政策制定者都对暴力组织给予了不成比例的关注.
它是主流的伊斯兰组织, 不是激进的, 这将对中东未来的政治演变产生最大的影响. 激进分子重建统一整个阿拉伯世界的哈里发的宏伟目标, 甚至将受伊斯兰教原教旨主义解释启发的法律和社会习俗强加于个别阿拉伯国家，这与今天的现实相去甚远，无法实现. 这并不意味着恐怖组织没有危险——即使在追求不可能的目标时，它们也可能造成巨大的生命损失——但它们不太可能改变中东的面貌. 主流伊斯兰组织通常是另一回事. 他们已经对许多国家的社会习俗产生了强大的影响, 制止和扭转世俗主义趋势，改变许多阿拉伯人的着装和行为方式. 以及他们直接的政治目标, 通过参与本国的正常政治而成为强大的力量, 不是不可能的. 它已经在摩洛哥等国家实现, 约旦, 甚至埃及, 仍然禁止所有伊斯兰政治组织，但现在议会中有八十八名穆斯林兄弟. 政治, 不是暴力, 是什么赋予了主流伊斯兰主义者影响力.

| 八月 18, 2010 | 评论 0
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伊斯兰教, 伊斯兰主义者, 和中东的选举原则

詹姆斯·皮斯卡托里

对于一个时间应该已经到来的想法, ÒdemocracyÓ 掩盖了一个惊人的

未回答的问题数量和, 在穆斯林世界, 产生了

大量的热量. 这是一个文化特定的术语, 反映西方

几个世纪以来的欧洲经验? 非西方社会是否拥有

他们自己的参与和问责标准——实际上是他们自己的

需要注意的发展节奏, 如果不尊重? 伊斯兰教,

强调圣经权威和神圣律法的中心地位, 允许

灵活的政治和参与式政府?

这些问题的答案构成了叙述和反叙述的一部分

他们自己是有争议的话语的一个组成部分. 更大的故事

关注 ÒIslamÓ 是否对西方构成威胁, 和补充

故事涉及伊斯兰教与民主的相容性. 知识分子

行李, 改变比喻, 几乎不中立. 讨论本身有

变得尖锐政治化, 陷入有关东方主义的相关争议,

尤其是中东和整个穆斯林世界的例外论,

和宗教“原教旨主义”运动的现代主义.

| 八月 17, 2010 | 评论 0
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政治伊斯兰教和欧洲外交政策

政治伊斯兰教和欧洲邻国政策

迈克尔·爱默生

理查德·杨斯

自从 2001 以及随之而来的西方与政治伊斯兰之间关系性质的国际事件已成为外交政策的决定性问题. 近年来，对政治伊斯兰问题进行了大量的研究和分析。. 这有助于纠正西方以前对伊斯兰价值观和意图的性质的一些简单化和危言耸听的假设. 与此平行, 欧盟 (欧盟) 制定了许多政策举措，主要是欧洲邻里政策(ENP) 原则上致力于对话和更深入的参与(非暴力) 阿拉伯国家内的政治行为者和民间社会组织. 然而，许多分析家和政策制定者现在抱怨在概念辩论和政策制定中的某个奖杯. 已经确定，政治伊斯兰教是一个不断变化的景观, 深受各种情况的影响, 但辩论似乎常常停留在“伊斯兰主义者是否民主”这样简单的问题上?’ 许多独立分析家仍然主张与伊斯兰主义者接触, 但西方政府与伊斯兰组织之间的实际和解仍然有限 .

| 八月 17, 2010 | 评论 0
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是什么导致选民在威权主义下支持反对派 ?

迈克尔·H. 罗宾斯

Elections have become commonplace in most authoritarian states. While this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in reality elections play an important role in these regimes. While elections for positions of real power tend to be non-competitive, many
elections—including those for seemingly toothless parliaments—can be strongly contested.
The existing literature has focused on the role that elections play in supporting the regime. 例如, they can help let off steam, help the regime take the temperature of society, or can be used to help a dominant party know which individuals it should promote (Schedler 2002; Blaydes 2006). 然而, while the literature has focused on the supply-side of elections in authoritarian states, there are relatively few systematic studies of voter behavior in these elections (see Lust-Okar 2006 for an exception). Rather, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995). While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. 实际上, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to
significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. 然而, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the
regime.

| 八月 14, 2010 | 评论 0
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为什么没有阿拉伯民主国家 ?

拉里·戴蒙德（Larry Diamond）

在民主化的“第三波,”民主不再是一种主要是西方现象，而是“走向全球”。当第三波开始时 1974, 世界只有大约 40 民主国家, 他们中只有少数位于西方之外. 当《民主杂志》开始在 1990, 曾经有 76 选举民主国家 (占世界独立国家的不到一半). 经过 1995, 这个数字飙升至 117 个——每五个州就有三个. 到时, 除了中东以外，世界上每个主要地区都存在大量民主国家。 1 此外, 世界上每一个主要的文化领域都成为了重要的民主存在的东道国, 尽管再次出现了一个例外——阿拉伯世界。 2 十五年后, 这个例外仍然存在.
阿拉伯世界甚至没有一个单一的民主政权是一个惊人的反常现象——民主全球化的主要例外. 为什么没有阿拉伯民主? 的确, 为什么中东和北非沿海的十六个独立的阿拉伯国家中, 黎巴嫩是唯一一个曾经是民主国家的国家?
关于阿拉伯民主赤字的最常见假设是它一定与宗教或文化有关. 毕竟, 所有阿拉伯国家共有的一件事是他们是阿拉伯人.

| 八月 07, 2010 | 评论 0
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民主, 恐怖主义与美国在阿拉伯世界的政策

F. 格雷戈里·高斯

The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. 所以, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? 换句话说, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; 和 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

| 八月 06, 2010 | 评论 0
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欧洲与温和的伊斯兰主义者的接触

克里斯蒂娜·考斯（Kristina Kausch）

Direct engagement1 with Islamist political movements has typically been a no-go for European governments. In recent years, 然而, the limits of the European Union’s (欧盟) stability-oriented approach towards cooperation with authoritarian rulers in the Middle East and North Africa (中东和北非) to defend EU strategic interests in the region have become increasingly obvious. Incumbent MENA rulers’ attempts to portray the European choice of interlocutors in the region as either stabilising governments or de-stabilising Islamists are increasingly perceived as short-sighted and contradictory. Recent debates suggest that the search for viable alternative policy approaches is leading to a shift in European policy makers’ attitude towards moderate2 Islamist actors.
There is no shortage of incentives to redirect the course of EU policies in the region. Preventing the
radicalisation of Islamist movements in the region is an integral part of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy. It
has become common wisdom that substantial political reform will only happen through effective pressure from
within. Non-violent, non-revolutionary Islamist parties that aspire to take power by means of a democratic
process have therefore often been portrayed as potential reform actors that carry the hopes of a volatile region
for genuine democratic development and long-term stability
| 八月 04, 2010 | 评论 0
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“穆斯林民主”的兴起”

瓦利·纳斯尔

A specter is haunting the Muslim world. This particular specter is notthe malign and much-discussed spirit of fundamentalist extremism, nor yet the phantom hope known as liberal Islam. Instead, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, 印度尼西亚, 马来西亚, 巴基斯坦 (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Islamic law) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

| 三月 29, 2010 | 评论 0
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伊斯兰运动: 政治自由 & 民主

优素福·卡拉达维博士

这是人的职责 (伊斯兰) 下一阶段的运动坚决反对极权独裁统治, 政治专制和篡夺民权. 运动应始终支持政治自由, 如真,不假, 民主. 它应该断然宣布它拒绝暴君并避开所有独裁者, 即使某些暴君似乎对它有良好的意图，以获取一些利益，而且时间通常很短, 正如经验所表明的那样。先知 (锯) 说, “当你看到我的国家成为恐惧的牺牲品，而不是对做错事的人说, “你错了”, 那么你可能会对他们失去希望。”那么，一个强迫人们对自负的不法者说话的政权怎么样？, “怎么刚刚, 你有多棒. 哦，我们的英雄, 我们的救世主和我们的解放者!”《古兰经》谴责像努姆鲁德这样的暴君, 法老, 哈曼等, 但它也鄙视那些追随暴君并服从他们命令的人. 这就是为什么安拉蔑视诺亚比的人说, “但他们跟随 (米) 他们的财富和孩子不会给他们增加，只会给他们带来损失。” [诺亚的信; 21]安拉也提到了广告, 胡德人, “并且听从了每一个强者的命令, 顽固的违法者”. [胡德的信:59]也看看古兰经是怎么说法老的人民的, “但他们听从了法老的命令, 法老的命令没有得到正确的引导。[胡德的信: 97] “因此他愚弄了他的人民, 他们服从了他: 他们确实是一个叛逆的民族 (反对真主).” [苏拉特·祖赫鲁夫: 54]仔细研究穆斯林民族的历史和现代伊斯兰运动应该清楚地表明，伊斯兰思想, 除非在民主和自由的气氛中，否则伊斯兰运动和伊斯兰觉醒从未繁荣或结出果实, 只有在压迫和暴政践踏了坚持伊斯兰教的人民的意志时，它们才会枯萎和贫瘠. 这种压迫政权强加了他们的世俗主义, 通过武力和胁迫对其人民实行社会主义或共产主义, 使用秘密酷刑和公开处决, 并使用那些撕裂肉体的恶魔工具,流血, 粉碎骨头并摧毁灵魂。我们在许多穆斯林国家看到了这些做法, 包括土耳其, 埃及, 叙利亚, 伊拉克, (前者) 南也门, 不同时期的索马里和北非国家, 取决于每个国家独裁者的年龄或统治时期。另一方面, 我们看到伊斯兰运动和伊斯兰觉醒在自由和民主时代结出硕果并蓬勃发展, 在以恐惧和压迫统治人民的帝国政权崩溃之后。因此, 我无法想象伊斯兰运动会支持政治自由和民主以外的任何东西。暴君允许每个人发出声音, 除了伊斯兰教的声音, 让每一种趋势都以政党或某种团体的形式表现出来, 除了伊斯兰潮流，它是唯一真正代表这个国家并表达它的趋势, 价值观, 本质和存在.

| 三月 07, 2010 | 评论 0
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这 500 最有影响力的穆斯林

约翰·埃斯波西托

易卜拉欣·卡林

您手中的出版物是我们希望成为年度系列的第一本，它为了解穆斯林世界的推动者和震动者提供了一个窗口. 我们努力突出穆斯林有影响力的人, 那是, 影响来自他们的伊斯兰教实践或来自他们是穆斯林这一事实的人. 我们认为这为穆斯林影响世界的不同方式提供了宝贵的见解, 并且还展示了当今穆斯林生活的多样性。影响是一个棘手的概念. 它的意思来源于拉丁词influensmeaning to flow-in, 指向一个古老的占星学观念，即看不见的力量 (喜欢月亮) 影响人类. 这份名单上的人物也有影响人类的能力. 这份名单上的每个人都以各种不同的方式影响着地球上许多人的生活. 这 50 最具影响力的人物简介. 他们的影响来自多种来源; 然而，它们是统一的，因为它们每个都影响着大量的人类。然后我们打破了 500 领导进入 15 类别——学术, 政治的,行政的, 血统, 传教士, 女装, 青年, 慈善事业, 发展,科学和技术, 艺术与文化, 媒体, 激进分子, 国际伊斯兰网络, 和今日问题——帮助您了解伊斯兰教和穆斯林影响当今世界的不同方式。两个综合列表显示了影响如何以不同方式发挥作用: 国际伊斯兰网络展示了穆斯林重要跨国网络的领导者, 和“今日问题”突出了由于当前影响人类的问题而具有重要意义的个人.

| 二月 20, 2010 | 评论 0
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阿尔及利亚: 伊斯兰或世俗国家的前景

当阿卡塞姆

What are the prospects for an Islamic state in Algeria nowadays? Before wecan answer that question, we must first understand the political, economic,and social developments that have recently taken place in Algeria. !ese eventswill shed some light on the decline of the Islamist movements.Soon after independence, Algeria adopted an inward-oriented “socialist”system. Its economic development model depended on revenues fromhydrocarbons, mainly oil. Additionally, the public sector dominated the economicactivities through the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that were supposed tocatalyze the economic and social development of the country. !e governmentwas the main supplier of subsidized food, utilities, housing, education, andjobs. In this first phase of the socialist experience, the government successfullyfaced “the problems of development,” and it could deliver the just-mentionedgoods and services as long as oil prices and oil revenues were high enough.1 !egovernment, 然而, failed to face “the development of problems” during thesecond phase of its socialist experience. A huge decrease in the price of oil inthe mid-1980s, from around $40 to around $6 a barrel in few weeks, left thegovernment unable to provide better living standards for a population that haddoubled in size since independence. Since oil revenues were, and still are, themost important source of foreign currency for the country, the drastic decreasein crude oil prices had several consequences. First, it led to a severe foreign debtcrisis. Second, there was a dramatic reduction in the volume of imports—inparticular, food products. !ird, the government’s budgetary resources werereduced by about 50%. 最后, there was a severe economic recession that ledto social protests that led, in turn, to “bread rioting.”

| 二月 17, 2010 | 评论 0
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