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СТРАТЭГІІ ДЛЯ УПРАЎЛЕННЯ ПАЛІТЫЧНЫХ ІСЛАМ

ШАДЗІ ХАМІД

AMANDA KADLEC

Палітычны іслам - самая актыўная сёння палітычная сіла на Блізкім Усходзе. Яго будучыня цесна звязана з будучыняй рэгіёну. Калі ЗША і Еўрапейскі Саюз абавязаны падтрымліваць палітычныя рэформы ў рэгіёне, ім трэба будзе прыдумаць бетон, узгодненыя стратэгіі ўцягвання ісламісцкіх груповак. Усё ж, ЗША. Звычайна не хоча адкрываць дыялог з гэтымі рухамі. Дакладна, Выключэнне ЕС з ісламістамі стала выключэннем, не правіла. Там, дзе існуюць кантакты нізкага ўзроўню, у асноўным яны служаць мэтам збору інфармацыі, не стратэгічныя мэты. U.S. і ЕС маюць шэраг праграм, прысвечаных эканамічнаму і палітычнаму развіццю ў рэгіёне - сярод іх Блізка-Усходняя ініцыятыва партнёрства (MEPI), карпарацыя "тысячагоддзе" (МКК), Саюз для Міжземнамор'я, і Еўрапейская палітыка добрасуседства (ЕПС) - але яны мала што могуць сказаць пра тое, як выклік ісламісцкай палітычнай апазіцыі ўпісваецца ў больш шырокія рэгіянальныя задачы. U.S. а таксама дапамога і праграмаванне дэмакратыі ў ЕС амаль цалкам накіраваны альбо на аўтарытарныя ўрады, альбо на свецкія групы грамадзянскай супольнасці з мінімальнай падтрымкай у іх уласных грамадствах.
Надышоў час для пераацэнкі цяперашняй палітыкі. З верасня тэрактаў 11, 2001, падтрымка дэмакратыі на Блізкім Усходзе набыла большае значэнне для заходніх палітыкаў, якія бачаць сувязь паміж адсутнасцю дэмакратыі і палітычным гвалтам. Большая ўвага была ўдзелена разуменню варыяцый палітычнага ісламу. Новая амерыканская адміністрацыя больш адкрыта для пашырэння сувязі з мусульманскім светам. Тым часам, пераважная большасць асноўных ісламісцкіх арганізацый - у тым ліку Браты-мусульмане ў Егіпце, Ісламскі фронт дзеянняў Іарданіі (IAF), Партыя Справядлівасці і развіцця Марока (ПСР), ісламскі канстытуцыйны рух Кувейце, і Еменская партыя - усё часцей падтрымліваюць палітычныя рэформы і дэмакратыю як цэнтральны кампанент у іх палітычных платформах. У дадатак, шмат хто выказаў вялікую зацікаўленасць у адкрыцці дыялогу з ЗША. і ўрады ЕС.
Будучыня адносін паміж заходнімі краінамі і на Блізкім Усходзе можа ў значнай ступені вызначацца ступенню, у якім былыя ўдзельнічаюць ісламісцкім партыям, якія не гвалтуюць у шырокім дыялогу пра агульныя інтарэсы і мэты. У апошні час было распаўсюджана даследаванне, звязанае з сувяззю з ісламістамі, але мала хто выразна разглядае тое, што можа пацягнуць на практыцы. Ace Zoé Nautré, наведвальны супрацоўнік Нямецкай рады па замежных сувязях, ставіць, "ЕС думае пра ўзаемадзеянне, але не ведае, як". 1 У надзеі ўдакладніць дыскусію, мы адрозніваем тры ўзроўні "ўзаемадзеяння","Кожны з рознымі сродкамі і заканчваецца: кантакты нізкага ўзроўню, стратэгічны дыялог, і партнёрства.

Islamist parties : Three kinds of movements

Тамара Cofman

Between 1991 і 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Сёння, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
Тым не менш, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.

Ісламісцкія партыі : A boon or a bane for democracy?

Амр Hamzawy

Натан Дж. карычневы

What role do Islamist movements play in Arab politics? With their popular messages and broad followings within Arab societies, would their incorporation as normal political actors be a boon for democratization or democracy’s bane? For too long, we have tried to answer such questions solely by speculating about the true intentions of these movements and their leaders. Islamist political movements in the Arab world are increasingly asked—both by outside observers and by members of their own societies—about their true intentions.
But to hear them tell it, leaders of mainstream Arab Islamist movements are not the problem. They see themselves as democrats in nondemocratic lands, firmly committed to clean and fair electoral processes, whatever outcomes these may bring. It is rulers and regimes that should be pressed to commit to democracy, say the Islamists, not their oppositions. We need not take such Islamist leaders at their word. Сапраўды, we should realize that there is only so much that any of their words can do to answer the question of the relationship between these movements and the prospects for democracy.
While their words are increasingly numerous (Islamist movements tend to be quite loquacious) and their answers about democracy increasingly specific, their ability to resolve all ambiguities is limited. Па-першае, as long as they are out of power—as most of them are, and are likely to remain for some time—they will never fully prove themselves. Many Islamist leaders themselves probably do not know how they would act were they to come to power.

The Mismeasure of Political Islam

Марцін Крамер

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are theextremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led bymoderatesorreformists.” Thesemoderatescan be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.

ІСЛАМІСТСКІЯ РУХІ І ДЭМАКРАТЫЧНЫ ПРАЦЭС У АРАБСКІМ СВЕЦЕ: Вывучэнне шэрых зон

Натан Дж. карычневы, Амр Hamzawy,

Марына Ottaway

На працягу апошняга дзесяцігоддзя, Ісламісцкія рухі зарэкамендавалі сябе як асноўныя палітычныя гульцы на Блізкім Усходзе. Разам з урадамі, Ісламісцкія руху, умераны, а таксама радыкальны, вызначыць, як будзе развівацца палітыка рэгіёну ў агляднай будучыні. Яны прадэманстравалі здольнасць не толькі распрацоўваць паведамленні з шырока распаўсюджанай папулярнасцю, але і, і самае галоўнае, ствараць арганізацыі з сапраўднай сацыяльнай базай і распрацоўваць узгодненыя палітычныя стратэгіі. Іншыя партыі,
па вялікім рахунку, праваліліся па ўсіх рахунках.
Грамадскасць на Захадзе і, у прыватнасці, ЗША, усвядоміў важнасць ісламісцкіх рухаў толькі пасля драматычных падзей, такія як рэвалюцыя ў Іране і забойства прэзідэнта Анвара аль-Садата ў Егіпце. Увага была значна больш прыцягнутай пасля тэрактаў у верасні 11, 2001. У выніку, Ісламісцкія рухі шырока разглядаюцца як небяспечныя і варожыя. У той час як такая характарыстыка дакладная ў дачыненні да арганізацый, якія знаходзяцца ў радыкальным канцы ісламісцкага спектру, якія небяспечныя сваёй гатоўнасцю звяртацца да неразборлівага гвалту ў дасягненні сваіх мэтаў, гэта не дакладная характарыстыка многіх груп, якія адмовіліся ад гвалту альбо пазбягалі яго. Таму што тэрарыстычныя арганізацыі ствараюць неадкладную дапамогу
пагроза, Аднак, палітыкі ва ўсіх краінах звярнулі непрапарцыйную ўвагу на гвалтоўныя арганізацыі.
Гэта асноўныя ісламісцкія арганізацыі, не радыкальныя, што акажа найбольшы ўплыў на будучую палітычную эвалюцыю Блізкага Усходу. Грандыёзныя мэты радыкалаў - узнавіць халіфат, які аб'ядноўвае ўвесь арабскі свет, ці нават навязванне асобным арабскім краінам законаў і сацыяльных звычаяў, натхнёных фундаменталісцкай інтэрпрэтацыяй ісламу, проста занадта далёка ад сённяшняй рэальнасці, каб быць рэалізаваным. Гэта не азначае, што тэрарыстычныя групоўкі не небяспечныя - яны могуць прывесці да вялікай гібелі людзей нават у дасягненні немагчымых мэтаў, - але наўрад ці яны зменяць аблічча Блізкага Усходу. Агульныя ісламісцкія арганізацыі, як правіла, розныя пытанні. Яны ўжо моцна паўплывалі на сацыяльныя звычаі многіх краін, спыненне і зварот секулярысцкіх тэндэнцый і змяненне спосабу адзення і паводзін многіх арабаў. І іх непасрэдная палітычная мэта, стаць магутнай сілай, удзельнічаючы ў нармальнай палітыцы сваёй краіны, не з'яўляецца немагчымым. Гэта ўжо рэалізуецца ў такіх краінах, як Марока, Іарданія, і нават Егіпет, які па-ранейшаму забараняе ўсе палітычныя арганізацыі ісламістаў, але цяпер у парламенце восемдзесят восем братоў-мусульман. палітыка, не гвалт, гэта тое, што дае ўплыў асноўных ісламістаў.

ISLAM, ISLAMISTS, AND THE ELECTORAL PRINCIPLE I N THE MIDDLE EAST

Джэймс Piscatori

For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing

number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated

a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western

European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess

their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own

rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,

with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow

for flexible politics and participatory government?

The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative

that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story

concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary

story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual

baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has

become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,

the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,

and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.

Палітычны іслам і еўрапейская знешняя палітыка

ПАЛІТЫЧНЫ ІСЛАМ І ЕЎРАПЕЙСКАЯ ПАЛІТЫКА ПАСУСЛІСТВА

МІХАЙЛ ЭМЕРСАН

РЫЧАРД МАЛАДЫ

Паколькі 2001 і міжнародныя падзеі, якія высветлілі характар ​​адносін паміж Захадам і палітычным ісламам, сталі вызначальным пытаннем для знешняй палітыкі. У апошнія гады было праведзена значная колькасць даследаванняў і аналізаў па праблеме палітычнага ісламу. Гэта дапамагло выправіць некаторыя спрошчаныя і трывожныя здагадкі, якія раней існавалі на Захадзе, пра прыроду ісламісцкіх каштоўнасцей і намераў. Паралельна з гэтым, Еўрапейскі Саюз (Я) распрацаваў шэраг палітычных ініцыятыў, у першую чаргу Еўрапейскую палітыку добрасуседства(ЕПС) якія ў прынцыпе імкнуцца да дыялогу і больш глыбокага ўзаемадзеяння(не гвалтоўны) палітычныя суб'екты і арганізацыі грамадзянскай супольнасці ў арабскіх краінах. Тым не менш многія аналітыкі і палітыкі цяпер скардзяцца на пэўны трафей як у канцэптуальных дэбатах, так і ў распрацоўцы палітыкі. Устаноўлена, што палітычны іслам - гэта зменлівы ландшафт, глыбока закрануты шэрагам абставін, але, здаецца, дыскусія часта спыняецца на спрошчаным пытанні "ці дэмакратычныя ісламісты?'Тым не менш многія незалежныя аналітыкі выступаюць за ўзаемадзеянне з ісламістамі, але фактычнае збліжэнне паміж заходнімі ўрадамі і ісламісцкімі арганізацыямі застаецца абмежаваным .

What Leads Voters to Support the Opposition under Authoritarianism ?

Майкл D.H. Robbins

Elections have become commonplace in most authoritarian states. While this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in reality elections play an important role in these regimes. While elections for positions of real power tend to be non-competitive, шмат
elections—including those for seemingly toothless parliaments—can be strongly contested.
The existing literature has focused on the role that elections play in supporting the regime. Напрыклад, they can help let off steam, help the regime take the temperature of society, or can be used to help a dominant party know which individuals it should promote (Schedler 2002; Blaydes 2006). Усё ж, while the literature has focused on the supply-side of elections in authoritarian states, there are relatively few systematic studies of voter behavior in these elections (see Lust-Okar 2006 for an exception). Rather, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995). While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. На самай справе, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to
significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. Усё ж, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the
рэжым.

why are there no arab democracies ?

Лары Дайманд

During democratization’s “third wave,” democracy ceased being a mostly Western phenomenon and “went global.” When the third wave began in 1974, the world had only about 40 democracies, and only a few of them lay outside the West. By the time the Journal of Democracy began publishing in 1990, there were 76 electoral democracies (accounting for slightly less than half the world’s independent states). By 1995, that number had shot up to 117—three in every five states. By then, a critical mass of democracies existed in every major world region save one—the Middle East.1 Moreover, every one of the world’s major cultural realms had become host to a significant democratic presence, albeit again with a single exception—the Arab world.2 Fifteen years later, this exception still stands.
The continuing absence of even a single democratic regime in the Arab world is a striking anomaly—the principal exception to the globalization of democracy. Why is there no Arab democracy? Сапраўды, why is it the case that among the sixteen independent Arab states of the Middle East and coastal North Africa, Lebanon is the only one to have ever been a democracy?
The most common assumption about the Arab democracy deficit is that it must have something to do with religion or culture. After all, the one thing that all Arab countries share is that they are Arab.

дэмакратыя, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World

F. Рыгор Gause

The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. Таму, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? Іншымі словамі, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; і 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

Europe’s Engagement with Moderate Islamists

Крысціна Kausch

Direct engagement1 with Islamist political movements has typically been a no-go for European governments. In recent years, Аднак, the limits of the European Union’s (Я) stability-oriented approach towards cooperation with authoritarian rulers in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to defend EU strategic interests in the region have become increasingly obvious. Incumbent MENA rulers’ attempts to portray the European choice of interlocutors in the region as either stabilising governments or de-stabilising Islamists are increasingly perceived as short-sighted and contradictory. Recent debates suggest that the search for viable alternative policy approaches is leading to a shift in European policy makers’ attitude towards moderate2 Islamist actors.
There is no shortage of incentives to redirect the course of EU policies in the region. Preventing the
radicalisation of Islamist movements in the region is an integral part of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy. It
has become common wisdom that substantial political reform will only happen through effective pressure from
ў. Non-violent, non-revolutionary Islamist parties that aspire to take power by means of a democratic
process have therefore often been portrayed as potential reform actors that carry the hopes of a volatile region
for genuine democratic development and long-term stability

THE RISE OF “MUSLIM DEMOCRACY

валі Наср

A specter is haunting the Muslim world. This particular specter is notthe malign and much-discussed spirit of fundamentalist extremism, nor yet the phantom hope known as liberal Islam. Замест гэтага, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Інданезія, Малайзія, Пакістан (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Ісламскае права) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

Ісламскі рух: Political Freedom & дэмакратыя

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (ісламскі) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, дэмакратыя. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah). [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Егіпет, Сірыя, Ірак, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, значэнні, essence and very existence.

the 500 most influential muslims

Джон Эспазіта

Ібрагім Калін

The publication you have in your hands is the first of what we hope will be anannual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslimworld. We have strived to highlight people who are influential as Muslims, thatis, people whose influence is derived from their practice of Islam or from the factthat they are Muslim. We think that this gives valuable insight into the differentways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, pointing to an old astrological idea that unseen forces (like themoon) affect humanity. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. The 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Their influence comes from a variety of sources; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leaders into 15 categories—Scholarly, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, жанчыны, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, сродкі масавай інфармацыі, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

Алжыр: Prospects for an Islamic or a Secular State

калі акацыя

What are the prospects for an Islamic state in Algeria nowadays? Before wecan answer that question, we must first understand the political, economic,and social developments that have recently taken place in Algeria. !ese eventswill shed some light on the decline of the Islamist movements.Soon after independence, Algeria adopted an inward-oriented “socialist”system. Its economic development model depended on revenues fromhydrocarbons, mainly oil. Additionally, the public sector dominated the economicactivities through the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that were supposed tocatalyze the economic and social development of the country. !e governmentwas the main supplier of subsidized food, utilities, housing, education, andjobs. In this first phase of the socialist experience, the government successfullyfaced “the problems of development,” and it could deliver the just-mentionedgoods and services as long as oil prices and oil revenues were high enough.1 !egovernment, Аднак, failed to face “the development of problems” during thesecond phase of its socialist experience. A huge decrease in the price of oil inthe mid-1980s, from around $40 to around $6 a barrel in few weeks, left thegovernment unable to provide better living standards for a population that haddoubled in size since independence. Since oil revenues were, and still are, themost important source of foreign currency for the country, the drastic decreasein crude oil prices had several consequences. Па-першае, it led to a severe foreign debtcrisis. Па-другое, there was a dramatic reduction in the volume of imports—inparticular, food products. !ird, the government’s budgetary resources werereduced by about 50%. Нарэшце, there was a severe economic recession that ledto social protests that led, in turn, to “bread rioting.”