RSSTë gjitha Hyrje në "Algjeri" Kategori

The Arab Tomorrow

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Tetor 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, a newly arrived foreign correspondent.Suddenly, one of the army trucks halted directly in front of the reviewing stand just as six Mirage jets roared overhead in an acrobatic performance, painting the sky with long trails of red, yellow, purple,and green smoke. Sadat stood up, apparently preparing to exchange salutes with yet another contingent of Egyptian troops. He made himself a perfect target for four Islamist assassins who jumped from the truck, stormed the podium, and riddled his body with bullets.As the killers continued for what seemed an eternity to spray the stand with their deadly fire, I considered for an instant whether to hit the ground and risk being trampled to death by panicked spectators or remain afoot and risk taking a stray bullet. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

Islam, Islami politik dhe Amerikë

Arabe Insajt

Është "Vëllazëria" me Amerikën mundshme?

Khalil al-Anani

"Nuk ka mundësi për të komunikuar me çdo SHBA. administratës për sa kohë që Shtetet e Bashkuara mban qëndrimin e saj të gjatë në këmbë të Islamit si një rrezik real, një pamje që i vë në Shtetet e Bashkuara në të njëjtën barkë si armiku sionist. Ne nuk kemi nocione të para-konceptuar në lidhje popullin amerikan apo U.S. shoqëria dhe organizatat e saj qytetare dhe mendoj tanke. Ne nuk kemi asnjë problem komunikimin me popullin amerikan, por jo përpjekjet e duhura janë duke u bërë për të na sjellë më afër,"Tha Dr. Issam al-Iryan, Shefi i departamentit politik të Vëllazërisë Myslimane në një intervistë telefonike.
Fjalët al-Iryan të përmbledhur pikëpamjet e Vëllazërisë Myslimane së popullit amerikan dhe të U.S. qeveri. Anëtarët e tjerë të Vëllazërisë Myslimane do të pajtoheshin, siç do vonë Hassan al-Banna, i cili e themeloi grupin në 1928. Al- Banna shikuara Perëndimin kryesisht si një simbol i prishjes morale. Selefite tjera - një shkollë islame të mendimit që mbështetet në paraardhësit si modele shembullore - kanë marrë të njëjtin mendim e Shteteve të Bashkuara, por nuk kanë fleksibilitetin ideologjik përqafuar nga Vëllazëria Myslimane. Ndërsa Vëllazëria Myslimane beson në angazhuar amerikanët në dialog civil, grupe të tjera ekstremiste nuk shoh asnjë pikë në dialog dhe për të ruajtur se forca është e vetmja mënyrë për të që kanë të bëjnë me Shtetet e Bashkuara.

Demokracia Liberale dhe Islami Politike: Search for Common Ground.

Mostapha Benhenda

This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: për shembull, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regjim, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. Për shembull, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (at least, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, it seems interesting to determine the conception of democracy underlying Islamic political models. Me fjale te tjera, we should try to find out what is democratic in “theodemocracy”. To that end, among the impressive diversity and plurality of Islamic traditions of normative political thought, we essentially focus on the broad current of thought going back to Abu ‘Ala Maududi and the Egyptian intellectual Sayyed Qutb.8 This particular trend of thought is interesting because in the Muslim world, it lies at the basis of some of the most challenging oppositions to the diffusion of the values originating from the West. Based on religious values, this trend elaborated a political model alternative to liberal democracy. Broadly speaking, the conception of democracy included in this Islamic political model is procedural. With some differences, this conception is inspired by democratic theories advocated by some constitutionalists and political scientists.10 It is thin and minimalist, up to a certain point. Për shembull, it does not rely on any notion of popular sovereignty and it does not require any separation between religion and politics. The first aim of this paper is to elaborate this minimalist conception. We make a detailed restatement of it in order to isolate this conception from its moral (liberal) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. Me të vërtetë, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, we show that such principle is not necessary to justify a democratic process.

ISLAM, DEMOKRACIA & USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Për më tepër, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, domethënë, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, SHBA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW

Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. At the same time, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.

Kulturës islame Politike, Demokraci, dhe të Drejtat e Njeriut

Daniel E. Çmimi

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Si pasojë, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, megjithatë, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Prandaj, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, demokraci, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

Saktësi në luftën globale ndaj terrorit:

Sherifa Zuhur

Shtatë vjet pas shtator 11, 2001 (9/11) sulmet, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Europa e Mesme, and European nations, si në komplot kapur në shtator 2007 in Germany. Bruce shtetet Riedel: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Kalimi në mjetet e "pushtetit të butë,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Pse, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
këtë përpjekje.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; dhe (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Shtoni në këtë zemërim amerikan, fear, dhe ankthi në lidhje me ngjarjet vdekjeprurës i 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Debatimi Demokracia në botën arabe

Ibtisam Ibrahim

Çfarë është demokracia?
Dijetarët perëndimorë karakterizojnë demokracinë një metodë për mbrojtjen e të drejtave civile dhe politike të individëve. Ai siguron për lirinë e shprehjes, shtyp, besim, opinion, pronësisë, dhe kuvendi, si dhe e drejta për të votuar, emërojë dhe të kërkojë poste publike. Huntington (1984) argumenton se një sistem politik demokratik në masën që krijuesit e saj më të fuqishme kolektive vendim janë zgjedhur përmes
Zgjedhjet periodike në të cilën kandidatët lirisht konkurrojnë për vota dhe në të cilën praktikisht të gjithë të rriturit kanë të drejtë për të votuar. Rothstein (1995) thotë se demokracia është një formë e qeverisjes dhe një proces i qeverisjes që ndryshon dhe përshtatet në përgjigje të rrethanave. Ai gjithashtu shton se përkufizimi i demokracisë perëndimore — Përveç llogaridhënies, konkurs, një shkallë e pjesëmarrjes — përmban një garanci e të drejtave të rëndësishme civile dhe politike. Anderson (1995) argumenton se demokracia termi do të thotë një sistem në të cilin krijuesit më të fuqishme vendim kolektiv janë zgjedhur përmes zgjedhjeve periodike në të cilën kandidatët lirisht konkurrojnë për vota dhe në të cilin praktikisht e gjithë popullsia e rritur ka të drejtë për të votuar. Ibrahim Saad Eddin (1995), një dijetar egjiptian, e sheh demokracinë që mund të zbatohet për botën arabe, si një grup i rregullave dhe institucioneve të projektuar për të mundësuar qeverisjen përmes paqësore
menaxhimi i grupeve konkurruese dhe / ose interesat konfliktuale. Megjithatë, Samir Amin (1991) bazuar përkufizimin e tij të demokracisë në perspektivën sociale marksiste. Ai ndan demokracinë në dy kategori: demokracia borgjeze e cila është e bazuar në të drejtat individuale dhe lirisë për individin, por pa pasur barazi sociale; dhe demokracia politike e cila i jep të drejtë të gjithë njerëzit në shoqëri të drejtën për të votuar dhe për të zgjedhur qeverinë e tyre dhe përfaqësues të institucioneve të cilat do të ndihmojnë për të marrë të drejtat e tyre të barabarta sociale.
Për të përfunduar këtë seksion, Unë do të thosha se nuk ka një përkufizim të vetëm të demokracisë që tregon pikërisht atë që është ose çfarë nuk është. Megjithatë, si ne re, shumica e definicioneve të përmendura më lart kanë elementet thelbësore të ngjashme – përgjegjësi, konkurs, dhe një shkallë e pjesëmarrjes – të cilat janë bërë dominuese në botën perëndimore dhe ndërkombëtarisht.

Islami dhe Demokracia

ITAC

Nëse dikush lexon shtypin apo dëgjon komentuesve mbi çështjet ndërkombëtare, ajo shpesh është thënë - dhe edhe më shpesh nënkuptohet, por nuk tha - se Islami nuk është në përputhje me demokracinë. Në vitet nëntëdhjetë, Samuel Huntington vendosur jashtë një stuhi intelektuale, kur ai botoi përplasjes së qytetërimeve dhe remaking e Rendit Botëror, në të cilën ai jep parashikimet e tij për botën - shkrim i madh. Në sferën politike, ai vë në dukje se ndërsa Turqia dhe Pakistani mund të ketë disa kërkesë të vogël për të "legjitimitetit demokratik" të gjitha të tjera "... vendet myslimane ishin shumicë dërrmuese jo-demokratike: monarkitë, Sistemet e një-partisë, regjimet ushtarake, diktaturat personale ose ndonjë kombinim i këtyre, zakonisht pushimi në një familje të kufizuar, fis, ose baza fisnore ". Premisa mbi të cilën argumenti i tij është themeluar është se ata nuk janë vetëm "nuk na pëlqen", ata janë kundër të vërtetë për vlerat tona themelore demokratike. Ai beson, si të tjerët, se ndërsa ideja e demokratizimit perëndimore është duke u rezistuar në pjesë të tjera të botës, konfrontimi është më i dukshëm në ato rajone ku Islami është feja dominante.
Argumenti ka bërë edhe nga ana tjetër, si dhe. Një dijetar fetar iranian, reflektuar në një krizë në fillim të shekullit të njëzetë kushtetuese në vendin e tij, deklaroi se Islami dhe demokracia nuk janë të pajtueshme për shkak se njerëzit nuk janë të barabartë dhe një trup legjislativ është i panevojshëm për shkak të natyrës gjithëpërfshirëse të ligjit fetar islam. Një pozitë e ngjashme është marrë kohët e fundit nga Ali Belhadj, një mësues algjerian të shkollës së mesme, predikues dhe (në këtë kontekst) Lideri i FIS, kur ai deklaroi se "demokracia nuk ishte një koncept islamik". Ndoshta deklarata më dramatike për këtë qëllim ishte ai i Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Lideri i kryengritësve suni në Irak të cilët, kur të përballen me perspektivën e zgjedhjeve, denoncuar demokracinë si një "parim i keq".
Por, sipas disa dijetarëve myslimanë, demokracia mbetet një ideal i rëndësishëm në Islam, me shtojcë që ajo është gjithmonë subjekt i ligjit fetar. Theksi në vendin madhe e Sheriatit është një element i pothuajse çdo komenti islame në qeverisje, moderuar apo ekstremist. Vetëm nëse sundimtari, që merr autoritetin e tij nga Perëndia, kufizon veprimet e tij në "mbikëqyrjen e administrimit të Sheriatit", është ai që do të bind. Nëse ai e bën të ndryshme nga kjo, ai është një jo-besimtar dhe e angazhuar muslimanët janë të rebelohen kundër tij. Këtu qëndron arsyetimi për pjesën më të madhe të dhunës që ka pllakosur botën myslimane në betejat e tilla si ai që mbizotëron në Algjeri gjatë viteve '90

Challenging Authoritarianism, Kolonializëm, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Veçanërisht, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
prandaj, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, por
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (ligjit islamik). Megjithatë, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. Në njërën anë,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. On the other hand, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Me të vërtetë,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Megjithatë, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, që

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Egjipti në Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 te 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.

Rrënjët e nacionalizmit në botën myslimane

Shaban Ahmed

The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. At present, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. Me të vërtetë, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
Veç kësaj, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, Arab, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. Për shembull, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Më tepër, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.

A Muslim Archipelago

Max L. Bruto

This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.

Kulturës islame Politike, Demokraci, dhe të Drejtat e Njeriut

Daniel E. Çmimi

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Si pasojë, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, megjithatë, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Prandaj, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
demokraci, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Partitë e opozitës islamiste dhe e mundshme për angazhimin e BE-

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Në dritën e rritjes së rëndësisë së lëvizjeve islamiste në botën myslimane dhe

mënyra se radikalizmi ka ndikuar ngjarjet globale që nga ana e shekullit, ajo

është e rëndësishme që BE të vlerësojë politikat e saj ndaj aktorëve në atë që mund të jetë i lirshëm

quajtur 'botën islame'. Kjo është veçanërisht e rëndësishme për të pyetur nëse dhe si të angazhohen

me grupe të ndryshme islamiste.

Kjo mbetet e diskutueshme edhe brenda BE-së. Disa mendojnë se vlerat islame që

shtrihen prapa partitë islamike janë thjesht të papajtueshme me idealet perëndimore të demokracisë dhe

të drejtat e njeriut, ndërsa të tjerët shohin angazhimin si një domosdoshmëri reale për shkak të rritje

Rëndësia e brendshme e partive islamike dhe përfshirja e tyre në rritje në ndërkombëtare

punë. Një perspektivë tjetër është se demokratizimi në botën muslimane do të rritet

sigurisë evropiane. Vlefshmëria e këtyre dhe argumente të tjera mbi nëse dhe si

BE-ja duhet të angazhohen mund të testohen vetëm duke studiuar lëvizjet e ndryshme islamike dhe

rrethanat e tyre politike, vendi nga vendi.

Demokratizimi është një temë qendrore e veprimeve të përbashkëta të politikës së jashtme të BE-së, siç përcaktohet

në nenin 11 të Traktatit për Bashkimin Europian. Shumica e shteteve të konsiderohen në këtë

Raporti nuk janë demokratike, ose jo plotësisht demokratike. Në shumicën e këtyre vendeve, islamike

partitë dhe lëvizjet përbëjnë një opozitë të rëndësishëm në regjimeve mbizotëruese, dhe

në disa ata formojnë madh bllokun opozitar. demokracitë europiane kanë pasur kohë për të

merren me regjimet qeverisëse që janë autoritare, por është një fenomen i ri për shtyp

për reforma demokratike në shtetet ku përfituesit më të mundshme mund të ketë, nga

Pika e parë e BE-së, qasje të ndryshme dhe nganjëherë problematike për të demokracisë dhe e saj

vlerat e lidhura, të tilla si minoritet dhe të drejtat e grave dhe të sundimit të ligjit. Këto akuza janë

shpesh hedhur kundër lëvizjeve islamiste, kështu që është e rëndësishme për hartuesit e politikave evropiane në

kanë një pamje të saktë të politikave dhe filozofitë e partnerëve të mundshëm.

Eksperienca nga vende të ndryshme ka tendencë për të sugjeruar se më shumë liri islamike

Partitë janë të lejuara, më të moderuar se ata janë në veprimet dhe idetë e tyre. Ne shume

Rastet partitë islamike dhe grupet kanë zhvendosur kohë që larg qëllimin e tyre origjinale

e krijimit të një shteti islamik i qeverisur nga ligji islamik, dhe kanë ardhur për të pranuar themelore

parimet demokratike të konkurrencës zgjedhore për pushtet, ekzistenca e politike të tjera

konkurrentët, dhe pluralizmi politik.

Islami politik në Lindjen e Mesme

A Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, në

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Megjithatë, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.