Allar Færslur í "Alsír" Flokkur
The Arab Tomorrow
DAVID B. ÚTTAKA
október 6, 1981, átti að vera hátíðardagur í Egyptalandi. Það markaði afmæli stórkostlegustu sigurstundar Egyptalands í þremur átökum araba og Ísraela., þegar fátækur her landsins lagðist yfir Súez-skurðinn á opnunardögum landsins 1973 Yom Kippur-stríðið og sendi ísraelska hermenn að hörfa. Á svala, skýlaus morgun, Kaíró leikvangurinn var troðfullur af egypskum fjölskyldum sem höfðu komið til að sjá herinn stinga vélbúnaði sínum., Anwar el-Sadat forseti,arkitekt stríðsins, horfði með ánægju þegar menn og vélar gengu fram fyrir hann. Ég var nálægt, nýkominn erlendur fréttaritari.Skyndilega, einn af herflutningabílunum stöðvaði beint fyrir framan yfirlitssýninguna rétt þegar sex Mirage þotur öskruðu yfir höfuð í loftfimleikum, að mála himininn með löngum rauðum slóðum, gulur, fjólublár,og grænan reyk. Sadat stóð upp, að því er virðist að búa sig undir að skiptast á kveðjum við enn einn lið egypskra hermanna. Hann gerði sig að fullkomnu skotmarki fyrir fjóra íslamista morðingja sem stukku úr vörubílnum, ruddist inn á pallinn, og þeytti líkama hans með byssukúlum. Þegar morðingjarnir héldu áfram í það sem virtist heila eilífð að úða stallinum með banvænum eldi sínum, Ég velti því fyrir mér í augnabliki hvort ég ætti að lenda í jörðu og eiga á hættu að verða troðinn til bana af skelfingu lostnum áhorfendum eða halda áfram og eiga á hættu að taka villandi byssukúlu. Eðlishvöt sagði mér að halda mér á fætur, og blaðamannaskylda mín varð til þess að ég fór að komast að því hvort Sadat væri á lífi eða dáinn.
| september 26, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
Íslam, Stjórnmála Íslam og Ameríku
Arab Insight
Er „Bræðralag“ með Ameríku mögulegt?
khalil al-anani
„Það er enginn möguleiki á að eiga samskipti við nein Bandaríkin. stjórnsýslu svo framarlega sem Bandaríkin halda við langvarandi skoðun sinni á íslam sem raunverulegri hættu, skoðun sem setur Bandaríkin í sama bát og óvinur zíonista. Við höfum engar fyrirfram gefnar hugmyndir varðandi bandarísku þjóðina eða Bandaríkin. samfélaginu og borgaralegum samtökum þess og hugveitum. Við eigum ekki í neinum vandræðum með að eiga samskipti við bandarísku þjóðina en ekki er reynt að færa okkur nær,“ sagði Dr. Issam al-Iryan, yfirmaður stjórnmáladeildar Bræðralags múslima í símaviðtali.
Orð Al-Iryan draga saman skoðanir Bræðralags múslima á bandarísku þjóðinni og Bandaríkjunum. ríkisstjórn. Aðrir meðlimir Bræðralags múslima myndu taka undir það, eins og hinn látni Hassan al-Banna, sem stofnaði hópinn í 1928. Al- Banna leit á Vesturlönd að mestu leyti sem tákn um siðferðisbrot. Aðrir salafistar – íslamskur hugsunarskóli sem treystir á forfeður sem fyrirmyndir – hafa tekið sömu skoðun á Bandaríkjunum, en skortir þann hugmyndafræðilega sveigjanleika sem Bræðralag múslima aðhyllist. Þó að Bræðralag múslima trúi því að Bandaríkjamenn taki þátt í borgaralegum viðræðum, aðrir öfgahópar sjá engan tilgang í viðræðum og halda því fram að hervald sé eina leiðin til að eiga við Bandaríkin.
| september 15, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
Frjálslynt lýðræði og pólitískt íslam: Leitin að sameiginlegum vettvangi.
Mostapha Benhenda
Í þessari grein er leitast við að koma á samræðum milli lýðræðislegra og íslamskra stjórnmálakenninga.1 Samspil þeirra er furðulegt.: til dæmis, í því skyni að útskýra sambandið sem er á milli lýðræðis og hugmynda þeirra um hið fullkomna íslamska stjórnmála
stjórn, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. Til dæmis, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (að minnsta kosti, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, it seems interesting to determine the conception of democracy underlying Islamic political models. Með öðrum orðum, við ættum að reyna að komast að því hvað er lýðræðislegt í „gyðræði“. Í því skyni, meðal áhrifamikillar fjölbreytni og fjölbreytni íslamskra hefða staðlaðrar pólitískrar hugsunar, við einblínum í meginatriðum á breiðan hugsunarstraum sem fer aftur til Abu 'Ala Maududi og egypska menntamannsins Sayyed Qutb.8 Þessi tiltekna hugsunarstefna er áhugaverð vegna þess að í múslimaheiminum, hún liggur til grundvallar sumum erfiðustu andstöðunum við útbreiðslu þeirra gilda sem koma frá Vesturlöndum. Byggt á trúarlegum gildum, þessi þróun útfærði pólitíska fyrirmynd valkost við frjálslynt lýðræði. Í stórum dráttum, Lýðræðishugmyndin sem felst í þessu íslamska pólitíska líkani er málsmeðferð. Með nokkrum mun, þessi hugmynd er innblásin af lýðræðiskenningum sem sumir stjórnskipunarsinnar og stjórnmálafræðingar hafa haldið fram.10 Hún er þunn og mínímalísk., upp að vissu marki. Til dæmis, það byggir ekki á neinum hugmyndum um alþýðufullveldi og það krefst ekki aðskilnaðar á milli trúarbragða og stjórnmála. Fyrsta markmið þessarar greinar er að útfæra þessa mínimalísku hugmynd. Við gerum nákvæma endurupptöku á því til að einangra þessa hugmynd frá siðferði sínu (frjálslyndur) undirstöður, sem eru umdeildar út frá því sérstaka íslamska sjónarhorni sem hér er fjallað um. Einmitt, hið lýðræðislega ferli er venjulega dregið af meginreglunni um persónulegt sjálfræði, sem er ekki studd af þessum íslömsku kenningum.11 Hér, við sýnum að slík meginregla er ekki nauðsynleg til að réttlæta lýðræðislegt ferli.
| september 09, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
ÍSLAM, LÝÐRÆÐI & BANDARÍKIN:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Ennfremur, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, nefnilega, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, US, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you
| september 07, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
ISLAM OG LÖGREGLU
Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld
Í nútíma vestrænu samfélagi okkar, ríkisskipulögð lögfræðileg kerfi draga venjulega sérstaka línu sem aðgreinir trúarbrögð og lög. Öfugt, það eru fjöldi íslamskra svæðisbundinna samfélaga þar sem trú og lög eru eins nátengd og samtvinnuð í dag eins og þau voru fyrir upphaf nútímans. Á sama tíma, það hlutfall sem trúarlög eru í (shariah á arabísku) og almannarétt (lögin) eru blandaðir mismunandi eftir löndum. Hvað er meira, staða íslams og þar af leiðandi einnig íslamskra laga. Samkvæmt upplýsingum frá Samtökum íslamska ráðstefnunnar (OIC), það eru eins og er 57 Íslamsk ríki um allan heim, skilgreind sem lönd þar sem íslam er trúarbrögð (1) ríkið, (2) meirihluti íbúanna, eða (3) mikill minnihluti. Allt þetta hefur áhrif á þróun og form íslamskra laga.
| september 06, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
Íslamsk stjórnmálamenning, Lýðræði, og mannréttindi
Daniel E. Verð
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Þar af leiðandi, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, þó, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| september 06, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
Sherifa Zuhur
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; og (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| september 06, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD
Ibtisam Ibrahim
What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, trú, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracy — in addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participation — contains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Hins vegar, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Hins vegar, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elements – accountability, competition, and some degree of participation – which have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.
| september 05, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
Islam and Democracy
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
| september 04, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
Að ögra forræðishyggju, Nýlendustefnunnar, og sundurlyndi: Íslamskar stjórnmálaumbótahreyfingar al-Afghani og Rida
Ahmed Ali Salem
The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most
Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Einkum, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
En, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet
some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Þess vegna, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, but
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). Hins vegar, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,
they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic
sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s
teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)
unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. On the other hand, they realized the
need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Einmitt,
their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the
following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led
caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing
a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity
and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating
a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the
Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. Hins vegar, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which
emphasized education and undermined politics.
| september 02, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
Egyptaland á Tipping Point ?
David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 til 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.
| september 02, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
Rætur þjóðernishyggju í heimi múslima
Shabir Ahmed
The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. At present, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. Einmitt, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
Enn fremur, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, Arab, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. Til dæmis, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Frekar, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.
| Ág 28, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
Múslímskur eyjaklasi
Max L. Gross
This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.
| Ág 27, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
Íslamsk stjórnmálamenning, Lýðræði, og mannréttindi
Daniel E. Verð
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the
values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Þar af leiðandi, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, þó, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,
and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of
Islam on politics across eight nations.
| Ág 22, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB
Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB, Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB
Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB
Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB. Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB
Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB.
Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB. Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB
Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB
mannréttindi, Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB
innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum
innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum
innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum
innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum
innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum.
innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum
innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum 11 innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum
innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, Íslamista
innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, og
innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum
takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg
takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg
takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg
takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg. takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg
takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg
takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg.
takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg
takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg. takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg
takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg
að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum, að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum
að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum, að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum
að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum, að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum.
| Ág 21, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
Pólitískt íslam í Miðausturlöndum
Eru Knudsen
This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly
referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, í
particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may
be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report
reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East
(Mynd 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and
that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been
engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up
arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is
widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even
Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political
parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Engu að síður, the Islamist
revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to
account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a
reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative
theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the
powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.
The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that
portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old
Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist
movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This
importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded
along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their
adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on
understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only
of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.
| Ág 20, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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