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Arabský zajtrajšok

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

októbra 6, 1981, mal byť v Egypte dňom osláv. Pripomenulo to výročie najväčšieho víťazstva Egypta v troch arabsko-izraelských konfliktoch, keď sa v úvodných dňoch podguráženej armády krajiny prehnali cez Suezský prieplav 1973 Jomkipurská vojna a poslala izraelské jednotky na ústup. V pohode, bezoblačné ráno, Káhirský štadión bol preplnený egyptskými rodinami, ktoré si prišli pozrieť vojenskú výstuhu s jej hardvérom., Prezident Anwar el-Sadat,architekt vojny, s uspokojením sledoval, ako pred ním defilujú muži a stroje. Bol som nablízku, novoprišlého zahraničného spravodajcu.Zrazu, jedno z armádnych nákladných vozidiel sa zastavilo priamo pred hodnotiacim stánkom práve vo chvíli, keď nad hlavami zahučalo šesť prúdových lietadiel Mirage v akrobatickom predstavení., maľovanie oblohy dlhými červenými stopami, žltá, Fialová,a zelený dym. Sadat vstal, očividne sa pripravujú na výmenu pozdravov s ďalším kontingentom egyptských jednotiek. Urobil zo seba dokonalý cieľ pre štyroch islamistických vrahov, ktorí vyskočili z kamiónu, vtrhol na pódium, a prešpikovali jeho telo guľkami. Keď vrahovia pokračovali celú večnosť, aby postriekali stánok svojim smrtiacim ohňom, Chvíľu som zvažoval, či mám dopadnúť na zem a riskovať, že ma ušliapu na smrť panikári diváci, alebo zostanem na nohách a risknem zatúlanú guľku.. Inštinkt mi povedal, aby som zostal stáť na nohách, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

FEMINISM BETWEEN SECULARISM AND ISLAMISM: THE CASE OF PALESTINE

Dr, Islah Jad

Legislative elections held in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 2006 brought to power the Islamist movement Hamas, which went on to form the majority of the Palestinian Legislative Council and also the first majority Hamas government. These elections resulted in the appointment of the first female Hamas minister, ktorá sa stala ministerkou pre záležitosti žien. Medzi marcom 2006 a jún 2007, tento post prevzali dve rôzne ministerky Hamasu, ale obaja mali problém riadiť ministerstvo, pretože väčšina jeho zamestnancov nebola členmi Hamasu, ale patrili k iným politickým stranám, a väčšina z nich bola členmi Fatahu, dominantné hnutie ovládajúce väčšinu inštitúcií palestínskej samosprávy. Napäté obdobie boja medzi ženami Hamasu na ministerstve pre záležitosti žien a členkami Fatahu sa skončilo po prevzatí moci Hamasom v pásme Gazy a následnom páde jeho vlády na Západnom brehu – boj ktorý niekedy nabral násilný spád. One reason later cited to explain this struggle was the difference between secular feminist discourse and Islamist discourse on women’s issues. In the Palestinian context this disagreement took on a dangerous nature as it was used to justify perpetuating the bloody political struggle, the removal of Hamas women from their positions or posts, and the political and geographical divides prevailing at the time in both the West Bank and the occupied Gaza Strip.
This struggle raises a number of important questions: should we punish the Islamist movement which has come to power, or should we consider the reasons which led to Fateh’s failure in the political arena? Can feminism offer a comprehensive framework for women, regardless of their social and ideological affiliations? Can a discourse of a shared common ground for women help them to realize and agree upon their common goals? Is paternalism only present in Islamist ideology, and not in nationalism and patriotism? What do we mean by feminism? Is there only one feminism, or several feminisms? What do we mean by Islamis it the movement known by this name or the religion, the philosophy, or the legal system? We need to go to the bottom of these issues and consider them carefully, and we must agree upon them so that we can later decide, as feminists, if our criticism of paternalism should be directed at religion (viera), which should be confined to the heart of the believer and not be allowed to take control of the world at large, or the jurisprudence, ktorý sa týka rôznych škôl viery, ktoré vysvetľujú právny systém obsiahnutý v Koráne a výroky proroka – Sunna.

ISLAMISTICKÝ ŽENSKÝ AKTIVIZMUS V Okupovanej Palestíne

Rozhovory s Khaledom Amayrehom

Rozhovor so Sameerou Al-Halaykou

Sameera Al-Halayka je zvoleným členom Palestínskej legislatívnej rady. Bola

narodený v dedine Shoyoukh neďaleko Hebronu v r 1964. Má BA v šaríi (islamský

judikatúra) z Hebronskej univerzity. Pracovala ako novinárka od r 1996 do 2006 kedy

vstúpila do Palestínskej legislatívnej rady ako zvolená členka v 2006 voľby.

Je vydatá a má sedem detí.

Q: V niektorých západných krajinách panuje všeobecný dojem, že ženy prijímajú

podradné zaobchádzanie v rámci skupín islamského odporu, such as Hamas. Is this true?

How are women activists treated in Hamas?
Rights and duties of Muslim women emanate first and foremost from Islamic Sharia or law.

They are not voluntary or charitable acts or gestures we receive from Hamas or anyone

else. Teda, as far as political involvement and activism is concerned, women generally have

the same rights and duties as men. After all, women make up at least 50 per cent of

society. In a certain sense, they are the entire society because they give birth to, and raise,

the new generation.

Therefore, I can say that the status of women within Hamas is in full conformity with her

status in Islam itself. This means that she is a full partner at all levels. Indeed, it would be

unfair and unjust for an Islamic (or Islamist if you prefer) woman to be partner in suffering

while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in

Hamas has always been pioneering.

Q: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is

a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts

regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to

pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued

Israeli occupation?

There is no text in Islamic jurisprudence nor in Hamas’ charter which impedes women from

political participation. I believe the opposite is truethere are numerous Quranic verses

and sayings of the Prophet Muhammed urging women to be active in politics and public

issues affecting Muslims. But it is also true that for women, as it is for men, political activism

is not compulsory but voluntary, and is largely decided in light of each woman’s abilities,

qualifications and individual circumstances. None the less, showing concern for public

matters is mandatory upon each and every Muslim man and woman. The Prophet

Muhammed said: “He who doesn’t show concern for the affairs of Muslims is not a Muslim.”

Moreover, Palestinian Islamist women have to take all objective factors on the ground into

account when deciding whether to join politics or get involved in political activism.


IRANIAN WOMEN AFTER THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

Ansiia Khaz Allii


More than thirty years have passed since the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, yet there remain a number of questions and ambiguities about the way the Islamic Republic and its laws deal with contemporary problems and current circumstances, particularly with regard to women and women’s rights. This short paper will shed light on these issues and study the current position of women in various spheres, comparing this to the situation prior to the Islamic Revolution. Reliable and authenticated data has been used wherever possible. The introduction summarises a number of theoretical and legal studies which provide the basis for the subsequent more practical analysis and are the sources from where the data has been obtained.
The first section considers attitudes of the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards women and women’s rights, and then takes a comprehensive look at the laws promulgated since the Islamic Revolution concerning women and their position in society. The second section considers women’s cultural and educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. The third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, the relationship between women and the family, and the family’s role in limiting or increasing women’s rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam

BASS PRE VÁS

When reading the majority of texts that comprise the vast literature that has been published by self-proclaimed pundits on political Islam, it is easy to miss the fact that a new movement has arisen. Further, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, však, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
Jedným z dôvodov týchto nedostatkov je skutočnosť, že väčšina z tých, ktorí sa nás snažia informovať o „hrozbe džihádistov“ – a Berman je pre toto štipendium typický – nielenže nemajú jazykové znalosti na čítanie zdrojov vytvorených ideológmi politického islam, ale aj nedostatok vedomostí o kultúrnom rozmere hnutia. Toto nové totalitné hnutie je v mnohých smeroch novinkou
v dejinách politiky, pretože má svoje korene v dvoch paralelných a súvisiacich javoch: najprv, kulturalizácia politiky, ktorá vedie k tomu, že politika je konceptualizovaná ako kultúrny systém (pohľad, ktorý propagoval Clifford Geertz); a po druhé návrat posvätného, alebo „očarovanie“ sveta, as a reaction to its intensive secularisation resulting from globalisation.
The analysis of political ideologies that are based on religions, and that can exert appeal as a political religion as a consequence of this, involves a social science understanding of the role of religion played by world politics, especially after the bi-polar system of the Cold War has given way to a multi-polar world. In a project conducted at the Hannah Arendt Institute for the application of totalitarianism to the study of political religions, I proposed the distinction between secular ideologies that act as a substitute for religion, and religious ideologies based on genuine religious faith, which is the case in religious fundamentalism (see note
24). Another project on ‘Political Religion’, carried out at the University of Basel, has made clearer the point that new approaches to politics become necessary once a religious faith becomes clothed in a political garb.Drawing on the authoritative sources of political Islam, this article suggests that the great variety of organisations inspired by Islamist ideology are to be conceptualised both as political religions and as political movements. The unique quality of political Islam lies is the fact that it is based on a transnational religion (see note 26).

Islam, Political Islam and America

Arabský pohľad

Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?

khalil al-anani

“there is no chance of communicating with any U.S. administration so long as the United States maintains its long-standing view of Islam as a real danger, a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have no pre-conceived notions concerning the American people or the U.S. society and its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chief of the political department of the Muslim Brotherhood in a phone interview.
Al-Iryan’s words sum up the Muslim Brotherhood’s views of the American people and the U.S. government. Other members of the Muslim Brotherhood would agree, as would the late Hassan al-Banna, who founded the group in 1928. Al- Banna viewed the West mostly as a symbol of moral decay. Other Salafis – an Islamic school of thought that relies on ancestors as exemplary models – have taken the same view of the United States, but lack the ideological flexibility espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood believes in engaging the Americans in civil dialogue, other extremist groups see no point in dialogue and maintain that force is the only way of dealing with the United States.

Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: the Search for Common Ground.

Mostapha Benhenda

This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: for example, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regime, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. For example, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, ktorý je charakteristickým znakom demokracie. Práve naopak, často odmietajú princíp oddelenia náboženstva a štátu, ktorý sa často považuje za súčasť demokracie (najmenej, demokracie, ako ju dnes v Spojených štátoch poznáme). Vzhľadom na toto zmiešané hodnotenie demokratických princípov, zdá sa zaujímavé určiť koncepciu demokracie, ktorá je základom islamských politických modelov. Inými slovami, mali by sme sa pokúsiť zistiť, čo je demokratické v „teodemokracii“. Za týmto účelom, medzi pôsobivú rozmanitosť a pluralitu islamských tradícií normatívneho politického myslenia, v podstate sa zameriavame na široký myšlienkový prúd siahajúci až k Abu ‘Ala Maududimu a egyptskému intelektuálovi Sayyedovi Qutbovi.8 Tento konkrétny myšlienkový trend je zaujímavý, pretože v moslimskom svete, je základom niektorých najnáročnejších opozícií voči šíreniu hodnôt pochádzajúcich zo Západu. Na základe náboženských hodnôt, tento trend vytvoril alternatívu politického modelu k liberálnej demokracii. Všeobecne povedané, Koncepcia demokracie obsiahnutá v tomto islamskom politickom modeli je procedurálna. S určitými rozdielmi, táto koncepcia je inšpirovaná demokratickými teóriami, ktoré presadzujú niektorí konštitucionalisti a politológovia.10 Je tenká a minimalistická, do určitého bodu. For example, nespolieha sa na žiadnu predstavu o suverenite ľudu a nevyžaduje žiadne oddelenie náboženstva a politiky. Prvým cieľom tohto príspevku je rozpracovať túto minimalistickú koncepciu. Robíme to podrobné preformulovanie, aby sme túto koncepciu izolovali od jej morálky (liberálny) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. Indeed, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, we show that such principle is not necessary to justify a democratic process.

The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal

As a cultural movement Islam rejects the old static view of the universe, and reaches a dynamic view. As an emotional system of unification it recognizes the worth of the individual as such, and rejects bloodrelationship as a basis of human unity. Blood-relationship is earthrootedness. The search for a purely psychological foundation of human unity becomes possible only with the perception that all human life is spiritual in its origin.1 Such a perception is creative of fresh loyalties without any ceremonial to keep them alive, and makes it possible for man to emancipate himself from the earth. Christianity which had originally appeared as a monastic order was tried by Constantine as a system of unification.2 Its failure to work as such a system drove the Emperor Julian3 to return to the old gods of Rome on which he attempted to put philosophical interpretations. A modern historian of civilization has thus depicted the state of the civilized world about the time when Islam appeared on the stage of History: It seemed then that the great civilization that it had taken four thousand years to construct was on the verge of disintegration, and that mankind was likely to return to that condition of barbarism where every tribe and sect was against the next, and law and order were unknown . . . The
old tribal sanctions had lost their power. Hence the old imperial methods would no longer operate. The new sanctions created by
Christianity were working division and destruction instead of unity and order. It was a time fraught with tragedy. Civilization, like a gigantic tree whose foliage had overarched the world and whose branches had borne the golden fruits of art and science and literature, stood tottering, its trunk no longer alive with the flowing sap of devotion and reverence, but rotted to the core, riven by the storms of war, and held together only by the cords of ancient customs and laws, that might snap at any moment. Was there any emotional culture that could be brought in, to gather mankind once more into unity and to save civilization? This culture must be something of a new type, for the old sanctions and ceremonials were dead, and to build up others of the same kind would be the work
of centuries.’The writer then proceeds to tell us that the world stood in need of a new culture to take the place of the culture of the throne, and the systems of unification which were based on bloodrelationship.
It is amazing, he adds, that such a culture should have arisen from Arabia just at the time when it was most needed. There is, však, nothing amazing in the phenomenon. The world-life intuitively sees its own needs, and at critical moments defines its own direction. This is what, in the language of religion, we call prophetic revelation. It is only natural that Islam should have flashed across the consciousness of a simple people untouched by any of the ancient cultures, and occupying a geographical position where three continents meet together. The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity in the principle of Tauhâd.’5 Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature. Konečný duchovný základ všetkého života, ako je chápaný islamom, je večné a odhaľuje sa v rozmanitosti a zmene. Spoločnosť založená na takejto koncepcii Reality sa musí zmieriť, vo svojom živote, kategórie trvalosti a zmeny. Musí mať večné princípy, aby mohol riadiť svoj kolektívny život, lebo večné nám dáva oporu vo svete ustavičných zmien.

islamská reformácia

Adnan Khan

Taliansky premiér, Silvio Berlusconi sa po udalostiach o 9/11:
„...musíme si byť vedomí nadradenosti našej civilizácie, systém, ktorý zaručuje

blahobyt, rešpektovanie ľudských práv a – na rozdiel od islamských krajín – rešpekt

za náboženské a politické práva, systém, ktorý má svoje hodnoty a chápe rozmanitosť

a tolerancia...Západ si podmaní národy, like it conquered communism, even if it

means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was

1,400 years ago…”1

And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of

ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”

Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute

The concept of ‘islah’ (reform) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the

history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical

Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified

their Islamic rulings (fiqh) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to

apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the

Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time

understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined

principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of

study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Tí, ktorí sa stali

ovplyvnený gréckou filozofiou, ako sú moslimskí filozofi a niektorí z Mut'azilah

sa považovali za ľudí, ktorí opustili záhyb islamu, keďže Korán prestal byť základom ich štúdia. Teda pre

každý moslim, ktorý sa pokúša odvodiť pravidlá alebo pochopiť, aký postoj by mal zaujať ku konkrétnemu

vydanie Koránu je základom tejto štúdie.

Prvý pokus o reformu islamu sa uskutočnil na prelome 19. storočia. Na prelome

storočia bola Ummah v dlhom období úpadku, keď sa globálna rovnováha síl posunula

z Khilafahu do Británie. Narastajúce problémy zachvátili Khilafah, kým bola západná Európa

uprostred priemyselnej revolúcie. Ummah stratila svoje pôvodné chápanie islamu, a

v snahe zvrátiť úpadok, ktorý pohltil Uthmáncov (Osmani) niektorí moslimovia boli poslaní do

West, a v dôsledku toho boli ohromení tým, čo videli. Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi z Egypta (1801-1873),

pri návrate z Paríža, napísal životopisnú knihu s názvom Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The

Ťažba zlata, alebo Prehľad Paríža, 1834), chvália ich čistotu, láska k práci, a nad

všetku spoločenskú morálku. Vyhlásil, že musíme napodobňovať to, čo sa robí v Paríži, obhajovanie zmien

islamskej spoločnosti od liberalizácie žien k systémom vládnutia. Táto myšlienka, a ostatným sa to páči,

znamenal začiatok nového trendu v islame.

ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION

IBRAHIM KALIN

In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.

Islam na Západe

Jocelyne Cesari

Imigrácia moslimov do Európy, Severná Amerika, Austrália a zložitá sociálno-náboženská dynamika, ktorá sa následne vyvinula, urobili z islamu na Západe presvedčivú novú oblasť výskumu. Aféra Salmana Rushdieho, hidžábové kontroverzie, útoky na Svetové obchodné centrum, a rozruch nad dánskymi karikatúrami sú príkladmi medzinárodných kríz, ktoré odhalili spojenie medzi moslimami na Západe a globálnym moslimským svetom.. Tieto nové situácie prinášajú teoretické a metodologické výzvy pre štúdium súčasného islamu, a stalo sa kľúčovým, aby sme sa vyhli esencializácii či už islamu alebo moslimov a odolali rétorickým štruktúram diskurzov, ktoré sú zaujaté bezpečnosťou a terorizmom..
V tomto článku, Tvrdím, že islam ako náboženská tradícia je terra incognita. Predbežným dôvodom tejto situácie je, že neexistuje konsenzus o náboženstve ako predmete výskumu. Náboženstvo, ako akademická disciplína, sa rozpoltená medzi historickými, sociologický, a hermeneutických metodológií. S islamom, situácia je ešte zamotanejšia. Na západe, štúdium islamu začalo ako odvetvie orientalistických štúdií, a preto nasledovalo samostatnú a osobitnú cestu od štúdia náboženstiev. Aj keď kritika orientalizmu bola ústredným prvkom objavenia sa islamu v oblasti spoločenských vied, napätie medzi islamistami a antropológmi a sociológmi zostáva silné. Téma islamu a moslimov na Západe je zakomponovaná do tohto boja. Jedným z dôsledkov tohto metodologického napätia je, že študenti islamu, ktorí začali svoju akademickú kariéru štúdiom islamu vo Francúzsku, Nemecko, alebo pre Ameriku je náročné vybudovať si dôveryhodnosť ako učenci islamu, najmä v akademickej oblasti Severnej Ameriky
kontext.

Povolanie, kolonializmus, apartheidu?

The Human Sciences Research Council

The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (namely, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, a
Gaza, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. Zároveň, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, a, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. Zároveň, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.

ISLAM, DEMOKRACIA & SPOJENÉ ŠTÁTY AMERICKÉ:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq |

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Moreover, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namely, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, USA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Bohužiaľ, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Islamism revisited

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 júla 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW

Birgit Krawietzová
Helmut Reifeld

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. Zároveň, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.