RSSKõik kanded "Lähis-Ida" Kategooria

Araabia homme

DAVID B. OTAWAY

oktoober 6, 1981, oli mõeldud Egiptuses pidupäevaks. See tähistas aastapäeva Egiptuse suurimast võiduhetkest kolmes Araabia-Iisraeli konfliktis, kui riigi allajäänud armee tungis selle avapäevadel üle Suessi kanali 1973 Jom Kippuri sõda ja saatis Iisraeli väed taganema. Jahedal, pilvitu hommik, Kairo staadion oli pungil Egiptuse peredest, kes olid tulnud vaatama sõjaväelasi, jalas oma riistvara., president Anwar el-Sadat,sõja arhitekt, vaatas rahulolevalt, kuidas mehed ja masinad tema ees paradeerusid. Olin lähedal, äsja saabunud väliskorrespondent.Äkki, üks armee veoautodest peatus otse ülevaatuse stendi ees just siis, kui kuus Mirage'i lennukit möirgasid pea kohal akrobaatilises etenduses, taeva maalimine pikkade punaste jälgedega, kollane, lilla,ja rohelist suitsu. Sadat tõusis püsti, ilmselt valmistub tervitusi vahetama veel ühe Egiptuse vägede kontingendiga. Ta tegi endast täiusliku sihtmärgi neljale veoautolt hüpanud islami palgamõrvarile, tungis poodiumile, ja täitis ta keha kuulidega.Kui mõrvarid jätkasid terve igaviku, et pritsida püstiku oma surmava tulega., Mõtlesin hetke, kas lüüa vastu maad ja riskida, et paanikas pealtvaatajad tallavad end surnuks või jään jalgele ja riskin hulkuva kuuliga. Sisetunne käskis mul jalul püsida, ja minu ajakirjanduslik kohusetunne sundis mind minema uurima, kas Sadat on elus või surnud.

Feminism VAHEL ilmalikkuse ja islamismi: CASE Palestiina

Dr, Islah Jad

aastal toimusid Läänekaldal ja Gaza sektoris seadusandlikud valimised 2006 tõi võimule islamistliku liikumise Hamas, mis moodustas enamuse Palestiina seadusandlikus nõukogus ja ka esimese enamusvalitsuse Hamasi. Nende valimiste tulemusel nimetati ametisse esimene Hamasi naisminister, kellest sai naisminister. Märtsi vahel 2006 ja juuni 2007, sellele ametikohale asusid kaks erinevat Hamasi naisministrit, kuid mõlemal oli ministeeriumi juhtimine keeruline, kuna enamik selle töötajatest ei olnud Hamasi liikmed, vaid kuulusid teistesse erakondadesse, ja enamik neist olid Fatahi liikmed, domineeriv liikumine, mis kontrollib enamikku Palestiina omavalitsuse institutsioone. Pingeline võitlusperiood naisteasjade ministeeriumis tegutsevate Hamasi naiste ja Fatahi naisliikmete vahel lõppes pärast Hamasi võimuhaaramist Gaza sektoris ja sellest tulenevat valitsuse langemist Läänekaldal – võitlus mis võttis vahel vägivaldse pöörde. Üks põhjus, miks seda võitlust hiljem selgitati, oli erinevus ilmaliku feministliku diskursuse ja islamistliku diskursuse vahel naiste teemadel.. Palestiina kontekstis omandas see erimeelsus ohtliku iseloomu, kuna seda kasutati verise poliitilise võitluse jätkamise õigustamiseks, Hamasi naiste ametikohalt või ametikohalt kõrvaldamine, ning sel ajal valitsenud poliitilised ja geograafilised lõhed nii Läänekaldal kui ka okupeeritud Gaza sektoris.
See võitlus tõstatab mitmeid olulisi küsimusi: kas peaksime karistama võimule tulnud islamistlikku liikumist, või peaksime kaaluma põhjuseid, mis viisid Fateh'i läbikukkumiseni poliitilisel areenil? Kas feminism võib pakkuda naistele terviklikku raamistikku, sõltumata nende sotsiaalsest ja ideoloogilisest kuuluvusest? Kas naiste ühise ühisosa diskursus aitab neil ühiseid eesmärke mõista ja nendes kokku leppida?? Kas paternalism on ainult islamistlikus ideoloogias?, ja mitte rahvusluses ja patriotismis? Mida me mõtleme feminismi all? Kas on ainult üks feminism, või mitu feminismi? Mida me islami all mõtleme – kas selle nime all tuntud liikumine või religioon, filosoofia, või õigussüsteem? Peame minema nende probleemide põhja ja neid hoolikalt kaaluma, ja me peame nendega kokku leppima, et saaksime hiljem otsustada, kui feministid, kui meie paternalismi kriitika peaks olema suunatud religioonile (usk), mis peaks piirduma uskliku südamega ja millel ei tohi lasta üle maailma kontrolli haarata, või kohtupraktika, mis on seotud erinevate usukoolkondadega, mis selgitavad Koraanis sisalduvat õigussüsteemi ja prohveti ütlusi – sunna.

Islamistlike NAISTE aktivismi okupeeritud Palestiina

Interviews by Khaled Amayreh

Interview with Sameera Al-Halayka

Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. She was

born in the village of Shoyoukh near Hebron in 1964. She has a BA in Sharia (Islami

Jurisprudence) from Hebron University. She worked as a journalist from 1996 kuni 2006 when

she entered the Palestinian Legislative Council as an elected member in the 2006 valimised.

She is married and has seven children.

Q: There is a general impression in some western countries that women receive

inferior treatment within Islamic resistance groups, such as Hamas. Is this true?

How are women activists treated in Hamas?
Rights and duties of Muslim women emanate first and foremost from Islamic Sharia or law.

They are not voluntary or charitable acts or gestures we receive from Hamas or anyone

else. Thus, mis puudutab poliitilist kaasatust ja aktivismi, naistel üldiselt on

samad õigused ja kohustused mis meestel. Pealegi, naised moodustavad vähemalt 50 protsenti

ühiskond. Teatud mõttes, nad on kogu ühiskond, sest nad sünnitavad, ja tõsta,

uus põlvkond.

Seetõttu, Võin öelda, et naiste staatus Hamasis on temaga täielikult kooskõlas

staatus islamis endas. See tähendab, et ta on täispartner kõigil tasanditel. Tõepoolest, see oleks

islami jaoks ebaõiglane ja ebaõiglane (või islamist, kui soovite) naine olla kannatustes partner

samas kui ta on otsustusprotsessist välja jäetud. Sellepärast on naise roll selles

Hamas on alati olnud teerajaja.

Q: Kas teile tundub, et Hamasis on esile kerkinud naiste poliitiline aktiivsus?

loomulik areng, mis sobib kokku klassikaliste islami kontseptsioonidega

naiste staatuse ja rolli kohta, või on see lihtsalt vajalik vastus

modernsusest ja poliitilise tegevuse nõuetest ja jätkumisest

Iisraeli okupatsioon?

Islami kohtupraktikas ega Hamasi põhikirjas ei ole ühtegi teksti, mis takistaks naistel

poliitiline osalus. Usun, et see on vastupidine — seal on palju Koraani salme

ja prohvet Muhamedi ütlused, mis kutsuvad naisi üles olema poliitikas ja avalikkuses aktiivsed

moslemeid puudutavad probleemid. Aga see on tõsi ka naiste puhul, nagu meeste jaoks on, poliitiline aktiivsus

ei ole kohustuslik, vaid vabatahtlik, ja see otsustatakse suuresti iga naise võimete valguses,

kvalifikatsioonist ja individuaalsetest asjaoludest. Sellest hoolimata, ilmutades muret avalikkuse pärast

on kohustuslik igale moslemi mehele ja naisele. Prohvet

ütles Muhammed: "See, kes ei näita muret moslemite asjade pärast, pole moslem."

enamgi veel, Palestiina islamistlikud naised peavad arvesse võtma kõiki kohapealseid objektiivseid tegureid

otsustades, kas liituda poliitikaga või osaleda poliitilises aktivismis.


Iraani naistel pärast islamirevolutsiooni

Ansiia Khaz Allii


Iraani islamirevolutsiooni võidukäigust on möödunud üle kolmekümne aasta, siiski on jäänud a palju küsimusi ja ebaselgust islamivabariigi ja selle seaduste käsitlemise kohta tänapäeva probleemid ja hetkeolud, eriti naiste ja naiste õiguste osas. See lühike artikkel heidab neile küsimustele valgust ja uurib naiste praegust positsiooni erinevates valdkondades, kui võrrelda seda olukorraga enne islamirevolutsiooni. Kasutatud on usaldusväärseid ja autentitud andmeid kus vähegi võimalik. Sissejuhatuses tehakse kokkuvõte mitmetest teoreetilistest ja juriidilistest uuringutest, mis pakuvad on aluseks hilisemale praktilisemale analüüsile ja on allikad, kust andmed on saadud.
Esimene osa käsitleb Iraani Islamivabariigi juhtkonna suhtumist naistesse ja naiste õigused, ja seejärel heidab põhjaliku ülevaate pärast islamirevolutsiooni välja kuulutatud seadusi naiste ja nende positsiooni kohta ühiskonnas. Teises osas käsitletakse naiste kultuuri- ja educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. The third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, the relationship between women and the family, and the family’s role in limiting or increasing women’s rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Totalitarismi kohta džihaadi islamit ja Challenge Euroopasse ja islam

Bassam Tibi

Lugedes enamus tekste, mis sisaldavad suurt kirjandust, mis on avaldatud isehakanud asjatundjad poliitiliste Islam, see on lihtne jääda asjaolu, et uue liikumise teket. edasi, Selle kirjanduse ei selgita rahuldavalt, et ideoloogia, mis ajab see põhineb eelkõige islamitõlgendus, ja et see on seega politiseeritud usu,
ei ilmalik üks. Ainus raamat, mis poliitilise islami on adresseeritud kui totalitarismiin on üks Paul Berman, Terror ja liberalism (2003). Autor on, siiski, ei ole ekspert, ei saa lugeda islami allikate, ja seetõttu sõltub valikulist kasutamist ühe või kahe teiseste allikate, jättes haarata nähtus.
Üks põhjustest puudusi on asjaolu, et enamik neist, kes püüavad teavitada meid "džihaadiohu" - ja Berman on tüüpiline see stipendium - mitte ainult puudub keeleoskus lugeda allikatest toodetud ideoloogid poliitilise islam, vaid ka teadmatus kultuurilist mõõdet liikumine. See uus totalitaarne liikumine on mitmeti uudne
ajaloos poliitikas, sest see on oma juured kaks paralleelset ja sellega seotud nähtusi: esimene, culturalisation poliitika, mis viib poliitikas on kontseptualiseeritud kui kultuuri süsteemi (eesmärgiga toimitud Clifford Geertz); ja teine ​​tagastamist püha, või "re-lummus" maailma, Reaktsioonina intensiivse ilmalikuks tulenevad globaliseerumisest.
Analüüsi poliitiliste ideoloogiate, mis põhinevad religioonide, ja mis võib avaldada kaebuse poliitiline religioon tagajärjel käesoleva, hõlmab ühiskonnaõpetus mõista rolli religioon mängib maailma poliitikas, eriti pärast bi-polaarne süsteemi külma sõja andnud viis mitmepolaarses maailma. Projektis teostati Hannah Arendt Instituut kohaldamise totalitarismist uuringu poliitilise religioonide, Tegin vahet ilmalik ideoloogia, mis toimivad asenda religioon, ja religioossete ideoloogiate põhineb tõelise usu, mis on nii religioosse fundamentalismi (vt märkus
24). Teine projekt "Poliitiline Religioon", läbi ülikooli Basel, on teinud selgemaks punkt, et uusi lähenemisviise poliitika muutuvad vajalikuks kord usu muutub riietatud poliitiline garb.Drawing kohta autoriteetsed allikad, et poliitilise islami, Selle artikli näitab, et väga erinevaid organisatsioone inspireeritud islami ideoloogia tuleb kontseptualiseeritud nii poliitilise religioonide ja poliitiliste liikumiste. Unikaalne kvaliteet poliitilise islami valesid on asjaolu, et see põhineb riikidevahelisel religioon (vt märkus 26).

Islam, Poliitiline islam ja Ameerika

Araabia Insight

Kas "vennaskond" Ameerikaga on võimalik?

khalil al-anani

"Pole mingit võimalust suhelda ühegi USA-ga. senikaua, kuni USA säilitab oma pikaajalise nägemuse islamist kui reaalsest ohust, vaade, mis paneb USA sionistliku vaenlasega ühte paati. Meil ei ole Ameerika rahva ega USA kohta eelarvamusi. ühiskond ja selle kodanikuorganisatsioonid ja mõttekojad. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, Moslemivennaskonna poliitilise osakonna juhataja telefoniintervjuus.
Al-Iryani sõnad võtavad kokku Moslemivennaskonna vaated Ameerika rahvale ja USA-le. valitsus. Teised Moslemi Vennaskonna liikmed oleksid sellega nõus, nagu ka kadunud Hassan al-Banna, aastal grupi asutanud 1928. Al- Banna pidas läänt enamasti moraalse allakäigu sümboliks. Teised salafid – islami koolkond, mis toetub esivanematele kui eeskujulikele mudelitele – on võtnud USA suhtes sama seisukoha., kuid puudub ideoloogiline paindlikkus, mida toetab Moslemivennaskond. Samal ajal kui Moslemivennaskond usub ameeriklaste kaasamisse kodanikuühiskonna dialoogi, teised äärmusrühmitused ei näe dialoogil mõtet ja väidavad, et jõud on ainus viis USAga toimetulemiseks.

Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: the Search for Common Ground.

Mostapha Benhenda

This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: for example, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regime, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. For example, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (vähemalt, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, tundub huvitav määrata kindlaks islami poliitiliste mudelite aluseks oleva demokraatia kontseptsioon. Teisisõnu, peaksime püüdma välja selgitada, mis on "teodemokraatias" demokraatlik. Selleks, normatiivse poliitilise mõtte islami traditsioonide muljetavaldava mitmekesisuse ja paljususe hulgas, keskendume sisuliselt laiaulatuslikule mõttevoolule, mis ulatub tagasi Abu ‘Ala Maududi ja Egiptuse intellektuaali Sayyed Qutb’i.8 See konkreetne mõttesuund on huvitav, sest moslemimaailmas, see on mõne kõige keerulisema vastuseisu aluseks läänest pärit väärtuste levikule. Lähtudes usulistest väärtustest, see suund töötas välja poliitilise mudeli alternatiivi liberaalsele demokraatiale. Laias laastus, the conception of democracy included in this Islamic political model is procedural. With some differences, this conception is inspired by democratic theories advocated by some constitutionalists and political scientists.10 It is thin and minimalist, up to a certain point. For example, it does not rely on any notion of popular sovereignty and it does not require any separation between religion and politics. The first aim of this paper is to elaborate this minimalist conception. We make a detailed restatement of it in order to isolate this conception from its moral (liberal) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. Tõepoolest, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, näitame, et selline põhimõte ei ole demokraatliku protsessi õigustamiseks vajalik.

The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal

As a cultural movement Islam rejects the old static view of the universe, and reaches a dynamic view. As an emotional system of unification it recognizes the worth of the individual as such, and rejects bloodrelationship as a basis of human unity. Blood-relationship is earthrootedness. The search for a purely psychological foundation of human unity becomes possible only with the perception that all human life is spiritual in its origin.1 Such a perception is creative of fresh loyalties without any ceremonial to keep them alive, and makes it possible for man to emancipate himself from the earth. Christianity which had originally appeared as a monastic order was tried by Constantine as a system of unification.2 Its failure to work as such a system drove the Emperor Julian3 to return to the old gods of Rome on which he attempted to put philosophical interpretations. A modern historian of civilization has thus depicted the state of the civilized world about the time when Islam appeared on the stage of History: It seemed then that the great civilization that it had taken four thousand years to construct was on the verge of disintegration, and that mankind was likely to return to that condition of barbarism where every tribe and sect was against the next, and law and order were unknown . . . The
old tribal sanctions had lost their power. Hence the old imperial methods would no longer operate. The new sanctions created by
Christianity were working division and destruction instead of unity and order. It was a time fraught with tragedy. Civilization, like a gigantic tree whose foliage had overarched the world and whose branches had borne the golden fruits of art and science and literature, stood tottering, its trunk no longer alive with the flowing sap of devotion and reverence, but rotted to the core, riven by the storms of war, and held together only by the cords of ancient customs and laws, that might snap at any moment. Was there any emotional culture that could be brought in, to gather mankind once more into unity and to save civilization? This culture must be something of a new type, for the old sanctions and ceremonials were dead, and to build up others of the same kind would be the work
of centuries.’The writer then proceeds to tell us that the world stood in need of a new culture to take the place of the culture of the throne, and the systems of unification which were based on bloodrelationship.
It is amazing, he adds, that such a culture should have arisen from Arabia just at the time when it was most needed. There is, siiski, nothing amazing in the phenomenon. The world-life intuitively sees its own needs, and at critical moments defines its own direction. This is what, in the language of religion, we call prophetic revelation. It is only natural that Islam should have flashed across the consciousness of a simple people untouched by any of the ancient cultures, and occupying a geographical position where three continents meet together. The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity in the principle of Tauhâd.’5 Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature. The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to regulate its collective life, for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of perpetual change.

Islami reformatsiooni

Adnan Khan

The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi boasted after the events of 9/11:
“…we must be aware of the superiority of our civilisation, a system that has guaranteed

well being, respect for human rights andin contrast with Islamic countriesrespect

for religious and political rights, a system that has its values understanding of diversity

and tolerance…The West will conquer peoples, like it conquered communism, even if it

means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was

1,400 years ago…”1

And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of

ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”

Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute

The concept of ‘islah’ (reform) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the

history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical

Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified

their Islamic rulings (fiqh) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to

apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the

Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time

understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined

principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of

study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Those who became

smitten by Greek philosophy such as the Muslim philosophers and some from amongst the Mut’azilah

were considered to have left the fold of Islam as the Qur’an ceased to be their basis of study. Seega selleks

moslemid, kes üritavad tuletada reegleid või mõista, millist seisukohta konkreetse suhtes võtta

Koraani väljaandmine on selle uuringu aluseks.

Esimene katse islamit reformida toimus 19. sajandi vahetusel. aasta pöördeks

sajandil oli Ummas olnud pikaajaline langusperiood, kus ülemaailmne jõudude tasakaal muutus

Khilafah'st Suurbritanniasse. Paigaldusprobleemid haarasid Khilafahi Lääne-Euroopa ajal

keset tööstusrevolutsiooni. Ummah kaotas oma põlise arusaama islamist, ja

püüdes tagasi pöörata Uthmani omasid haaranud allakäik (Ottomanid) osa moslemeid saadeti sinna

Läände, ja selle tulemusel olid nad nähtust rabatud. Egiptuse Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi (1801-1873),

naastes Pariisist, wrote a biographical book called Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The

Extraction of Gold, or an Overview of Paris, 1834), praising their cleanliness, love of work, and above

all social morality. He declared that we must mimic what is being done in Paris, advocating changes to

the Islamic society from liberalising women to the systems of ruling. This thought, and others like it,

marked the beginning of the reinventing trend in Islam.

ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION

IBRAHIM KALIN

In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.

Islam in the West

Jocelyne Cesari

The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.

Elukutse, Kolonialism, Apartheidi?

The Human Sciences Research Council

The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (namely, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, ja
Gaas, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. At the same time, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, ja, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, alates 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. At the same time, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
enamgi veel, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namely, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, USA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Kahjuks, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Islamism revisited

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 aastat, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Juuli 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW

Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. At the same time, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.