میں تمام اندراجات "مشرق بعید" زمرہ
اسلام اور ریاستی طاقت کے میکنگ
seyyed لہروں نصر کٹ
اسلام, جمہوریت & ریاستہائے متحدہ امریکہ:
قرطبہ فاؤنڈیشن
عبداللہ Faliq
انٹرو ,
ایک مسلمان Archipelago
زیادہ سے زیادہ ایل. مجموعی
اسلامی حزب اختلاف کی جماعتوں اور یورپی یونین کے مشغولیت کے لئے متوقع
ٹوبی آرچر
Heidi Huuhtanen
حل امریکہ کی اسلامی مشکوک: اسباق جنوبی اور جنوب مشرقی ایشیا سے
عالمی اور مقامی درمیان
انتھونی BUBALO
گریگ FEALY
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. آج, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : اسلامیت, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.
اسلامی MODERNITIES: فتح اللہ گولن اور عصری اسلام
FAHRI CAKI
The Nurju movement1, being the oldest moderate Islamist movement which is probably peculiar to Modern Turkey, was broken into several groups since Said Nursi, the founder of the movement, passed away in 1960. At the present time, there are more than ten nurcu groups with different agendas and strategies. Despite all their differences, today the Nurju groups seem to acknowledge each other’s identity and try to keep a certain level of solidarity. Theplace of the Fethullah Gulen group within the Nurju movement, تاہم, seems to be a bit shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, at least in appearance, from the overall Nurju movement in 1972 and succeeded in establishing his own group with a strong organizational structure in the 1980’s and the 90’s. Due to the development of its broad school network both in Turkey and abroad2, his group attracted attention. Those schools fascinated not only Islamist businessmen and middle classes but also a large number of secularist intellectuals and politicians. Although it originally emerged out of the overall Nurju movement, some believe that the number of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen group is much larger than that of the total of the rest of the nurju groups. ابھی تک, there seems to be enough reason to think that there was a price to pay for this success: alienation from other Islamist groups as well as from the overall Nurju movement of which the Fethullah Gulen group3 itself is supposed to be a part.
ترقی پسند اسلامی نے سوچا کہ, سول سوسائٹی اور قومی تناظر میں Gulen تحریک
Greg Barton
Fethullah Gulen (born 1941), or Hodjaeffendi as he is known affectionately by hundreds of thousands of people in his native Turkey and abroad, is one of the most significant Islamic thinkers and activists to have emerged in the twentieth century. His optimistic and forward-looking thought, with its emphasis on self development of both heart and mind through education, of engaging proactively and positively with the modern world and of reaching out in dialogue and a spirit of cooperation between religious communities, social strata and nations can be read as a contemporary reformulation of the teachings of Jalaluddin Rumi, Yunus Emre, and other classic Sufi teachers (Michel, 2005ایک, 2005b; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005ایک; 2005b; Unal and Williams, 2005). زیادہ خاص طور پر, Gulen can be seen to be carrying on where Said Nursi (1876-1960), another great Anatolian Islamic intellectual, left off: chartinga way for Muslim activists in Turkey and beyond to effectively contribute to the development of modern society that avoids the pitfalls and compromises of party-political activism and replaces the narrowness of Islamist thought with a genuinely inclusive and humanitarian understanding of religion’s role in the modern world (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham and Ozdemir, 2005; Vahide, 2005, Yavuz, 2005ایک).
ریاست ہائے متحدہ امریکہ اور مصر
A Conference Report
The study of bilateral relations has fallen deeply out of favor in the academiccommunity. Political science has turned to the study of international state systemsrather than relations between individual states; anthropologists and sociologists arefar more interested in non-state actors; and historians have largely abandonedstates altogether. It is a shame, because there is much to be learned from bilateralrelationships, and some such relationships are vital—not only to the countriesinvolved, but also to a broader array of countries.One such vital relationship is that between the United States and Egypt. Forgedduring the Cold War almost entirely on the issue of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, theU.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship has deepened and broadened over the lastquarter century. Egypt remains one of the United States’ most important Arab allies,and the bilateral relationship with Washington remains the keystone of Egypt’sforeign policy. Strong U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations are also an important anchorfor states throughout the Middle East and for Western policy in the region. Therelationship is valuable for policymakers in both countries; doing without it isunthinkable.To explore this relationship, the CSIS Middle East Program, in cooperation with theAl-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, convened a one-dayconference on June 26, 2003, entitled, “The United States and Egypt: Building thePartnership.” The goal of the meeting was to brainstorm how that partnership mightbe strengthened.Participants agreed that much needs to be done on the diplomatic, political, فوجی,and economic levels. Although all did not agree on a single course forward, theparticipants unanimously concurred that a stronger U.S.-Egyptian relationship is verymuch in the interests of both countries, and although it will require a great deal ofwork to achieve, the benefits are worth the effort.
ترکی ایک اسلامی کے صدر ہوں گے?
مائیکل روبن
While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, theTurkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-yearterm ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a newparliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks willinaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the futureof Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known asAKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned toerode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—theTurkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wearsa Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December2006, مثال کے طور پر, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predictinga 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about militaryintervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared tospark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’scivilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkishdemocracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interferenceby U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.
اسلامی تحریکیں اور تشدد کا استعمال:
Esen Kirdis
متشدد بین الاقوامی اسلامی دہشت گردی کے نیٹ ورکس پر حالیہ تعلیمی اور مقبول توجہ کے باوجود,اسلامی تحریکوں کی کثرت ہے. یہ ضرب علماء کو دو پہیلیاں پیش کرتی ہے. پہلا معما یہ سمجھ رہا ہے کہ سیکولر قومی ریاستوں کے قیام کے رد عمل کے طور پر تشکیل پانے والی گھریلو پر مبنی اسلامی تحریکوں نے اپنی سرگرمیاں اور اہداف کو ایک کثیر سطحی عبوری بین الاقوامی جگہ پر کیوں منتقل کیا؟. دوسرا معما یہ سمجھ رہا ہے کہ کیوں "اسی طرح کے بین الاقوامی ہونے پر" اسی طرح کے مقاصد اور اہداف والے گروہ تشدد یا عدم تشدد کے استعمال کی مختلف حکمت عملی اپناتے ہیں۔ یہ مقالہ جن دو اہم سوالات پر توجہ دے گا وہ ہیں: اسلامی تحریکیں بین الاقوامی کیوں ہوتی ہیں؟? اور, جب وہ بین الاقوامی حیثیت اختیار کرتے ہیں تو وہ مختلف شکلیں کیوں اختیار کرتے ہیں? پہلا, میں یہ استدلال کرتا ہوں کہ بین الاقوامی سطح پر اسلامی تحریکوں کے لئے ایک نیا سیاسی مقام پیش کیا گیا ہے جو گھریلو سطح پر ان کے دعوے کرنے میں محدود ہے۔. دوسرا, میرا مؤقف ہے کہ بین الاقوامی سطح پر گروہوں کے لئے اپنی شناخت اور دعووں کے بارے میں غیر یقینی صورتحال پیدا کرتی ہے. میڈیم اپنایا, یعنی. عدم تشدد کے مقابلے میں تشدد کا استعمال, transnationization کی قسم پر منحصر ہے, بین الاقوامی سطح پر اداکاروں کا مقابلہ ہوتا ہے, اور قیادت کی ترجمانی کہ اس تحریک کے آگے کہاں جانا چاہئے. میرے سوالات کے جوابات دینے کے لئے, میں چار معاملات پر نظر ڈالوں گا: (1) ترک اسلام, (2) اخوان المسلمون, (3) Jemaah اسلامیہ, اور (4) تبلیغی جماعت
مصر اور ملائشیا میں اسلام پسند دھارے کا اندازہ لگانا
'دہشت گردی' اور 'ریاست کی سربلندی' سے پرے: مصر اور ملائشیا میں اسلامسٹمین اسٹریم کا جائزہ لینا
جنوری مضبوط
اسلامی ’دہشت گردی‘ کے بین الاقوامی نیٹ ورکس نے اس کے بعد سے اسلام کے رجحان کو بیان کرنے کے لئے ان کی مقبول وضاحت کی ہے 11 ستمبر کے حملے.
اس مقالے میں یہ استدلال کیا گیا ہے کہ عسکریت پسندوں کے خود ساختہ نظریاتی اسلام اور یکجہتیاسلامی خطرے کے بارے میں مغربی خیالات دونوں کو غیر ضروری سمجھنے کی ضرورت ہے تاکہ 'او' سیئل '' اور '' حزب اختلاف '' اسلام کے متنازعہ مظاہروں کو دریافت کیا جاسکے۔, جدیدیت اور کنزرویٹیٹ ازم کی.
جیسا کہ دو اسلامی ممالک کا موازنہ ہے, مصر اور ملائشیا,جو دونوں اپنے اپنے خطوں میں قائدانہ کردار ادا کرنے کا دعوی کرتے ہیں, شوز, اعتدال پسنداسلامی گروپوں نے جمہوری نظام کے عمل پر کافی اثر ڈالا ہے اور 'اسلامی انقلاب کے بعد' سہ ماہی کے دوران سول سوسائٹی کے ظہور میں.
مشترکہ تجربے جیسے سیاسی اتحاد کے ساتھ مشترکہ تجربات اور سیاسی شراکت کے ساتھ ہی گروپ اخلاق کی اہمیت اور اس کی اہمیت کا ثبوت ہے کہ مصری اخوان المسلمون, ملیشیا کی اسلامی یوتھ موومنٹ (اے بی آئی ایم) یا ملیشیا کی اسلامی پارٹی (نہیں).
ان گروہوں نے سیاسی دہشت گردانہ نظریہ کو موجودہ دہشت گردی کے واقعے سے کہیں زیادہ بڑے پیمانے پر تشکیل دے دیا ہے. ’’ مکالمہ کی ثقافت ‘‘ کی بتدریج ترقی نے نچلی سطح پر سیاسی پارٹی اور جمہوریت کی طرف نئے اندازوں کا انکشاف کیا ہے۔.