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Islam at ang Paggawa ng Kapangyarihan ng Estado

seyyed vali reza nasr

Sa 1979 Heneral Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, ang pinunong militar ng Pakistan, ipinahayag na ang Pakistan ay magiging isang Islamic state. Ang mga halaga at pamantayan ng Islam ay magsisilbing pundasyon ng pambansang pagkakakilanlan, batas, ekonomiya, at ugnayang panlipunan, at magbibigay inspirasyon sa lahat ng paggawa ng patakaran. Sa 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, ang bagong punong ministro ng Malaysia, nagpakilala ng katulad na malawak na nakabatay sa plano upang iangkla ang paggawa ng patakaran ng estado sa mga halagang Islamiko, at upang maiayon ang mga batas at gawaing pang-ekonomiya ng kanyang bansa sa mga turo ng Islam. Bakit pinili ng mga pinunong ito ang landas ng "Islamisasyon" para sa kanilang mga bansa? At paano naging mga ahente ng Islamisasyon ang isang beses na sekular na postkolonyal na estado at ang tagapagbalita ng "tunay" na estadong Islam.?
Ang Malaysia at Pakistan ay mula noong huling bahagi ng 1970s–unang bahagi ng 1980s ay sumunod sa isang natatanging landas tungo sa pag-unlad na nag-iiba mula sa mga karanasan ng ibang mga estado ng Third World. Sa dalawang bansang ito, ang pagkakakilanlan ng relihiyon ay isinama sa ideolohiya ng estado upang ipaalam ang layunin at proseso ng pag-unlad na may mga pagpapahalagang Islamiko.
Ang gawaing ito ay nagpakita rin ng ibang larawan ng kaugnayan sa pagitan ng Islam at pulitika sa mga lipunang Muslim. Sa Malaysia at Pakistan, ito ay mga institusyon ng estado sa halip na mga aktibistang Islamista (yaong nagtataguyod ng politikal na pagbabasa ng Islam; kilala rin bilang mga revivalist o fundamentalists) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, at mas malawak kung paano nagsisilbi ang kultura at relihiyon sa mga pangangailangan ng kapangyarihan at pag-unlad ng estado. Ang pagsusuri dito ay umaasa sa mga teoretikal na talakayan
sa mga agham panlipunan ng pag-uugali ng estado at ang papel ng kultura at relihiyon dito. Mas mahalaga, kumukuha ito ng mga hinuha mula sa mga kaso na sinusuri upang makagawa ng mas malawak na konklusyon ng interes sa mga disiplina.

| Sep 25, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
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ISLAM, DEMOKRASYA & ANG USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq |

Intro ,


Sa kabila ng pagiging parehong pangmatagalan at kumplikadong debate, Ang Arches Quarterly ay muling nagsusuri mula sa teolohiko at praktikal na mga batayan, ang mahalagang debate tungkol sa relasyon at pagkakatugma sa pagitan ng Islam at Demokrasya, bilang echoed sa Barack Obama's agenda ng pag-asa at pagbabago. Habang marami ang nagdiriwang sa pag-akyat ni Obama sa Oval Office bilang isang pambansang catharsis para sa US, ang iba ay nananatiling hindi gaanong optimistiko sa pagbabago ng ideolohiya at diskarte sa internasyonal na arena. Habang ang karamihan sa tensyon at kawalan ng tiwala sa pagitan ng mundo ng Muslim at ng USA ay maaaring maiugnay sa diskarte ng pagtataguyod ng demokrasya, karaniwang pinapaboran ang mga diktadurya at papet na rehimen na nagbibigay ng lip-service sa mga demokratikong halaga at karapatang pantao, ang aftershock ng 9/11 ay tunay na pinatibay ang mga pag-aalinlangan sa pamamagitan ng posisyon ng Amerika sa politikal na Islam. Lumikha ito ng pader ng negatibiti gaya ng natagpuan ng worldpublicopinion.org, ayon sa kung saan 67% naniniwala ang mga taga-Ehipto na sa buong mundo ang America ay gumaganap ng isang "pangunahing negatibo" na papel.
Ang tugon ng Amerika ay naging angkop. Sa pamamagitan ng pagpili kay Obama, marami sa buong mundo ang umaasa sa pagbuo ng hindi gaanong palaaway, ngunit mas patas na patakarang panlabas patungo sa mundo ng Muslim. Ang pagsubok para kay Obama, habang tinatalakay natin, ay kung paano itaguyod ng Amerika at ng kanyang mga kaalyado ang demokrasya. Magiging facilitating ba ito o kahanga-hanga?
At saka, maaari ba itong maging isang matapat na broker sa matagal na mga lugar ng mga salungatan? Pagkuha ng kadalubhasaan at pananaw ng prolifi
c mga iskolar, akademya, mga batikang mamamahayag at pulitiko, Binibigyang liwanag ng Arches Quarterly ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng Islam at Demokrasya at ang papel ng Amerika – pati na rin ang mga pagbabagong dulot ni Obama, sa paghahanap ng karaniwang batayan. Anas Altikriti, ang CEO ng Th e Cordoba Foundation ay nagbibigay ng pambungad na sugal sa talakayang ito, kung saan siya ay sumasalamin sa mga pag-asa at hamon na nakasalalay sa landas ni Obama. Kasunod ng Altikriti, ang dating tagapayo ni Pangulong Nixon, Nag-aalok si Dr Robert Crane ng masusing pagsusuri sa prinsipyo ng Islam ng karapatan sa kalayaan. Anwar Ibrahim, dating Deputy Prime Minister ng Malaysia, pinayaman ang talakayan sa mga praktikal na katotohanan ng pagpapatupad ng demokrasya sa mga dominanteng lipunan ng Muslim, ibig sabihin, sa Indonesia at Malaysia.
Mayroon din kaming Dr Shireen Hunter, ng Georgetown University, USA, na gumagalugad sa mga bansang Muslim na nahuhuli sa demokratisasyon at modernisasyon. Ito ay kinukumpleto ng manunulat ng terorismo, Ang paliwanag ni Dr Nafeez Ahmed sa krisis ng post-modernity at ang
pagkamatay ng demokrasya. Dr. Daud Abdullah (Direktor ng Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (dating ITN at BBC Panorama correspondent; may-akda ng Zionism: Ang Tunay na Kaaway ng mga Hudyo) at Asem Sondos (Editor ng Egypt's Sawt Al Omma linggu-linggo) tumutok kay Obama at sa kanyang tungkulin vis-à-vis democracy-promote sa Muslim world, gayundin ang relasyon ng US sa Israel at sa Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Nag-isip si Ahmed Shaheed sa hinaharap ng Islam at Demokrasya; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– isang miyembro ng Sinn Féin na nagtiis ng apat na taon sa bilangguan para sa mga aktibidad ng Irish Republican at isang campaigner para sa Guildford 4 at Birmingham 6, sumasalamin sa kanyang kamakailang paglalakbay sa Gaza kung saan nasaksihan niya ang epekto ng kalupitan at kawalang-katarungang ginawa laban sa mga Palestinian; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Ang Direktor ng Center for the Study of Radicalization at Contemporary Political Violence ay tumatalakay sa mga hamon ng kritikal na pagsasaliksik ng politikal na terorismo; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, manunulat at manunulat ng dula, tinatalakay ang mga prospect ng kapayapaan sa Darfur; at sa wakas ang mamamahayag at aktibistang karapatang pantao na si Ashur Shamis ay tumitingin nang kritikal sa demokratisasyon at pamumulitika ng mga Muslim ngayon.
Inaasahan namin na ang lahat ng ito ay gumagawa para sa isang komprehensibong pagbabasa at isang mapagkukunan para sa pagmumuni-muni sa mga isyu na nakakaapekto sa ating lahat sa isang bagong bukang-liwayway ng pag-asa.
salamat po

| Sep 07, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
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A Muslim Archipelago

Max L. Gross

This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.

| Aug 27, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
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Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, it

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

mga karapatang pantao, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, at

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

| Aug 21, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
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Paglutas sa Islamist Dilemma ng America: Mga aral mula sa Timog at Timog Silangang Asya

Shadi Hamid
U.S. Ang mga pagsisikap na itaguyod ang demokrasya sa Gitnang Silangan ay matagal nang naparalisa ng "Islamist dilemma": sa teorya, gusto natin ng demokrasya, ngunit, sa pagsasanay, takot na ang mga Islamistang partido ang magiging pangunahing makikinabang sa anumang pagbubukas ng pulitika. Ang pinaka-trahedya na pagpapakita nito ay ang Algerian debacle ng 1991 at 1992, nang ang Estados Unidos ay tahimik na tumindig habang ang matibay na sekular na militar ay kinansela ang halalan matapos ang isang Islamist na partido ay manalo ng parliamentaryong mayorya. Kamakailan lamang, ang administrasyong Bush ay umatras mula sa "adyenda ng kalayaan" nito matapos ang mga Islamista ay nakakagulat na mahusay sa mga halalan sa buong rehiyon, kabilang sa Egypt, Saudi Arabia, at ang mga teritoryo ng Palestinian.
Ngunit maging ang ating takot sa mga partidong Islamista—at ang nagresultang pagtanggi na makipag-ugnayan sa kanila—ay mismong hindi naaayon., totoo para sa ilang bansa ngunit hindi sa iba. Lalo na ang isang bansa ay nakikita bilang mahalaga sa mga interes ng pambansang seguridad ng Amerika, ang hindi gaanong gustong tanggapin ng Estados Unidos ang mga grupong Islamista na mayroong prominenteng papel sa pulitika doon. Gayunpaman, sa mga bansang nakikitang hindi gaanong nauugnay sa estratehikong paraan, at kung saan mas kaunti ang nakataya, ang Estados Unidos ay paminsan-minsan ay gumawa ng isang mas nuanced na diskarte. Ngunit tiyak kung saan higit ang nakataya na ang pagkilala sa isang papel para sa mga walang dahas na Islamista ay pinakamahalaga., at, dito, Ang patakaran ng Amerika ay patuloy na nahuhulog.
Sa buong rehiyon, aktibong sinuportahan ng Estados Unidos ang mga autokratikong rehimen at binigyan ng berdeng ilaw para sa mga kampanya ng panunupil laban sa mga grupo tulad ng Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, ang pinakamatanda at pinakamaimpluwensyang kilusang pampulitika sa rehiyon. Noong Marso 2008, sa panahon ng itinuturing ng maraming tagamasid na pinakamasamang panahon ng panunupil laban sa Kapatiran mula noong 1960s, Tinalikuran ng Kalihim ng Estado Condoleezza Rice a $100 milyon na ipinag-uutos ng kongreso na pagbabawas ng tulong militar sa Egypt. Ang sitwasyon sa Jordan ay katulad. Pinuri ng administrasyong Bush at ng Demokratikong kongreso ang bansa bilang isang "modelo" ng repormang Arabo sa parehong oras na ito ay gumagawa ng mga bagong paraan upang manipulahin ang proseso ng elektoral upang limitahan ang representasyong Islamista., at tulad ng pagdaraos nito ng mga halalan na sinalanta ng malawakang mga paratang ng tahasang pandaraya
at rigging.1 Hindi ito nagkataon. Ang Egypt at Jordan ang tanging dalawang bansang Arabo na pumirma ng mga kasunduan sa kapayapaan sa Israel. At saka, sila ay nakikitang mahalaga sa U.S. pagsisikap na kontrahin ang Iran, patatagin ang Iraq, at labanan ang terorismo.
| Aug 19, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
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BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL

ANTHONY BUBALO

GREG FEALY

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Today, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Islamismo, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

| Peb 17, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
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ISLAMIC MODERNITIES: FETHULLAH GULEN and CONTEMPORARY ISLAM

FAHRI CAKI

The Nurju movement1, being the oldest moderate Islamist movement which is probably peculiar to Modern Turkey, was broken into several groups since Said Nursi, the founder of the movement, passed away in 1960. At the present time, there are more than ten nurcu groups with different agendas and strategies. Despite all their differences, today the Nurju groups seem to acknowledge each other’s identity and try to keep a certain level of solidarity. Theplace of the Fethullah Gulen group within the Nurju movement, gayunpaman, seems to be a bit shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, at least in appearance, from the overall Nurju movement in 1972 and succeeded in establishing his own group with a strong organizational structure in the 1980’s and the 90’s. Due to the development of its broad school network both in Turkey and abroad2, his group attracted attention. Those schools fascinated not only Islamist businessmen and middle classes but also a large number of secularist intellectuals and politicians. Although it originally emerged out of the overall Nurju movement, some believe that the number of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen group is much larger than that of the total of the rest of the nurju groups. Pa, there seems to be enough reason to think that there was a price to pay for this success: alienation from other Islamist groups as well as from the overall Nurju movement of which the Fethullah Gulen group3 itself is supposed to be a part.

| Peb 17, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
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Umunlad na kaisipang Islam, lipunang sibil at kilusang Gulen sa pambansang konteksto

Greg Barton

Fethullah Gulen (born 1941), or Hodjaeffendi as he is known affectionately by hundreds of thousands of people in his native Turkey and abroad, is one of the most significant Islamic thinkers and activists to have emerged in the twentieth century. His optimistic and forward-looking thought, with its emphasis on self development of both heart and mind through education, of engaging proactively and positively with the modern world and of reaching out in dialogue and a spirit of cooperation between religious communities, social strata and nations can be read as a contemporary reformulation of the teachings of Jalaluddin Rumi, Yunus Emre, and other classic Sufi teachers (Michel, 2005a, 2005b; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005a; 2005b; Unal and Williams, 2005). More specifically, Gulen can be seen to be carrying on where Said Nursi (1876-1960), another great Anatolian Islamic intellectual, left off: chartinga way for Muslim activists in Turkey and beyond to effectively contribute to the development of modern society that avoids the pitfalls and compromises of party-political activism and replaces the narrowness of Islamist thought with a genuinely inclusive and humanitarian understanding of religion’s role in the modern world (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham and Ozdemir, 2005; Vahide, 2005, Yavuz, 2005a).

| Peb 17, 2010 | Mga Komento 2
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The United States and Egypt

A Conference Report

The study of bilateral relations has fallen deeply out of favor in the academiccommunity. Political science has turned to the study of international state systemsrather than relations between individual states; anthropologists and sociologists arefar more interested in non-state actors; and historians have largely abandonedstates altogether. It is a shame, because there is much to be learned from bilateralrelationships, and some such relationships are vital—not only to the countriesinvolved, but also to a broader array of countries.One such vital relationship is that between the United States and Egypt. Forgedduring the Cold War almost entirely on the issue of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, theU.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship has deepened and broadened over the lastquarter century. Egypt remains one of the United States’ most important Arab allies,and the bilateral relationship with Washington remains the keystone of Egypt’sforeign policy. Strong U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations are also an important anchorfor states throughout the Middle East and for Western policy in the region. Therelationship is valuable for policymakers in both countries; doing without it isunthinkable.To explore this relationship, the CSIS Middle East Program, in cooperation with theAl-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, convened a one-dayconference on June 26, 2003, entitled, “The United States and Egypt: Building thePartnership.” The goal of the meeting was to brainstorm how that partnership mightbe strengthened.Participants agreed that much needs to be done on the diplomatic, political, militar,and economic levels. Although all did not agree on a single course forward, theparticipants unanimously concurred that a stronger U.S.-Egyptian relationship is verymuch in the interests of both countries, and although it will require a great deal ofwork to achieve, the benefits are worth the effort.

| Peb 12, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
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Will Turkey Have An Islamist President?

Michael Rubin


While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, ang

Turkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-year

term ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a new

parliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks will

inaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the future

of Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan

wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known as

AKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned to

erode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—the

Turkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wears

a Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,

which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December

2006, for example, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predicting

a 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1

While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about military
intervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared to
spark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’s
civilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkish
democracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interference
by U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.

While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, theTurkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-yearterm ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a newparliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks willinaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the futureof Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known asAKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned toerode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—theTurkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wearsa Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December2006, for example, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predictinga 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about militaryintervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared tospark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’scivilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkishdemocracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interferenceby U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.

| Peb 12, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
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Islamic Movements and the Use of Violence:

Esen Kirdis

.


Despite recent academic and popular focus on violent transnational Islamic terrorist networks,there is a multiplicity of Islamic movements. This multiplicity presents scholars with two puzzles. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? First, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Second, I argue that transnationalization creates uncertainty for groups about their identity and claims at the transnational level. The medium adopted, i.e. use of violence versus non-violence, is dependent on type of transnationalization, the actors encounter at the transnational level, and leadership’s interpretations on where the movement should go next. To answer my questions, I will look at four cases: (1) Turkish Islam, (2) the Muslim Brotherhood, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, at (4) Tablighi Jamaat

| Peb 11, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
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Assessing the Islamist mainstream in Egypt and Malaysia

Beyond ‘Terrorism’ and ‘StateHegemony’: assessing the Islamistmainstream in Egypt and Malaysia

JAN STARKMalaysia-Islamists

International networks of Islamic ‘terrorism’ have served as themost popular explanation to describe the phenomenon of political Islam sincethe 11 September attacks.

This paper argues that both the self-proclaimeddoctrinal Islam of the militants and Western perceptions of a homogeneousIslamist threat need to be deconstructed in order to discover the oftenambiguous manifestations of ‘official’ and ‘opposition’ Islam, of modernity andconservatism.

As a comparison of two Islamic countries, Egypt and Malaysia,which both claim a leading role in their respective regions, shows, moderateIslamic groups have had a considerable impact on processes of democratisationand the emergence of civil society during the quarter century since the ‘Islamicresurgence’.

Shared experiences like coalition building and active participationwithin the political system demonstrate the influence and importance of groupssuch as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) or the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).

These groups haveshaped the political landscape to a much larger extent than the current pre-occupation with the ‘terrorist threat’ suggests. The gradual development of a‘culture of dialogue’ has rather revealed new approaches towards politicalparticipation and democracy at the grassroots level.

| Dec 18, 2009 | Mga Komento 1
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