Maingizo zote "Mashariki ya Mbali" Kundi
Uislamu na Uundaji wa Madaraka ya Serikali
seyyed vali Reza Nasr
Uislamu, DEMOKRASIA & MAREKANI:
Msingi wa Cordoba
Abdullah Faliq
Intro ,
Visiwa vya Waislamu
Max L. Jumla
Vyama vya Upinzani vya Kiisilamu na Uwezo wa Ushirikiano wa EU
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Kutatua Shida ya Waislamu wa Amerika: Masomo kutoka Kusini na Kusini Mashariki mwa Asia
KATI YA ULIMWENGU NA MTAA
Anthony BUBALO
Greg FEALY
Kinyume na msingi wa 'vita dhidi ya ugaidi',watu wengi wameuona Uislamu kama harakati ya itikadi ya amonolithic inayoenea kutoka katikati mwa ulimwengu wa Kiislamu., Mashariki ya Kati, kwa nchi za Kiislamu duniani kote. Kuazima maneno kutoka kwa Abdullah Azzam, mwanajihadi wa hadithi ambaye alipigana kufukuza Umoja wa Kisovieti kutoka Afghanistan katika miaka ya 1980., wengi leo wanaona wasafiri wenzao wote wa Kiislamu katika msafara wa kimataifa wenye imani kali. Jarida hili linatathmini ukweli wa mtazamo huo.. Inafanya hivyo kwa kuchunguza uenezaji wa kategoria mbili pana za fikra na uanaharakati wa Kiislamu - Uislamu unaozingatia zaidi siasa na 'umsingi mamboleo' unaozingatia zaidi dini - kutoka Mashariki ya Kati hadi Indonesia., nchi ambayo mara nyingi hutajwa kama mfano wa jumuiya ya Kiislamu iliyokuwa na amani ambayo hapo awali ilikuwa na misimamo mikali na ushawishi wa nje. Uislamu ni neno linalofahamika kwa wengi.. Leo, makundi mbalimbali yanaainishwa kuwa ya Kiislamu, kutoka kwa Udugu wa Kiislamu wa Misri hadi al-qa'ida.,Uislamu unaonekana kutokuwa na manufaa kwa makundi ambayo hayaoni Uislamu kama itikadi ya kisiasa na kwa kiasi kikubwa yanaepuka harakati za kisiasa - hata kama harakati zao wakati mwingine zina athari za kisiasa.. Imejumuishwa katika kategoria hii ni vikundi vinavyohusika hasa na dhamira ya Kiislamu-IV Bet w e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Islamism, Mi d d l e E a s t , a n shughuli za Kiindonesia, lakini pia ingejumuisha kundi kama la asal-qa'ida ambalo vitendo vyao vya kigaidi bila shaka havina budi kuendeshwa na malengo madhubuti ya kisiasa kuliko msukumo wa kidini.,ingawa ni fomu potofu. Kwa hivyo karatasi hii inatumia neno 'neo-fundamentalist', iliyoandaliwa na msomi wa Ufaransa Olivier Roy, kuelezea vikundi hivi na itasoma uenezaji wa itikadi za Kiislamu na mamboleo hadi Indonesia.
SASA ZA KIISLAMU: FETHULLAH GULEN na UISLAMU WA KAWAIDA
Heshima ÇAKI
The Nurju movement1, being the oldest moderate Islamist movement which is probably peculiar to Modern Turkey, was broken into several groups since Said Nursi, the founder of the movement, passed away in 1960. At the present time, there are more than ten nurcu groups with different agendas and strategies. Despite all their differences, today the Nurju groups seem to acknowledge each other’s identity and try to keep a certain level of solidarity. Theplace of the Fethullah Gulen group within the Nurju movement, hata hivyo, seems to be a bit shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, at least in appearance, from the overall Nurju movement in 1972 and succeeded in establishing his own group with a strong organizational structure in the 1980’s and the 90’s. Due to the development of its broad school network both in Turkey and abroad2, his group attracted attention. Those schools fascinated not only Islamist businessmen and middle classes but also a large number of secularist intellectuals and politicians. Although it originally emerged out of the overall Nurju movement, some believe that the number of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen group is much larger than that of the total of the rest of the nurju groups. Yet, there seems to be enough reason to think that there was a price to pay for this success: alienation from other Islamist groups as well as from the overall Nurju movement of which the Fethullah Gulen group3 itself is supposed to be a part.
Maendeleo ya Kiislamu mawazo, vyama vya kiraia na harakati Gulen katika mazingira ya kitaifa
Greg Barton
Fethullah Gulen (kuzaliwa 1941), au Hodjaeffendi kama anavyojulikana kwa upendo na mamia ya maelfu ya watu katika nchi yake ya asili ya Uturuki na nje ya nchi., ni mmoja wa wanafikra na wanaharakati muhimu wa Kiislamu walioibuka katika karne ya ishirini. Mawazo yake ya matumaini na ya mbele, kwa msisitizo wake katika kujiendeleza kwa moyo na akili kupitia elimu, ya kujihusisha kikamilifu na vyema na ulimwengu wa kisasa na kufikia katika mazungumzo na moyo wa ushirikiano kati ya jumuiya za kidini., matabaka ya kijamii na mataifa yanaweza kusomwa kama mageuzi ya kisasa ya mafundisho ya Jalaluddin Rumi., Yunus Emre, na walimu wengine wa kawaida wa Kisufi (Michel, 2005a, 2005b; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005a; 2005b; Unal na Williams, 2005). Zaidi hasa, Gulen anaweza kuonekana akiendelea pale Said Nursi (1876-1960), msomi mwingine mkubwa wa Kiislamu wa Anatolia, kushoto mbali: chartinga njia kwa wanaharakati wa Kiislamu nchini Uturuki na kwingineko kuchangia ipasavyo katika maendeleo ya jamii ya kisasa ambayo inaepuka mitego na maelewano ya harakati za kisiasa za chama na kuchukua nafasi ya fikra finyu ya Uislamu na ufahamu wa kweli unaojumuisha na wa kibinadamu wa jukumu la dini katika ulimwengu wa kisasa. (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham na Ozdemir, 2005; Vahide, 2005, Yavuz, 2005a).
Marekani na Misri
A Conference Report
The study of bilateral relations has fallen deeply out of favor in the academiccommunity. Political science has turned to the study of international state systemsrather than relations between individual states; anthropologists and sociologists arefar more interested in non-state actors; and historians have largely abandonedstates altogether. It is a shame, because there is much to be learned from bilateralrelationships, and some such relationships are vital—not only to the countriesinvolved, but also to a broader array of countries.One such vital relationship is that between the United States and Egypt. Forgedduring the Cold War almost entirely on the issue of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, theU.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship has deepened and broadened over the lastquarter century. Egypt remains one of the United States’ most important Arab allies,and the bilateral relationship with Washington remains the keystone of Egypt’sforeign policy. Strong U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations are also an important anchorfor states throughout the Middle East and for Western policy in the region. Therelationship is valuable for policymakers in both countries; doing without it isunthinkable.To explore this relationship, the CSIS Middle East Program, in cooperation with theAl-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, convened a one-dayconference on June 26, 2003, entitled, “The United States and Egypt: Building thePartnership.” The goal of the meeting was to brainstorm how that partnership mightbe strengthened.Participants agreed that much needs to be done on the diplomatic, kisiasa, kijeshi,and economic levels. Although all did not agree on a single course forward, theparticipants unanimously concurred that a stronger U.S.-Egyptian relationship is verymuch in the interests of both countries, and although it will require a great deal ofwork to achieve, the benefits are worth the effort.
Je! Uturuki Itakuwa na Rais wa Kiisilamu?
Michael Rubin
While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, theTurkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-yearterm ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a newparliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks willinaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the futureof Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known asAKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned toerode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—theTurkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wearsa Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December2006, kwa mfano, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predictinga 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about militaryintervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared tospark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’scivilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkishdemocracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interferenceby U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.
Harakati ya Kiislamu na ya Matumizi ya Uhasama:
Esen Kirdis
Despite recent academic and popular focus on violent transnational Islamic terrorist networks,there is a multiplicity of Islamic movements. This multiplicity presents scholars with two puzzles. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? Kwanza, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Pili, I argue that transnationalization creates uncertainty for groups about their identity and claims at the transnational level. The medium adopted, i.e. use of violence versus non-violence, is dependent on type of transnationalization, the actors encounter at the transnational level, and leadership’s interpretations on where the movement should go next. To answer my questions, I will look at four cases: (1) Turkish Islam, (2) Muslim Brotherhood, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, na (4) Tablighi Jamaat
Kutathmini tawala za Waislam huko Misri na Malaysia
Beyond ‘Terrorism’ and ‘StateHegemony’: assessing the Islamistmainstream in Egypt and Malaysia
Januari IMARA
International networks of Islamic ‘terrorism’ have served as themost popular explanation to describe the phenomenon of political Islam sincethe 11 September attacks.
This paper argues that both the self-proclaimeddoctrinal Islam of the militants and Western perceptions of a homogeneousIslamist threat need to be deconstructed in order to discover the oftenambiguous manifestations of ‘official’ and ‘opposition’ Islam, of modernity andconservatism.
As a comparison of two Islamic countries, Egypt and Malaysia,which both claim a leading role in their respective regions, shows, moderateIslamic groups have had a considerable impact on processes of democratisationand the emergence of civil society during the quarter century since the ‘Islamicresurgence’.
Shared experiences like coalition building and active participationwithin the political system demonstrate the influence and importance of groupssuch as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) or the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).
These groups haveshaped the political landscape to a much larger extent than the current pre-occupation with the ‘terrorist threat’ suggests. The gradual development of a‘culture of dialogue’ has rather revealed new approaches towards politicalparticipation and democracy at the grassroots level.