Все записи в "Дальний Восток" Категория
Ислам и создание государственной власти
Сейед Реза Вали Наср
ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Абдулла Faliq
Intro ,
A Muslim Archipelago
Макс L. Брутто
Исламистские оппозиционные партии и потенциал взаимодействия с ЕС
Тоби Арчер
Хайди Huuhtanen
Решение исламистских Америки Дилемма: Уроки из стран Южной и Юго-Восточной Азии
МЕЖДУ глобальные и локальные
Антоний Бубало
Грег FEALY
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Today, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Исламизм, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.
ИСЛАМСКАЯ MODERNITIES: Фетхуллаха Гюлена и современном Исламском
Почетный нож
Nurju movement1, является старейшим умеренные исламистские движения которая, вероятно, свойственных современной Турции, была разбита на несколько групп, так как Саид Нурси, основатель движения, скончался в 1960. В настоящее время, Есть более чем 10 групп nurcu различных программах и стратегиях. Несмотря на все их различия, Сегодня Nurju групп как представляется, признать личности друг друга и попытаться сохранить определенный уровень солидарности. Theplace группы Фетхуллаха Гюлена в движении Nurju, однако, , кажется, немного shaky.Fethullah Гюлена (b.1938) split himself, по крайней мере по внешнему виду, от общего движения в Nurju 1972 и преуспел в создании своей собственной группы с сильной организационной структуры в 1980-х и 90-х годов. В связи с развитием его широкая сеть школ в Турции и abroad2, его группа привлекла внимание. Эти школы очарованы не только исламистские предпринимателей и среднего класса, но и большое количество светских интеллектуалов и политиков. Хотя первоначально возникли из общего движения Nurju, некоторые считают, что число последователей группы Фетхуллаха Гюлена гораздо больше, чем у всего остального nurju групп. Еще, как представляется, будет достаточно оснований полагать, что существует плата за успех: отчуждение от других исламистских групп, а также от общего движения Nurju которых Фетхуллаха Гюлена group3 сама должна быть частью.
Прогрессивная исламской мысли, гражданского общества и движения Гюлена в национальном контексте
Greg Barton
Фетхуллаха Гюлена (born 1941), or Hodjaeffendi as he is known affectionately by hundreds of thousands of people in his native Turkey and abroad, is one of the most significant Islamic thinkers and activists to have emerged in the twentieth century. His optimistic and forward-looking thought, with its emphasis on self development of both heart and mind through education, of engaging proactively and positively with the modern world and of reaching out in dialogue and a spirit of cooperation between religious communities, social strata and nations can be read as a contemporary reformulation of the teachings of Jalaluddin Rumi, Yunus Emre, and other classic Sufi teachers (Michel, 2005а, 2005б; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005а; 2005б; Unal and Williams, 2005). More specifically, Gulen can be seen to be carrying on where Said Nursi (1876-1960), another great Anatolian Islamic intellectual, left off: chartinga way for Muslim activists in Turkey and beyond to effectively contribute to the development of modern society that avoids the pitfalls and compromises of party-political activism and replaces the narrowness of Islamist thought with a genuinely inclusive and humanitarian understanding of religion’s role in the modern world (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham and Ozdemir, 2005; Vahide, 2005, Yavuz, 2005а).
The United States and Egypt
A Conference Report
The study of bilateral relations has fallen deeply out of favor in the academiccommunity. Political science has turned to the study of international state systemsrather than relations between individual states; anthropologists and sociologists arefar more interested in non-state actors; and historians have largely abandonedstates altogether. It is a shame, because there is much to be learned from bilateralrelationships, and some such relationships are vital—not only to the countriesinvolved, but also to a broader array of countries.One such vital relationship is that between the United States and Egypt. Forgedduring the Cold War almost entirely on the issue of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, theU.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship has deepened and broadened over the lastquarter century. Egypt remains one of the United States’ most important Arab allies,and the bilateral relationship with Washington remains the keystone of Egypt’sforeign policy. Strong U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations are also an important anchorfor states throughout the Middle East and for Western policy in the region. Therelationship is valuable for policymakers in both countries; doing without it isunthinkable.To explore this relationship, the CSIS Middle East Program, in cooperation with theAl-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, convened a one-dayconference on June 26, 2003, entitled, “The United States and Egypt: Building thePartnership.” The goal of the meeting was to brainstorm how that partnership mightbe strengthened.Participants agreed that much needs to be done on the diplomatic, political, военные,and economic levels. Although all did not agree on a single course forward, theparticipants unanimously concurred that a stronger U.S.-Egyptian relationship is verymuch in the interests of both countries, and although it will require a great deal ofwork to achieve, the benefits are worth the effort.
Будет ли Турция исламистским Президента?
Майкл Рубин
Хотя кампании официально не началась, сезон выборов в Турции накаляется. Весной этого года, theTurkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-yearterm ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a newparliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks willinaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the futureof Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known asAKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned toerode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—theTurkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wearsa Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December2006, например, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predictinga 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about militaryintervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared tospark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’scivilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkishdemocracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interferenceby U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.
Исламских движений и применение насилия:
Блоуинг Kirdis
Несмотря на недавнее научное и популярное внимание к насильственным транснациональным исламским террористическим сетям,существует множество исламских движений. Эта множественность ставит перед учеными две головоломки.. Первая загадка заключается в понимании того, почему исламистские движения внутренней ориентации, сформировавшиеся как реакция на создание светских национальных государств, перенесли свою деятельность и цели в многослойное транснациональное пространство.. Вторая загадка - понять, почему группы со схожими целями и задачами применяют разные стратегии использования насилия или ненасилия, когда они «переходят на международный уровень». В этом документе будут рассмотрены два основных вопроса:: Почему исламские движения становятся транснациональными? И, почему они принимают разные формы при транснационализации? Первый, Я утверждаю, что транснациональный уровень представляет собой новую политическую площадку для исламских движений, которые ограничены в своих претензиях на внутреннем уровне.. Второй, Я утверждаю, что транснационализация создает для групп неуверенность в отношении их идентичности и требований на транснациональном уровне.. Среда принята, т.е.. использование насилия против ненасилия, зависит от типа транснационализации, актеры сталкиваются на транснациональном уровне, и интерпретации руководства о том, где движение должно развиваться дальше. Чтобы ответить на мои вопросы, Я посмотрю на четыре случая: (1) Турецкий ислам, (2) Братья-мусульмане, (3) "Джемаа исламия", а также (4) Таблиги Джамаат
Оценка основных исламистских в Египте и Малайзии
Beyond ‘Terrorism’ and ‘StateHegemony’: assessing the Islamistmainstream in Egypt and Malaysia
Январь STRONG
International networks of Islamic ‘terrorism’ have served as themost popular explanation to describe the phenomenon of political Islam sincethe 11 September attacks.
This paper argues that both the self-proclaimeddoctrinal Islam of the militants and Western perceptions of a homogeneousIslamist threat need to be deconstructed in order to discover the oftenambiguous manifestations of ‘official’ and ‘opposition’ Islam, of modernity andconservatism.
As a comparison of two Islamic countries, Egypt and Malaysia,which both claim a leading role in their respective regions, shows, moderateIslamic groups have had a considerable impact on processes of democratisationand the emergence of civil society during the quarter century since the ‘Islamicresurgence’.
Shared experiences like coalition building and active participationwithin the political system demonstrate the influence and importance of groupssuch as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) or the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).
These groups haveshaped the political landscape to a much larger extent than the current pre-occupation with the ‘terrorist threat’ suggests. The gradual development of a‘culture of dialogue’ has rather revealed new approaches towards politicalparticipation and democracy at the grassroots level.