RSSL-Iskrizzjonijiet kollha fil- "Lvant Imbiegħed" Kategorija

L-Islam u l-Għamla tal-Poter Statali

seyyed vali reza nasr

Fil 1979 Ġenerali Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, il-ħakkiem militari tal-Pakistan, iddikjara li l-Pakistan se jsir stat Iżlamiku. Il-valuri u n-normi Iżlamiċi jservu bħala l-pedament tal-identità nazzjonali, liġi, ekonomija, u r-relazzjonijiet soċjali, u jispira kull tfassil tal-politika. Fil 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, il-prim ministru l-ġdid tal-Malasja, introduċa pjan wiesa' simili biex jankra t-tfassil tal-politika statali fil-valuri Iżlamiċi, u li jġib il-liġijiet u l-prattiċi ekonomiċi ta’ pajjiżu f’konformità mat-tagħlim tal-Islam. Għaliex dawn il-ħakkiema għażlu t-triq tal-“Iżlamizzazzjoni” għal pajjiżi tagħhom? U kif l-istati postkolonjali sekulari ta’ darba saru l-aġenti tal-Iżlamizzazzjoni u l-prospertur tal-istat Iżlamiku “veru”?
Il-Malasja u l-Pakistan ilhom mill-aħħar tas-snin sebgħin sal-bidu tas-snin tmenin segwew triq unika għall-iżvilupp li tvarja mill-esperjenzi ta’ stati oħra tat-Tielet Dinja.. F'dawn iż-żewġ pajjiżi l-identità reliġjuża ġiet integrata fl-ideoloġija tal-istat biex tinforma l-għan u l-proċess tal-iżvilupp bil-valuri Iżlamiċi.
Dan l-impenn ippreżenta wkoll stampa differenti ħafna tar-relazzjoni bejn l-Islam u l-politika fis-soċjetajiet Musulmani. Fil-Malasja u l-Pakistan, kienu istituzzjonijiet statali aktar milli attivisti Iżlamiċi (dawk li jirrakkomandaw qari politiku tal-Islam; magħrufa wkoll bħala revivalisti jew fundamentalisti) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, u b'mod aktar wiesa' kif il-kultura u r-reliġjon jaqdu l-bżonnijiet tal-poter u l-iżvilupp tal-istat. L-analiżi hawnhekk tiddependi fuq diskussjonijiet teoretiċi
fix-xjenzi soċjali tal-imġiba tal-istat u r-rwol tal-kultura u r-reliġjon fihom. Iktar importanti, hija tislet deduzzjonijiet mill-każijiet li qed jiġu eżaminati biex tagħmel konklużjonijiet usa' ta' interess għad-dixxiplini.

| Settembru 25, 2010 | Kummenti 0
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L-ISLAM, DEMOKRAZIJA & L-Istati Uniti:

Fondazzjoni Cordoba

Abdullah Faliq |

Intro ,


Minkejja li huwa kemm dibattitu perenni kif ukoll kumpless, Arches Quarterly jeżamina mill-ġdid minn raġunijiet teoloġiċi u prattiċi, id-dibattitu importanti dwar ir-relazzjoni u l-kompatibilità bejn l-Islam u d-Demokrazija, kif imtenni fl-aġenda ta’ tama u bidla ta’ Barack Obama. Filwaqt li ħafna jiċċelebraw l-axxendent ta’ Obama fl-Uffiċċju Ovali bħala katarsi nazzjonali għall-Istati Uniti, oħrajn jibqgħu inqas ottimisti dwar bidla fl-ideoloġija u l-approċċ fl-arena internazzjonali. Filwaqt li ħafna mit-tensjoni u n-nuqqas ta’ fiduċja bejn id-dinja Musulmana u l-Istati Uniti jistgħu jiġu attribwiti għall-approċċ tal-promozzjoni tad-demokrazija, tipikament jiffavorixxu dittatorjati u reġimi tal-pupazzi li jħallsu s-servizz bla xkiel għall-valuri demokratiċi u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem, il-konsegwenza ta ' 9/11 tassew ikkummenta aktar id-dubji permezz tal-pożizzjoni ta ’l-Amerika dwar l-Islam politiku. Ħoloq ħajt ta ’negattività kif jinstab minn worldpublicopinion.org, skond liema 67% tal-Eġizzjani jemmnu li globalment l-Amerika għandha rwol "prinċipalment negattiv".
Ir-rispons ta ’l-Amerika b’hekk kien xieraq. Billi jeleġġi lil Obama, ħafna madwar id-dinja qed jagħżlu t-tamiet tagħhom biex jiżviluppaw inqas beligeranti, iżda politika barranija aktar ġusta lejn id-dinja Musulmana. It-test għal Obama, kif niddiskutu, huwa kif l-Amerika u l-alleati tagħha jippromwovu d-demokrazija. Se jkun qed jiffaċilita jew jimponi?
Barra minn hekk, jista 'jkun importanti li jkun sensar onest f'żoni mtawla ta' kunflitti? Ir-rikors għall-għarfien espert u għarfien tal-prolifi
c studjużi, akkademiċi, ġurnalisti u politiċi imħawwar, Arches Quarterly joħroġ għar-relazzjoni bejn l-Iżlam u d-Demokrazija u r-rwol tal-Amerika - kif ukoll il-bidliet li ġab Obama, fit-tfittxija tal-bażi komuni. Anas Altikriti, il-Kap Eżekuttiv tal-Fondazzjoni Cordoba jipprovdi l-gambit tal-ftuħ għal din id-diskussjoni, fejn jirrifletti fuq it-tamiet u l-isfidi li jistrieħu fit-triq ta ’Obama. Wara Altikriti, l-eks konsulent tal-President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane joffri analiżi bir-reqqa tal-prinċipju Iżlamiku tad-dritt għal-libertà. Anwar Ibrahim, eks Deputat Prim Ministru tal-Malasja, tarrikkixxi d-diskussjoni bir-realtajiet prattiċi tal-implimentazzjoni tad-demokrazija f'soċjetajiet dominanti Musulmani, jiġifieri, fl-Indoneżja u l-Malasja.
Għandna wkoll lil Dr Shireen Hunter, ta 'l-Università ta' Georgetown, L-Istati Uniti, li jesplora pajjiżi Musulmani li għadhom lura fid-demokratizzazzjoni u l-modernizzazzjoni. Dan huwa kkumplimentat minn kittieb tat-terroriżmu, L-ispjegazzjoni ta ’Dr Nafeez Ahmed dwar il-kriżi ta’ wara l-modernità u l-
mewt tad-demokrazija. Dr Daud Abdullah (Direttur tal-Lvant Nofsani Media Monitor), Alan Hart (ex korrispondent tal-ITN u tal-BBC Panorama; awtur taż-Żjoniżmu: L-Għedewwa Veru tal-Lhud) u Asem Sondos (Editur ta ’kull ġimgħa ta’ l-Eġittu Sawt Al Omma) tikkonċentra fuq Obama u r-rwol tiegħu vis-à-vis il-promozzjoni tad-demokrazija fid-dinja Musulmana, kif ukoll ir-relazzjonijiet tal-Istati Uniti mal-Iżrael u l-Fratellanza Musulmana.
Il-Ministru tal-Affarijiet Barranin jixxandar, Maldivi, Ahmed Shaheed jispekula dwar il-futur tal-Iżlam u d-Demokrazija; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– membru tas-Sinn Féin li ġarrab erba' snin ħabs għal attivitajiet Repubblikani Irlandiżi u kampanjatur għall-Guildford 4 u Birmingham 6, jirrifletti fuq il-vjaġġ reċenti tiegħu f'Gaża fejn ra l-impatt tal-brutalità u l-inġustizzja li saru kontra l-Palestinjani; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Id-Direttur taċ-Ċentru għall-Istudju tar-Radikalizzazzjoni u l-Vjolenza Politika Kontemporanja jiddiskuti l-isfidi tar-riċerka kritika tat-terrur politiku; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, kittieb u drammaturgu, jiddiskuti prospetti ta' paċi fid-Darfur; u fl-aħħar il-ġurnalist u attivist tad-drittijiet tal-bniedem Ashur Shamis iħares b’mod kritiku lejn id-demokratizzazzjoni u l-politiċizzazzjoni tal-Musulmani llum.
Nittamaw li dan kollu jagħmel qari komprensiv u sors ta 'riflessjoni fuq kwistjonijiet li jaffettwawna lkoll f'dawl ġdid ta' tama.
Grazzi

| Settembru 07, 2010 | Kummenti 0
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Arċipelagu Musulman

L massimu. Gross

This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.

| Awissu 27, 2010 | Kummenti 0
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Partiti tal-Oppożizzjoni Iżlamiċi u l-Potenzjal għall-Impenn tal-UE

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Fid-dawl tal-importanza dejjem tikber tal-movimenti Iżlamiċi fid-dinja Musulmana u

il-mod kif ir-radikalizzazzjoni influwenzat avvenimenti globali mill-bidu tas-seklu, dan

huwa importanti għall-UE li tevalwa l-politiki tagħha lejn atturi fi ħdan dak li jista' jkun laxk

imsejħa d-'dinja Islamika'. Huwa partikolarment importanti li wieħed jistaqsi jekk u kif jimpenja ruħu

mad-diversi gruppi Iżlamiċi.

Dan jibqa’ kontroversjali anke fi ħdan l-UE. Xi wħud iħossu li l-Iżlamiċi jgħollu dan

jinsabu wara partiti Iżlamiċi huma sempliċement inkompatibbli mal-ideali tal-punent tad-demokrazija u

drittijiet umani, filwaqt li oħrajn jaraw l-ingaġġ bħala ħtieġa realistika minħabba t-tkabbir

importanza domestika tal-partiti Iżlamiċi u l-involviment dejjem akbar tagħhom fil-qasam internazzjonali

affarijiet. Perspettiva oħra hija li d-demokratizzazzjoni fid-dinja Musulmana tiżdied

sigurtà Ewropea. Il-validità ta’ dawn u argumenti oħra dwar jekk u kif il-

L-UE għandha timpenja ruħha tista' tiġi ttestjata biss billi tistudja l-movimenti Iżlamiċi differenti u

iċ-ċirkostanzi politiċi tagħhom, pajjiż b’pajjiż.

Id-demokratizzazzjoni hija tema ċentrali tal-azzjonijiet tal-politika barranija komuni tal-UE, kif imqiegħda

fl-Artikolu 11 tat-Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea. Ħafna mill-istati kkunsidrati f'dan

rapport mhumiex demokratiċi, jew mhux kompletament demokratiku. F'ħafna minn dawn il-pajjiżi, Iżlamiku

partiti u movimenti jikkostitwixxu oppożizzjoni sinifikanti għar-reġimi prevalenti, u

f’xi wħud jiffurmaw l-akbar blokk ta’ oppożizzjoni. Id-demokraziji Ewropej ilhom jagħmlu

jittrattaw reġimi governattivi li huma awtoritarji, iżda huwa fenomenu ġdid għall-istampa

għal riforma demokratika fi stati fejn l-aktar benefiċjarji probabbli jista' jkollhom, minn

l-opinjoni tal-UE, approċċi differenti u kultant problematiċi għad-demokrazija u tagħha

valuri relatati, bħall-minoranzi u d-drittijiet tan-nisa u l-istat tad-dritt. Dawn il-ħlasijiet huma

spiss imqiegħda kontra movimenti Iżlamiċi, għalhekk huwa importanti għal dawk li jfasslu l-politika Ewropej li

ikollhom stampa preċiża tal-politiki u l-filosofiji tal-imsieħba potenzjali.

Esperjenzi minn pajjiżi differenti għandhom it-tendenza li jissuġġerixxu li l-iżlamista aktar libertà

partijiet huma permessi, aktar ikunu moderati fl-azzjonijiet u l-ideat tagħhom. F'ħafna

każi partiti u gruppi Iżlamiċi ilhom li tbiegħdu mill-għan oriġinali tagħhom

tat-twaqqif ta’ stat Iżlamiku rregolat mil-liġi Iżlamika, u waslu biex jaċċettaw bażiku

prinċipji demokratiċi tal-kompetizzjoni elettorali għall-poter, l-eżistenza ta’ politika oħra

kompetituri, u pluraliżmu politiku.

| Awissu 21, 2010 | Kummenti 0
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Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma: Lessons from South and Southeast Asia

Shadi Hamid
L-Istati Uniti. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, but, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 u 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. Madankollu, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, u, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt. The situation in Jordan is similar. The Bush administration and the Democratic congress have hailed the country as a “model” of Arab reform at precisely the same time that it has been devising new ways to manipulate the electoral process to limit Islamist representation, and just as it held elections plagued by widespread allegations of outright fraud
and rigging.1 This is not a coincidence. Egypt and Jordan are the only two Arab countries that have signed peace treaties with Israel. Barra minn hekk, they are seen as crucial to U.S. efforts to counter Iran, stabilize Iraq, and combat terrorism.
| Awissu 19, 2010 | Kummenti 0
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BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL

ANTHONY BUBALO

GREG FEALY

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Illum, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Iżlamiżmu, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

| Frar 17, 2010 | Kummenti 0
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MODERNITAJIET IŻLAMIĊI: FETHULLAH GULEN u IŻLAM KONTEMPORANJU

FAHRI CAKI

Il-moviment Nurju1, huwa l-eqdem moviment Iżlamiku moderat li probabbilment huwa partikolari għat-Turkija Moderna, kien maqsum f’diversi gruppi minn Said Nursi, il-fundatur tal-moviment, miet fi 1960. Fil-preżent, hemm aktar minn għaxar gruppi nurcu b'aġendi u strateġiji differenti. Minkejja d-differenzi kollha tagħhom, illum il-gruppi Nurju donnhom jirrikonoxxu l-identità ta' xulxin u jippruvaw iżommu ċertu livell ta' solidarjetà. Il-post tal-grupp Fethullah Gulen fi ħdan il-moviment Nurju, madankollu, jidher li hu daqsxejn mfixkel.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) maqsum lilu nnifsu, għallinqas fid-dehra, mill-moviment ġenerali ta’ Nurju fi 1972 u rnexxielu jistabbilixxi l-grupp tiegħu stess bi struttura organizzattiva b’saħħitha fis-snin 80 u 90. Minħabba l-iżvilupp tan-netwerk skejjel wiesa' tagħha kemm fit-Turkija kif ukoll barra mill-pajjiż2, il-grupp tiegħu ġibed l-attenzjoni. Dawk l-iskejjel affaxxinaw mhux biss negozjanti u klassijiet tan-nofs Iżlamiċi iżda wkoll numru kbir ta’ intellettwali u politiċi sekulari.. Għalkemm oriġinarjament ħarġet mill-moviment ġenerali ta 'Nurju, xi wħud jemmnu li n-numru tas-segwaċi tal-grupp Fethullah Gulen huwa ħafna akbar minn dak tat-total tal-bqija tal-gruppi nurju. Madankollu, jidher li hemm raġuni biżżejjed biex wieħed jaħseb li kien hemm prezz x’tħallas għal dan is-suċċess: aljenazzjoni minn gruppi Iżlamiċi oħra kif ukoll mill-moviment ġenerali ta’ Nurju li l-grupp Fethullah Gulen3 innifsu suppost jagħmel parti minnu.

| Frar 17, 2010 | Kummenti 0
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Ħsieb Iżlamiku Progressiv, is-soċjetà ċivili u l-moviment Gulen fil-kuntest nazzjonali

Greg Barton

Fethullah Gulen (imwieled 1941), jew Hodjaeffendi kif hu magħruf b’affezzjoni minn mijiet ta’ eluf ta’ nies fit-Turkija twelidu u barra minn Malta, huwa wieħed mill-aktar ħassieba u attivisti Iżlamiċi sinifikanti li ħarġu fis-seklu għoxrin. Il-ħsieb tiegħu ottimist u li jħares 'il quddiem, bl-enfasi tagħha fuq l-iżvilupp personali kemm tal-qalb kif ukoll tal-moħħ permezz tal-edukazzjoni, li tinvolvi ruħha b'mod proattiv u pożittiv mad-dinja moderna u li tilħaq fi djalogu u spirtu ta' kooperazzjoni bejn komunitajiet reliġjużi, is-saffi soċjali u n-nazzjonijiet jistgħu jinqraw bħala riformulazzjoni kontemporanja tat-tagħlim ta’ Jalaluddin Rumi, Yunus Emre, u għalliema Sufi klassiċi oħra (Michel, 2005a, 2005b; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005a; 2005b; Unal u Williams, 2005). B'mod aktar speċifiku, Gulen jidher li qed ikompli fejn Said Nursi (1876-1960), intellettwali ieħor Iżlamiku Anatoljan kbir, titħalla: tfassal mod għall-attivisti Musulmani fit-Turkija u lil hinn biex jikkontribwixxu b'mod effettiv għall-iżvilupp tas-soċjetà moderna li tevita l-iżvantaġġi u l-kompromessi tal-attiviżmu politiku tal-partiti u tissostitwixxi d-dejjaq tal-ħsieb Iżlamiku b'fehim ġenwinament inklużiv u umanitarju tar-rwol tar-reliġjon fid-dinja moderna. (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham u Ozdemir, 2005; Vahide, 2005, Yavuz, 2005a).

| Frar 17, 2010 | Kummenti 2
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The United States and Egypt

A Conference Report

The study of bilateral relations has fallen deeply out of favor in the academiccommunity. Political science has turned to the study of international state systemsrather than relations between individual states; anthropologists and sociologists arefar more interested in non-state actors; and historians have largely abandonedstates altogether. It is a shame, because there is much to be learned from bilateralrelationships, and some such relationships are vital—not only to the countriesinvolved, but also to a broader array of countries.One such vital relationship is that between the United States and Egypt. Forgedduring the Cold War almost entirely on the issue of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, theU.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship has deepened and broadened over the lastquarter century. Egypt remains one of the United States’ most important Arab allies,and the bilateral relationship with Washington remains the keystone of Egypt’sforeign policy. Strong U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations are also an important anchorfor states throughout the Middle East and for Western policy in the region. Therelationship is valuable for policymakers in both countries; doing without it isunthinkable.To explore this relationship, the CSIS Middle East Program, in cooperation with theAl-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, convened a one-dayconference on June 26, 2003, entitled, “The United States and Egypt: Building thePartnership.” The goal of the meeting was to brainstorm how that partnership mightbe strengthened.Participants agreed that much needs to be done on the diplomatic, political, militari,and economic levels. Although all did not agree on a single course forward, theparticipants unanimously concurred that a stronger U.S.-Egyptian relationship is verymuch in the interests of both countries, and although it will require a great deal ofwork to achieve, the benefits are worth the effort.

| Frar 12, 2010 | Kummenti 0
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Will Turkey Have An Islamist President?

Michael Rubin


While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, il

Turkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-year

term ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a new

parliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks will

inaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the future

of Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan

wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known as

AKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned to

erode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—the

Turkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wears

a Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,

which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December

2006, pereżempju, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predicting

a 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1

While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about military
intervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared to
spark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’s
civilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkish
democracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interference
by U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.

While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, theTurkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-yearterm ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a newparliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks willinaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the futureof Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known asAKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned toerode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—theTurkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wearsa Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December2006, pereżempju, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predictinga 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about militaryintervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared tospark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’scivilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkishdemocracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interferenceby U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.

| Frar 12, 2010 | Kummenti 0
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Movimenti Iżlamiċi u l-Użu tal-Vjolenza:

Esen Kirdis

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Minkejja l-enfasi akkademika u popolari reċenti fuq netwerks ta 'terroristi Iżlamiċi transnazzjonali vjolenti,hemm diversi movimenti Iżlamiċi. Din il-multipliċità tippreżenta lill-istudjużi b'żewġ puzzles. L-ewwel puzzle qed jifhem għaliex movimenti Iżlamiċi orjentati lejn id-dar li ġew iffurmati bħala reazzjoni għat-twaqqif ta 'stati-nazzjon sekulari biddlu l-attivitajiet u l-miri tagħhom fuq spazju transnazzjonali b'ħafna saffi. It-tieni taħbil il-moħħ qed jifhem għaliex gruppi bi għanijiet u miri simili jadottaw strateġiji differenti biex jużaw il-vjolenza jew in-non-vjolenza meta "jmorru transnazzjonali." Iż-żewġ mistoqsijiet ewlenin li se tindirizza dan id-dokument huma: Għaliex il-movimenti Iżlamiċi jmorru transnazzjonali? U, għaliex jieħdu forom differenti meta jittrasnazzjonalizzaw? L-ewwel, Nargumenta li l-livell transnazzjonali jippreżenta post politiku ġdid għall-movimenti Iżlamiċi li huma limitati fit-talba tagħhom fil-livell domestiku. It-tieni, Nargumenta li t-transnazzjonalizzazzjoni toħloq inċertezza għal gruppi dwar l-identità u t-talbiet tagħhom fil-livell transnazzjonali. Il-mezz adottat, jiġifieri. użu tal-vjolenza kontra n-non-vjolenza, tiddependi fuq it-tip ta 'transnazzjonalizzazzjoni, l-atturi jiltaqgħu magħhom fil-livell transnazzjonali, u l-interpretazzjonijiet tat-tmexxija dwar fejn għandu jmur il-moviment. Biex inwieġeb il-mistoqsijiet tiegħi, Se nħares lejn erba 'każijiet: (1) Islam Tork, (2) il-Fratellanza Musulmana, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, u (4) Tablighi Jamaat

| Frar 11, 2010 | Kummenti 0
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Assessing the Islamist mainstream in Egypt and Malaysia

Beyond ‘Terrorism’ and ‘StateHegemony’: assessing the Islamistmainstream in Egypt and Malaysia

JAN STARKMalaysia-Islamists

International networks of Islamic ‘terrorism’ have served as themost popular explanation to describe the phenomenon of political Islam sincethe 11 September attacks.

This paper argues that both the self-proclaimeddoctrinal Islam of the militants and Western perceptions of a homogeneousIslamist threat need to be deconstructed in order to discover the oftenambiguous manifestations of ‘official’ and ‘opposition’ Islam, of modernity andconservatism.

As a comparison of two Islamic countries, Egypt and Malaysia,which both claim a leading role in their respective regions, shows, moderateIslamic groups have had a considerable impact on processes of democratisationand the emergence of civil society during the quarter century since the ‘Islamicresurgence’.

Shared experiences like coalition building and active participationwithin the political system demonstrate the influence and importance of groupssuch as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) or the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).

These groups haveshaped the political landscape to a much larger extent than the current pre-occupation with the ‘terrorist threat’ suggests. The gradual development of a‘culture of dialogue’ has rather revealed new approaches towards politicalparticipation and democracy at the grassroots level.

| Diċembru 18, 2009 | Kummenti 1
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