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Islāms un valsts varas veidošana
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ISLAMS, DEMOKRĀTIJA & AMERIKAS SAVIENOTĀS VALSTIS:
Kordovas fonds
Abdullah Faliq |
Ievads ,
Musulmaņu arhipelāgs
Max L. Bruto
Islāmistu opozīcijas partijas un ES iesaistīšanās potenciāls
Tobijs Ārčers
Heidija Huuhtanena
Amerikas islāmistu dilemmas atrisināšana: Mācības no Dienvidāzijas un Dienvidaustrumāzijas
BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL
ANTONIJA BUBALO
GREG FEALY
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Today, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Islāmisms, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.
ISLAMIC MODERNITIES: FETHULLAH GULEN and CONTEMPORARY ISLAM
FAHRI CAKI
The Nurju movement1, being the oldest moderate Islamist movement which is probably peculiar to Modern Turkey, was broken into several groups since Said Nursi, the founder of the movement, passed away in 1960. At the present time, there are more than ten nurcu groups with different agendas and strategies. Despite all their differences, today the Nurju groups seem to acknowledge each other’s identity and try to keep a certain level of solidarity. Theplace of the Fethullah Gulen group within the Nurju movement, tomēr, seems to be a bit shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, at least in appearance, from the overall Nurju movement in 1972 and succeeded in establishing his own group with a strong organizational structure in the 1980’s and the 90’s. Due to the development of its broad school network both in Turkey and abroad2, his group attracted attention. Those schools fascinated not only Islamist businessmen and middle classes but also a large number of secularist intellectuals and politicians. Although it originally emerged out of the overall Nurju movement, some believe that the number of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen group is much larger than that of the total of the rest of the nurju groups. Yet, there seems to be enough reason to think that there was a price to pay for this success: alienation from other Islamist groups as well as from the overall Nurju movement of which the Fethullah Gulen group3 itself is supposed to be a part.
Progresīvā islāma doma, pilsoniskā sabiedrība un Gulena kustība nacionālajā kontekstā
Greg Barton
Fethullah Gulen (born 1941), or Hodjaeffendi as he is known affectionately by hundreds of thousands of people in his native Turkey and abroad, is one of the most significant Islamic thinkers and activists to have emerged in the twentieth century. His optimistic and forward-looking thought, with its emphasis on self development of both heart and mind through education, of engaging proactively and positively with the modern world and of reaching out in dialogue and a spirit of cooperation between religious communities, social strata and nations can be read as a contemporary reformulation of the teachings of Jalaluddin Rumi, Yunus Emre, and other classic Sufi teachers (Michel, 2005a, 2005b; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005a; 2005b; Unal and Williams, 2005). More specifically, Gulen can be seen to be carrying on where Said Nursi (1876-1960), another great Anatolian Islamic intellectual, left off: chartinga way for Muslim activists in Turkey and beyond to effectively contribute to the development of modern society that avoids the pitfalls and compromises of party-political activism and replaces the narrowness of Islamist thought with a genuinely inclusive and humanitarian understanding of religion’s role in the modern world (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham and Ozdemir, 2005; Vahide, 2005, Yavuz, 2005a).
ASV un Ēģipte
Konferences ziņojums
Divpusējo attiecību izpēte akadēmiskajā sabiedrībā ir dziļi kritusi. Politikas zinātne ir pievērsusies starptautisko valstu sistēmu izpētei nevis attiecībām starp atsevišķām valstīm; antropologi un sociologi vairāk interesējas par nevalstiskiem dalībniekiem; un vēsturnieki lielākoties vispār ir pametuši valstis. Tas ir kauns, jo no divpusējām attiecībām ir daudz jāmācās, un dažas šādas attiecības ir vitāli svarīgas - ne tikai iesaistītajām valstīm, bet arī ar plašāku valstu loku. Viena no šādām būtiskām attiecībām ir Amerikas Savienoto Valstu un Ēģiptes attiecības. Gandrīz pilnībā viltots aukstā kara laikā arābu un Izraēlas miera veidošanas jautājumā, ASV un Ēģiptes divpusējās attiecības pēdējā ceturksnī ir padziļinājušās un paplašinājušās. Ēģipte joprojām ir viens no nozīmīgākajiem ASV arābu sabiedrotajiem,un divpusējās attiecības ar Vašingtonu joprojām ir Ēģiptes ārpolitikas pamatakmens. Spēcīgas ASV un Ēģiptes divpusējās attiecības ir arī nozīmīgs enkurs valstīm Tuvajos Austrumos un Rietumu politikai šajā reģionā. Terelācija ir vērtīga politikas veidotājiem abās valstīs; iztikt bez tā nav iedomājama. Lai izpētītu šīs attiecības, CSIS Tuvo Austrumu programma, sadarbībā ar Al-Ahram politisko un stratēģisko pētījumu centru Kairā, jūnijā sasauca vienas dienas konferenci 26, 2003, tiesības, “Amerikas Savienotās Valstis un Ēģipte: Partnerības veidošana. ” Sanāksmes mērķis bija domāt par to, kā šī partnerība varētu nostiprināties. Dalībnieki bija vienisprātis, ka daudz jādara diplomātiskajai, politisks, militārais,ekonomikas līmeni. Lai gan visi nepiekrita vienam kursam uz priekšu, dalībnieki vienbalsīgi piekrita, ka spēcīgākas ASV un Ēģiptes attiecības ir ļoti būtiskas abu valstu interesēs, un, lai arī tā sasniegšana prasīs daudz darba, ieguvumi ir pūļu vērti.
Will Turkey Have An Islamist President?
Maikls Rubins
While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, theTurkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-yearterm ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a newparliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks willinaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the futureof Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known asAKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned toerode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—theTurkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wearsa Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December2006, for example, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predictinga 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about militaryintervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared tospark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’scivilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkishdemocracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interferenceby U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.
Islāma kustības un vardarbības izmantošana:
Esens Kirdis
Neskatoties uz neseno akadēmisko un tautas uzmanību vardarbīgiem starptautiskiem islāma teroristu tīkliem,ir daudz islāma kustību. Šī daudzveidība sniedz zinātniekiem divas mīklas. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? First, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Second, Es uzskatu, ka transnacionalizācija rada nenoteiktību grupām par viņu identitāti un prasībām transnacionālā līmenī. Pieņemtais medijs, t.i. vardarbības izmantošana pret nevardarbību, ir atkarīgs no transnacionalizācijas veida, dalībnieki saskaras starpvalstu līmenī, un vadības interpretācijas par to, kur kustībai vajadzētu virzīties tālāk. Lai atbildētu uz maniem jautājumiem, Apskatīšu četrus gadījumus: (1) Turcijas islāms, (2) musulmaņu brālība, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, un (4) Tablighi Jamaat
Novērtējot islāmistu galveno virzienu Ēģiptē un Malaizijā
Ārpus "terorisma" un "valsts hegemonijas": novērtējot islāmistu galveno virzienu Ēģiptē un Malaizijā
JAN STARK
Starptautiskie islāma “terorisma” tīkli kopš tā laika ir bijuši populārākais skaidrojums politiskā islāma fenomenam 11 Septembra uzbrukumi.
Šajā rakstā tiek apgalvots, ka ir jādekonstruē gan kaujinieku pašpasludinātais doktrinālais islāms, gan Rietumu priekšstati par viendabīgiem islāmistu draudiem, lai atklātu bieži vien neskaidrās "oficiālā" un "opozīcijas" islāma izpausmes., modernitāte un konservatīvisms.
Kā divu islāma valstu salīdzinājums, Ēģipte un Malaizija,kuras abi pretendē uz vadošo lomu savos reģionos, rāda, mērenajām islāma grupām ir bijusi ievērojama ietekme uz demokratizācijas procesu un pilsoniskās sabiedrības rašanos ceturtdaļgadsimta laikā kopš “islāma atdzimšanas”.
Kopīga pieredze, piemēram, koalīcijas veidošana un aktīva līdzdalība politiskajā sistēmā, parāda tādu grupu kā Ēģiptes Musulmaņu brālība ietekmi un nozīmi., Malaizijas islāma jauniešu kustība (ABIM) vai Malaizijas Islāma partija (NAV).
Šīs grupas ir veidojušas politisko ainavu daudz lielākā mērā, nekā liecina pašreizējā okupācija ar "terorisma draudiem".. “Dialoga kultūras” pakāpeniskā attīstība drīzāk ir atklājusi jaunas pieejas politiskai līdzdalībai un demokrātijai tautas līmenī..