All Entries in the "Tolimieji Rytai" Category
Islamas ir valstybės valdžios kūrimas
seyyed vali reza nasr
ISLAMAS, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq |
Intro ,
Musulmonų archipelagas
Maks. L. Bendras
Islamistų opozicijos partijos ir ES įsitraukimo potencialas
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Amerikos islamistinės dilemos sprendimas: Pamokos iš Pietų ir Pietryčių Azijos
BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL
ANTHONY BUBALO
GREG FEALY
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Today, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Islamizmas, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.
ISLAMIC MODERNITIES: FETHULLAH GULEN and CONTEMPORARY ISLAM
FAHRI CAKI
The Nurju movement1, being the oldest moderate Islamist movement which is probably peculiar to Modern Turkey, was broken into several groups since Said Nursi, the founder of the movement, passed away in 1960. At the present time, there are more than ten nurcu groups with different agendas and strategies. Despite all their differences, today the Nurju groups seem to acknowledge each other’s identity and try to keep a certain level of solidarity. Theplace of the Fethullah Gulen group within the Nurju movement, tačiau, seems to be a bit shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, at least in appearance, from the overall Nurju movement in 1972 and succeeded in establishing his own group with a strong organizational structure in the 1980’s and the 90’s. Due to the development of its broad school network both in Turkey and abroad2, his group attracted attention. Those schools fascinated not only Islamist businessmen and middle classes but also a large number of secularist intellectuals and politicians. Although it originally emerged out of the overall Nurju movement, some believe that the number of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen group is much larger than that of the total of the rest of the nurju groups. Dar, there seems to be enough reason to think that there was a price to pay for this success: alienation from other Islamist groups as well as from the overall Nurju movement of which the Fethullah Gulen group3 itself is supposed to be a part.
Progresyvi islamo mintis, pilietinė visuomenė ir Guleno judėjimas nacionaliniame kontekste
Greg Barton
Fethullahas Gulenas (born 1941), or Hodjaeffendi as he is known affectionately by hundreds of thousands of people in his native Turkey and abroad, is one of the most significant Islamic thinkers and activists to have emerged in the twentieth century. His optimistic and forward-looking thought, with its emphasis on self development of both heart and mind through education, of engaging proactively and positively with the modern world and of reaching out in dialogue and a spirit of cooperation between religious communities, social strata and nations can be read as a contemporary reformulation of the teachings of Jalaluddin Rumi, Yunus Emre, and other classic Sufi teachers (Michel, 2005a, 2005b; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005a; 2005b; Unal and Williams, 2005). Tiksliau, Gulen can be seen to be carrying on where Said Nursi (1876-1960), another great Anatolian Islamic intellectual, left off: chartinga way for Muslim activists in Turkey and beyond to effectively contribute to the development of modern society that avoids the pitfalls and compromises of party-political activism and replaces the narrowness of Islamist thought with a genuinely inclusive and humanitarian understanding of religion’s role in the modern world (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham and Ozdemir, 2005; Vahide, 2005, Yavuz, 2005a).
The United States and Egypt
A Conference Report
The study of bilateral relations has fallen deeply out of favor in the academiccommunity. Political science has turned to the study of international state systemsrather than relations between individual states; anthropologists and sociologists arefar more interested in non-state actors; and historians have largely abandonedstates altogether. It is a shame, because there is much to be learned from bilateralrelationships, and some such relationships are vital—not only to the countriesinvolved, but also to a broader array of countries.One such vital relationship is that between the United States and Egypt. Forgedduring the Cold War almost entirely on the issue of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, theU.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship has deepened and broadened over the lastquarter century. Egypt remains one of the United States’ most important Arab allies,and the bilateral relationship with Washington remains the keystone of Egypt’sforeign policy. Strong U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations are also an important anchorfor states throughout the Middle East and for Western policy in the region. Therelationship is valuable for policymakers in both countries; doing without it isunthinkable.To explore this relationship, the CSIS Middle East Program, in cooperation with theAl-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, convened a one-dayconference on June 26, 2003, entitled, “The United States and Egypt: Building thePartnership.” The goal of the meeting was to brainstorm how that partnership mightbe strengthened.Participants agreed that much needs to be done on the diplomatic, political, karinis,and economic levels. Although all did not agree on a single course forward, theparticipants unanimously concurred that a stronger U.S.-Egyptian relationship is verymuch in the interests of both countries, and although it will require a great deal ofwork to achieve, the benefits are worth the effort.
Ar Turkija turės islamistinį prezidentą??
Michaelas Rubinas
Nors kampanijos oficialiai neprasidėjo, rinkimų sezonas Turkijoje įkaista. Šį pavasarį, Turkijos parlamentas išrinks prezidentą, kuris pakeis dabartinį prezidentą Ahmetą Necdetą Sezerį, kurios septynerių metų kadencija baigiasi gegužę 16, 2007. Lapkričio mėnesį arba anksčiau 4, 2007, Turkai eis prie balsadėžių rinkti naujo parlamento. Šie metai ne tik pirmieji nuo 1973 m., bet ir 1950 prieš tai – tais pačiais metais turkai inauguruos naują prezidentą ir parlamentą, tačiau šių metų apklausos taip pat paveiks Turkijos ateitį labiau nei turbūt jokie rinkimai per pastarąjį pusę amžiaus. Jei ministras pirmininkas Recepas Tayyipas Erdo˘ganas laimės prezidento postą ir jo Teisingumo ir plėtros partiją (Teisingumo ir plėtros partija, taip pat žinomas kaip AKP) išlaiko savo parlamentinę daugumą, Islamistai kontroliuotų visas Turkijos biurus ir būtų pakirsti sekuliarizmui ir iš naujo apibrėžtų valstybę bei visuomenę. Jei Erdoganas pakils į Çankaya rūmus – Turkijos Baltuosius rūmus, turkai susidurs su tikimybe, kad islamistų prezidentas ir pirmoji ponia dėvi Saudo Arabijos stiliaus skarelę.. Tokia perspektyva paskatino spėliones apie Turkijos kariuomenės įsikišimą,kuris tradiciškai tarnauja kaip sekuliarizmo ir Turkijos konstitucijos sergėtojas. 2006 m. gruodžio mėn, pavyzdžiui, „Newsweek“ paskelbė esė „Artėjantis perversmas?“ prognozuoja 50 procentų tikimybė, kad kariškiai šiais metais perims kontrolę Turkijoje.1 Nors susirūpinimas dėl Turkijos sekuliarizmo ateities yra pagrįstas, nerimas dėl karinės intervencijos nėra. Karinių perversmų Turkijoje nebebus. Erdogas gali būti pasirengęs sukelti konstitucinę krizę, siekdamas asmeninių ambicijų ir ideologinės darbotvarkės, tačiau Turkijos civilinės institucijos yra pakankamai stiprios, kad galėtų susidoroti su iššūkiu. Didžiausias pavojus Turkijos demokratijai nebus Turkijos karinė intervencija,bet gana geranoriškas, bet naivus JAV kišimasis. stabilumo siekiantys ir islamistų grėsmę menkinantys diplomatai.
Islamic Movements and the Use of Violence:
Esenas Kirdis
Despite recent academic and popular focus on violent transnational Islamic terrorist networks,there is a multiplicity of Islamic movements. This multiplicity presents scholars with two puzzles. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? First, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Second, I argue that transnationalization creates uncertainty for groups about their identity and claims at the transnational level. The medium adopted, i.e. use of violence versus non-violence, is dependent on type of transnationalization, the actors encounter at the transnational level, and leadership’s interpretations on where the movement should go next. To answer my questions, I will look at four cases: (1) Turkish Islam, (2) the Muslim Brotherhood, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, ir (4) Tablighi Jamaat
Assessing the Islamist mainstream in Egypt and Malaysia
Beyond ‘Terrorism’ and ‘StateHegemony’: assessing the Islamistmainstream in Egypt and Malaysia
JAN STARK
International networks of Islamic ‘terrorism’ have served as themost popular explanation to describe the phenomenon of political Islam sincethe 11 September attacks.
This paper argues that both the self-proclaimeddoctrinal Islam of the militants and Western perceptions of a homogeneousIslamist threat need to be deconstructed in order to discover the oftenambiguous manifestations of ‘official’ and ‘opposition’ Islam, of modernity andconservatism.
As a comparison of two Islamic countries, Egypt and Malaysia,which both claim a leading role in their respective regions, shows, moderateIslamic groups have had a considerable impact on processes of democratisationand the emergence of civil society during the quarter century since the ‘Islamicresurgence’.
Shared experiences like coalition building and active participationwithin the political system demonstrate the influence and importance of groupssuch as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) or the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).
These groups haveshaped the political landscape to a much larger extent than the current pre-occupation with the ‘terrorist threat’ suggests. The gradual development of a‘culture of dialogue’ has rather revealed new approaches towards politicalparticipation and democracy at the grassroots level.