Όλες οι συμμετοχές στο "Απω Ανατολή" Κατηγορία

Το Ισλάμ και η Δημιουργία της Κρατικής Εξουσίας

Seyyed βαλής Reza nasr

ΙΣΛΑΜ, ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ & Η ΗΠΑ:

Ίδρυμα Κόρδοβα

Αμπντουλάχ Faliq

Εισαγωγή ,

Μουσουλμανικό Αρχιπέλαγος

max L. Ακαθάριστο

Τα Ισλαμικά Κόμματα της Αντιπολίτευσης και το Δυναμικό για δέσμευση της ΕΕ

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Επίλυση του Ισλαμιστικού Διλήμματος της Αμερικής: Lessons from South and Southeast Asia

BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL

ANTHONY Bubalo

GREG FEALY

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Today, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : ισλαμισμός, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

ISLAMIC MODERNITIES: FETHULLAH GULEN and CONTEMPORARY ISLAM

Φέργκιουσον Caki

The Nurju movement1, being the oldest moderate Islamist movement which is probably peculiar to Modern Turkey, was broken into several groups since Said Nursi, the founder of the movement, passed away in 1960. At the present time, there are more than ten nurcu groups with different agendas and strategies. Despite all their differences, today the Nurju groups seem to acknowledge each other’s identity and try to keep a certain level of solidarity. Theplace of the Fethullah Gulen group within the Nurju movement, ωστόσο, seems to be a bit shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, at least in appearance, from the overall Nurju movement in 1972 and succeeded in establishing his own group with a strong organizational structure in the 1980’s and the 90’s. Due to the development of its broad school network both in Turkey and abroad2, his group attracted attention. Those schools fascinated not only Islamist businessmen and middle classes but also a large number of secularist intellectuals and politicians. Although it originally emerged out of the overall Nurju movement, some believe that the number of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen group is much larger than that of the total of the rest of the nurju groups. Ακόμη, there seems to be enough reason to think that there was a price to pay for this success: alienation from other Islamist groups as well as from the overall Nurju movement of which the Fethullah Gulen group3 itself is supposed to be a part.

Προοδευτική ισλαμικής σκέψης, της κοινωνίας των πολιτών και το κίνημα Gulen σε εθνικό επίπεδο

Greg Barton

Φετουλάχ Γκιουλέν (born 1941), or Hodjaeffendi as he is known affectionately by hundreds of thousands of people in his native Turkey and abroad, is one of the most significant Islamic thinkers and activists to have emerged in the twentieth century. His optimistic and forward-looking thought, with its emphasis on self development of both heart and mind through education, of engaging proactively and positively with the modern world and of reaching out in dialogue and a spirit of cooperation between religious communities, social strata and nations can be read as a contemporary reformulation of the teachings of Jalaluddin Rumi, Yunus Emre, and other classic Sufi teachers (Michel, 2005ένα, 2005b; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005ένα; 2005b; Unal and Williams, 2005). More specifically, Gulen can be seen to be carrying on where Said Nursi (1876-1960), another great Anatolian Islamic intellectual, left off: chartinga way for Muslim activists in Turkey and beyond to effectively contribute to the development of modern society that avoids the pitfalls and compromises of party-political activism and replaces the narrowness of Islamist thought with a genuinely inclusive and humanitarian understanding of religion’s role in the modern world (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham and Ozdemir, 2005; Vahide, 2005, Yavuz, 2005ένα).

The United States and Egypt

A Conference Report

The study of bilateral relations has fallen deeply out of favor in the academiccommunity. Political science has turned to the study of international state systemsrather than relations between individual states; anthropologists and sociologists arefar more interested in non-state actors; and historians have largely abandonedstates altogether. It is a shame, because there is much to be learned from bilateralrelationships, and some such relationships are vital—not only to the countriesinvolved, but also to a broader array of countries.One such vital relationship is that between the United States and Egypt. Forgedduring the Cold War almost entirely on the issue of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, theU.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship has deepened and broadened over the lastquarter century. Egypt remains one of the United States’ most important Arab allies,and the bilateral relationship with Washington remains the keystone of Egypt’sforeign policy. Strong U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations are also an important anchorfor states throughout the Middle East and for Western policy in the region. Therelationship is valuable for policymakers in both countries; doing without it isunthinkable.To explore this relationship, the CSIS Middle East Program, in cooperation with theAl-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, convened a one-dayconference on June 26, 2003, entitled, “The United States and Egypt: Building thePartnership.” The goal of the meeting was to brainstorm how that partnership mightbe strengthened.Participants agreed that much needs to be done on the diplomatic, political, Στρατός,and economic levels. Although all did not agree on a single course forward, theparticipants unanimously concurred that a stronger U.S.-Egyptian relationship is verymuch in the interests of both countries, and although it will require a great deal ofwork to achieve, the benefits are worth the effort.

Will Turkey Have An Islamist President?

Michael Rubin

Ισλαμικά κινήματα και χρήση βίας:

Esen Kirdis

.

Παρά την πρόσφατη ακαδημαϊκή και δημοφιλή εστίαση στα βίαια διεθνικά ισλαμικά τρομοκρατικά δίκτυα,υπάρχει μια πολλαπλότητα ισλαμικών κινημάτων. Αυτή η πολλαπλότητα παρουσιάζει στους μελετητές δύο παζλ. Ο πρώτος γρίφος είναι να κατανοήσουμε γιατί ισλαμικά κινήματα προσανατολισμένα στο εσωτερικό που σχηματίστηκαν ως αντίδραση στην ίδρυση κοσμικών εθνών-κρατών μετατόπισαν τις δραστηριότητες και τους στόχους τους σε έναν πολυεπίπεδο διακρατικό χώρο. Ο δεύτερος γρίφος είναι να κατανοήσουμε γιατί ομάδες με παρόμοιους σκοπούς και στόχους υιοθετούν διαφορετικές στρατηγικές χρήσης βίας ή μη βίας όταν «πάνε διακρατικά». Τα δύο βασικά ερωτήματα που θα εξετάσει αυτή η εργασία είναι: Γιατί τα ισλαμικά κινήματα γίνονται διακρατικά? Και, γιατί παίρνουν διαφορετικές μορφές όταν διακρατικοποιούνται? Πρώτα, Υποστηρίζω ότι το διακρατικό επίπεδο παρουσιάζει έναν νέο πολιτικό χώρο για τα ισλαμικά κινήματα τα οποία είναι περιορισμένα στη διεκδίκησή τους σε εγχώριο επίπεδο. Δεύτερος, Υποστηρίζω ότι η διακρατικοποίηση δημιουργεί αβεβαιότητα για τις ομάδες σχετικά με την ταυτότητα και τις αξιώσεις τους σε διακρατικό επίπεδο. Το μέσο που υιοθετήθηκε, δηλ. χρήση βίας έναντι μη βίας, εξαρτάται από το είδος της διακρατικοποίησης, οι ηθοποιοί συναντούν σε διακρατικό επίπεδο, και τις ερμηνείες της ηγεσίας για το πού πρέπει να πάει το κίνημα. Για να απαντήσω στις ερωτήσεις μου, Θα εξετάσω τέσσερις περιπτώσεις: (1) Τουρκικό Ισλάμ, (2) η Μουσουλμανική Αδελφότητα, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, και (4) Tablighi Jamaat

Αξιολόγηση του ισλαμιστικού ρεύματος στην Αίγυπτο και τη Μαλαισία

Πέρα από την «τρομοκρατία» και την «κρατική ηγεμονία»: αξιολογώντας το ισλαμιστικό ρεύμα στην Αίγυπτο και τη Μαλαισία

Ιανουάριος STRONG

International networks of Islamic ‘terrorism’ have served as themost popular explanation to describe the phenomenon of political Islam sincethe 11 September attacks.

This paper argues that both the self-proclaimeddoctrinal Islam of the militants and Western perceptions of a homogeneousIslamist threat need to be deconstructed in order to discover the oftenambiguous manifestations of ‘official’ and ‘opposition’ Islam, of modernity andconservatism.

As a comparison of two Islamic countries, Egypt and Malaysia,which both claim a leading role in their respective regions, shows, moderateIslamic groups have had a considerable impact on processes of democratisationand the emergence of civil society during the quarter century since the ‘Islamicresurgence’.

Shared experiences like coalition building and active participationwithin the political system demonstrate the influence and importance of groupssuch as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) or the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).

These groups haveshaped the political landscape to a much larger extent than the current pre-occupation with the ‘terrorist threat’ suggests. The gradual development of a‘culture of dialogue’ has rather revealed new approaches towards politicalparticipation and democracy at the grassroots level.