Alle Einträge in der "Fernost" Kategorie
Islam und dem Making of State Power
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr
ISLAM, DEMOKRATIE & DIE USA:
Cordoba-Stiftung
Abdullah Faliq
Einleitung ,
Ein Moslem-Archipel
Max L. Gross
Islamistische Oppositionsparteien und das Potenzial für EU-Engagement
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Beheben von America's islamistischen Dilemma: Lehren aus Süd-und Südostasien
ZWISCHEN DEM GLOBAL UND DEM LOKAL
ANTHONY Bubalo
GREG FEALY
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Heute, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Islamismus, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.
ISLAMISCHE MODERNEN: FETHULLAH GULEN und DER ZEITGENÖSSISCHE ISLAM
Honorary Knife
The Nurju movement1, being the oldest moderate Islamist movement which is probably peculiar to Modern Turkey, was broken into several groups since Said Nursi, the founder of the movement, passed away in 1960. At the present time, there are more than ten nurcu groups with different agendas and strategies. Despite all their differences, today the Nurju groups seem to acknowledge each other’s identity and try to keep a certain level of solidarity. Theplace of the Fethullah Gulen group within the Nurju movement, jedoch, seems to be a bit shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, at least in appearance, from the overall Nurju movement in 1972 and succeeded in establishing his own group with a strong organizational structure in the 1980’s and the 90’s. Due to the development of its broad school network both in Turkey and abroad2, his group attracted attention. Those schools fascinated not only Islamist businessmen and middle classes but also a large number of secularist intellectuals and politicians. Although it originally emerged out of the overall Nurju movement, some believe that the number of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen group is much larger than that of the total of the rest of the nurju groups. Noch, there seems to be enough reason to think that there was a price to pay for this success: alienation from other Islamist groups as well as from the overall Nurju movement of which the Fethullah Gulen group3 itself is supposed to be a part.
Progressive islamischen Denkens, Zivilgesellschaft und die Gülen-Bewegung im nationalen Kontext
Greg Barton
Fethullah Gülen (born 1941), or Hodjaeffendi as he is known affectionately by hundreds of thousands of people in his native Turkey and abroad, is one of the most significant Islamic thinkers and activists to have emerged in the twentieth century. His optimistic and forward-looking thought, with its emphasis on self development of both heart and mind through education, of engaging proactively and positively with the modern world and of reaching out in dialogue and a spirit of cooperation between religious communities, social strata and nations can be read as a contemporary reformulation of the teachings of Jalaluddin Rumi, Yunus Emre, and other classic Sufi teachers (Michel, 2005ein, 2005b; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005ein; 2005b; Unal and Williams, 2005). More specifically, Gulen can be seen to be carrying on where Said Nursi (1876-1960), another great Anatolian Islamic intellectual, left off: chartinga way for Muslim activists in Turkey and beyond to effectively contribute to the development of modern society that avoids the pitfalls and compromises of party-political activism and replaces the narrowness of Islamist thought with a genuinely inclusive and humanitarian understanding of religion’s role in the modern world (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham and Ozdemir, 2005; Vahide, 2005, Yavuz, 2005ein).
Die Vereinigten Staaten und Ägypten
A Conference Report
The study of bilateral relations has fallen deeply out of favor in the academiccommunity. Political science has turned to the study of international state systemsrather than relations between individual states; anthropologists and sociologists arefar more interested in non-state actors; and historians have largely abandonedstates altogether. It is a shame, because there is much to be learned from bilateralrelationships, and some such relationships are vital—not only to the countriesinvolved, but also to a broader array of countries.One such vital relationship is that between the United States and Egypt. Forgedduring the Cold War almost entirely on the issue of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, theU.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship has deepened and broadened over the lastquarter century. Egypt remains one of the United States’ most important Arab allies,and the bilateral relationship with Washington remains the keystone of Egypt’sforeign policy. Strong U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations are also an important anchorfor states throughout the Middle East and for Western policy in the region. Therelationship is valuable for policymakers in both countries; doing without it isunthinkable.To explore this relationship, the CSIS Middle East Program, in cooperation with theAl-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, convened a one-dayconference on June 26, 2003, entitled, “The United States and Egypt: Building thePartnership.” The goal of the meeting was to brainstorm how that partnership mightbe strengthened.Participants agreed that much needs to be done on the diplomatic, politisch, Militär,and economic levels. Although all did not agree on a single course forward, theparticipants unanimously concurred that a stronger U.S.-Egyptian relationship is verymuch in the interests of both countries, and although it will require a great deal ofwork to achieve, the benefits are worth the effort.
Wird die Türkei einen islamistischen Präsidenten haben??
Michael Rubin
While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, theTurkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-yearterm ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a newparliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks willinaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the futureof Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known asAKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned toerode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—theTurkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wearsa Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December2006, zum Beispiel, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predictinga 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about militaryintervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared tospark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’scivilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkishdemocracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interferenceby U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.
Islamische Bewegungen und den Einsatz von Gewalt:
Blowing Kirdis
Trotz der jüngsten wissenschaftlichen und populären Fokus auf heftige grenzüberschreitenden islamischen Terrornetzwerke,gibt es eine Vielzahl von islamischen Bewegungen. Diese Vielfalt präsentiert Wissenschaftler mit zwei Puzzles. Das erste Rätsel besteht darin, zu verstehen, warum binnenorientierte islamische Bewegungen, die als Reaktion auf die Gründung säkularer Nationalstaaten entstanden sind, ihre Aktivitäten und Ziele auf einen vielschichtigen transnationalen Raum verlagert haben. Das zweite Rätsel besteht darin, zu verstehen, warum Gruppen mit ähnlichen Zielen und Zielsetzungen unterschiedliche Strategien der Anwendung von Gewalt oder Gewaltlosigkeit anwenden, wenn sie „transnational gehen“. Die zwei Hauptfragen, denen sich dieses Papier widmen wird, sind: Warum gehen islamische Bewegungen transnational? Und, Warum nehmen sie bei der Transnationalisierung unterschiedliche Formen an?? Zuerst, Ich behaupte, dass die transnationale Ebene einen neuen politischen Ort für islamische Bewegungen darstellt, die in ihrer Behauptung auf nationaler Ebene begrenzt sind. Zweite, Ich argumentiere, dass Transnationalisierung für Gruppen Unsicherheit über ihre Identität und Ansprüche auf transnationaler Ebene schafft. Das Medium angenommen, d.h. Gewaltanwendung versus Gewaltlosigkeit, ist abhängig von der Art der Transnationalisierung, begegnen sich die Akteure auf transnationaler Ebene, und die Interpretationen der Führung darüber, wohin die Bewegung als nächstes gehen sollte. Um meine Fragen zu beantworten, Ich werde vier Fälle betrachten: (1) Türkischer Islam, (2) die Muslimbruderschaft, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, und (4) Tablighi Jamaat
Die Bewertung der islamistischen Mainstream in Ägypten und Malaysia
Jenseits von „Terrorismus“ und „staatlicher Hegemonie“: Einschätzung des islamistischen Mainstreams in Ägypten und Malaysia
Januar STRONG
Internationale Netzwerke des islamischen „Terrorismus“ dienen seither als beliebteste Erklärung für die Beschreibung des Phänomens des politischen Islam 11 Anschläge im September.
Dieses Papier argumentiert, dass sowohl der selbsternannte doktrinäre Islam der Militanten als auch die westliche Wahrnehmung einer homogenen islamistischen Bedrohung dekonstruiert werden müssen, um die oft zweideutigen Manifestationen des „offiziellen“ und „oppositionellen“ Islam zu entdecken, der Moderne und des Konservatismus.
Als Vergleich zweier islamischer Länder, Ägypten und Malaysia,die beide eine führende Rolle in ihren jeweiligen Regionen beanspruchen, zeigt an, Moderat-islamische Gruppen haben die Demokratisierungsprozesse und die Entstehung der Zivilgesellschaft im Vierteljahrhundert seit dem „islamischen Wiederaufleben“ maßgeblich beeinflusst..
Gemeinsame Erfahrungen wie Koalitionsbildung und aktive Teilnahme am politischen System zeigen den Einfluss und die Bedeutung von Gruppen wie der ägyptischen Muslimbruderschaft, die Islamische Jugendbewegung Malaysias (ABIM) oder die Islamische Partei von Malaysia (NICHT).
Diese Gruppen haben die politische Landschaft in einem viel größeren Ausmaß geprägt, als die aktuelle Beschäftigung mit der „terroristischen Bedrohung“ vermuten lässt. Die allmähliche Entwicklung einer „Kultur des Dialogs“ hat vielmehr neue Ansätze für politische Partizipation und Demokratie auf der Basisebene offenbart.