Всички записи в "Далеч на изток" Категория
Ислямът и създаването на държавна власт
seyyed vali reza nasr
ИСЛЯМ, ДЕМОКРАЦИЯ & САЩ:
Фондация Кордоба
Абдула Фалик |
Въведение ,
Мюсюлмански архипелаг
Max L. Брутно
Ислямистките опозиционни партии и потенциалът за ангажиране на ЕС
Тоби Арчър
Хайди Хуутанен
Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma: Lessons from South and Southeast Asia
BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL
АНТОНИ БУБАЛО
GREG FEALY
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Today, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Ислямизъм, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.
ISLAMIC MODERNITIES: FETHULLAH GULEN and CONTEMPORARY ISLAM
ФАХРИ ЦАКИ
Движението Нурджу1, като най-старото умерено ислямистко движение, което вероятно е характерно за съвременна Турция, беше разделен на няколко групи след Саид Нурси, основателят на движението, почина през 1960. В момента, има повече от десет nurcu групи с различни програми и стратегии. Въпреки всичките им различия, днес групите Нурджу изглежда признават идентичността на другия и се опитват да поддържат определено ниво на солидарност. Мястото на групата на Фетхуллах Гюлен в движението Нурджу, въпреки това, изглежда малко нестабилен.Фетхуллах Гюлен (б.1938 г) разцепи себе си, поне на външен вид, от цялостното движение Нурджу в 1972 и успява да създаде своя собствена група със силна организационна структура през 1980-те и 90-те години. Благодарение на развитието на широката си училищна мрежа както в Турция, така и в чужбина2, неговата група привлече вниманието. Тези училища очароваха не само ислямистките бизнесмени и средната класа, но и голям брой светски интелектуалци и политици. Въпреки че първоначално се появи от общото движение Нурджу, някои смятат, че броят на последователите на групата на Фетхуллах Гюлен е много по-голям от този на останалите групи на нурджу. Още, изглежда има достатъчно основания да смятаме, че е имало цена за този успех: отчуждение от други ислямистки групи, както и от цялостното движение Нурджу, от което се предполага, че самата група на Фетхуллах Гюлен3 е част.
Прогресивна ислямска мисъл, гражданското общество и движението на Гюлен в национален контекст
Greg Barton
Фетхулах Гюлен (born 1941), or Hodjaeffendi as he is known affectionately by hundreds of thousands of people in his native Turkey and abroad, is one of the most significant Islamic thinkers and activists to have emerged in the twentieth century. His optimistic and forward-looking thought, with its emphasis on self development of both heart and mind through education, of engaging proactively and positively with the modern world and of reaching out in dialogue and a spirit of cooperation between religious communities, social strata and nations can be read as a contemporary reformulation of the teachings of Jalaluddin Rumi, Yunus Emre, and other classic Sufi teachers (Michel, 2005а, 2005b; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005а; 2005b; Unal and Williams, 2005). More specifically, Gulen can be seen to be carrying on where Said Nursi (1876-1960), another great Anatolian Islamic intellectual, left off: chartinga way for Muslim activists in Turkey and beyond to effectively contribute to the development of modern society that avoids the pitfalls and compromises of party-political activism and replaces the narrowness of Islamist thought with a genuinely inclusive and humanitarian understanding of religion’s role in the modern world (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham and Ozdemir, 2005; Vahide, 2005, Yavuz, 2005а).
The United States and Egypt
A Conference Report
The study of bilateral relations has fallen deeply out of favor in the academiccommunity. Political science has turned to the study of international state systemsrather than relations between individual states; anthropologists and sociologists arefar more interested in non-state actors; and historians have largely abandonedstates altogether. It is a shame, because there is much to be learned from bilateralrelationships, and some such relationships are vital—not only to the countriesinvolved, but also to a broader array of countries.One such vital relationship is that between the United States and Egypt. Forgedduring the Cold War almost entirely on the issue of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, theU.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship has deepened and broadened over the lastquarter century. Egypt remains one of the United States’ most important Arab allies,и двустранните отношения с Вашингтон остават ключовият камък на външната политика на Египет. Силните двустранни отношения между САЩ и Египет също са важна опора за държавите в Близкия изток и за западната политика в региона. Връзката е ценна за политиците и в двете страни; без него е немислимо. За да изследвате тази връзка, Близкоизточната програма на CSIS, в сътрудничество с Центъра за политически и стратегически изследвания Ал-Ахрам в Кайро, свика еднодневна конференция на юни 26, 2003, озаглавен, „САЩ и Египет: Изграждане на партньорство.“ Целта на срещата беше да се обсъди как това партньорство може да бъде укрепено. Участниците се съгласиха, че трябва да се направи много по отношение на дипломатическата, политически, военни,и икономически нива. Въпреки че всички не бяха съгласни с един курс напред, theparticipants unanimously concurred that a stronger U.S.-Egyptian relationship is verymuch in the interests of both countries, and although it will require a great deal ofwork to achieve, the benefits are worth the effort.
Will Turkey Have An Islamist President?
Майкъл Рубин
While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, theTurkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-yearterm ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a newparliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks willinaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the futureof Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known asAKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned toerode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—theTurkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wearsa Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December2006, например, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predictinga 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about militaryintervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared tospark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’scivilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkishdemocracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interferenceby U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.
Islamic Movements and the Use of Violence:
Есен Кирдис
Despite recent academic and popular focus on violent transnational Islamic terrorist networks,there is a multiplicity of Islamic movements. This multiplicity presents scholars with two puzzles. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? First, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Второ, I argue that transnationalization creates uncertainty for groups about their identity and claims at the transnational level. The medium adopted, i.e. use of violence versus non-violence, is dependent on type of transnationalization, the actors encounter at the transnational level, and leadership’s interpretations on where the movement should go next. To answer my questions, I will look at four cases: (1) Turkish Islam, (2) the Muslim Brotherhood, (3) Джемаа Исламия, и (4) Tablighi Jamaat
Assessing the Islamist mainstream in Egypt and Malaysia
Beyond ‘Terrorism’ and ‘StateHegemony’: assessing the Islamistmainstream in Egypt and Malaysia
ДЖАН СТАРК
International networks of Islamic ‘terrorism’ have served as themost popular explanation to describe the phenomenon of political Islam sincethe 11 September attacks.
This paper argues that both the self-proclaimeddoctrinal Islam of the militants and Western perceptions of a homogeneousIslamist threat need to be deconstructed in order to discover the oftenambiguous manifestations of ‘official’ and ‘opposition’ Islam, of modernity andconservatism.
As a comparison of two Islamic countries, Egypt and Malaysia,which both claim a leading role in their respective regions, shows, moderateIslamic groups have had a considerable impact on processes of democratisationand the emergence of civil society during the quarter century since the ‘Islamicresurgence’.
Shared experiences like coalition building and active participationwithin the political system demonstrate the influence and importance of groupssuch as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) or the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).
These groups haveshaped the political landscape to a much larger extent than the current pre-occupation with the ‘terrorist threat’ suggests. The gradual development of a‘culture of dialogue’ has rather revealed new approaches towards politicalparticipation and democracy at the grassroots level.