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A iniciativa dos Irmáns Musulmáns como programa de reforma

En marzo 3, 2004, Señor. Mahdi Akef, o líder e guía dos Irmáns Musulmáns lanzou a Iniciativa da Irmandade para Participar na esperada Reforma Democrática, presentando a Irmandade como unha facción política que se considera competente para participar. Presentouse a Irmandade – naturalmente – coa mellor luz posible, que é dereito de todos. E en maio 8, 2004, Dr. Essam Aryan, unha luminaria da Irmandade moi coñecida polas súas aparicións na estación satelital exipcia local, Dream TV, dixo que esta iniciativa é integral, complete program for soon converting the Brotherhood into a political party.Democracy, no seu sentido liberal, significa gobernar polo pobo, lexislando por si mesmos as leis segundo as súas condicións. Non significa só eleccións. Máis importante aínda, e sentar as bases para as eleccións, a democracia é un sistema político pluralista que garante aos cidadáns’ liberdades públicas e privadas, especialmente a liberdade de expresión e opinión. Tamén garante os seus dereitos humanos, especialmente a liberdade de relixión. Estas son liberdades absolutas, sen ningunha limitación ou seguimento. O sistema democrático permite o cambio pacífico do poder na sociedade e baséase nunha separación de poderes. O poder xudicial, especialmente, debe ser totalmente independente. As democracias adoptan a economía de libre mercado que se basea na competencia, e que fomenta as iniciativas individuais. As democracias baséanse en canles de diálogo e entendemento pacífico entre os cidadáns. In dealing with local and international conflicts, they avoid military options as much as possible. Along with those who believe in democracy, it confronts the mentality of terrorism and violent fundamentalist dogmatism. Democracies oppose absolutist ideas that claim to own the absolute truth, and defend relativistic and pluralistic principles. By doing so, they provide all religions the right to be active safely, except opinions that aim to confiscate freedoms or impose themselves on other parties by force or violence. So democracies are concerned with freeing religion from the monopoly of one interpretation or one sect.In summary, democracy is a group of regulatory and legal measures for society that humankind has reached after a long history of conflict to refine authorities where religious figures cannot impose their will. As autoridades relixiosas foron desvinculadas das autoridades do estado, to guarantee the state’s neutrality toward all religions. This is what allows for freedom of religion and opinion, and freedom of worship for all in total freedom and equality. This prevents conflict in the name of religion, which leads to the security of the state and its citizens.

Movementos terroristas e extremistas en Oriente Medio

O terrorismo e a guerra asimétrica son apenas características novas do equilibrio militar de Oriente Medio, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, e estes levaron dende hai tempo a violencia esporádica dentro de determinados estados, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. As guerras civís en Iemen e a rebelión de Dhofar en Omán son exemplos, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. O crecente poder da Organización de Liberación de Palestina (Plo) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. A revolución iraniana en 1979 foi seguido por serios combates políticos, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrein e Arabia Saudita tiveron enfrontamentos civís entre as súas elites gobernantes sunitas e os xiítas hostís e estes enfrontamentos levaron a unha violencia significativa no caso de Arabia Saudita. Tamén houbo, con todo, foi unha longa historia de extremismo islámico violento na rexión, ás veces fomentado por réximes que máis tarde se converteron no obxectivo dos mesmos islamistas aos que apoiaron inicialmente. Sadat intentou utilizar os movementos islámicos como contraposición á súa oposición secular en Exipto só para ser asasinado por un destes movementos despois do acordo de paz con Israel.. Israel pensou que era seguro patrocinar movementos islámicos despois 1967 como oposición á OLP, só para ver a rápida aparición de grupos violentamente antiisraelís. O Iemen do Norte e do Sur foron escenario de golpes de estado e guerras civís desde principios dos anos 60, e foi unha guerra civil no Iemen do Sur que finalmente levou ao colapso do seu réxime e á súa fusión co Iemen do Norte en 1990. A caída do xa provocou unha toma do poder islamista en Irán., e a resistencia á invasión soviética de Afganistán desencadeou unha reacción islamita que aínda inflúe en Oriente Medio e en todo o mundo islámico.. Arabia Saudita tivo que facer fronte a un levantamento na Gran Mezquita da Meca 1979. O carácter relixioso deste levantamento compartía moitos elementos dos movementos xurdidos despois da retirada soviética de Afganistán e da Guerra do Golfo en 1991. Os esforzos alxerinos por suprimir a vitoria dos partidos políticos islámicos nunhas eleccións democráticas en 1991. 1992 foron seguidas por unha guerra civil que dura dende entón. Exipto loitou unha longa e exitosa batalla cos seus propios extremistas islámicos na década de 1990., pero Exipto só conseguiu suprimir tales movementos en lugar de erradicalos. No resto do mundo árabe, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. Marrocos, Libia, Tunisia, Xordania, Bahrein, Qatar, Omán, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.

Commentary: Hollow ring for democracy

Arnaud de Borchgrave

WASHINGTON, June 24 (UPI) — The White House’s crusade for democracy, as President Bush sees it, has produced “a critical mass of events taking that (Middle Eastern) region in a hopeful new direction.” And Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice just toured the area, making clear at every stop whenever the United States has a choice between stability and democracy, the new ideological remedy would sacrifice stability.

Veteran Mideast hands who have dealt with five regional wars and two intifadas over the past half century shuddered. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger first among them.

“For the U.S. to crusade in every part of the world to spread democracy may be beyond our capacity,” he says. The U.S. system, he explains, “is the product of unique historical experiences, difficult to duplicate or to transplant into Muslim societies where secular democracy has seldom thrived.” If ever.

Se a estabilidade fora sacrificada pola democracia, o antigo conselleiro de seguridade nacional e secretario de Estado dos presidentes Nixon e Ford non puido negociar grandes acordos de separación árabe-israelí: Sinaí I, Golán e Sinaí II. Sen o antidemocrático, figura ditatorial benigna de Anwar Sadat á fronte en Exipto, ou sen o falecido ditador sirio e mestre terrorista Hafez Assad, aínda se escribiría outra páxina da historia da guerra.

Cun parlamento democrático en Exipto en 1974, presuntamente dominado polos populares Irmáns Musulmáns, Sadat non puido facer o seu espectacular, viaxe que desafia a morte a Xerusalén — e de súpeto converteuse no líder máis popular de Israel. Un tratado de paz entre Exipto e Israel e entre Xordania e Israel só foi posible porque os gobernantes absolutos — Sadat and the late King Hussein, led both Arab countries.

Sadat knew his courageous act of statesmanship was tantamount to signing his own death warrant. It was carried out in 1981 — by Islamist extremists — on worldwide television.

Rice proudly proclaims it is no longer a war against terrorism but a struggle for democracy. She is proud the Bush administration no longer pursues stability at the expense of democracy. But already the democracy crusade is not only encountering speed bumps, but also roadblocks on a road to nowhere.

The much-vaunted Palestinian elections scheduled for July have been postponed indefinitely.

In Lebanon, the ballot box has already been nullified by political machinations. Gen. Michael Aoun, a bright but aging prospect who came back from French exile to take on Syria’s underground machine, has already joined forces with Damascus. While denying any deal with Syria, the general’s henchmen concede he was compensated munificently for his retirement years in Paris from his post as army chief of staff and his time as premier. Aoun collected $22 millóns, which included compound interest.

In Egypt, Rice, presumably attempting to confer respectability on President Hosni Mubarak’s challengers, took time out to receive a known political charlatan who has over the years been exposed as someone who forged election results as he climbed the ladder of a number of political parties under a variety of labels.

Even Mubarak’s enemies concede Ayman Nour fabricated and forged the signatures of as many as 1,187 citizens to conform to regulations to legalize his Ghad (Tomorrow) party. His career is dotted with phony academic credentials, plagiarism, a staged assassination attempt on himself, charges of embezzlement by his Saudi media employer, and scads of document forgeries.

Rice had canceled a previous trip to Egypt to protest the indictment and jailing of Nour pending trial. And before Rice’s most recent accolade, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had also gone out of her way to praise Egypt’s master political con man. Makes you wonder what kind of political reporting is coming out of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.

With this double-headed endorsement by the United States, Nour is losing what little favor he still has in Egypt. He is now seen as a U.S. stooge, to add to a long list of failings.

Os Irmáns Musulmáns, which is outlawed but tolerated since it renounced terrorism, is more representative of Egyptian opinion than Nour. There is also the Kifaya (Enough) movement that groups Egypt’s leading intellectuals. But they declined to meet with Rice.

The United States is seen throughout the Arab world as synonymous with Israel. This automatically limits the Bush administration’s ability to win friends and influence people. Those making the most out of U.S. pressure to democratize are organizations listed by the United States as “terrorist.” Both Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon are now mining opportunities both above and underground. Islamic legislators in Jordan petitioned King Abdullah to allow Jordanian Hamas leaders, evicted six years ago, to come home. The king listened impassively.

It took Europe 500 years to reach the degree of political maturity witnessed by the recent collapse of the European Union’s plans for a common constitution. Winston Churchill said democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried. But Churchill also said, “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.” This still applies in the souks of the Arab world, from Marrakech to Muscat.

The Problem of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Jeffrey Azarva

Samuel Tadros

On June 20, 2007, the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research convened ameeting ofU.S. intelligence officials to weigh the prospect of formal engagement with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,1known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin. The session was the result of several years of discussion aboutengaging the group considered by many to be the fountainhead of Sunni fundamentalism.Although the Bush administration established a diplomatic quarantine of the Brotherhood afterSeptember 11, 2001, members of the U.S. House of Representatives held several meetings in Egyptin the spring of 2007—almost three months before the State Department meeting—with MuhammadSaad al-Katatni, an independent member of the Egyptian parliament and the head of its Brotherhoodaffiliatedbloc. On April 5, 2007, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) broke with conventionand met with Katatni at the Egyptian parliament building and at the residence ofU.S. ambassador to Egypt Francis J. Ricciardone. Entón, on May 27, 2007, a four-member U.S. congressionaldelegation led by Representative David Price (D-N.C.) met with Katatni in Cairo.Following Hoyer’s visit, the U.S. Embassy in Cairo dismissed Egyptian criticism that his meetingspresaged a reversal of U.S. policy.2 In November 2007, Ricciardone also played down themeetings when he claimed that U.S. contacts with nominally independent Brotherhood members did“not imply American endorsement of the views of the individual parliamentarians or their politicalaffiliates.”3 Despite this reassurance, the meetings with Katatni are indicative of opinion leaders, bothinside and outside the U.S. government, warming inevitable. Yet while the movement, established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, constitutes the most organizedand well-funded opposition in the country today—the byproduct of both its charitable services and da’wa (literally“call to God,” or preaching) rede que operan fóra do control estatal; calquera exame da súa retórica e plataformas políticas mostra que EE. divulgación para ser prematura. A pesar do seu compromiso declarado co pluralismo e o estado de dereito, a Irmandade segue comprometéndose nun perigoso dobre discurso cando se trata dos temas máis fundamentais da democracia.

Renegando da Reforma: Exipto e Tunisia

Jeffrey Azarva

En novembro 6, 2003, O presidente George W. Bush proclamou, "Sesenta anos de escusación e adaptación das nacións occidentais á falta de liberdade en Oriente Medio non fixeron nada para que nos protexese, porque a longo prazo, a estabilidade non se pode comprar a costa da liberdade". Este cambio estratéxico, xunto coas invasións de Iraq e Afganistán, avisar aos gobernos autonómicos. A primavera seguinte, presidente de Tunisia, ZineEl Abidine Bin Ali, and Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak—stalwart allies in the U.S.-led war on terrorismand two of North Africa’s most pro-American rulers—were among the first Arab leaders to visit Washingtonand discuss reform. But with this “Arab spring” has come the inadvertent rise of Islamist movementsthroughout the region. Agora, as U.S. policymakers ratchet down pressure, Egypt and Tunisia see a greenlight to backtrack on reform.

What Happened to the “Arab Street?”

Neha Sahgal

Why do opposition movements engage in protest under some circumstances but not inothers? Why did the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt organize large scale protest during the 2005regime initiated political reforms while remaining largely off the streets during the United States’led war in Iraq in 2003? There is a common notion among Western public opinion and policymakers that United States’ policies in the Middle East have led to greater political activismamong Islamic fundamentalists. Yet, while citizens around the world protested the war in Iraq,Egypt remained largely quiet. The lack of protest and other acts of opposition were surprisinggiven the history of Arab-anti colonial struggle, the 1950s street politics in Egypt that broughtNasser to power and the flourishing civil society organizations in the region exemplified byIslamist parties, non governmental organizations and professional syndicates. Máis importante aínda,with the 2005 regime initiated political opening in Egypt, the country’s largest oppositionmovement, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organized high levels of protests anddemonstrations exposing undemocratic practices of the current government and seeking greaterpolitical freedom. The year 2005, was marked by a “wave of contention” in Egypt standing instark contrast to the lack of mobilization against the Iraq war. Clearly, Muslim Brotherhoodprotest activity is guided by factors other than the prevalence of “anti-Americanism.”Scholars of contentions politics have developed and tested various theories that explainand predict protest behavior. As teorías de tensión e ruptura explican a protesta como un resultado das condicións económicas, mentres que as teorías da mobilización de recursos subliñaron o papel das limitacións materiais e organizativas na organización da protesta.. Aínda outros argumentaron que as protestas son estimuladas por cambios estruturais, por exemplo, divisións ou ruptura no goberno. Neste documento, Argumento que explicar o comportamento de protesta dun grupo debería ter en conta a interacción do grupo con outros actores da oposición.. Os grupos de oposición operan nunha densa rede de aliados,adversarios así como contra movementos. Polo tanto, as súas estratexias inflúen mutuamente formas intanxibles. Presento unha análise de como o 2005 A apertura política en Exipto provocou cambios en partidos ilegais como al-Ghad e al-Wafd aos que se lles permitiu participar nas eleccións presidenciais e parlamentarias.. Ademais, o novo movemento Kifaya, orixinalmente formado para expresar a oposición á guerra de Iraq, tamén gañou impulso como anti-Mubarak, alianza pro-democracia.Os cambios nos partidos aos que se permitiu concorrer ás eleccións e a aparición de novos movementos alteraron o contexto sociopolítico para os “oficialmente prohibidos”., aínda tolerado,” Irmandade Musulmá. A Irmandade tentou reafirmarse como a principal voz da oposición política no país organizando unha maior actividade reivindicativa e, deste xeito, estableceu similitudes cos partidos de oposición legal.. Aínda que os partidos de oposición legal seguen sendo débiles e ineficaces en Exipto, andnewer opposition movements are still small in their membership, they may still influence eachothers’ strategies in tangible ways.