همه ورودی ها در "افریقا" دسته بندی

ابتکار اخوان المسلمین به عنوان یک برنامه اصلاحات

در ماه مارس 3, 2004, آقای. مهدی عاکف, رهبر و راهنمای اخوان المسلمین راه اندازی طرح اخوان برای شرکت در اصلاحات دموکراتیک موعود, ارائه اخوان به عنوان یک جناح سیاسی که بداند خود را صالح به شرکت. اخوان المسلمین خود را ارائه – به طور طبیعی – در بهترین نور ممکن, که حق همه است. و در ماه مه 8, 2004, دکتر. عصام آریایی, چهره برجسته اخوان همچنین با توجه به حضور خود شناخته شده در ایستگاه ماهواره ای مصر محلی, رویای تلویزیون, گفت که این ابتکار جامع است, برنامه کامل برای به زودی تبدیل اخوان به یک party.Democracy سیاسی, در مفهوم لیبرال آن, معنی حکومت مردم, وضع قوانین برای خود با توجه به شرایط خود. این کار نه تنها به معنای انتخابات. از همه مهمتر, و به ذخیره کردن پایه برای انتخابات, دموکراسی یک نظام کثرت گرایانه که شهروندان را تضمین است’ آزادی های عمومی و خصوصی, بخصوص آزادی بیان و عقیده. همچنین حقوق بشر خود را تضمین می کند, به ویژه آزادی مذهب. این آزادی مطلق هستند, بدون هیچ گونه محدودیت یا نظارت. نظام دموکراتیک اجازه می دهد تا تغییر مسالمت آمیز قدرت در جامعه است و در تفکیک قوا بر اساس. قوه قضائیه, بخصوص, باید کاملا مستقل باشد. دموکراسی اتخاذ اقتصاد بازار آزاد است که بر روی رقابت مبتنی بر, و تشویق می کند که ابتکارات فردی. دموکراسی در کانال های dialgoue و درک مسالمت آمیز در میان شهروندان بر اساس. در برخورد با درگیری های محلی و بین المللی, آنها جلوگیری از گزینه نظامی را به عنوان آنجا که ممکن است. همراه با کسانی که به دموکراسی اعتقاد, آن مواجه ذهنیت تروریسم و ​​دگماتیسم بنیادگرا خشونت. دموکراسی علیه اندیشههای مطلق که ادعا می کنند خود حقیقت مطلق, و دفاع از اصول نسبیتی و کثرت گرا. با انجام این کار, آنها را فراهم همه ادیان حق به آن فعال باشد با خیال راحت, به جز نظرات است که با هدف مصادره آزادی یا خود را در احزاب دیگر با توسل به زور یا خشونت تحمیل. بنابراین دموکراسی با دین آزاد از انحصار یک تفسیر یا یک خلاصه sect.In نگران, دموکراسی یک گروه از اقدامات قانونی و حقوقی برای جامعه ای که بشر پس از سابقه ای طولانی در درگیری رسیده به اصلاح مقامات که در آن شخصیت های مذهبی بتوانند اراده خود را تحمیل نمی باشد. مقامات مذهبی از theauthorities از دولت جدا و منفصل شدند, برای تضمین بی طرفی دولت نسبت به همه ادیان. این چیزی است که اجازه می دهد تا برای آزادی دین و عقیده, و آزادی عبادت برای همه در آزادی کامل و برابری. این به جلوگیری از جنگ به نام دین, که منجر به امنیت کشور و شهروندان آن.

Terrorist and Extremist Movements in the Middle East

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (سازمان آزادی بخش فلسطین) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, با این حال, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. مراکش, Libya, تونس, اردن, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.

Commentary: Hollow ring for democracy

ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE

WASHINGTON, June 24 (UPI) — The White House’s crusade for democracy, as President Bush sees it, has produced “a critical mass of events taking that (Middle Eastern) region in a hopeful new direction.” And Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice just toured the area, making clear at every stop whenever the United States has a choice between stability and democracy, the new ideological remedy would sacrifice stability.

Veteran Mideast hands who have dealt with five regional wars and two intifadas over the past half century shuddered. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger first among them.

“For the U.S. to crusade in every part of the world to spread democracy may be beyond our capacity,” he says. The U.S. system, he explains, “is the product of unique historical experiences, difficult to duplicate or to transplant into Muslim societies where secular democracy has seldom thrived.” If ever.

If stability had been sacrificed for democracy, the former national security adviser and secretary of State to Presidents Nixon and Ford could not have negotiated major Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements: Sinai I, Golan and Sinai II. Without the undemocratic, benign dictatorial figure of Anwar Sadat at the helm in Egypt, or without the late Syrian dictator and master terror-broker Hafez Assad, yet another page of war history would have been written.

With a democratic parliament in Egypt in 1974, presumably dominated by the popular Muslim Brotherhood, Sadat could not have made his spectacular, death-defying trip to Jerusalem — and suddenly become the most popular leader in Israel. A peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and between Jordan and Israel were possible only because absolute rulers — Sadat and the late King Hussein, led both Arab countries.

Sadat knew his courageous act of statesmanship was tantamount to signing his own death warrant. It was carried out in 1981 — by Islamist extremists — on worldwide television.

Rice proudly proclaims it is no longer a war against terrorism but a struggle for democracy. She is proud the Bush administration no longer pursues stability at the expense of democracy. But already the democracy crusade is not only encountering speed bumps, but also roadblocks on a road to nowhere.

The much-vaunted Palestinian elections scheduled for July have been postponed indefinitely.

In Lebanon, the ballot box has already been nullified by political machinations. Gen. Michael Aoun, a bright but aging prospect who came back from French exile to take on Syria’s underground machine, has already joined forces with Damascus. While denying any deal with Syria, the general’s henchmen concede he was compensated munificently for his retirement years in Paris from his post as army chief of staff and his time as premier. Aoun collected $22 million, which included compound interest.

In Egypt, Rice, presumably attempting to confer respectability on President Hosni Mubarak’s challengers, took time out to receive a known political charlatan who has over the years been exposed as someone who forged election results as he climbed the ladder of a number of political parties under a variety of labels.

Even Mubarak’s enemies concede Ayman Nour fabricated and forged the signatures of as many as 1,187 citizens to conform to regulations to legalize his Ghad (Tomorrow) party. His career is dotted with phony academic credentials, plagiarism, a staged assassination attempt on himself, charges of embezzlement by his Saudi media employer, and scads of document forgeries.

Rice had canceled a previous trip to Egypt to protest the indictment and jailing of Nour pending trial. And before Rice’s most recent accolade, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had also gone out of her way to praise Egypt’s master political con man. Makes you wonder what kind of political reporting is coming out of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.

With this double-headed endorsement by the United States, Nour is losing what little favor he still has in Egypt. He is now seen as a U.S. stooge, to add to a long list of failings.

The Muslim Brotherhood, which is outlawed but tolerated since it renounced terrorism, is more representative of Egyptian opinion than Nour. There is also the Kifaya (Enough) movement that groups Egypt’s leading intellectuals. But they declined to meet with Rice.

The United States is seen throughout the Arab world as synonymous with Israel. This automatically limits the Bush administration’s ability to win friends and influence people. Those making the most out of U.S. pressure to democratize are organizations listed by the United States as “terrorist.” Both Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon are now mining opportunities both above and underground. Islamic legislators in Jordan petitioned King Abdullah to allow Jordanian Hamas leaders, evicted six years ago, to come home. The king listened impassively.

It took Europe 500 years to reach the degree of political maturity witnessed by the recent collapse of the European Union’s plans for a common constitution. Winston Churchill said democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried. But Churchill also said, “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.” This still applies in the souks of the Arab world, from Marrakech to Muscat.

مسئله اخوان المسلمین مصر

جفری Azarva

ساموئل تادروس

در ژوئن 20, 2007, ایالات متحده آمریکا. اداره اطلاعات و تحقیقات وزارت امور خارجه با تشکیل جلسه ای از آمریكا برگزار شد. مقامات اطلاعاتی احتمال تعامل رسمی با اخوان المسلمین مصر را ارزیابی کنند,1در عربی به الاخوان المسلمین معروف است. این جلسه نتیجه بحث و گفتگوهای چندین ساله در مورد جلب گروهی بود که بسیاری او را سرچشمه بنیادگرایی اهل سنت می دانستند. اگرچه دولت بوش قرنطینه دیپلماتیک اخوان را پس از سپتامبر ایجاد کرد 11, 2001, اعضای ایالات متحده. مجلس نمایندگان در بهار 2007 - تقریباً سه ماه قبل از جلسه وزارت امور خارجه - در مصر جلسات متعددی با محمد سعد الکاتنی برگزار کرد., یک عضو مستقل پارلمان مصر و رئیس اخوان المسلمین وابسته به آن. در آوریل 5, 2007, رهبر اکثریت مجلس استنی هویر (D-Md) کنوانسیون را شکست و با کاتاتنی در ساختمان پارلمان مصر و محل اقامت آمریکا دیدار کرد. سفیر مصر ، فرانسیس ج. ریکیاردون. سپس, در ماه مه 27, 2007, یک چهار عضو ایالات متحده. هیئت کنگره به رهبری نماینده دیوید پرایس (D-N.C) پس از بازدید هویر با کاتاتنی در قاهره ملاقات کرد, ایالات متحده آمریکا. سفارت در قاهره انتقاد مصر مبنی بر اینکه جلسات وی باعث تغییر در ایالات متحده شده است را رد کرد. سیاست .2 در ماه نوامبر 2007, ریکیاردون همچنین هنگامی که ادعا کرد که ایالات متحده آمریکا ، موضوعات کمتری را نشان می دهد ، کمرنگ است. تماس با اعضای کاملاً مستقل اخوان به معنای تأیید نظرات هر یک از نمایندگان پارلمان یا تأسیس کنندگان سیاسی آنها توسط آمریکایی ها نبود. "3 علیرغم این اطمینان خاطر, جلسات با کاتاتنی نشانگر رهبران افکار است, هم در داخل و هم خارج از ایالات متحده. دولت, گرم شدن اجتناب ناپذیر است. اما در حالی که جنبش, تاسیس شده توسط حسن البنا در 1928, سازمان یافته ترین و بودجه مخالف امروز کشور است - محصول جانبی خدمات خیریه و دعوت (به معنای واقعی کلمه "خدا را صدا کنید,”یا موعظه کردن) شبکه ای که خارج از کنترل دولت کار می کند - هرگونه بررسی سخنرانی ها و سیستم عامل های سیاسی آن ، ایالات متحده را نشان می دهد. دسترسی زودرس بودن. علی رغم تعهد اعتقادی خود به تکثرگرایی و حاکمیت قانون, اخوان المسلمین وقتی صحبت از اساسی ترین مسائل دموکراسی می شود ، همچنان به گفتگوی خطرناک ادامه می دهد.

Reneging on Reform: Egypt and Tunisia

جفری Azarva

On November 6, 2003, President George W. Bush proclaimed, “Sixty years of Western nations excusingand accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe—because in the longrun, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.” This strategic shift, coupled with the invasionsof Iraq and Afghanistan, put regional governments on notice. The following spring, Tunisia’s president, ZineEl Abidine Bin Ali, and Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak—stalwart allies in the U.S.-led war on terrorismand two of North Africa’s most pro-American rulers—were among the first Arab leaders to visit Washingtonand discuss reform. But with this “Arab spring” has come the inadvertent rise of Islamist movementsthroughout the region. Now, به عنوان ایالات متحده. policymakers ratchet down pressure, Egypt and Tunisia see a greenlight to backtrack on reform.

What Happened to the “Arab Street?”

نیها Sahgal

Why do opposition movements engage in protest under some circumstances but not inothers? Why did the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt organize large scale protest during the 2005regime initiated political reforms while remaining largely off the streets during the United States’led war in Iraq in 2003? There is a common notion among Western public opinion and policymakers that United States’ policies in the Middle East have led to greater political activismamong Islamic fundamentalists. Yet, while citizens around the world protested the war in Iraq,Egypt remained largely quiet. The lack of protest and other acts of opposition were surprisinggiven the history of Arab-anti colonial struggle, the 1950s street politics in Egypt that broughtNasser to power and the flourishing civil society organizations in the region exemplified byIslamist parties, non governmental organizations and professional syndicates. از همه مهمتر,with the 2005 regime initiated political opening in Egypt, the country’s largest oppositionmovement, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organized high levels of protests anddemonstrations exposing undemocratic practices of the current government and seeking greaterpolitical freedom. The year 2005, was marked by a “wave of contention” in Egypt standing instark contrast to the lack of mobilization against the Iraq war. Clearly, Muslim Brotherhoodprotest activity is guided by factors other than the prevalence of “anti-Americanism.”Scholars of contentions politics have developed and tested various theories that explainand predict protest behavior. Strain and breakdown theories explain protest as an outcome ofeconomic conditions while resource mobilization theories have stressed the role of material andorganizational constraints in organizing protest. Yet others have argued that protests are spurredby structural changes, for example, divisions or breakdown in the government. In this paper, Iargue that explaining the protest behavior of one group should take into account the group’sinteraction with other opposition actors. Opposition groups operate in a dense network of allies,adversaries as well as counter movements. Therefore their strategies influence each other intangible ways. I present an analysis of how the 2005 political opening in Egypt led to changes inlegal parties such as al-Ghad and al-Wafd that were allowed to contest presidential andparliamentary elections. Further, the new movement Kifaya, originally formed to expressopposition to the Iraq war, also gained momentum as an anti-Mubarak, pro-democracy alliance.The changes in the parties that were allowed to contest elections and the emergence of newmovements altered the socio-political context for the “officially banned, yet tolerated,” MuslimBrotherhood. The Brotherhood tried to reassert itself as the main voice of political opposition inthe country by organizing greater protest activity and in this way established similarity with legalopposition parties. While legal opposition parties remain weak and ineffective in Egypt, andnewer opposition movements are still small in their membership, they may still influence eachothers’ strategies in tangible ways.