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The Muslim Brotherhood’s Initiative as a Reform Program

Sayed Mahmoud Al-Qumni
On March 3, 2004, Mr. Mahdi Akef, the leader and guide of the Muslim Brotherhood launched the Brotherhood’s Initiative to Participate in Awaited Democratic Reform, presenting the Brotherhood as a political faction that deems itself competent to participate. The Brotherhood presented itselfnaturallyin the best possible light, which is everyone’s right. And on May 8, 2004, Dr.. Essam Aryan, a Brotherhood luminary well known due to his appearances on the local Egyptian satellite station, Dream TV, said this initiative is a comprehensive, complete program for soon converting the Brotherhood into a political party.
Demokrati, in its liberal sense, means rule by the people, legislating laws for themselves according to their conditions. It doesn’t just mean elections. More importantly, and to lay the foundations for elections, democracy is a pluralistic political system that guarantees citizenspublic and private freedoms, especially freedom of expression and opinion. It also guarantees their human rights, especially freedom of religion. These are absolute freedoms, without any limitation or monitoring. The democratic system allows peaceful change of power in society and is based on a separation of powers. The judicial branch, especially, must be totally independent. Democracies adopt the free market economy that is based on competition, and that encourages individual initiatives. Democracies are based on channels of dialgoue and peaceful understanding among citizens. In dealing with local and international conflicts, they avoid military options as much as possible. Along with those who believe in democracy, it confronts the mentality of terrorism and violent fundamentalist dogmatism. Democracies oppose absolutist ideas that claim to own the absolute truth, and defend relativistic and pluralistic principles. By doing so, they provide all religions the right to be active safely, except opinions that aim to confiscate freedoms or impose themselves on other parties by force or violence. So democracies are concerned with freeing religion from the monopoly of one interpretation or one sect.
In summary, democracy is a group of regulatory and legal measures for society that humankind has reached after a long history of conflict to refine authorities where religious figures cannot impose their will. Religious authorities were disengaged from the
authorities of the state, to guarantee the state’s neutrality toward all religions. This is what allows for freedom of religion and opinion, and freedom of worship for all in total freedom and equality. This prevents conflict in the name of religion, which leads to the security of the state and its citizens.

On March 3, 2004, Mr. Mahdi Akef, the leader and guide of the Muslim Brotherhood launched the Brotherhood’s Initiative to Participate in Awaited Democratic Reform, presenting the Brotherhood as a political faction that deems itself competent to participate. The Brotherhood presented itselfnaturallyin the best possible light, which is everyone’s right. And on May 8, 2004, Dr.. Essam Aryan, a Brotherhood luminary well known due to his appearances on the local Egyptian satellite station, Dream TV, said this initiative is a comprehensive, complete program for soon converting the Brotherhood into a political party.Democracy, in its liberal sense, means rule by the people, legislating laws for themselves according to their conditions. It doesn’t just mean elections. More importantly, and to lay the foundations for elections, democracy is a pluralistic political system that guarantees citizenspublic and private freedoms, especially freedom of expression and opinion. It also guarantees their human rights, especially freedom of religion. These are absolute freedoms, without any limitation or monitoring. The democratic system allows peaceful change of power in society and is based on a separation of powers. The judicial branch, especially, must be totally independent. Democracies adopt the free market economy that is based on competition, and that encourages individual initiatives. Democracies are based on channels of dialgoue and peaceful understanding among citizens. In dealing with local and international conflicts, they avoid military options as much as possible. Along with those who believe in democracy, it confronts the mentality of terrorism and violent fundamentalist dogmatism. Democracies oppose absolutist ideas that claim to own the absolute truth, and defend relativistic and pluralistic principles. By doing so, they provide all religions the right to be active safely, except opinions that aim to confiscate freedoms or impose themselves on other parties by force or violence. So democracies are concerned with freeing religion from the monopoly of one interpretation or one sect.In summary, democracy is a group of regulatory and legal measures for society that humankind has reached after a long history of conflict to refine authorities where religious figures cannot impose their will. Religious authorities were disengaged from theauthorities of the state, to guarantee the state’s neutrality toward all religions. This is what allows for freedom of religion and opinion, and freedom of worship for all in total freedom and equality. This prevents conflict in the name of religion, which leads to the security of the state and its citizens.

Terroristiske og ekstremistiske bevægelser i Mellemøsten

Anthony H. Cordesman

Terrorisme og asymmetrisk krigsførelse er næppe nye træk ved den mellemøstlige militære balance, og islamisk
ekstremisme er næppe den eneste kilde til ekstremistisk vold. Der er mange alvorlige etniske og sekteriske forskelle
i Mellemøsten, og disse har længe ført til sporadisk vold inden for givne stater, og undertiden til større borgerlige
konflikter. Borgerkrigene i Yemen og Dhofar-oprøret i Oman er eksempler, ligesom civils lange historie
krig i Libanon og Syriens voldelige undertrykkelse af islamiske politiske grupper, der var imod Hafez al-
Asad. Den stigende magt i den palæstinensiske befrielsesorganisation (PLO) førte til en borgerkrig i Jordan i september
1970. Den iranske revolution i 1979 blev efterfulgt af alvorlig politisk kamp, og et forsøg på at eksportere en teokratisk
revolution, der var med til at udløse Iran-Irak-krigen. Bahrain og Saudi-Arabien har begge haft civile sammenstød mellem deres
Sunni-herskende eliter og fjendtlige shiitter og disse sammenstød førte til betydelig vold i Saudi-Arabiens tilfælde.
Der også, imidlertid, har været en lang historie med voldelig islamisk ekstremisme i regionen, undertiden opmuntret af
regimer, der senere blev målet for de meget islamister, de oprindeligt støttede. Sadat forsøgte at bruge islam
bevægelser som en modvirker mod hans verdslige opposition i Egypten kun for at blive myrdet af en sådan bevægelse efter hans
fredsaftale med Israel. Israel troede, at det var sikkert at sponsorere islamiske bevægelser efter 1967 som en tæller mod
PLO, kun for at se den hurtige fremkomst af voldeligt anti-israelske grupper. Nord- og Syd Yemen var stedet for
kup og borgerkrige siden begyndelsen af ​​1960'erne, og det var en borgerkrig i Syd Yemen, der i sidste ende førte til sammenbruddet
af dets regime og dets fusion med Nord Yemen i 1990.
Shahs fald førte til en islamistisk overtagelse i Iran, og modstand mod den sovjetiske invasion af Afghanistan udløst
en islamistisk reaktion, der stadig påvirker Mellemøsten og hele den islamiske verden. Saudi-Arabien havde at gøre med
et oprør ved den store moske i Mekka i 1979. Denne opstands religiøse karakter delte mange elementer
af de bevægelser, der opstod efter den sovjetiske tilbagetrækning fra Afghanistan og Golfkrigen i 1991.
Algeriets bestræbelser på at undertrykke de islamiske politiske partiers sejr i et demokratisk valg i 1992 blev efterfulgt af
en borgerkrig, der har varet lige siden. Egypten kæmpede en lang og stort set vellykket kamp med sin egen islam
ekstremister i 1990'erne, men Egypten har kun formået at have undertrykt sådanne bevægelser snarere end udryddet
dem. I resten af ​​den arabiske verden, borgerkrigene i Kosovo og Bosnien var med til at skabe nye islamiske ekstremistiske kadre.
Saudi-Arabien led før af to store terrorangreb 2001. Disse angreb ramte på en nationalgarde
Træningscenter og USAF kaserne i Al Khobar, og mindst én ser ud til at have været resultatet af islam
ekstremister. Marokko, Libyen, Tunesien, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, og Yemen har alle set hårde islamister
bevægelser bliver en alvorlig national trussel.
Mens det ikke direkte er en del af regionen, Sudan har kæmpet en 15 år lang borgerkrig, der sandsynligvis har kostet over to
millioner liv, og denne krig var blevet understøttet af hårde islamistiske elementer i det arabiske nord. Somalia har også
har været stedet for en borgerkrig siden 1991 der har gjort det muligt for islamistiske celler at operere i det land. a

Terrorisme og asymmetrisk krigsførelse er næppe nye træk ved den mellemøstlige militære balance, og Islamicextremism er næppe den eneste kilde til ekstremistisk vold. Der er mange alvorlige etniske og sekteriske forskelle i Mellemøsten, og disse har længe ført til sporadisk vold inden for givne stater, og nogle gange til større civile konflikter. Borgerkrigene i Yemen og Dhofar-oprøret i Oman er eksempler, ligesom den lange historie med borgerkrig i Libanon og Syriens voldelige undertrykkelse af islamiske politiske grupper, der var imod Hafez al-Asads regime. Den stigende magt i den palæstinensiske befrielsesorganisation (PLO) førte til en borgerkrig i Jordan i september1970. Den iranske revolution i 1979 blev efterfulgt af alvorlig politisk kamp, og et forsøg på at eksportere en teokratisk revolution, der var med til at udløse krigen mellem Iran og Irak. Bahrain og Saudi-Arabien har begge haft civile sammenstød mellem deres sunnitiske herskende eliter og fjendtlige shi'itter, og disse sammenstød førte til betydelig vold i Saudi-Arabiens tilfælde., imidlertid, har været en lang historie med voldelig islamisk ekstremisme i regionen, undertiden opmuntret af regimer, der senere blev målet for de islamister, de oprindeligt støttede. Sadat forsøgte at bruge islamiske bevægelser som en modvirker mod sin verdslige opposition i Egypten for kun at blive myrdet af en sådan bevægelse efter hans fredsaftale med Israel. Israel troede, at det var sikkert at sponsorere islamiske bevægelser efter 1967 som en tæller mod PLO, kun for at se den hurtige fremkomst af voldeligt anti-israelske grupper. Nord- og Syd Yemen var stedet for grupper og borgerkrige siden begyndelsen af ​​1960'erne, og det var en borgerkrig i Syd Yemen, der i sidste ende førte til sammenbruddet af dets regime og dets fusion med Nord Yemen i 1990. Shahens fald førte til en islamistisk overtagelse i Iran, og modstand mod den sovjetiske invasion af Afghanistan udløste en islamistisk reaktion, der stadig påvirker Mellemøsten og hele den islamiske verden. Saudi-Arabien måtte håndtere et oprør ved den store moske i Mekka i 1979. Denne opstands religiøse karakter delte mange elementer i de bevægelser, der opstod efter den sovjetiske tilbagetrækning fra Afghanistan og Golfkrigen i 1991. Algeriets bestræbelser på at undertrykke sejren for islamiske politiske partier i et demokratisk valg i 1992 blev efterfulgt af en borgerkrig, der har varet lige siden. Egypten kæmpede en lang og stort set vellykket kamp med sine egne Islamice-ekstremister i 1990'erne, men Egypten har kun formået at have undertrykt sådanne bevægelser snarere end udryddet dem. I resten af ​​den arabiske verden, borgerkrigene i Kosovo og Bosnien var med til at skabe nye islamiske ekstremistiske kadre. Saudi-Arabien led af to store terrorangreb før 2001. Disse angreb ramte på et National GuardTraining center og USAF kaserne i Al Khobar, og mindst én ser ud til at have været resultatet af Islamicextremists. Marokko, Libyen, Tunesien, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, og Yemen har alle set hårde islamistiske bevægelser blive en alvorlig national trussel. Mens de ikke direkte er en del af regionen, Sudan har kæmpet en 15 år lang borgerkrig, der sandsynligvis har kostet over to millioner menneskeliv, og denne krig var blevet understøttet af hårde islamistiske elementer i det arabiske nord. Somalia har siden dengang været borgerkrig 1991 der har gjort det muligt for islamistiske celler at operere i dette land.

Kommentar: Hul ring til demokrati

ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE

WASHINGTON, June 24 (UPI) — The White House’s crusade for democracy, as President Bush sees it, has produceda critical mass of events taking that (Mellemøstlig) region in a hopeful new direction.And Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice just toured the area, making clear at every stop whenever the United States has a choice between stability and democracy, the new ideological remedy would sacrifice stability.

Veteran Mideast hands who have dealt with five regional wars and two intifadas over the past half century shuddered. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger first among them.

For the U.S. to crusade in every part of the world to spread democracy may be beyond our capacity,” he says. USA. system, he explains, “is the product of unique historical experiences, difficult to duplicate or to transplant into Muslim societies where secular democracy has seldom thrived.If ever.

If stability had been sacrificed for democracy, the former national security adviser and secretary of State to Presidents Nixon and Ford could not have negotiated major Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements: Sinai I, Golan and Sinai II. Without the undemocratic, benign dictatorial figure of Anwar Sadat at the helm in Egypt, or without the late Syrian dictator and master terror-broker Hafez Assad, yet another page of war history would have been written.

With a democratic parliament in Egypt in 1974, presumably dominated by the popular Muslim Brotherhood, Sadat could not have made his spectacular, death-defying trip to Jerusalemand suddenly become the most popular leader in Israel. A peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and between Jordan and Israel were possible only because absolute rulersSadat and the late King Hussein, led both Arab countries.

Sadat knew his courageous act of statesmanship was tantamount to signing his own death warrant. It was carried out in 1981 — by Islamist extremistson worldwide television.

Rice proudly proclaims it is no longer a war against terrorism but a struggle for democracy. She is proud the Bush administration no longer pursues stability at the expense of democracy. But already the democracy crusade is not only encountering speed bumps, but also roadblocks on a road to nowhere.

The much-vaunted Palestinian elections scheduled for July have been postponed indefinitely.

I Libanon, the ballot box has already been nullified by political machinations. Gen. Michael Aoun, a bright but aging prospect who came back from French exile to take on Syria’s underground machine, has already joined forces with Damascus. While denying any deal with Syria, the general’s henchmen concede he was compensated munificently for his retirement years in Paris from his post as army chief of staff and his time as premier. Aoun collected $22 million, which included compound interest.

I Egypten, Rice, presumably attempting to confer respectability on President Hosni Mubarak’s challengers, took time out to receive a known political charlatan who has over the years been exposed as someone who forged election results as he climbed the ladder of a number of political parties under a variety of labels.

Even Mubarak’s enemies concede Ayman Nour fabricated and forged the signatures of as many as 1,187 citizens to conform to regulations to legalize his Ghad (Tomorrow) parti. His career is dotted with phony academic credentials, plagiarism, a staged assassination attempt on himself, charges of embezzlement by his Saudi media employer, and scads of document forgeries.

Rice had canceled a previous trip to Egypt to protest the indictment and jailing of Nour pending trial. And before Rice’s most recent accolade, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had also gone out of her way to praise Egypt’s master political con man. Makes you wonder what kind of political reporting is coming out of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.

With this double-headed endorsement by the United States, Nour is losing what little favor he still has in Egypt. He is now seen as a U.S. stooge, to add to a long list of failings.

Det muslimske broderskab, which is outlawed but tolerated since it renounced terrorism, is more representative of Egyptian opinion than Nour. There is also the Kifaya (Enough) movement that groups Egypt’s leading intellectuals. But they declined to meet with Rice.

The United States is seen throughout the Arab world as synonymous with Israel. This automatically limits the Bush administration’s ability to win friends and influence people. Those making the most out of U.S. pressure to democratize are organizations listed by the United States asterrorist.Both Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon are now mining opportunities both above and underground. Islamic legislators in Jordan petitioned King Abdullah to allow Jordanian Hamas leaders, evicted six years ago, to come home. The king listened impassively.

It took Europe 500 years to reach the degree of political maturity witnessed by the recent collapse of the European Union’s plans for a common constitution. Winston Churchill said democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried. But Churchill also said, “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.This still applies in the souks of the Arab world, from Marrakech to Muscat.

Problemet med det egyptiske muslimske broderskab

Jeffrey Azarva

Samuel Tadros

On June 20, 2007, USA. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research convened ameeting ofU.S. intelligence officials to weigh the prospect of formal engagement with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,1known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin. The session was the result of several years of discussion aboutengaging the group considered by many to be the fountainhead of Sunni fundamentalism.Although the Bush administration established a diplomatic quarantine of the Brotherhood afterSeptember 11, 2001, members of the U.S. House of Representatives held several meetings in Egyptin the spring of 2007—almost three months before the State Department meeting—with MuhammadSaad al-Katatni, an independent member of the Egyptian parliament and the head of its Brotherhoodaffiliatedbloc. On April 5, 2007, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) broke with conventionand met with Katatni at the Egyptian parliament building and at the residence ofU.S. ambassador to Egypt Francis J. Ricciardone. Then, on May 27, 2007, a four-member U.S. congressionaldelegation led by Representative David Price (D-N.C.) met with Katatni in Cairo.Following Hoyer’s visit, USA. Embassy in Cairo dismissed Egyptian criticism that his meetingspresaged a reversal of U.S. policy.2 In November 2007, Ricciardone also played down themeetings when he claimed that U.S. contacts with nominally independent Brotherhood members did“not imply American endorsement of the views of the individual parliamentarians or their politicalaffiliates.”3 Despite this reassurance, the meetings with Katatni are indicative of opinion leaders, bothinside and outside the U.S. regering, warming inevitable. Yet while the movement, established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, constitutes the most organizedand well-funded opposition in the country today—the byproduct of both its charitable services and da’wa (literally“call to God,” or preaching) network that operate outside state control—any examination of its rhetoricand political platforms shows U.S. outreach to be premature. Despite its professed commitment to pluralismand the rule of law, the Brotherhood continues to engage in dangerous doublespeak when it comes to the mostfundamental issues of democracy.

Afstå fra reformen: Egypten og Tunesien

Jeffrey Azarva

On November 6, 2003, President George W. Bush proclaimed, “Sixty years of Western nations excusingand accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe—because in the longrun, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.” This strategic shift, coupled with the invasionsof Iraq and Afghanistan, put regional governments on notice. The following spring, Tunisia’s president, ZineEl Abidine Bin Ali, and Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak—stalwart allies in the U.S.-led war on terrorismand two of North Africa’s most pro-American rulers—were among the first Arab leaders to visit Washingtonand discuss reform. But with this “Arab spring” has come the inadvertent rise of Islamist movementsthroughout the region. Now, as U.S. policymakers ratchet down pressure, Egypt and Tunisia see a greenlight to backtrack on reform.

What Happened to the “Arab Street?”

Neha Sahgal



Why do opposition movements engage in protest under some circumstances but not inothers? Why did the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt organize large scale protest during the 2005regime initiated political reforms while remaining largely off the streets during the United States’led war in Iraq in 2003? There is a common notion among Western public opinion and policymakers that United States’ policies in the Middle East have led to greater political activismamong Islamic fundamentalists. Endnu, while citizens around the world protested the war in Iraq,Egypt remained largely quiet. The lack of protest and other acts of opposition were surprisinggiven the history of Arab-anti colonial struggle, the 1950s street politics in Egypt that broughtNasser to power and the flourishing civil society organizations in the region exemplified byIslamist parties, non governmental organizations and professional syndicates. More importantly,with the 2005 regime initiated political opening in Egypt, the country’s largest oppositionmovement, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organized high levels of protests anddemonstrations exposing undemocratic practices of the current government and seeking greaterpolitical freedom. Året 2005, was marked by a “wave of contention” in Egypt standing instark contrast to the lack of mobilization against the Iraq war. Clearly, Muslim Brotherhoodprotest activity is guided by factors other than the prevalence of “anti-Americanism.”Scholars of contentions politics have developed and tested various theories that explainand predict protest behavior. Strain and breakdown theories explain protest as an outcome ofeconomic conditions while resource mobilization theories have stressed the role of material andorganizational constraints in organizing protest. Yet others have argued that protests are spurredby structural changes, for eksempel, divisions or breakdown in the government. In this paper, Iargue that explaining the protest behavior of one group should take into account the group’sinteraction with other opposition actors. Opposition groups operate in a dense network of allies,adversaries as well as counter movements. Therefore their strategies influence each other intangible ways. I present an analysis of how the 2005 political opening in Egypt led to changes inlegal parties such as al-Ghad and al-Wafd that were allowed to contest presidential andparliamentary elections. Yderligere, the new movement Kifaya, originally formed to expressopposition to the Iraq war, also gained momentum as an anti-Mubarak, pro-democracy alliance.The changes in the parties that were allowed to contest elections and the emergence of newmovements altered the socio-political context for the “officially banned, yet tolerated,” MuslimBrotherhood. The Brotherhood tried to reassert itself as the main voice of political opposition inthe country by organizing greater protest activity and in this way established similarity with legalopposition parties. While legal opposition parties remain weak and ineffective in Egypt, andnewer opposition movements are still small in their membership, they may still influence eachothers’ strategies in tangible ways.