RSSTë gjitha Hyrje në "Rajonet" Kategori

The Arab Tomorrow

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Tetor 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, a newly arrived foreign correspondent.Suddenly, one of the army trucks halted directly in front of the reviewing stand just as six Mirage jets roared overhead in an acrobatic performance, painting the sky with long trails of red, yellow, purple,and green smoke. Sadat stood up, apparently preparing to exchange salutes with yet another contingent of Egyptian troops. He made himself a perfect target for four Islamist assassins who jumped from the truck, stormed the podium, and riddled his body with bullets.As the killers continued for what seemed an eternity to spray the stand with their deadly fire, I considered for an instant whether to hit the ground and risk being trampled to death by panicked spectators or remain afoot and risk taking a stray bullet. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

Islam and the Making of State Power

Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr

Në 1979 General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, the military ruler of Pakistan, declared that Pakistan would become an Islamic state. Islamic values and norms would serve as the foundation of national identity, law, economy, and social relations, and would inspire all policy making. Në 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, the new prime minister of Malaysia, introduced a similar broad-based plan to anchor state policy making in Islamic values, and to bring his country’s laws and economic practices in line with the teachings of Islam. Why did these rulers choose the path of “Islamization” for their countries? And how did one-time secular postcolonial states become the agents of Islamization and the harbinger of the “true” Islamic state?
Malaysia and Pakistan have since the late 1970s–early 1980s followed a unique path to development that diverges from the experiences of other Third World states. In these two countries religious identity was integrated into state ideology to inform the goal and process of development with Islamic values.
This undertaking has also presented a very different picture of the relation between Islam and politics in Muslim societies. In Malaysia and Pakistan, it has been state institutions rather than Islamist activists (those who advocate a political reading of Islam; also known as revivalists or fundamentalists) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, and more broadly how culture and religion serve the needs of state power and development. The analysis here relies on theoretical discussions
in the social sciences of state behavior and the role of culture and religion therein. More important, it draws inferences from the cases under examination to make broader conclusions of interest to the disciplines.

Feminizmi MES sekularizmit dhe islamizmit: Rastin e Palestinës

Dr, Islah Jad

Zgjedhjet legjislative të mbajtura në Bregun Perëndimor dhe Rripin e Gazës në 2006 solli në pushtet lëvizjen islamike e Hamasit, e cila vazhdoi për të formuar shumicën e Këshillit Legjislativ palestinez dhe gjithashtu shumicën parë qeverinë e Hamasit. Këto zgjedhje rezultuan në emërimin e ministrit të parë femër të Hamasit, i cili u bë ministri i Punëve të Grave. në mes të marsit 2006 dhe qershor 2007, dy ministra të ndryshëm femra Hamasit mori këtë post, por të dyja gjetur të vështirë për të menaxhuar Ministrinë pasi që shumica e punonjësve të saj nuk ishin anëtarë të Hamasit, por i përkisnin partive të tjera politike, dhe shumica ishin anëtarë të Fatahut, lëvizja dominante kontrollon shumicën e institucioneve palestineze Autoriteti. Një periudhë e tensionuar të luftës midis grave të Hamasit në Ministrinë e Punëve të Grave dhe femra anëtarët e Fatahut erdhi fundi pas marrjen Hamasit e pushtetit në Rripin e Gazës dhe rënies rezultante e qeverisë së tij në Bregun Perëndimor - një luftë të cilat nganjëherë mori një kthesë të dhunshme. Një arsye më vonë cituara për të shpjeguar këtë luftë ishte diferenca midis diskursit laik feminist dhe diskursin islamik në çështjet e grave. Në kontekstin palestinez kjo mosmarrëveshje mori një natyrë të rrezikshme si ajo është përdorur për të justifikuar përjetësimin luftën të përgjakshme politike, heqja e grave të Hamasit nga pozitat e tyre apo posteve, dhe ndarjeve politike dhe gjeografike mbizotëruese në kohën në të dy Bregun Perëndimor dhe e pushtuar Rripin e Gazës.
Kjo luftë ngre një numër pyetjesh të rëndësishme: duhet të dënojë lëvizjen islamike e cila ka ardhur në pushtet, apo duhet të kemi parasysh arsyet që çuan në dështimin e Fateh në arenën politike? Mund feminizmi të ofrojë një kornizë gjithëpërfshirëse për gratë, pavarësisht nga përkatësitë e tyre sociale dhe ideologjike? A mund një ligjërim i një bazë të përbashkët të përbashkët për gratë ndihmuar ata për të realizuar dhe për të rënë dakord mbi qëllimet e tyre të përbashkëta? Është paternalizmi vetëm i pranishëm në ideologjinë islamike, dhe jo në nacionalizëm dhe patriotizëm? Çfarë nënkuptojmë me feminizmin? A ka vetëm një feminizmi, ose disa Feminizmat? Çfarë kuptojmë me Islam – është lëvizja e njohur me këtë emër ose fesë, filozofia, ose sistemi ligjor? Ne kemi nevojë për të shkuar në fund të këtyre çështjeve dhe të konsiderojnë me kujdes, dhe ne duhet të bien dakord mbi ta në mënyrë që më vonë mund të vendosë, si feministe, në qoftë se kritika jonë i paternalizmit duhet të drejtohen në fenë (besim), të cilat duhet të kufizohet në zemrën e besimtarit dhe nuk të lejohet të marrë kontrollin e botës në përgjithësi, ose jurisprudenca, e cila ka të bëjë me shkolla të ndryshme të besimit të cilat shpjegojnë sistemin ligjor përfshira në Kuran dhe thëniet e Profetit – Suneti.

Islamist Aktivizmi i grave në Palestinën e pushtuar

Intervistat nga Khaled Amayreh

Intervistë me Sameera Al-Halayka

Sameera Al-Halayka është një anëtar i zgjedhur i Këshillit Legjislativ palestinez. Ajo ishte

lindur në fshatin Shoyoukh afër Hebronit në 1964. Ajo ka një BA në Sheriatit (Islamik

jurisprudencë) nga Universiteti Hebron. Ajo ka punuar si gazetar nga 1996 te 2006 kur

ajo hyri Këshillit Legjislativ palestinez si një anëtar i zgjedhur në 2006 Zgjedhjet.

Ajo është e martuar dhe ka shtatë fëmijë.

Q: Ekziston një përshtypje e përgjithshme në disa vende perëndimore që gratë marrin

Trajtimi inferior brenda grupeve të rezistencës islamike, si Hamasin. A eshte e vertete?

Si janë gratë aktiviste trajtohen në Hamasit?
Të drejtat dhe detyrat e grave muslimane buron para së gjithash nga Sheriatit apo ligjit islamik.

Ata nuk janë akte vullnetare apo bamirëse apo gjeste që marrim nga Hamasi apo të gjithë

tjetër. Kështu, aq sa është angazhimi politik dhe aktivizmi është e shqetësuar, gratë në përgjithësi kanë

të njëjtat të drejta dhe detyrime si meshkujt. Pas te gjithave, gratë përbëjnë të paktën 50 për qind e

shoqëri. Në një kuptim, ato janë e gjithë shoqëria, sepse ata lindin, dhe për të rritur,

brezi i ri.

prandaj, Unë mund të them se statusi i grave në kuadër të Hamasit është në përputhje të plotë me të

Statusi në vetë Islam. Kjo do të thotë se ajo është një partner i plotë në të gjitha nivelet. Me të vërtetë, do të ishte

e padrejtë dhe e padrejtë për një islam (ose islamist në qoftë se ju preferoni) grua që të jetë partner në vuajtje

ndërsa ajo është përjashtuar nga procesi i vendim-marrjes. Kjo është arsyeja pse roli i gruas në

Hamasi ka qenë gjithmonë pioniere.

Q: A mendoni se shfaqja e aktivizmit politik të grave në kuadër të Hamasit është

një zhvillim i natyrshëm që është në përputhje me konceptet klasike islame

lidhur me statusin dhe rolin e gruas, apo është kjo thjesht një përgjigje e nevojshme për të

presionet e modernitetit dhe kërkesat e veprimit politik dhe e të vazhdueshme

pushtimi izraelit?

Nuk ka asnjë tekst në jurisprudencën islame as në statutin e Hamasit e cila pengon gratë nga

pjesëmarrja politike. Unë besoj se e kundërta është e vërtetë — ka ajete të shumta Kur'anore

dhe thëniet e Profetit Muhammed duke i bërë thirrje grave që të jenë aktivë në politikë dhe në publik

Çështjet që prekin muslimanët. Por është gjithashtu e vërtetë se për gratë, si ajo është për burrat, aktivizmi politik

nuk është i detyrueshëm, por vullnetare, dhe është i vendosur kryesisht në dritën e aftësive të secilit gruas,

kualifikimet dhe rrethanat individuale. Asnjë më pak, duke treguar shqetësim për publikun

çështje është i detyrueshëm mbi çdo dhe çdo njeriu musliman dhe gruaja. Profeti

Muhammed tha: "Ai që nuk tregojnë shqetësim për çështjet e muslimanëve nuk është musliman."

Për më tepër, gratë palestineze islamike duhet të marrin të gjithë faktorëve objektivë në terren në

parasysh kur të vendoset nëse do të bashkohet me politikën apo të përfshihen në aktivitete politike.


Gratë iraniane pas revolucionit islamik

Ansiia Khaz Allii


Më shumë se tridhjetë vjet kanë kaluar që nga triumfin e Revolucionit Islamik në Iran, yet there remain a number of questions and ambiguities about the way the Islamic Republic and its laws deal with contemporary problems and current circumstances, veçanërisht në lidhje me gratë dhe të drejtat e grave. This short paper will shed light on these issues and study the current position of women in various spheres, comparing this to the situation prior to the Islamic Revolution. Reliable and authenticated data has been used wherever possible. The introduction summarises a number of theoretical and legal studies which provide the basis for the subsequent more practical analysis and are the sources from where the data has been obtained.
The first section considers attitudes of the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards women and women’s rights, and then takes a comprehensive look at the laws promulgated since the Islamic Revolution concerning women and their position in society. The second section considers women’s cultural and educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. The third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, the relationship between women and the family, and the family’s role in limiting or increasing women’s rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

smearcasting: How Islamophobes spread fear, bigotry and misinformation

FAIR

Julie Hollar

Jim Naureckas

Making Islamophobia Mainstream:
How Muslim-bashers broadcast their bigotry
A remarkable thing happened at the National Book Critics Circle (NBCC) nominations in February 2007: The normally highbrow and tolerant group nominated for best book in the field of criticism a book widely viewed as denigrating an entire religious group.
The nomination of Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (New York Times, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, bigotry and misinformation. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. And not unlike the charges made in the classical document of anti-Semitism, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, some of Islamophobia’s more virulent expressionslike While Europe Sleptinclude evocations of Islamic designs to dominate the West.
Islamic institutions and Muslims, sigurisht, should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny and criticism as anyone else. për shembull, when a Norwegian Islamic Council debates whether gay men and lesbians should be executed, one may forcefully condemn individuals or groups sharing that opinion without pulling all European Muslims into it, as did Bawer’s Pajamas Media post (8/7/08),
“European Muslims Debate: Should Gays Be Executed?"
Në mënyrë të ngjashme, extremists who justify their violent actions by invoking some particular interpretation of Islam can be criticized without implicating the enormously diverse population of Muslims around the world. Pas te gjithave, reporters managed to cover the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeighan adherent of the racist Christian Identity sectwithout resorting to generalized statements about “Christian terrorism.” Likewise, media have covered acts of terrorism by fanatics who are Jewishfor instance the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–without implicating the entirety of Judaism.

The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam

Bassam Tibi

When reading the majority of texts that comprise the vast literature that has been published by self-proclaimed pundits on political Islam, it is easy to miss the fact that a new movement has arisen. Further, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, megjithatë, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty
in the history of politics since it has its roots in two parallel and related phenomena: first, the culturalisation of politics which leads to politics being conceptualised as a cultural system (a view pioneered by Clifford Geertz); and second the return of the sacred, or ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, as a reaction to its intensive secularisation resulting from globalisation.
The analysis of political ideologies that are based on religions, and that can exert appeal as a political religion as a consequence of this, involves a social science understanding of the role of religion played by world politics, especially after the bi-polar system of the Cold War has given way to a multi-polar world. In a project conducted at the Hannah Arendt Institute for the application of totalitarianism to the study of political religions, I proposed the distinction between secular ideologies that act as a substitute for religion, and religious ideologies based on genuine religious faith, which is the case in religious fundamentalism (see note
24). Another project on ‘Political Religion’, carried out at the University of Basel, has made clearer the point that new approaches to politics become necessary once a religious faith becomes clothed in a political garb.Drawing on the authoritative sources of political Islam, this article suggests that the great variety of organisations inspired by Islamist ideology are to be conceptualised both as political religions and as political movements. The unique quality of political Islam lies is the fact that it is based on a transnational religion (see note 26).

Islam, Islami politik dhe Amerikë

Arabe Insajt

Është "Vëllazëria" me Amerikën mundshme?

Khalil al-Anani

"Nuk ka mundësi për të komunikuar me çdo SHBA. administratës për sa kohë që Shtetet e Bashkuara mban qëndrimin e saj të gjatë në këmbë të Islamit si një rrezik real, një pamje që i vë në Shtetet e Bashkuara në të njëjtën barkë si armiku sionist. Ne nuk kemi nocione të para-konceptuar në lidhje popullin amerikan apo U.S. shoqëria dhe organizatat e saj qytetare dhe mendoj tanke. Ne nuk kemi asnjë problem komunikimin me popullin amerikan, por jo përpjekjet e duhura janë duke u bërë për të na sjellë më afër,"Tha Dr. Issam al-Iryan, Shefi i departamentit politik të Vëllazërisë Myslimane në një intervistë telefonike.
Fjalët al-Iryan të përmbledhur pikëpamjet e Vëllazërisë Myslimane së popullit amerikan dhe të U.S. qeveri. Anëtarët e tjerë të Vëllazërisë Myslimane do të pajtoheshin, siç do vonë Hassan al-Banna, i cili e themeloi grupin në 1928. Al- Banna shikuara Perëndimin kryesisht si një simbol i prishjes morale. Selefite tjera - një shkollë islame të mendimit që mbështetet në paraardhësit si modele shembullore - kanë marrë të njëjtin mendim e Shteteve të Bashkuara, por nuk kanë fleksibilitetin ideologjik përqafuar nga Vëllazëria Myslimane. Ndërsa Vëllazëria Myslimane beson në angazhuar amerikanët në dialog civil, grupe të tjera ekstremiste nuk shoh asnjë pikë në dialog dhe për të ruajtur se forca është e vetmja mënyrë për të që kanë të bëjnë me Shtetet e Bashkuara.

Demokracia Liberale dhe Islami Politike: Search for Common Ground.

Mostapha Benhenda

This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: për shembull, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regjim, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. Për shembull, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (at least, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, it seems interesting to determine the conception of democracy underlying Islamic political models. Me fjale te tjera, we should try to find out what is democratic in “theodemocracy”. To that end, among the impressive diversity and plurality of Islamic traditions of normative political thought, we essentially focus on the broad current of thought going back to Abu ‘Ala Maududi and the Egyptian intellectual Sayyed Qutb.8 This particular trend of thought is interesting because in the Muslim world, it lies at the basis of some of the most challenging oppositions to the diffusion of the values originating from the West. Based on religious values, this trend elaborated a political model alternative to liberal democracy. Broadly speaking, the conception of democracy included in this Islamic political model is procedural. With some differences, this conception is inspired by democratic theories advocated by some constitutionalists and political scientists.10 It is thin and minimalist, up to a certain point. Për shembull, it does not rely on any notion of popular sovereignty and it does not require any separation between religion and politics. The first aim of this paper is to elaborate this minimalist conception. We make a detailed restatement of it in order to isolate this conception from its moral (liberal) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. Me të vërtetë, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, we show that such principle is not necessary to justify a democratic process.

Parimi i Lëvizjes në strukturën e Islamit

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal

Si një lëvizje kulturore Islami e hedh poshtë pikëpamjen e vjetër statik të gjithësisë, dhe arrin një pamje dinamike. Si një sistem emocionale e bashkimit ajo e njeh vlerën e individit si i tillë, dhe refuzon bloodrelationship si një bazë e unitetit të njeriut. Blood-marrëdhënie është earthrootedness. Kërkimi për një themel thjesht psikologjike të unitetit njerëzor bëhet e mundur vetëm me perceptimin se e gjithë jeta e njeriut është shpirtërore në origin.1 saj një perceptim i tillë është krijues i lojalitetit të freskëta, pa asnjë ceremonial për t'i mbajtur ata gjallë, dhe bën të mundur që njeriu të emancipuar veten nga toka. Krishterimi i cili ishte shfaqur fillimisht si një urdhër manastirit u gjykua nga Kostandini si një sistem të dështimit unification.2 të saj për të punuar si një sistem të tillë çuan Perandorin Julian3 për t'u kthyer në perënditë e vjetra të Romës në të cilën ai u përpoq për të vënë interpretime filozofike. Një historian modern i qytetërimit e ka përshkruar në këtë mënyrë gjendjen e botës së qytetëruar në lidhje me kohën kur Islami u shfaq në skenën e historisë: Dukej pra se qytetërimi i madh se ai kishte marrë katër mijë vjet për të ndërtuar ishte në prag të shpërbërjes, dhe se njerëzimi kishte të ngjarë të kthehen në atë gjendje të barbarisë ku çdo fis dhe sekti ishte kundër ardhshme, dhe rendi dhe ligji ishin të panjohura . . . The
Sanksionet e vjetra fisnore kishin humbur fuqinë e tyre. Prandaj metodat e vjetra perandorake do të veprojë më. Sanksionet e reja të krijuara nga
Krishterimi u punuar ndarje dhe shkatërrim në vend të unitetit dhe të rendit. Kjo ishte një kohë e mbushur me tragjedi. qytetërim, si një pemë gjigande gjeth e të cilit e kishte harkuar botën dhe degët e së cilës kishte lindur frytet e artë e artit dhe shkencës dhe letërsisë, u lëkundur, trungu i tij nuk është më i gjallë me llogore rrjedh nga përkushtimi dhe nderimi, por rotted në thelbin, copëtuar nga stuhitë e luftës, dhe mbajtur së bashku vetëm nga litarët e zakoneve dhe ligjeve të lashta, që mund të parakohshme në çdo moment. A kishte ndonjë kulturë emocionale që mund të sjellë, për të mbledhur njerëzimin përsëri në unitet dhe për të shpëtuar qytetërimin? Kjo kulturë duhet të jetë diçka e një lloji të ri, për sanksionet dhe ceremonitë e vjetra ishin të vdekur, dhe për të ndërtuar të tjerët të të njëjtit lloj do të jetë puna
i shkrimtarit centuries.'The pastaj vazhdon të na tregoni se bota u ndal në nevojën e një kulture të re për të marrë vendin e kulturës së fronit, dhe sistemet e bashkimit të cilat janë të bazuara në bloodrelationship.
Eshte e mrekullueshme, ai shton, se një kulturë e tillë duhet të ketë lindur nga Arabia pikërisht në kohën kur ajo ishte më e nevojshme. ka, megjithatë, asgjë mahnitshme në fenomenin. Bota-jeta intuitivisht sheh nevojat e veta, dhe në momente kritike e përcakton drejtimin e vet. Kjo është ajo që, në gjuhën e fesë, ne e quajmë zbulesë profetike. Është e natyrshme se Islami duhet të kishte flashed nëpër vetëdijen e një populli të thjeshtë paprekur nga ndonjë prej kulturave të lashta, dhe zënë një pozicion gjeografik ku tre kontinente të takohen së bashku. Kultura e re e gjen themelin e botës-unitetit në parimin e Tauhâd.'5 Islamit, si një shtet, është vetëm një mjet praktik për të bërë këtë parim një faktor që jetojnë në jetën intelektuale dhe emocionale të njerëzimit. Ajo kërkon besnikëri ndaj Perëndisë, mos fronet. Dhe që All-llahu është baza kryesore shpirtërore e të gjithë jetës, besnikëria ndaj Perëndisë praktikisht shkon në besnikërinë e njeriut me natyrën e tij ideale. Baza kryesore shpirtërore e të gjithë jetës, si konceptuar nga Islami, është e përjetshme dhe zbulon veten në shumëllojshmëri dhe ndryshim. Një shoqëri e bazuar në një konceptim të tillë të realitetit duhet të pajtohen, në jetën e saj, kategoritë e përhershme dhe ndryshimit. Ajo duhet të ketë parime të përjetshme për të rregulluar jetën e saj kolektive, për përjetshme na jep një pikëmbështetje në botën e ndryshimeve të vazhdueshme.

Islamic Reformimi

Adnan Khan

The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi boasted after the events of 9/11:
“…we must be aware of the superiority of our civilisation, a system that has guaranteed

well being, respect for human rights andin contrast with Islamic countriesrespect

for religious and political rights, a system that has its values understanding of diversity

and tolerance…The West will conquer peoples, like it conquered communism, even if it

means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was

1,400 years ago…”1

And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of

ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”

Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute

The concept of ‘islah’ (reform) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the

history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical

Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified

their Islamic rulings (fiqh) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to

apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the

Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time

understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined

principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of

study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Those who became

smitten by Greek philosophy such as the Muslim philosophers and some from amongst the Mut’azilah

were considered to have left the fold of Islam as the Qur’an ceased to be their basis of study. Thus for

any Muslim attempting to deduce rules or understand what stance should be taken upon a particular

issue the Qur’an is the basis of this study.

The first attempt at reforming Islam took place at the turn of the 19th century. By the turn of the

century the Ummah had been in a lengthy period of decline where the global balance of power shifted

from the Khilafah to Britain. Mounting problems engulfed the Khilafah whilst Western Europe was in

the midst of the industrial revolution. The Ummah came to lose her pristine understanding of Islam, dhe

in an attempt to reverse the decline engulfing the Uthmani’s (Ottomans) some Muslims were sent to the

Perëndimi, and as a result became smitten by what they saw. Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi of Egypt (1801-1873),

on his return from Paris, wrote a biographical book called Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The

Extraction of Gold, or an Overview of Paris, 1834), praising their cleanliness, love of work, and above

all social morality. He declared that we must mimic what is being done in Paris, advocating changes to

the Islamic society from liberalising women to the systems of ruling. This thought, and others like it,

marked the beginning of the reinventing trend in Islam.

ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION

IBRAHIM KALIN

In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, aktivist, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.

Islam in the West

Jocelyne Çesari

The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.

Profesion, Kolonializëm, Aparteid?

The Human Sciences Research Council

The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (domethënë, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, dhe
Gaz, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. At the same time, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, dhe, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, këshillim, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. At the same time, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, për më tepër, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.

ISLAM, DEMOKRACIA & USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Për më tepër, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, domethënë, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, SHBA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

SHBA Hamasi blloqe politike e paqes në Lindjen e Mesme

Henry Siegman


bisedimeve dypalëshe Gabim gjatë këtyre të fundit 16 vite kanë treguar se një marrëveshje paqeje në Lindjen e Mesme nuk mund të arrihet nga vetë palët. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Për fat të keq, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.