RSS中的所有條目 "活動 & 新聞" 類別

一個穆斯林群島

最大大號. 毛

這本書已經製作了很多年, 正如作者在他的序言中解釋的那樣, 儘管他在戰略情報研究中心擔任高級研究員期間撰寫了大部分實際文本. 曾任聯合軍事情報學院情報學院院長多年. 儘管這本書看起來可能是由任何優秀的歷史學家或東南亞地區專家寫的, 作者在國家情報界服務了 3 多年,為這項工作提供了啟示. 他的區域專業知識經常被應用於社區的特殊評估. 他對伊斯蘭教的了解在他的同齡人中是無與倫比的,並且對確定這個宗教的目標如何在遠離大多數決策者當前關注的焦點的領域發揮作用的渴望無法抑制, 作者充分利用這次機會,讓情報界和更廣泛的讀者熟悉一個處於協調世俗和宗教力量陣痛中的地區的戰略認識.
本出版物已獲安全審查辦公室批准不受限制地分發, 國防部.

印度尼西亞的選舉

伯恩哈德Platzdasch

AS INDONESIA gears up for its elections next April, making sense of developments can be a challenge.
Take, 例如, the latest election forecasts. In a recent opinion poll, the Indonesian Survey Institute named President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s DemocratsParty (PD) as the leading contender with an approval rating of 16.8 per cent. The party was followed by Vice-President Jusuf Kalla’s Golkar Party with 15.9 per cent and Ms Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) 與 14.2 per cent. But several surveys had earlier this year put PDI-P and
Golkar first and second, with PD taking third or fourth place. Another noteworthy difference in the latest survey is the meagre 4.9 per cent for the Islamist Justice and Welfare Party (PKS). Earlier surveys put the PKSshare a few points higher and the party has even claimed that it can achieve some 20 per cent of the total vote.
Without forgetting that the forecasts have limited credibility due to the large number of undecided voters, what conclusions can be drawn from the varying results of these surveys?
第一, it is almost certain that no party will secure an outright victory, thus paving the way for yet anotherand again potentially brittlecoalition government. With no party gaining an absolute majority, contenders for the presidential elections in July
will need the endorsement of other parties. As for Dr Yudhoyono, he and Golkar will probably continue their partnership. But Ms Megawati has already made it clear that she is not willing to serve as vice-president. This means a coalition made up of Golkar
and the PDI-P is unlikely.

美國穆斯林中產階級和主流

皮尤研究中心

Muslims constitute a growing and increasingly important segment of American society.Yet there is surprisingly little quantitative research about the attitudes and opinions of thissegment of the public for two reasons. 第一, 美國. Census is forbidden by law from askingquestions about religious belief and affiliation, 和, as a result, we know very little about thebasic demographic characteristics of Muslim Americans. 第二, Muslim Americans comprisesuch a small percentage of the U.S. population that general population surveys do not interview asufficient number of them to allow for meaningful analysis.This Pew Research Center study is therefore the first ever nationwide survey to attempt tomeasure rigorously the demographics, attitudes and experiences of Muslim Americans. It buildson surveys conducted in 2006 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project of Muslim minority publics inGreat Britain, 法國, Germany and Spain. The Muslim American survey also follows on Pew’sglobal surveys conducted over the past five years with more than 30,000 Muslims in 22 nationsaround the world since 2002.The methodological approach employed was the most comprehensive ever used to studyMuslim Americans. Nearly 60,000 respondents were interviewed to find a representative sampleof Muslims. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, Urdu and Farsi, as well as English. Subsamplesof the national poll were large enough to explore how various subgroups of thepopulationincluding recent immigrants, native-born converts, and selected ethnic groupsincluding those of Arab, Pakistani, and African American heritagediffer in their attitudesThe survey also contrasts the views of the Muslim population as a whole with those ofthe U.S. general population, and with the attitudes of Muslims all around the world, includingWestern Europe. 最後, findings from the survey make important contributions to the debateover the total size of the Muslim American population.The survey is a collaborative effort of a number of Pew Research Center projects,including the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, the Pew Forum on Religion &Public Life and the Pew Hispanic Center. The project was overseen by Pew Research CenterPresident Andrew Kohut and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Director Luis Lugo. ThePew Research Center’s Director of Survey Research, Scott Keeter, served as project director forthe study, with the close assistance of Gregory Smith, Research Fellow at the Pew Forum. Manyother Pew researchers participated in the design, execution and analysis of the survey.

走向理解伊斯蘭教

賽義德馬杜迪

THE MEANING OF ISLAM

Every religion of the world has been named either after its founder or after the community ornation in which it was born. 例如, Christianity takes its name from its prophet JesusChrist; Buddhism from its founder, Gautama Buddha; Zoroastrianism from its founderZoroaster-, and Judaism, the religion of the Jews, from the name of the tribe Judah (of thecountry of Judea) where it originated. The same is true of all other religions except Islam, whichenjoys the unique distinction of having no such association with any particular person or peopleor country. Nor is it the product of any human mind. It is a universal religion and itsobjective is to create and cultivate in man the quality and attitude of Islam.Islam, in fact, is an attributive title. Anyone who possesses this attribute, whatever race,community, country or group he belongs to, is a Muslim. According to the Qur’an (the HolyBook of the Muslims), among every people and in all ages there have been good and righteouspeople who possessed this attributeand all of them were and are Muslims.IslamWhat Does it Mean?Islam is an Arabic word and connotes submission, surrender and obedience. As a religion,Islam stands for complete submission and obedience to Allah.1Everyone can see that we live in an orderly universe, where everything is assigned a place in agrand scheme. The moon, the stars and all the heavenly bodies are knit together in amagnificent system. They follow unalterable laws and make not even the slightest deviation fromtheir ordained courses. 相似地, everything in the world, from the minute whirling electron tothe mighty nebulae, invariably follows its own laws. Matter, energy and lifeall obey their lawsand grow and change and live and die in accordance with those laws. Even in the human worldthe laws of nature are paramount. Man’s birth, growth and life are all regulated by a set ofbiological laws. He derives sustenance from nature in accordance with an unalterable law. Allthe organs of his body, from the smallest tissues to the heart and the brain, are governedby the laws prescribed for them. In short, ours is a law-governed universe and everything in it isfollowing the course that has been ordained for it.

中東民主促進不是單行道

瑪麗娜奧特維

美國. administration is under pressure to revive democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East,but momentum toward political reform has stalled in most of the region. Opposition parties are at lowebb, and governments are more firmly in control than ever. While new forms of activism, such as laborprotests and a growing volume of blogging critical of government and opposition parties have becomewidespread, they have yet to prove effective as means of influencing leaders to change long-standingpolicies.The last time a U.S. administration faced such unfavorable circumstances in advancing political reformswas over 30 years ago, when the Helsinki process was launched during the Cold War. That experiencetaught us that the United States needs to give reluctant interlocutors something they want if itexpects them to engage on issues they would rather not address. If Washington wants Arab countriesto discuss the universal democratic principles that should underpin their political systems, it needs to beprepared to discuss the universal principles that should underpin its own Middle East policies.

南埃及的伊斯蘭教

James Toth

For years, religious violence and terrorism in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypthave splashed across the headlines and surged across the screen, announcing yet anotherround of senseless death and destruction. While Arabists and Islamicists attemptto pick their way carefully through the ideological and intellectual minefields to makesense of what is happening, the wider public generally disregards their insights andinstead sticks to what it knows best: deeply ingrained prejudices and biases. 埃及的,阿拉伯, Muslim—all are painted in a very unfavorable light. Even in Egypt, manybystanders show the same sorry prejudices. In the end, people simply blame the brutalityon inexplicable backward religious ideas and then move on.Yet comprehending terrorism and violence in places such as Egypt by recourse toan unnuanced religious fundamentalism is generally acknowledged not only to begthe question of why these events actually happen, but also to lead to misunderstandingsand misperceptions, and perhaps even to exacerbating existing tensions.1 Mostscholars agree that such seemingly “irrational” social behavior instead needs to beplaced in its appropriate context to be properly understood, and hence made rational.Analyzing these actions, then, involves situating this violence and destruction in theireconomic, 政治的, and ideological milieu as these have developed historically, forthis so-called Islamic terrorism does not merely arise, ex nihilo, out of a timeless void.What follows, then, is one case study of one portion of the Islamic movement as itemerged principally in southern Egypt and as it was revealed through anthropologicalfieldwork conducted in one of this region’s major cities. This account takes a completelydifferent direction from that of stigmatizing this movement as a sordid collectionof terrorist organizations hell bent on the senseless destruction of Egypt and itsIslamic civilization.2 Because this view is somewhat at odds with the perceptions oflocal spectators, Egyptians in Cairo, and non–Egyptians inside and outside the country,I go to some length not only to discuss the movement itself but also to shed lighton why it might have received such negative publicity.

MB去農村

霍山塔馬姆


The May 2008 elections of the Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Bureau show that the grouphas undergone a major transformation. The Muslim Brotherhood used to be an urban group inits membership and style of management. Now its cultural patterns and loyalties are taking ona rural garb. 結果是, the Muslim Brotherhood is losing the clarity of direction and methodit once had.Over the past few years, the Muslim Brotherhood has been infused with rural elements. Itstone is becoming more and more patriarchal, and its members are showing their superiors thekind of deference associated with countryside traditions. You hear them referring to their topofficials as theuncle hajj “, “the big hajj “, “our blessed one”, “the blessed man of ourcircle”, “the crown on our heads”, etc. Occasionally, they even kiss the hands and heads of thetop leaders. Not long ago, a Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarian kissed the hand of thesupreme guide in public.These patterns of behaviour are new to the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that emerged andoperated mostly in an urban context. The new ways of speech and behaviour, which I willrefer to as theruralisationof the Muslim Brotherhood, have affected every aspect of thegroup’s internal operations. In its recent elections, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained a tightlid of secrecy, offered the public contradictory information, and generally seemed to beoperating with little regard for established procedure.The Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council elections emphasised ritual over order. The mainconcern of the Brotherhood, throughout the recent elections, seemed to be with maintainingan aura of respect for the leadership and getting the rank-and- file to offer unquestioningloyalty to top officials.A system of secondary loyalties has emerged inside the Muslim Brotherhood, in nearindependence from all considerations of institutional work. Entire geographical areas, indeedentire governorates, are now viewed as political fiefdoms pertaining to one MuslimBrotherhood leader or another. Muslim Brotherhood members would refer to a certain city orgovernorate as being the turf of certain individuals.Duplicity, another trait of rural communities, is also rampant. Feigned allegiance is common,with members saying one thing in private and another in public. As is the custom in thecountryside, deference to authority is often coupled with resistance to change. 結果是,you’d see members pretending to listen to their Muslim Brotherhood superiors while payinglittle or no attention to what they say. Many of the new ideas put forward by MuslimBrotherhood leaders have been ignored, or at least diluted and then discarded.When a Brotherhood member comes up with a new idea, the Muslim Brotherhood leadershipreacts as if that member spoke out of order. Self- criticism is increasingly being frowned uponand the dominant thinking within the Brotherhood is becoming traditionalist andunquestioning.The Muslim Brotherhood has been active in recruiting teachers and professors. But most ofthe new recruits are rural in their culture and understanding of public life. Despite theirscholarly pedigree, many of the academics that have joined the Brotherhood are parochial intheir understanding of the world. The Muslim Brotherhood has nearly 3,000 universityprofessors in its ranks, and few or any of those are endowed with the habit of critical thinking.They may be academics, but they are no visionaries.In the recent Muslim Brotherhood elections, five members of the group’s Shura Council wonseats in the Guidance Bureau. Most of those were either from rural areas or people with apronounced rural lifestyle. Four were from the countryside, including Saadeddin El-Husseinifrom Sharqiya, Mohamed Hamed from Mahala Al-Kobra, Saadeddin El-Katatni from Minya.Only one was from a metropolitan centre: Osama Nasr from Alexandria.Over the past decade or so, most of the newcomers to the Guidance Bureau were from thecountryside: Mahmoud Hussein from Assiut, Sabri Arafa El-Komi from Daqahliya, andMohamed Mursi from Sharqiya. Rural governorates, such as Assiut, Minya, Daqahliya andSharqiya, are now in control of much of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially middle-rankingposts, while Cairo and Alexandria have seen their status gradually erode. The Brotherhoodleadership is encouraging the trend, for rural people are less prone to challenging theirleaders.There was a time when the Muslim Brotherhood appealed mainly to an urban audience. Butsince the late 1980s things have changed. Due to the long-running confrontation with theregime, the Muslim Brotherhood has found it harder to recruit urban supporters. Also, the lackof innovation in Muslim Brotherhood ways has turned off many city dwellers. Instead ofjoining the Muslim Brotherhood, the young and disgruntled, as well as those seeking spiritualsalvation, have joined the Salafi current or become followers of the country’s new breed ofwell- spoken televangelists. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood has mostly abandonedreligious propagation in favour of politics may have accelerated this trend.What the Muslim Brotherhood has to offer is something that city dwellers don’t really need.The Muslim Brotherhood offers an alternative family, a cloning of the village communitywith its personalised support system. This is something that appeals best to new arrivals fromthe countryside, to people who miss the stability and comfort of a traditional community.The attraction of countryside people to the Muslim Brotherhood over the past two decadescoincided with the disintegration of the extended family and the weakening of communal ties.Moreover, the Westernisation of city life may have pushed many people with a ruralbackground into seeking a moral and social refuge in the Muslim Brotherhood.In universities, the Muslim Brotherhood attracts newcomers to the cities rather than originalcity dwellers. It is more successful in recruitment among students in Al-Azhar University thanin other universities, and more successful in rural governorates than in Cairo and Alexandria.Following the 1952 Revolution, Egypt as a whole underwent a wave of ruralisation. But eventhen, the Muslim Brotherhood focussed its recruitment on people with an urban lifestyle. Fiftyyears ago, the Muslim Brotherhood recruited mostly among the sons of governmentemployees, teachers, and generally the white-collared class. Egypt’s countryside was notwelcoming to the Muslim Brotherhood or its outlook. Now, the Muslim Brotherhood hasgone so conventional that it is gaining ground in the countryside.The Muslim Brotherhood can run effective campaigns and even win elections in many areasin Egypt’s countryside. 然而, it is my belief that the countryside is affecting the MuslimBrotherhood more than the Muslim Brotherhood is affecting it.In Hassan El-Banna’s time, Muslim Brotherhood leaders were mostly urban in their ways:Hassan El-Hodeibi, Omar El-Telmesani, Hassan Ashmawi, Mounir Dallah, Abdel-QaderHelmi and Farid Abdel Khaleq. Even in the countryside, top Muslim Brotherhood memberswere known for their urban lifestyle: Mohamed Hamed Abul- Naser and Abbas Al-Sisi, forexample.By contrast, the new breed of Muslim Brotherhood leaders is rural in its ways. This goes evenfor Cairo-based Muslim Brotherhood leaders including Mohamed Mursi, Saad El-Katatni,Saad Al-Husseini and Sabri Arafa El-Komi. And the Muslim Brotherhood supreme guide,馬赫迪Akef, is more rural in his leadership style than his predecessor, Maamoun鋁Hodeibi.

政治伊斯蘭正在崛起

邁克爾. 長

characteristics of the democratic order. Their newly-discovered acceptance of elections andparliamentary processes results not least from a gradual democratisation of the formerlyauthoritarian regimes these groups had fought by terrorist means even in their home countries.The prime example of this development is Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, which started out as acharitable social movement and has now become the most powerful political opposition force inEgypt.Founded in the 1920s, the Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest Islamic organisation of the Arabworld today. Following the ideas of its founder Al-Banna, it intended to return to a state of ‘trueIslam’, 即. to return to the way of life of the early Islamic congregation at the time of theProphet, and to establish a community of social justice. This vision was increasingly viewed as acounterweight to the Western social model that was marked by secularisation, moral decay, andgreed. During World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood even founded a secret military arm, whoseactivities, 然而, were uncovered, leading to the execution of Mr Al-Banna by Egypt’s secretpolice

在兄弟的陰影下

Omayma阿卜杜勒 - 拉蒂夫

In September 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt released its fi rst politicalparty platform draft. Among the heavily criticized clauses was one that deniedwomen (and Copts) the right to be head of state. “Duties and responsibilities assumed by the head of state, such as army commanding, are in contradictionwith the socially acceptable roles for women,” the draft stated. In previousBrotherhood documents there was no specifi c mention of the position of headof state; rather, they declared that women were allowed to occupy all postsexcept for al-imama al-kubra, the position of caliph, which is the equivalentof a head of state in modern times. Many were surprised that despite severalprogressive moves the Brotherhood had made in previous years to empowerwomen, it ruled out women’s right to the country’s top position.Although the platform was only a fi rst draft, the Muslim Brotherhood’s banon women in Egypt’s top offi ce revived old, but serious, questions regardingthe Islamist movement’s stand on the place and role of the “Sisters” inside themovement. The Brotherhood earlier had taken an advanced position concerningwomen, as refl ected in its naming of women candidates for parliamentaryand municipal elections in 2000, 2005, 和 2007, as well as the growingnumbers of women involved in Brotherhood political activities, such as streetprotests and elections. Although the platform recognizes women as key politicalactors, it was considered a retreat from the movement’s advanced positionin some earlier electoral platforms.

埃及穆斯林兄弟會黨綱草案

彌敦道Ĵ. 棕色
阿穆爾·哈薩

In the late summer 2007, amid great anticipation from Egypt’s ruling elite and opposition movements, the Muslim Brotherhood distributed the first draft of a party platform to a group of intellectuals and analysts. The platform was not to serve as a document for an existing political party or even one about to be founded: the Brotherhood remains without legal recognition in Egypt and Egypt’s rulers and the laws they have enacted make the prospect of legal recognition for a Brotherhood-founded party seem distant. But the Brotherhood’s leadership clearly wished to signal what sort of party they would found if allowed to do so.

With the circulation of the draft document, the movement opened its doors to discussion and even contentious debate about the main ideas of the platform, the likely course of the Brotherhood’s political role, and the future of its relationship with other political forces in the country.1 In this paper, we seek to answer four questions concerning the Brotherhood’s

party platform:

1. What are the specific controversies and divisions generated by the platform?


2. Why and how has the platform proved so divisive?


3. Given the divisions it caused as well as the inauspicious political environment,

why was a platform drafted at this time?


4. How will these controversies likely be resolved?


We also offer some observations about the Brotherhood’s experience with

drafting a party platform and demonstrate how its goals have only been partly

met. Ultimately, the integration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a normal political

actor will depend not only on the movement’s words but also on the deeds

of a regime that seems increasingly hostile to the Brotherhood’s political role.

比利時穆斯林兄弟會

史蒂夫Merley,
高級分析師


The Global Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Europe since 1960 when SaidRamadan, the grandson of Hassan Al-Banna, founded a mosque in Munich.1 Since that time,Brotherhood organizations have been established in almost all of the EU countries, as well asnon-EU countries such as Russia and Turkey. Despite operating under other names, some ofthe organizations in the larger countries are recognized as part of the global MuslimBrotherhood. 例如, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) isgenerally regarded as part of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. The network is alsobecoming known in some of the smaller countries such as the Netherlands, where a recentNEFA Foundation report detailed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in that country.2Neighboring Belgium has also become an important center for the Muslim Brotherhood inEurope. A 2002 report by the Intelligence Committee of the Belgian Parliament explainedhow the Brotherhood operates in Belgium:“The State Security Service has been following the activities of the InternationalMuslim Brotherhood in Belgium since 1982. The International MuslimBrotherhood has had a clandestine structure for nearly 20 年份. The identityof the members is secret; they operate in the greatest discretion. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,在這種情況下, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

歐洲的穆斯林兄弟會

Brigi元帥T優
Shumuliyyat al-islam (Islam as encompassing every aspect of life) is the first of twenty principles laid out by the
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, 哈桑·班納, to teach his followers the proper understanding
of Islam. Even though this principle, usually translated as the “comprehensive way of life,” still remains integral
to the teachings of the members of the Brotherhood, both in Egypt and in Europe, it is strangely enough
neither commented upon in scholarly references nor by the wider public. When the Federation of Islamic
Organizations in Europe (FIOE, representing the Muslim Brotherhood movement at the European level) presented the European Muslim Charter to the international press in January 2008, none pinpointed this “universal dimension” of their understanding of Islam despite the potential tensions or even incompatibilities, both political and
legal, that this concept might have on a discourse on integration and citizenship. What do the Muslim Brothers traditionally say about this concept and how do they justify their call for it? What are its constituents
and the scope of its application? Are there any significant modifications to the concept in attempting to contextualize it within a pluralist Europe?

伊斯蘭動員

齊亞德·曼森

This article examines the emergence and growth of the Muslim Brotherhood inEgypt from the 1930s through the 1950s. It begins by outlining and empirically evaluatingpossible explanations for the organization’s growth based on (1) theories of politicalIslam and (2) the concept of political opportunity structure in social movementtheory. An extension of these approaches is suggested based on data from organizationaldocuments and declassiŽed U.S. State Department Žles from the period. Thesuccessful mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood was possible because of the wayin which its Islamic message was tied to its organizational structure, activities, andstrategies and the everyday lives of Egyptians. The analysis suggests that ideas areintegrated into social movements in more ways than the concept of framing allows.It also expands our understanding of how organizations can arise in highly repressiveenvironments.

馬哈茂德·埃扎特(Mahmoud Ezzat)在半島電視台的艾哈邁德·曼蘇(Ahmed Mansur)進行的全面採訪中

Mahmoud Ezzat

博士. 馬哈茂德·伊扎特, 穆斯林兄弟會秘書長, 在對半島電視台的艾哈邁德·曼蘇爾(Ahmed Mansour)進行的全面採訪中,確定了指導局成員計劃在未來一段時間內舉行的穆斯林兄弟會主席選舉對所有希望提交提名文件的候選人開放.

在脫口秀節目Bila Hedood的發言中 (無邊無界) 在半島電視台上, 埃扎特(Ezzat)解釋說,穆斯林兄弟會的候選人通常不應使用提名文件,而應提交整個兄弟會由100名成員組成的舒拉委員會的完整清單,以選舉兄弟會主席和指導局. 他否認兄弟會修羅理事會總領導力總指南不允許他自由做出自己的最終決定. 他還透露,安理會有權要求主席對任何失敗負責,如果有需要,可隨時將其解僱。.

他強調說,運動準備作出最終犧牲,以實踐修羅的原則 (諮詢服務) 在...的範圍內, 指出修羅議會將在來年選出主席和新的指導局.

他對媒體對指導局幕後實際發生情況的報導發表了評論, 指出該委員會由博士等領導人物組成. 艾薩姆·埃里安(Essam el-Erian)和許多指導局成員,負責印製主席對先生的每周聲明. Mahdi Akef希望意見分歧. 阿克夫的第一個任期將於一月結束 13, 2010 但是他早些時候宣布; 他仍將決定是否繼續擔任該小組的一般指導第二任期.

他繼續說,現年81歲的阿克夫早些時候已通知指導局成員,他打算辭職,不會再連任。. 主席團成員立即作出回應,敦促他繼續任職.

在他的每週留言中, 馬赫迪·阿克夫(Mahdi Akef)含糊地提到了他不打算連任第二任總統的意圖,並感謝穆斯林兄弟會和指導局成員與他分擔責任,好像他希望這是他的告別演講一樣。. 星期日, 十月 17 媒體聲稱兄弟會主席已宣布辭職。; 但是,主席一再否認媒體指控他第二天去辦公室與成員會面. 後來他發表聲明披露真相. 媒體關於指導局不願任命博士的指控. Essam el-Erian完全是假的.

博士. 馬哈茂德·埃扎特(Mahmoud Ezzat)確定,該運動很高興為會員提供一個分享意見的機會, 強調這是權力與現有規模和領導角色相匹配的體現, 表明穆斯林兄弟會主席對此感到非常高興.

他強調,所有問題都將由指導辦公室作出最終決定,其決議對所有人都具有約束力並令人滿意。, 不管意見分歧.

“我不會小看已經發生的事情,或者我只是說沒有危機, 與此同時, 我們不應該把事情從上下文中吹出來, 我們決心應用修羅原則”, 他加了.

指導局隨後的會議早些時候曾討論過,該小組的修羅理事會有權將指導局成員選為任何成員, 他解釋. 博士. Essam本人同意,由於選舉臨近,因此不適合在兄弟會指導局任命新成員.

埃扎特(Ezzat)表示,在國家安全部門頻繁逮捕和拘留期間,該集錦是應指導辦公室的建議提交舒拉委員會的. 我們努力爭取讓修羅理事會選拔下一個指導辦公室主席和成員. 預計將解決整個問題, 真主願意, 一月之前 13.

MB指導局主席和成員在本次會議上決定致信Shura委員會, 強調這些選舉的日期不得遲於六個月. 據推測,程序將在選舉之前或之中進行,其中 5 去年選出新成員. 這是修羅議會的決定,而不是MB指導局的決定. 所以, 總工會的修羅議會終於達成了盡快舉行選舉的一致決定.

他強調穆斯林兄弟會, 與修羅的執行是由其內部法規組織的. 修羅議會法律通過和倡導的法規,可能會發生變化. 正在進行其中一項條款的最新修正案是指導辦公室成員的任期期限,條件是該成員的任期不得超過兩個連續任期.

指導辦公室的一些成員被指控堅持任職多年。; 博士. 埃扎特(Ezzat)聲稱,頻繁的逮捕並不排除執行局的任何行為,這促使我們修改了內部條例中的另一條,該條規定即使被拘留的成員仍保持其成員身份. 缺乏為他們國家的福利所做的光榮的工作和崇高的使命使我們堅持要求他們維持其成員資格. 工程師Khayrat Al-Shater將繼續擔任MB的第二副主席和博士. Mohammed Ali Bishr,MB執行局成員. 預計Bishr將於下個月發布.

博士. 馬哈茂德·埃扎特(Mahmoud Ezzat)完全否認了反對派內部關於領導層內部衝突的傳聞, 強調機制, 法規和條款為選拔運動領導人鋪平了道路. 他還指出,埃及的地理環境和穆斯林世界中相當大的道德分量證明,MB主席必須是埃及人.

“指導辦公室目前正在探討兄弟會由修羅理事會100名成員組成的一般趨勢,即提名合適的候選人擔任主席”, 他說.

“很難預測誰將成為下一任主席, 注意 5 任命先生之前的幾分鐘. 阿克夫(Akef)擔任主席,沒人知道, 選票只決定誰將成為新領導人”, 他說.

博士. 馬哈茂德·埃扎特(Mahmoud Ezzat)將媒體關於其關於兄弟會最高領導人的言論的指控顯然相互矛盾,這歸因於媒體對高層領導的報導存在著不一致的情況,各家報紙對此有所不同.

博士. 馬哈茂德·埃扎特(Mahmoud Ezzat)的安全突襲行動引起了人們的注意,導致一些人被捕 2696 該組的成員 2007, 3674 在 2008 和 5022 在 2009. 這導致修羅議會無法舉行會議和競選.

他還強調,穆斯林兄弟會非常熱衷於維護埃及的國家安全及其’ 對社會實現和平改革的興趣. “我們很清楚,儘管我們只打算實行民主,但指導辦公室的會議受到安全監督。. 事實上, 我們不想引起他人的敵意和敵意”.

他還強調,組織內部的差異並非出於仇恨或個人差異,因為伊斯蘭崇高教義所鼓舞的體面脾氣鼓勵我們寬容意見分歧. 他補充說,歷史證明,穆斯林兄弟會運動比當前的危機所遇到的困難要大得多。.

媒體已經預測出穆斯林兄弟會的負面形象,他們依靠SSI調查獲得信息. 當務之急是,記者要想獲得某種信譽就必須從原始資料中獲取事實. 實際上,司法機構已使州調查中報告的所有指控無效, 他說.

博士. 馬哈茂德·埃扎特(Mahmoud Ezzat)樂觀地認為當前的政治危機將過去,他斷言事件將證明穆斯林兄弟會以其一切崇高的態度, 客觀性, 民主的實踐將閃耀著光芒.

發表於 Ikhwanweb