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A Muslim Archipelago

Max L. brut

This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.

INDONESIA’S ELECTIONS

Bernhard Platzdasch

AS INDONESIA gears up for its elections next April, making sense of developments can be a challenge.
Take, for example, the latest election forecasts. In a recent opinion poll, the Indonesian Survey Institute named President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s DemocratsParty (PD) as the leading contender with an approval rating of 16.8 per cent. The party was followed by Vice-President Jusuf Kalla’s Golkar Party with 15.9 per cent and Ms Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) with 14.2 per cent. But several surveys had earlier this year put PDI-P and
Golkar first and second, with PD taking third or fourth place. Another noteworthy difference in the latest survey is the meagre 4.9 per cent for the Islamist Justice and Welfare Party (PKS). Earlier surveys put the PKSshare a few points higher and the party has even claimed that it can achieve some 20 per cent of the total vote.
Without forgetting that the forecasts have limited credibility due to the large number of undecided voters, what conclusions can be drawn from the varying results of these surveys?
Primer, it is almost certain that no party will secure an outright victory, thus paving the way for yet anotherand again potentially brittlecoalition government. With no party gaining an absolute majority, contenders for the presidential elections in July
will need the endorsement of other parties. As for Dr Yudhoyono, he and Golkar will probably continue their partnership. But Ms Megawati has already made it clear that she is not willing to serve as vice-president. This means a coalition made up of Golkar
and the PDI-P is unlikely.

Muslim Americans Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream

Pew Research Center

Muslims constitute a growing and increasingly important segment of American society.Yet there is surprisingly little quantitative research about the attitudes and opinions of thissegment of the public for two reasons. Primer, Els EUA. Census is forbidden by law from askingquestions about religious belief and affiliation, i, as a result, we know very little about thebasic demographic characteristics of Muslim Americans. Segon, Muslim Americans comprisesuch a small percentage of the U.S. population that general population surveys do not interview asufficient number of them to allow for meaningful analysis.This Pew Research Center study is therefore the first ever nationwide survey to attempt tomeasure rigorously the demographics, attitudes and experiences of Muslim Americans. It buildson surveys conducted in 2006 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project of Muslim minority publics inGreat Britain, França, Germany and Spain. The Muslim American survey also follows on Pew’sglobal surveys conducted over the past five years with more than 30,000 Muslims in 22 nationsaround the world since 2002.The methodological approach employed was the most comprehensive ever used to studyMuslim Americans. Nearly 60,000 respondents were interviewed to find a representative sampleof Muslims. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, Urdu and Farsi, as well as English. Subsamplesof the national poll were large enough to explore how various subgroups of thepopulationincluding recent immigrants, native-born converts, and selected ethnic groupsincluding those of Arab, Pakistani, and African American heritagediffer in their attitudesThe survey also contrasts the views of the Muslim population as a whole with those ofthe U.S. general population, and with the attitudes of Muslims all around the world, includingWestern Europe. Finalment, findings from the survey make important contributions to the debateover the total size of the Muslim American population.The survey is a collaborative effort of a number of Pew Research Center projects,including the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, the Pew Forum on Religion &Public Life and the Pew Hispanic Center. The project was overseen by Pew Research CenterPresident Andrew Kohut and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Director Luis Lugo. ThePew Research Center’s Director of Survey Research, Scott Keeter, served as project director forthe study, with the close assistance of Gregory Smith, Research Fellow at the Pew Forum. Manyother Pew researchers participated in the design, execution and analysis of the survey.

Towards Understanding Islam

Sayyid Mawdudi

THE MEANING OF ISLAM

Every religion of the world has been named either after its founder or after the community ornation in which it was born. Per exemple, Christianity takes its name from its prophet JesusChrist; Buddhism from its founder, Gautama Buddha; Zoroastrianism from its founderZoroaster-, and Judaism, the religion of the Jews, from the name of the tribe Judah (of thecountry of Judea) where it originated. The same is true of all other religions except Islam, whichenjoys the unique distinction of having no such association with any particular person or peopleor country. Nor is it the product of any human mind. It is a universal religion and itsobjective is to create and cultivate in man the quality and attitude of Islam.Islam, de fet, is an attributive title. Anyone who possesses this attribute, whatever race,community, country or group he belongs to, is a Muslim. According to the Qur’an (the HolyBook of the Muslims), among every people and in all ages there have been good and righteouspeople who possessed this attributeand all of them were and are Muslims.IslamWhat Does it Mean?Islam is an Arabic word and connotes submission, surrender and obedience. As a religion,Islam stands for complete submission and obedience to Allah.1Everyone can see that we live in an orderly universe, where everything is assigned a place in agrand scheme. The moon, the stars and all the heavenly bodies are knit together in amagnificent system. They follow unalterable laws and make not even the slightest deviation fromtheir ordained courses. De la mateixa manera, everything in the world, from the minute whirling electron tothe mighty nebulae, invariably follows its own laws. Matter, energy and lifeall obey their lawsand grow and change and live and die in accordance with those laws. Even in the human worldthe laws of nature are paramount. Man’s birth, growth and life are all regulated by a set ofbiological laws. He derives sustenance from nature in accordance with an unalterable law. Allthe organs of his body, from the smallest tissues to the heart and the brain, are governedby the laws prescribed for them. In short, ours is a law-governed universe and everything in it isfollowing the course that has been ordained for it.

Middle East Democracy Promotion Is Not a One-way Street

Marina Ottaway

Els EUA. administration is under pressure to revive democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East,but momentum toward political reform has stalled in most of the region. Opposition parties are at lowebb, and governments are more firmly in control than ever. While new forms of activism, such as laborprotests and a growing volume of blogging critical of government and opposition parties have becomewidespread, they have yet to prove effective as means of influencing leaders to change long-standingpolicies.The last time a U.S. administration faced such unfavorable circumstances in advancing political reformswas over 30 years ago, when the Helsinki process was launched during the Cold War. That experiencetaught us that the United States needs to give reluctant interlocutors something they want if itexpects them to engage on issues they would rather not address. If Washington wants Arab countriesto discuss the universal democratic principles that should underpin their political systems, it needs to beprepared to discuss the universal principles that should underpin its own Middle East policies.

ISLAMISM IN SOUTHERN EGYPT

James Toth

For years, religious violence and terrorism in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypthave splashed across the headlines and surged across the screen, announcing yet anotherround of senseless death and destruction. While Arabists and Islamicists attemptto pick their way carefully through the ideological and intellectual minefields to makesense of what is happening, the wider public generally disregards their insights andinstead sticks to what it knows best: deeply ingrained prejudices and biases. egipci,àrab, Muslim—all are painted in a very unfavorable light. Even in Egypt, manybystanders show the same sorry prejudices. In the end, people simply blame the brutalityon inexplicable backward religious ideas and then move on.Yet comprehending terrorism and violence in places such as Egypt by recourse toan unnuanced religious fundamentalism is generally acknowledged not only to begthe question of why these events actually happen, but also to lead to misunderstandingsand misperceptions, and perhaps even to exacerbating existing tensions.1 Mostscholars agree that such seemingly “irrational” social behavior instead needs to beplaced in its appropriate context to be properly understood, and hence made rational.Analyzing these actions, then, involves situating this violence and destruction in theireconomic, political, and ideological milieu as these have developed historically, forthis so-called Islamic terrorism does not merely arise, ex nihilo, out of a timeless void.What follows, then, is one case study of one portion of the Islamic movement as itemerged principally in southern Egypt and as it was revealed through anthropologicalfieldwork conducted in one of this region’s major cities. This account takes a completelydifferent direction from that of stigmatizing this movement as a sordid collectionof terrorist organizations hell bent on the senseless destruction of Egypt and itsIslamic civilization.2 Because this view is somewhat at odds with the perceptions oflocal spectators, Egyptians in Cairo, and non–Egyptians inside and outside the country,I go to some length not only to discuss the movement itself but also to shed lighton why it might have received such negative publicity.

MB goes Rural

Hossam Tamman


The May 2008 elections of the Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Bureau show that the grouphas undergone a major transformation. The Muslim Brotherhood used to be an urban group inits membership and style of management. Now its cultural patterns and loyalties are taking ona rural garb. Com a resultat, the Muslim Brotherhood is losing the clarity of direction and methodit once had.Over the past few years, the Muslim Brotherhood has been infused with rural elements. Itstone is becoming more and more patriarchal, and its members are showing their superiors thekind of deference associated with countryside traditions. You hear them referring to their topofficials as theuncle hajj “, “the big hajj “, “our blessed one”, “the blessed man of ourcircle”, “the crown on our heads”, etc. Occasionally, they even kiss the hands and heads of thetop leaders. Not long ago, a Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarian kissed the hand of thesupreme guide in public.These patterns of behaviour are new to the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that emerged andoperated mostly in an urban context. The new ways of speech and behaviour, which I willrefer to as theruralisationof the Muslim Brotherhood, have affected every aspect of thegroup’s internal operations. In its recent elections, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained a tightlid of secrecy, offered the public contradictory information, and generally seemed to beoperating with little regard for established procedure.The Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council elections emphasised ritual over order. The mainconcern of the Brotherhood, throughout the recent elections, seemed to be with maintainingan aura of respect for the leadership and getting the rank-and- file to offer unquestioningloyalty to top officials.A system of secondary loyalties has emerged inside the Muslim Brotherhood, in nearindependence from all considerations of institutional work. Entire geographical areas, indeedentire governorates, are now viewed as political fiefdoms pertaining to one MuslimBrotherhood leader or another. Muslim Brotherhood members would refer to a certain city orgovernorate as being the turf of certain individuals.Duplicity, another trait of rural communities, is also rampant. Feigned allegiance is common,with members saying one thing in private and another in public. As is the custom in thecountryside, deference to authority is often coupled with resistance to change. Com a resultat,you’d see members pretending to listen to their Muslim Brotherhood superiors while payinglittle or no attention to what they say. Many of the new ideas put forward by MuslimBrotherhood leaders have been ignored, or at least diluted and then discarded.When a Brotherhood member comes up with a new idea, the Muslim Brotherhood leadershipreacts as if that member spoke out of order. Self- criticism is increasingly being frowned uponand the dominant thinking within the Brotherhood is becoming traditionalist andunquestioning.The Muslim Brotherhood has been active in recruiting teachers and professors. But most ofthe new recruits are rural in their culture and understanding of public life. Despite theirscholarly pedigree, many of the academics that have joined the Brotherhood are parochial intheir understanding of the world. The Muslim Brotherhood has nearly 3,000 universityprofessors in its ranks, and few or any of those are endowed with the habit of critical thinking.They may be academics, but they are no visionaries.In the recent Muslim Brotherhood elections, five members of the group’s Shura Council wonseats in the Guidance Bureau. Most of those were either from rural areas or people with apronounced rural lifestyle. Four were from the countryside, including Saadeddin El-Husseinifrom Sharqiya, Mohamed Hamed from Mahala Al-Kobra, Saadeddin El-Katatni from Minya.Only one was from a metropolitan centre: Osama Nasr from Alexandria.Over the past decade or so, most of the newcomers to the Guidance Bureau were from thecountryside: Mahmoud Hussein from Assiut, Sabri Arafa El-Komi from Daqahliya, andMohamed Mursi from Sharqiya. Rural governorates, such as Assiut, Minya, Daqahliya andSharqiya, are now in control of much of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially middle-rankingposts, while Cairo and Alexandria have seen their status gradually erode. The Brotherhoodleadership is encouraging the trend, for rural people are less prone to challenging theirleaders.There was a time when the Muslim Brotherhood appealed mainly to an urban audience. Butsince the late 1980s things have changed. Due to the long-running confrontation with theregime, the Muslim Brotherhood has found it harder to recruit urban supporters. També, the lackof innovation in Muslim Brotherhood ways has turned off many city dwellers. Instead ofjoining the Muslim Brotherhood, the young and disgruntled, as well as those seeking spiritualsalvation, have joined the Salafi current or become followers of the country’s new breed ofwell- spoken televangelists. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood has mostly abandonedreligious propagation in favour of politics may have accelerated this trend.What the Muslim Brotherhood has to offer is something that city dwellers don’t really need.The Muslim Brotherhood offers an alternative family, a cloning of the village communitywith its personalised support system. This is something that appeals best to new arrivals fromthe countryside, to people who miss the stability and comfort of a traditional community.The attraction of countryside people to the Muslim Brotherhood over the past two decadescoincided with the disintegration of the extended family and the weakening of communal ties.Moreover, the Westernisation of city life may have pushed many people with a ruralbackground into seeking a moral and social refuge in the Muslim Brotherhood.In universities, the Muslim Brotherhood attracts newcomers to the cities rather than originalcity dwellers. It is more successful in recruitment among students in Al-Azhar University thanin other universities, and more successful in rural governorates than in Cairo and Alexandria.Following the 1952 Revolution, Egypt as a whole underwent a wave of ruralisation. But eventhen, the Muslim Brotherhood focussed its recruitment on people with an urban lifestyle. Fiftyyears ago, the Muslim Brotherhood recruited mostly among the sons of governmentemployees, teachers, and generally the white-collared class. Egypt’s countryside was notwelcoming to the Muslim Brotherhood or its outlook. Now, the Muslim Brotherhood hasgone so conventional that it is gaining ground in the countryside.The Muslim Brotherhood can run effective campaigns and even win elections in many areasin Egypt’s countryside. No obstant això, it is my belief that the countryside is affecting the MuslimBrotherhood more than the Muslim Brotherhood is affecting it.In Hassan El-Banna’s time, Muslim Brotherhood leaders were mostly urban in their ways:Hassan El-Hodeibi, Omar El-Telmesani, Hassan Ashmawi, Mounir Dallah, Abdel-QaderHelmi and Farid Abdel Khaleq. Even in the countryside, top Muslim Brotherhood memberswere known for their urban lifestyle: Mohamed Hamed Abul- Naser and Abbas Al-Sisi, forexample.By contrast, the new breed of Muslim Brotherhood leaders is rural in its ways. This goes evenfor Cairo-based Muslim Brotherhood leaders including Mohamed Mursi, Saad El-Katatni,Saad Al-Husseini and Sabri Arafa El-Komi. And the Muslim Brotherhood supreme guide,Mahdi Akef, is more rural in his leadership style than his predecessor, Maamoun Al-Hodeibi.

Political Islam Gaining Ground

Michael A. llarg

characteristics of the democratic order. Their newly-discovered acceptance of elections andparliamentary processes results not least from a gradual democratisation of the formerlyauthoritarian regimes these groups had fought by terrorist means even in their home countries.The prime example of this development is Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, which started out as acharitable social movement and has now become the most powerful political opposition force inEgypt.Founded in the 1920s, the Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest Islamic organisation of the Arabworld today. Following the ideas of its founder Al-Banna, it intended to return to a state of ‘trueIslam’, és a dir. to return to the way of life of the early Islamic congregation at the time of theProphet, and to establish a community of social justice. This vision was increasingly viewed as acounterweight to the Western social model that was marked by secularisation, moral decay, andgreed. During World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood even founded a secret military arm, whoseactivities, malgrat això, were uncovered, leading to the execution of Mr Al-Banna by Egypt’s secretpolice

In the Shadow of the Brothers

Omayma Abdel-Latif

Al Setembre 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt released its fi rst politicalparty platform draft. Among the heavily criticized clauses was one that deniedwomen (and Copts) the right to be head of state. “Duties and responsibilities assumed by the head of state, such as army commanding, are in contradictionwith the socially acceptable roles for women,” the draft stated. In previousBrotherhood documents there was no specifi c mention of the position of headof state; rather, they declared that women were allowed to occupy all postsexcept for al-imama al-kubra, the position of caliph, which is the equivalentof a head of state in modern times. Many were surprised that despite severalprogressive moves the Brotherhood had made in previous years to empowerwomen, it ruled out women’s right to the country’s top position.Although the platform was only a fi rst draft, the Muslim Brotherhood’s banon women in Egypt’s top offi ce revived old, but serious, questions regardingthe Islamist movement’s stand on the place and role of the “Sisters” inside themovement. The Brotherhood earlier had taken an advanced position concerningwomen, as refl ected in its naming of women candidates for parliamentaryand municipal elections in 2000, 2005, i 2007, as well as the growingnumbers of women involved in Brotherhood political activities, such as streetprotests and elections. Although the platform recognizes women as key politicalactors, it was considered a retreat from the movement’s advanced positionin some earlier electoral platforms.

The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Nathan J. marró
Amr Hamzawy

In the late summer 2007, amid great anticipation from Egypt’s ruling elite and opposition movements, the Muslim Brotherhood distributed the first draft of a party platform to a group of intellectuals and analysts. The platform was not to serve as a document for an existing political party or even one about to be founded: the Brotherhood remains without legal recognition in Egypt and Egypt’s rulers and the laws they have enacted make the prospect of legal recognition for a Brotherhood-founded party seem distant. But the Brotherhood’s leadership clearly wished to signal what sort of party they would found if allowed to do so.

With the circulation of the draft document, the movement opened its doors to discussion and even contentious debate about the main ideas of the platform, the likely course of the Brotherhood’s political role, and the future of its relationship with other political forces in the country.1 In this paper, we seek to answer four questions concerning the Brotherhood’s

party platform:

1. What are the specific controversies and divisions generated by the platform?


2. Why and how has the platform proved so divisive?


3. Given the divisions it caused as well as the inauspicious political environment,

why was a platform drafted at this time?


4. How will these controversies likely be resolved?


We also offer some observations about the Brotherhood’s experience with

drafting a party platform and demonstrate how its goals have only been partly

met. Ultimately, the integration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a normal political

actor will depend not only on the movement’s words but also on the deeds

of a regime that seems increasingly hostile to the Brotherhood’s political role.

Els Germans Musulmans a Bèlgica

Steve Merley,
analista sènior


Des de llavors, els Germans Musulmans Globals són presents a Europa 1960 quan va dir Ramadan, nét de Hassan Al-Banna, va fundar una mesquita a Munic.1 Des d’aleshores,S'han establert organitzacions de germandats a gairebé tots els països de la UE, així com països no membres de la UE com Rússia i Turquia. Tot i operar amb altres noms, algunes de les organitzacions dels països més grans són reconegudes com a part de la Germanor Musulmana global. Per exemple, la Unió d'Organitzacions Islàmiques de França (UOIF) generalment es considera part dels Germans Musulmans a França. La xarxa també s'està fent coneguda en alguns dels països més petits, com ara els Països Baixos, on un informe recent de la Fundació NEFA detallava les activitats dels Germans Musulmans en aquest país.2 La veïna Bèlgica també s'ha convertit en un centre important per als Germans Musulmans a Europa.. A 2002 L'informe del Comitè d'Intel·ligència del Parlament belga va explicar com funciona la Germandat a Bèlgica:“Des de llavors, el Servei de Seguretat de l'Estat segueix les activitats dels Germans Musulmans Internacionals a Bèlgica 1982. La Germandat Musulmana Internacional té una estructura clandestina des de fa gairebé 20 anys. La identitat dels membres és secreta; operen amb la màxima discreció. Busquen difondre la seva ideologia dins de la comunitat islàmica de Bèlgica i s'adrecen especialment als joves de la segona i tercera generació d'immigrants.. A Bèlgica com a altres països europeus, intenten prendre el control dels religiosos, socials, i associacions esportives i s'estableixen com a interlocutors privilegiats de les autoritats nacionals per gestionar els afers islàmics.. Els Germans Musulmans assumeixen que les autoritats nacionals seran pressionades cada cop més perquè escollissin líders musulmans per a aquesta gestió i,en aquest context, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

Brigi Mariscal t vostè
Shumuliyyat al-islam (Islam as encompassing every aspect of life) is the first of twenty principles laid out by the
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, Hassan al-Banna, to teach his followers the proper understanding
of Islam. Even though this principle, usually translated as the “comprehensive way of life,” still remains integral
to the teachings of the members of the Brotherhood, tant a Egipte com a Europa, és prou estrany
ni comentat en referències acadèmiques ni pel públic en general. Quan la Federació Islàmica
Organitzacions a Europa (FIOE, representant el moviment dels Germans Musulmans a nivell europeu) va presentar al gener la Carta musulmana europea a la premsa internacional 2008, cap va assenyalar aquesta "dimensió universal" de la seva comprensió de l'Islam malgrat les possibles tensions o fins i tot incompatibilitats., tant polítics com
legal, que aquest concepte podria tenir en un discurs sobre integració i ciutadania. Què diuen tradicionalment els Germans Musulmans sobre aquest concepte i com justifiquen la seva crida? Quins són els seus components
i l'abast de la seva aplicació? Hi ha alguna modificació significativa al concepte per intentar contextualitzar-lo dins d'una Europa pluralista??

ISLAMIC MOBILIZATION

Ziad Munson

This article examines the emergence and growth of the Muslim Brotherhood inEgypt from the 1930s through the 1950s. It begins by outlining and empirically evaluatingpossible explanations for the organization’s growth based on (1) theories of politicalIslam and (2) the concept of political opportunity structure in social movementtheory. An extension of these approaches is suggested based on data from organizationaldocuments and declassiŽed U.S. State Department Žles from the period. Thesuccessful mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood was possible because of the wayin which its Islamic message was tied to its organizational structure, activities, andstrategies and the everyday lives of Egyptians. The analysis suggests that ideas areintegrated into social movements in more ways than the concept of framing allows.It also expands our understanding of how organizations can arise in highly repressiveenvironments.

Mahmoud Ezzat en una entrevista exhaustiva amb Ahmed Mansur d'Al Jazeera

Mahmoud Ezzat

dr. Mahmoud Ezzat, Secretari general dels Germans Musulmans, en una entrevista exhaustiva amb Ahmed Mansour, d'Al Jazeera, va assegurar que les eleccions per a la presidència dels Germans Musulmans que els membres de l'Oficina d'Orientació tenen previst celebrar-hi en el proper període estan obertes a tothom que vulgui presentar els seus documents de nominació com a candidat..

En la seva declaració a la tertúlia Bila Hedood (Sense Fronteres) a Al-Jazeera TV, Ezzat va explicar que els papers de nominació generalment no s'han d'utilitzar per als candidats dels Germans Musulmans, sinó que es presenta una llista completa del Consell de Shura de 100 membres de la Germandat per escollir el President i l'Oficina d'Orientació de la Germandat.. Va negar que la Guia General de la Germandat per al lideratge del Consell General de la Shura no li permetés la llibertat de treballar pel seu compte per prendre la seva decisió final.. També ha revelat que el Consell té l'autoritat per exigir comptes al President de qualsevol incompliment i, si és necessari, destituir-lo en qualsevol moment..

Va destacar que el moviment està preparat per fer el sacrifici final per tal de practicar el principi de la Shura (consulta) dins de les files de, assenyalant que el Consell Shura elegirà el president i una nova Oficina d'Orientació l'any vinent.

Va comentar sobre la cobertura dels mitjans del que realment va passar darrere de les escenes a l'Oficina d'Orientació, citant que el comitè que estava format per figures destacades com el Dr. Essam el-Erian i alguns dels membres de l'Oficina d'Orientació responsables d'imprimir la declaració setmanal del president es van oposar al Sr.. El desig de Mahdi Akef és una petita diferència d'opinió. El primer mandat d'Akef finalitzarà el gener 13, 2010 tanmateix ho ha anunciat abans; encara prendrà la decisió de si es mantindrà en el càrrec un segon mandat com a guia general del grup.

Va continuar dient que l'Akef, de 81 anys, havia informat abans als membres de l'Oficina d'Orientació que tenia la intenció de dimitir i que no ocuparà un segon mandat.. Els membres de la Mesa van respondre immediatament instant-lo a continuar en el càrrec.

En el seu missatge setmanal, Mahdi Akef es va referir vagament a les seves intencions de no presentar un segon mandat i va agrair als Germans Musulmans i als membres de l'Oficina d'Orientació que van compartir amb ell la responsabilitat com si volgués que fos el seu discurs de comiat.. El diumenge, Octubre 17 els mitjans van afirmar que el president de la Confraria havia anunciat la seva dimissió; no obstant això, el president ha negat repetidament les acusacions dels mitjans de comunicació on va venir a l'oficina l'endemà i es va reunir amb els membres.. Més tard va emetre un comunicat revelant la veritat. Les denúncies dels mitjans de comunicació sobre la falta de voluntat de l'Oficina d'Orientació per nomenar el Dr. Essam el-Erian són totalment falsos.

dr. Mahmoud Ezzat va assegurar que el moviment es complau a oferir una oportunitat als membres de compartir les seves opinions, subratllar que és una manifestació de poder que coincideix amb la seva gran mida existent i el seu paper principal, indicant que el president dels Germans Musulmans està molt satisfet de fer-ho.

Va destacar que totes les qüestions tornen a l'Oficina d'Orientació per a la decisió final on les seves resolucions siguin vinculants i satisfactòries per a tots., independentment de les diferències d'opinió.

“No subestimo el que ja ha passat o simplement diria que no hi ha crisi, al mateix temps, no hem de treure les coses del seu context, estem decidits a aplicar el principi de Shura”, va afegir.

Es va discutir anteriorment a la reunió posterior de l'Oficina d'Orientació que el Consell Shura del grup té el dret exclusiu d'elegir membres de l'Oficina d'Orientació a qualsevol membre., va explicar. dr. El mateix Essam va acceptar que no era adequat nomenar un nou membre a l'Oficina d'Orientació de la Germandat, ja que les eleccions s'acosten..

Ezzat va declarar que l'episodi es va presentar al Consell Shura per recomanació de l'oficina d'orientació enmig de freqüents arrests i detencions realitzades per la seguretat de l'estat.. Ens esforcem molt per implicar el Consell Shura per triar el proper president i els membres de l'Oficina d'Orientació. S'espera que es resolgui tot el tema, Allah vol, abans de gener 13.

En aquesta reunió, el president i els membres de l'Oficina d'Orientació de MB van decidir enviar una carta al Consell de Shura., subratllant que la data d'aquestes eleccions no serà posterior als sisè mesos. Es va suposar que el procediment es portaria a terme abans o durant les eleccions en què 5 nous membres van ser escollits l'any passat. És una decisió del Consell Shura i no de l'Oficina d'Orientació de MB. conseqüentment, el Consell de Shura del grup general va arribar finalment a la seva decisió unànime de celebrar eleccions el més aviat possible.

Va destacar que els Germans Musulmans, amb l'aplicació de la Shura s'organitza pel seu reglament intern. Reglaments que s'adopten i defensen per lleis del Consell Shura i estan subjectes a canvis. La modificació més recent en curs amb una de les seves clàusules és la durada del mandat d'un membre de l'Oficina d'Orientació preveu que un membre no ha de servir més de dos mandats consecutius..

Alguns membres de l'Oficina d'Orientació van ser acusats de la seva adhesió a mantenir-se en el càrrec durant molts anys; dr. Ezzat va afirmar que les freqüents detencions que no excloïen ningú a la Mesa Executiva ens van impulsar a modificar un altre article del Reglament intern que preveu que un membre mantingui la seva condició de membre encara que fos detingut.. L'absència dels honorables treballant pel benestar del seu país i la sublim missió ens va portar a insistir perquè mantinguessin la seva adhesió.. L'enginyer Khayrat Al-Shater es mantindrà com a segon vicepresident del MB i el Dr. Mohammed Ali Bishr, membre del Bureau Executiu de MB. S'espera que Bishr surti el mes que ve.

dr. Mahmoud Ezzat va negar completament els rumors sobre conflictes interns dins del grup de l'oposició pel que fa al lideratge, subratllant que els mecanismes, els reglaments i els termes estan obrint el camí per seleccionar els líders del moviment. També va assenyalar que la situació geogràfica d'Egipte i el pes moral considerable dins del món musulmà justifiquen la necessitat que el president de MB sigui egipci..

“Actualment, l'Oficina d'Orientació està explorant la tendència general del Consell de Shura de 100 membres de la Germandat pel que fa a la nominació d'un candidat adequat apte per assumir el càrrec com a president.”, Ell va dir.

“És molt difícil predir qui serà el proper president, assenyalant que 5 minuts abans de nomenar el Sr. Akef com a president ningú ho sabia, les urnes només van decidir qui seria el nou líder”, Ell va dir.

dr. Mahmoud Ezzat va atribuir els informes aparents contradictoris dels mitjans de comunicació sobre les seves al·legacions sobre comentaris sobre els màxims dirigents de la Germandat a les mateixes inconsistències dels informes dels mitjans de comunicació sobre líders alts que varien d'un diari a un altre..

dr. Mahmoud Ezzat va donar llum amb xifres sobre les batudes de seguretat que van portar a la detenció d'alguns 2696 membres del grup en 2007, 3674 en 2008 i 5022 en 2009. Això va provocar la incapacitat del Consell de Shura per celebrar reunions i competir a eleccions.

També va subratllar que els Germans Musulmans estan molt interessats en mantenir la seguretat nacional d'Egipte i la seva’ interès per aconseguir una reforma pacífica de la societat. “Som ben conscients que les reunions de l'Oficina d'Orientació estan vigilades per la seguretat encara que només pretenem practicar la democràcia.. De fet, no volem provocar l'hostilitat i animositat dels altres”.

També va subratllar que les diferències dins de l'organització no estan motivades per l'odi o les diferències personals, ja que els temperaments decents fomentats pels sublims ensenyaments de l'Islam ens animen a tolerar la diferència d'opinions.. Va afegir que la història ha demostrat que el moviment dels Germans Musulmans s'ha trobat amb circumstàncies molt més difícils que la crisi actual..

Els mitjans de comunicació han projectat una imatge negativa dels Germans Musulmans on confiaven en les investigacions de l'SSI per obtenir informació. És imprescindible que els periodistes obtinguin fets de les fonts originals si volen tenir algun tipus de credibilitat. De fet, el poder judicial ha invalidat totes les acusacions denunciades en la investigació estatal, Ell va dir.

dr. Mahmoud Ezzat es mostra optimista que l'actual crisi política passi i assegura que els esdeveniments demostraran que els Germans Musulmans amb totes les seves maneres nobles, objectivitat, i la pràctica de la democràcia brillarà amb nota.

Publicat el Ikhwanweb