中的所有條目 "哥 & 西方" 類別

伊斯蘭改革

阿德南汗

西方的伊斯蘭教

塞薩里主任Jocelyne

對伊斯蘭政治思想的選舉後重讀

Roxanne L. Euben

伊斯蘭教與西方

Preface

約翰·Ĵ. DeGioia

The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, 政治, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. 事實上, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

民主, 恐怖主義與美國在阿拉伯世界的政策

F. 格雷戈里·高斯

聲稱中心: 轉型中的政治伊斯蘭

約翰大號. 埃斯波西托

1990年代的政治伊斯蘭教, 有些人叫什麼 “伊斯蘭原教旨主義,” 從北非到東南亞，在政府和反對派政治中仍然佔有重要地位. 權力和政治中的政治伊斯蘭教提出了許多問題和疑問: “伊斯蘭教與現代化對立嗎?,” “伊斯蘭教和民主不相容嗎?,” “伊斯蘭政府對多元化有何影響, 少數群體和婦女權利,” “伊斯蘭主義者的代表性有多大,” “有伊斯蘭溫和派嗎?,” “西方是否應該害怕跨國伊斯蘭威脅或文明衝突?” 當代伊斯蘭復興主義 當今穆斯林世界的景觀揭示了新的伊斯蘭共和國的出現 (伊朗, 蘇丹, 阿富汗), 在現有系統中充當主要政治和社會行為者的伊斯蘭運動的擴散, 以及激進的暴力極端分子的對抗性政治。_ 與 1980 年代政治伊斯蘭被簡單地等同於革命的伊朗或具有伊斯蘭聖戰或上帝之軍等名稱的秘密團體形成鮮明對比, 1990 年代的穆斯林世界是伊斯蘭主義者參與選舉過程並以總理身份出現的世界, 內閣官員, 國民議會議長, 議員, 和埃及等不同國家的市長, 蘇丹, 火雞, 伊朗, 黎巴嫩, 科威特, 也門, 約旦, 巴基斯坦, 孟加拉國, 馬來西亞, 印度尼西亞, 和以色列/巴勒斯坦. 在二十一世紀初, 政治伊斯蘭教仍然是全球政治秩序和混亂的主要力量, 參與政治進程但也參與恐怖主義行為的人, 對穆斯林世界和西方的挑戰. 了解當今政治伊斯蘭教的本質, 特別是從最近的經驗中出現的問題和問題, 對政府仍然至關重要, 決策者, 和國際政治的學生一樣.

這是政策, 愚蠢的

約翰大號. 埃斯波西托

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. 襯套. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. 然而, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, 恐怖主義, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. 從而, 例如, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?

解決美國的伊斯蘭困境

穆斯林知識分子關於伊斯蘭教的國際磋商 & 政治

史汀生中心 & 政策研究所

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, 埃及, India,印度尼西亞, Kenya, 馬來西亞, 巴基斯坦, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. 最後, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

埃及: 背景和美國. 關係

傑里米中號. 尖銳

In the last year, Egyptian foreign policy, particularly its relationship with the United States, hasbenefitted substantially from both a change in U.S. policy and from events on the ground. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as U.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. 此外, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (十二月 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. 同時, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.

在歐洲的穆斯林鄰國中旅行

喬斯特·拉根第戎克

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, 普羅迪, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, 然而. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. 自從 11 九月 2001, 尤其是, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.

全球與地方之間

ANTHONY BUBALO

GREG FEALY

在“反恐戰爭”的背景下,許多人開始將伊斯蘭主義視為從穆斯林世界中心傳播的單一意識形態運動, 中東地區, 到世界各地的穆斯林國家. 借用阿卜杜拉·阿扎姆的一句話, 1980 年代為將蘇聯從阿富汗驅逐出境而戰鬥的傳奇聖戰者, 今天，許多人將所有伊斯蘭主義者視為全球原教旨主義大篷車中的同路人。本文評估了這種看法的真實性. 它通過研究兩大類伊斯蘭思想和激進主義——更注重政治的伊斯蘭主義和更注重宗教的“新原教旨主義”——從中東到印度尼西亞的傳播來做到這一點, 一個經常被引用為以前和平的穆斯林社區的例子，該社區因外部影響而變得激進。伊斯蘭主義是許多人熟悉的術語。最常用於對將伊斯蘭教視為政治意識形態的激進主義思想和形式進行分類. 今天, 廣泛的團體被歸類為伊斯蘭主義者, 從埃及穆斯林兄弟會到基地組織。雖然這種分類在許多情況下仍然合適,對於那些不將伊斯蘭教視為一種政治意識形態並在很大程度上避開政治激進主義的團體來說，伊斯蘭主義似乎不太有用——即使他們的激進主義有時具有政治含義. 包括在這一類中的團體主要關注伊斯蘭使命-IV Be t w e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : 伊斯蘭教, 中東地區 , 和印度尼西亞活動, 但它也將包括一個組織，例如 asal-qa'ida，他們的恐怖主義行為可以說是出於宗教動機而不是具體的政治目標,儘管是一種被誤導的形式. 因此，本文使用“新原教旨主義者”一詞, 由法國學者 Olivier Roy 開發, 描述這些群體，並將研究伊斯蘭主義和新原教旨主義思想向印度尼西亞的傳播.

穆斯林世界的改革: 伊斯蘭主義者和外部勢力的作用

希布利·特爾米

在過去的幾年裡，布什政府對在中東傳播民主的關注得到了很多討論, 不僅在美國和阿拉伯和穆斯林國家，而且在世界各地. 事實上, 無論是關於政治和經濟改革必要性的區域性話語，還是美國傳播民主的言論都不是新的. 過去二十年, 特別是從冷戰結束開始, 中東的知識分子和政府談論改革. 伊拉克入侵科威特之前的美國政策 1990 還旨在在阿拉伯世界傳播民主. 但在那種情況下,第一次海灣戰爭以及與獨裁政權結成聯盟的必要性是關於民主的討論被拒絕的一個原因. 另一個原因是發現政治改革為伊斯蘭政治團體提供了機會，這似乎與美國的目標大相徑庭。擔心伊斯蘭團體僅基於“一個人”的原則支持民主, 一票, 一度,”正如前助理國務卿愛德華·傑雷吉安斯所說, 導緻美國後退. 克林頓政府的傍晚, 國務卿沃倫·克里斯托弗最初專注於中東政策中的民主，但隨著政府在激進的伊斯蘭組織的陰影下推動巴以談判，他很快就擱置了這個問題,尤其是哈馬斯.

政治伊斯蘭與西方

JOHN L.ESPOSITO

At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,伊朗, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, 埃及, 印度尼西亞,約旦, 科威特, 黎巴嫩,馬來西亞, 巴基斯坦, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

建造橋樑而不是牆壁

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 九月 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (印度空軍) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. 對於他們來說, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. 然而, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

伊斯蘭教, 民主 & 美國

科爾多瓦基礎

In spite of it being both a perennial anda complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practicalgrounds, 關於伊斯蘭教與民主之間的關係和相容性的重要辯論, 正如巴拉克奧巴馬的希望和變革議程所呼應的那樣. 雖然許多人慶祝奧巴馬登上橢圓形辦公室作為美國的全國宣洩, othersremain less optimistic of a shift in ideologyand approach in the international arena.While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA canbe attributed to the approach of promotingdemocracy, typically favoring dictatorshipsand puppet regimes that pay lip-service todemocratic values and human rights, the aftershockof 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivingsfurther through America’s position onpolitical Islam. It has created a wall of negativityas found by worldpublicopinion.org,根據該 67% of Egyptians believethat globally America is playing a “mainlynegative” role.America’s response has thus been apt. Byelecting Obama, many around the world arepinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent,but fairer foreign policy towards theMuslim world. 奧巴馬的考驗, 當我們討論,是美國及其盟友促進民主的方式. 是促進還是強加?而且, can it importantly be an honestbroker in prolonged zones of conflicts?