RSSAlle oppføringer i "brorskap & Vest" Kategori

Islamsk reformasjon

Adnan Khan

Den italienske statsministeren, Silvio Berlusconi skrøt etter hendelsene i 9/11:
“... vi må være klar over sivilisasjonens overlegenhet, et system som har garantert

velvære, respekt for menneskerettighetene og – i motsetning til islamske land – respekt

for religiøse og politiske rettigheter, et system som har sine verdier forståelse av mangfold

og toleranse ... Vesten vil erobre folk, som om den erobret kommunismen, selv om det

betyr en konfrontasjon med en annen sivilisasjon, den islamske, satt fast der den var

1,400 år siden ... ”1

Og i en 2007 rapporterer RAND-instituttet erklært:
“Kampen som pågår i store deler av den muslimske verden er egentlig en krig av

ideer. Resultatet av det vil avgjøre den muslimske verdens fremtidige retning. ”

Bygger moderat muslimske nettverk, RAND-instituttet

Konseptet ‘islah’ (reform) er et begrep ukjent for muslimer. Det eksisterte aldri i hele

historien til den islamske sivilisasjonen; det ble aldri diskutert eller engang vurdert. Et kort blikk på klassisk

Islamsk litteratur viser oss at når klassiske forskere la grunnlaget for usul, og kodifisert

deres islamske avgjørelser (fiqh) de så bare på forståelsen av de islamske reglene for å kunne

bruke dem. En lignende situasjon oppstod da reglene ble lagt for hadithen, tafseer og

arabisk språk. Lærde, tenkere og intellektuelle gjennom islamsk historie brukte mye tid

forstå Allahs åpenbaring - Koranen og anvende ayaat på realitetene og myntet

rektorer og disipliner for å lette forståelsen. Derfor ble Koranen fortsatt grunnlaget for

studier og alle fagene som utviklet seg, var alltid basert på Koranen. De som ble

slått av gresk filosofi som muslimske filosofer og noen fra Mut’azilah

ble ansett å ha forlatt islams fold da Koranen sluttet å være deres grunnlag for studier. Dermed for

enhver muslim som prøver å utlede regler eller forstå hvilken holdning som skal tas mot en bestemt

utstede Koranen er grunnlaget for denne studien.

Det første forsøket på å reformere islam fant sted på begynnelsen av 1800-tallet. Ved begynnelsen av

århundre hadde Ummah vært i en lang periode med tilbakegang der den globale maktbalansen skiftet

fra Khilafah til Storbritannia. Monteringsproblemer slukte Khilafah mens Vest-Europa var i

midt i den industrielle revolusjonen. Ummah mistet sin uberørte forståelse av islam, og

i et forsøk på å snu tilbakegangen som oppslukte Uthmanis (Osmannere) noen muslimer ble sendt til

Vest, og som et resultat ble slått av det de så. Rifa’a Rafi ’al-Tahtawi fra Egypt (1801-1873),

da han kom tilbake fra Paris, skrev en biografisk bok kalt Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (De

Utvinning av gull, eller en oversikt over Paris, 1834), roser deres renslighet, kjærlighet til arbeid, og over

all sosial moral. Han erklærte at vi må etterligne det som blir gjort i Paris, taler for endringer i

det islamske samfunnet fra å liberalisere kvinner til styresystemene. Denne tanken, og andre liker det,

markerte begynnelsen på den gjenoppfunnende trenden i islam.

Islam i Vesten

Jocelyne Cesari

Innvandringen av muslimer til Europa, Nord Amerika, og Australia og den komplekse samfunnsreligiøse dynamikken som senere har utviklet seg, har gjort islam i Vesten til et overbevisende nytt felt av forskning. Salman Rushdie-affære, hijab-kontroverser, angrepene på World Trade Center, og furoren over de danske tegneseriene er alle eksempler på internasjonale kriser som har ført til lys forbindelsene mellom muslimer i Vesten og den globale muslimske verden. Disse nye situasjonene medfører teoretiske og metodiske utfordringer for studiet av moderne islam, og det har blitt avgjørende at vi unngår å essalisere enten islam eller muslimer og motstå retoriske strukturer i diskurser som er opptatt av sikkerhet og terrorisme.
I denne artikkelen, Jeg hevder at islam som en religiøs tradisjon er en terra incognita. En foreløpig årsak til denne situasjonen er at det ikke er enighet om religion som et objekt for forskning. Religion, som en faglig disiplin, har blitt revet mellom historisk, sosiologisk, og hermeneutiske metoder. Med islam, situasjonen er enda mer intrikat. I Vesten, studiet av islam begynte som en gren av orientalistiske studier og fulgte derfor en egen og særpreget vei fra studiet av religioner. Selv om kritikken av orientalisme har vært sentral for fremveksten av studien av islam i samfunnet, spenningen er fortsatt sterk mellom islamister og både antropologer og sosiologer. Temaet islam og muslimer i Vesten er innebygd i denne kampen. En implikasjon av denne metodiske spenningen er at studenter av islam som startet sin akademiske karriere med å studere islam i Frankrike, Tyskland, eller Amerika ªnd det utfordrende å etablere troverdighet som islamforskere, spesielt i den nordamerikanske akademikeren
kontekst.

A Post-election Re-reading of Islamist Political Thought

Roxanne L. Euben

Barack Obama’s post-election rhetoric regarding the “Muslim world” has signaled a critical paradigm shift from his predecessor. The new president’s characterization of the United States in his inaugural address as a “nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus and nonbelievers”; his formulation, invoked in several different contexts, that America will offer a hand of friendship to a Muslim world willing to “unclench [its] fist”; the emphasis on his own mixed lineage and experience living in Muslim countries; his pledge to close the Guantánamo Bay prison camp; his interview with Al Arabiya; and the promise to address the Muslim world from a Muslim capital during his first 100 days in office, all suggest a deliberate attempt to shift away from the hardening rhetoric of a new Cold War between the West and Islam and reframe American foreign policy toward Muslim societies.1 Obama’s rhetoric has enormous symbolic importance even if it has yet to issue in dramatic departures from previous U.S. foreign policies regarding, for eksempel, Hamas or Iran’s nuclear program. At this particular juncture, its significance lies less in the specific policies it may presage or the greater sensitivity to Muslim sensibilities it reveals than in its underlying logic: implicit in these rhetorical gestures is the understanding that, as Obama put it in his interview with Al Arabiya, “the language we use matters,” that words and categories do not simply reflect but also create the world in which we live.

Islam og Vesten

Forord

John J. DeGioia

Den bemerkelsesverdige følelsen av nærhet mellom mennesker og nasjoner er den umiskjennelige virkeligheten i vår globaliserte verden. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, politics, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. stilte ikke engang med en kandidat. Mubareks avgjørende seier ser ut til å være betryggende for de fleste – spesielt sekulære amerikanere – som er bekymret for fremtiden til de få vestlige vennlige, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

Demokrati, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World

F. Gregory Gause

The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. Derfor, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? Med andre ord, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; og 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition

John L.. Esposito

In the 1990s political Islam, what some callIslamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Tyrkia, Iran, Libanon, Kuwait, Jemen, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.

It’s the Policy, Stupid

John L.. Esposito

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. Busk. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. derimot, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, terrorisme, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Og dermed, for eksempel, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?


Løser USAs islamistiske dilemma

Shadi Hamid

OSS. innsats for å fremme demokrati i Midtøsten har lenge vært lammet av det "islamistiske dilemmaet": i teorien, vi vil ha demokrati, men, i praksis, frykter at islamistiske partier vil være de viktigste fordelene ved enhver politisk åpning. Den mest tragiske manifestasjonen av dette var den algeriske debakelen av 1991 og 1992, da USA sto stille mens det trofaste sekulære militæret avlyste valget etter at et islamistisk parti vant et parlamentarisk flertall. Mer nylig, Bush-administrasjonen trakk seg tilbake fra sin "frihetsagenda" etter at islamister gjorde det overraskende bra i valg i hele regionen, inkludert i Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, og de palestinske områdene.
Men selv frykten vår for islamistiske partier – og den resulterende avvisningen av å engasjere seg med dem – har i seg selv vært inkonsekvent, gjelder for noen land, men ikke andre. Jo mer som et land blir sett på som avgjørende for amerikanske nasjonale sikkerhetsinteresser, jo mindre villige har USA vært til å akseptere islamistiske grupper som har en fremtredende politisk rolle der. derimot, i land som anses som mindre strategisk relevante, og hvor mindre står på spill, USA har tidvis tatt en mer nyansert tilnærming. Men det er nettopp der mer står på spill at det er viktigst å anerkjenne en rolle for ikke-voldelige islamister, og, her, Amerikansk politikk kommer fortsatt til kort.
I hele regionen, USA har aktivt støttet autokratiske regimer og gitt grønt lys for undertrykkelseskampanjer mot grupper som det egyptiske muslimske brorskapet, den eldste og mest innflytelsesrike politiske bevegelsen i regionen. I mars 2008, i det mange observatører anser for å være den verste perioden med anti-brorskapsundertrykkelse siden 1960-tallet, Utenriksminister Condoleezza Rice frafalt en $100 millioner av kongressens mandat reduksjon av militærhjelp til Egypt.

International Consultation of Muslim Intellectuals on Islam & Politikk

Stimson Center & Institutt for politikkstudier

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, Egypt, India,Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. Endelig, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations

Jeremy M. Skarp

In the last year, Egyptian foreign policy, particularly its relationship with the United States, hasbenefitted substantially from both a change in U.S. policy and from events on the ground. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as U.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. Furthermore, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (desember 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. Samtidig, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.

REISER BLANT EUROPAS MUSLIMME NABOER

JOOST LAGENDIJK

JAN MARINUS WIERSMA

«En ring av venner rundt unionen […], fra Marokko til Russland. Dette er hvordan, Inn sent 2002, daværende president for EU-kommisjonen, Romano Prodi, beskrev hovedutfordringen Europa står overfor etter den planlagte utvidelsen av 2004. Tiltredelsesprosessen hadde bygget opp fart, og de tidligere kommunistlandene i Sentral-Europa hadde blitt stabilisert og forvandlet seg til demokratier. EU-medlemskap var ikke direkte på dagsorden for land utenfor utvidelseshorisonten, derimot. Hvordan kunne Europa forhindre at nye skillelinjer dannes ved grensene? Hvordan kunne EU garantere stabilitet, sikkerhet og fred langs omkretsen? Disse spørsmålene var kanskje mest relevante for EUs sørlige naboer. Siden 11 september 2001, spesielt, vårt forhold til den islamske verden har vært gjennomsyret av en følelse av at det haster. Politisk utvikling i våre islamske naboland som grenser til Middelhavet kan ha en enorm innvirkning på europeisk sikkerhet. Selv om området er i nærheten, den politiske avstanden er stor. Midt i truende språk om et "sammenstøt mellom sivilisasjoner", EU trakk raskt konklusjonen at forsoning og samarbeid, heller enn konfrontasjon, utgjorde den beste strategien for å håndtere sine sørlige naboer.

BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL

ANTHONY BUBALO

GREG FEALY

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Today, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Islamisme, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

Reform in the Muslim World: The Role of Islamists and Outside Powers

Shibley Telhami


The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, neither the regional discourse about theneed for political and economic reform nor the Americantalk of spreading democracy is new. Over the pasttwo decades, particularly beginning with the end of theCold War, intellectuals and governments in the MiddleEast have spoken about reform. The American policyprior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also aimedto spread democracy in the Arab world. But in that case,the first Gulf War and the need to forge alliances withautocratic regimes were one reason talk of democracydeclined. The other reason was the discovery that politicalreform provided openings to Islamist political groupsthat seemed very much at odd with American objectives.The fear that Islamist groups supported democracy onlybased on the principle of “one man, one vote, one time,”as former Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejianonce put it, led the United States to backtrack. Evenearly in the Clinton Administration, Secretary of StateWarren Christopher initially focused on democracy inhis Middle East policy but quickly sidelined the issueas the administration moved to broker Palestinian-Israelinegotiation in the shadow of militant Islamist groups,especially Hamas.

POLITISK ISLAM og Vesten

JOHN L.ESPOSITO


Ved begynnelsen av det 21. århundre politisk islam, eller mer vanlig islamsk fundamentalisme, er fortsatt en stor tilstedeværelse i regjeringer og opposisjonell politikk fra Nord-Afrika til Sørøst-Asia. Nye islamske republikker har dukket opp i Afghanistan,Iran, og Sudan. Islamister har blitt valgt inn i parlamentene, servert i skap,og vært presidenter, statsminister,og visestatsminister-innasjoner så forskjellige som Algerie, Egypt, Indonesia,Jordan, Kuwait, Libanon,Malaysia, Pakistan, og Jemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Bygge broer ikke vegger

Alex Glennie

Siden terrorangrepene til 11 september 2001 det har vært en eksplosjon av interesse for politisk islamisme i Midtøsten og Nord-Afrika (MENA) region. Inntil ganske nylig,analytikere har forståelig nok fokusert på de aktørene som opererer i den voldelige enden av det islamistiske spekteret, inkludert Al-Qaida, Taliban, noen av de sekteriske partiene i Irak og politiske grupper med væpnede vinger som Hamas i de okkuperte palestinske områdene (OPT)og Hizbollah i Libanon.Men, dette har tilslørt det faktum at over hele MENA-regionen blir samtidspolitikk drevet og formet av en mye mer mangfoldig samling av "mainstream" islamistiske bevegelser. Vi definerer disse asgruppene som engasjerer seg eller søker å engasjere seg i de juridiske politiske prosessene i sine land og som offentlig har unngått bruken av vold for å bidra til å realisere sine mål på nasjonalt nivå, selv der de blir diskriminert eller undertrykt. Denne definisjonen vil omfatte grupper som Det muslimske brorskapet i Egypt, partiet for rettferdighet og utvikling (PJD) i Marokko og Islamic Action Front (IAF) i Jordan. Disse ikke-voldelige islamistiske bevegelsene eller partiene representerer ofte det best organiserte og mest populære elementet i opposisjonen til de eksisterende regimene i hvert land, og som sådan har det vært økende interesse fra vestlige beslutningstakere for rollen som de kan spille i demokratifremme i regionen. Likevel ser det ut til at diskusjonene om dette spørsmålet har stoppet opp på spørsmålet om det ville være hensiktsmessig å engasjere seg med disse gruppene på et mer systematisk og formelt grunnlag., snarere enn på det praktiske ved å faktisk gjøre det. Denne holdningen er delvis knyttet til en forsvarlig uvilje til å legitimere grupper som kan ha antidemokratiske syn på kvinners rettigheter, politisk pluralisme og en rekke andre spørsmål. Den reflekterer også pragmatiske betraktninger om de strategiske interessene til vestlige makter i MENA-regionen som oppfattes å være truet av islamistenes økende popularitet og innflytelse. For deres del, Islamistiske partier og bevegelser har vist en klar motvilje mot å knytte tettere bånd med de vestmaktene hvis politikk i regionen de er sterkt imot., ikke minst av frykt for hvordan de undertrykkende regimene de opererer innenfor kan reagere. Dette prosjektets fokus på ikke-voldelige politiske islamistiske bevegelser bør ikke mistolkes som implisitt støtte til deres politiske agendaer. Å forplikte seg til en strategi for mer bevisst engasjement med mainstream islamistiske partier vil innebære betydelige risikoer og avveininger for nordamerikanske og europeiske politiske beslutningstakere. derimot, vi tar den posisjonen at tendensen til begge sider til å se på engasjement som et nullsum "alt eller ingenting"-spill har vært lite nyttig, og må endres hvis en mer konstruktiv dialog rundt reformer i Midtøsten og Nord-Afrika skal oppstå.

ISLAM, DEMOKRATI & DE FORENTE STATER

cordoba foundation


In spite of it being both a perennial anda complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practicalgrounds, den viktige debatten om forholdet og kompatibiliteten mellom islam og demokrati, som ekko i Barack Obamas agenda for håp og endring. Mens mange feirer Obamas fremgang til Oval Office som en nasjonal katarsis for USA, othersremain less optimistic of a shift in ideologyand approach in the international arena.While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA canbe attributed to the approach of promotingdemocracy, typically favoring dictatorshipsand puppet regimes that pay lip-service todemocratic values and human rights, the aftershockof 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivingsfurther through America’s position onpolitical Islam. It has created a wall of negativityas found by worldpublicopinion.org,ifølge hvilken 67% of Egyptians believethat globally America is playing a “mainlynegative” role.America’s response has thus been apt. Byelecting Obama, many around the world arepinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent,but fairer foreign policy towards theMuslim world. Testen for Obama, som vi diskuterer,er hvordan Amerika og hennes allierte fremmer demokrati. Vil det være tilretteleggende eller imponerende?Dessuten, can it importantly be an honestbroker in prolonged zones of conflicts?