RSSL-Iskrizzjonijiet kollha fil- "Fratellanza & Punent" Kategorija

Riforma Iżlamika

Adnan Khan

Il-Prim Ministru Taljan, Silvio Berlusconi ftaħar wara l-avvenimenti ta 9/11:
“... irridu nkunu konxji tas-superjorità taċ-ċiviltà tagħna, sistema li tkun garantita

benesseri, rispett għad-drittijiet tal-bniedem u – b’kuntrast mal-pajjiżi Iżlamiċi – rispett

għad-drittijiet reliġjużi u politiċi, sistema li għandha l-valuri tagħha fehim tad-diversità

u tolleranza... Il-Punent se jirbaħ il-popli, qisu rebaħ il-komuniżmu, anki jekk dan

tfisser konfront ma’ ċiviltà oħra, dik Iżlamika, mwaħħla fejn kien

1,400 snin ilu…”1

U fi a 2007 jirrapporta l-istitut RAND iddikjarat:
“Il-ġlieda li għaddejja f’ħafna mid-dinja Musulmana hija essenzjalment gwerra ta’

ideat. Ir-riżultat tiegħu se jiddetermina d-direzzjoni futura tad-dinja Musulmana.”

Nibnu Netwerks Musulmani moderati, Istitut RAND

Il-kunċett ta ''islah' (riforma) huwa kunċett mhux magħruf mill-Musulmani. Qatt ma eżistiet matul il-

istorja taċ-ċiviltà Iżlamika; qatt ma ġiet diskussa jew saħansitra kkunsidrata. Ħarsa sommarja lejn il-klassiku

Il-letteratura Iżlamika turina li meta l-istudjużi klassiċi poġġew il-pedamenti ta 'usul, u kkodifikati

deċiżjonijiet Iżlamiċi tagħhom (fiqh) kienu biss iħarsu lejn il-komprensjoni tar-regoli Iżlamiċi sabiex

japplikawhom. Sitwazzjoni simili seħħet meta r-regoli ġew stabbiliti għall-hadith, tafseer u l-

Lingwa Għarbi. Skulari, ħassieba u intellettwali matul l-istorja Iżlamika qattgħu ħafna ħin

tifhem ir-rivelazzjoni ta 'Allah - il-Koran u tapplika l-ayaat fuq ir-realtajiet u maħluqa

prinċipali u dixxiplini sabiex jiffaċilitaw il-fehim. Għalhekk il-Koran baqa’ l-bażi ta’

studju u d-dixxiplini kollha li evolvew kienu dejjem ibbażati fuq il-Koran. Dawk li saru

milquta mill-filosofija Griega bħall-filosfi Musulmani u xi wħud minn fost il-Mut'azilah

kienu kkunsidrati li ħallew il-qasma tal-Islam hekk kif il-Koran ma baqax il-bażi ta’ studju tagħhom. Għalhekk għal

kwalunkwe Musulman li jipprova jiddeduċi regoli jew jifhem x'pożizzjoni għandha tittieħed fuq partikolari

il-ħruġ tal-Koran huwa l-bażi ta’ dan l-istudju.

L-ewwel tentattiv ta’ riforma tal-Iżlam seħħ fil-bidu tas-seklu 19. Sad-dawra tal-

seklu l-Ummah kienet f’perjodu twil ta’ tnaqqis fejn il-bilanċ globali tal-poter inbidel

mill-Khilafah sal-Gran Brittanja. Problemi ta 'immuntar ħakmu l-Khilafah waqt li l-Ewropa tal-Punent kienet fiha

f’nofs ir-rivoluzzjoni industrijali. L-Ummah tilfet il-fehim verġni tagħha tal-Islam, u

f’tentattiv biex ireġġa’ lura t-tnaqqis li ħakem lil Uthmani’s (Ottomani) xi Musulmani intbagħtu lill-

Punent, u b’riżultat ta’ dan laqtu b’dak li raw. Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi tal-Eġittu (1801-1873),

mar-ritorn tiegħu minn Pariġi, kiteb ktieb bijografiku bl-isem Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (Il

Estrazzjoni tad-Deheb, jew Ħarsa ġenerali lejn Pariġi, 1834), ifaħħar l-indafa tagħhom, imħabba għax-xogħol, u fuq

il-moralità soċjali kollha. Hu ddikjara li rridu nimitaw dak li qed isir f’Pariġi, favur bidliet għal

is-soċjetà Iżlamika mil-liberalizzazzjoni tan-nisa għas-sistemi ta’ ħakma. Dan il-ħsieb, u oħrajn bħalha,

immarka l-bidu tax-xejra ta’ reinventing fl-Islam.

Iżlam fil-Punent

Jocelyne Cesari

L-immigrazzjoni tal-Musulmani lejn l-Ewropa, L-Amerka ta 'Fuq, u l-Awstralja u d-dinamika soċjoreliġjuża kumplessa li żviluppaw sussegwentement għamlu l-Islam fil-Punent qasam ġdid ta’ riċerka konvinċenti.. L-affari Salman Rushdie, kontroversji tal-hijab, l-attakki fuq il-World Trade Center, u l-furur fuq il-cartoons Daniżi huma kollha eżempji ta’ kriżijiet internazzjonali li ħarġu fid-dawl il-konnessjonijiet bejn il-Musulmani fil-Punent u d-dinja Musulmana globali. Dawn is-sitwazzjonijiet ġodda jinvolvu sfidi teoretiċi u metodoloġiċi għall-istudju tal-Islam kontemporanju, u sar kruċjali li nevitaw li nistabbilizzaw jew l-Islam jew il-Musulmani u nirreżistu l-istrutturi retoriċi ta’ diskorsi li huma mħassba bis-sigurtà u t-terroriżmu..
F'dan l-artikolu, Jiena nargumenta li l-Islam bħala tradizzjoni reliġjuża hija terra incognita. Raġuni preliminari għal din is-sitwazzjoni hija li m'hemm l-ebda kunsens dwar ir-reliġjon bħala oġġett ta 'riċerka. Reliġjon, bħala dixxiplina akkademika, saret maqsuma bejn storiċi, soċjoloġiċi, u metodoloġiji ermenewtiċi. Mal-Islam, is-sitwazzjoni hija saħansitra aktar kumplessa. Fil-Punent, l-istudju tal-Iżlam beda bħala fergħa tal-istudji Orjentalisti u għalhekk segwa triq separata u distintiva mill-istudju tar-reliġjonijiet. Anke jekk il-kritika tal-Orjentaliżmu kienet ċentrali għall-emerġenza tal-istudju tal-Islam fil-qasam tax-xjenzi soċjali, it-tensjonijiet jibqgħu qawwija bejn l-Iżlamiċi u kemm l-antropoloġi kif ukoll is-soċjologi. Is-suġġett tal-Islam u l-Musulmani fil-Punent huwa inkorporat f'din il-ġlieda. Implikazzjoni waħda ta 'din it-tensjoni metodoloġika hija li l-istudenti tal-Islam li bdew il-karriera akkademika tagħhom jistudjaw l-Iżlam fi Franza, il-Ġermanja, jew l-Amerika u hija sfida biex tiġi stabbilita l-kredibilità bħala studjużi tal-Islam, partikolarment fl-akkademiku tal-Amerika ta’ Fuq
kuntest.

A Post-election Re-reading of Islamist Political Thought

Roxanne L. Euben

Barack Obama’s post-election rhetoric regarding the “Muslim world” has signaled a critical paradigm shift from his predecessor. The new president’s characterization of the United States in his inaugural address as a “nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus and nonbelievers”; his formulation, invoked in several different contexts, that America will offer a hand of friendship to a Muslim world willing to “unclench [its] fist”; the emphasis on his own mixed lineage and experience living in Muslim countries; his pledge to close the Guantánamo Bay prison camp; his interview with Al Arabiya; and the promise to address the Muslim world from a Muslim capital during his first 100 days in office, all suggest a deliberate attempt to shift away from the hardening rhetoric of a new Cold War between the West and Islam and reframe American foreign policy toward Muslim societies.1 Obama’s rhetoric has enormous symbolic importance even if it has yet to issue in dramatic departures from previous U.S. foreign policies regarding, pereżempju, Hamas or Iran’s nuclear program. At this particular juncture, its significance lies less in the specific policies it may presage or the greater sensitivity to Muslim sensibilities it reveals than in its underlying logic: implicit in these rhetorical gestures is the understanding that, as Obama put it in his interview with Al Arabiya, “the language we use matters,” that words and categories do not simply reflect but also create the world in which we live.

Iżlam u l-Punent

Prefazju

John J. DeGioia

Is-sensazzjoni notevoli ta 'prossimità bejn in-nies u n-nazzjonijiet hija r-realtà inequivocabbli tad-dinja globalizzata tagħna. Laqgħat mal-modi ta’ ħajja ta’ nies oħra, grajjiet kurrenti, politika, il-benesseri u l-fidi huma aktar frekwenti minn qatt qabel. Aħna mhux biss kapaċi naraw kulturi oħra b'mod aktar ċar, iżda wkoll biex naraw id-differenzi tagħna b'mod aktar qawwi. L-intensità tal-informazzjoni tal-ħajja moderna għamlet din id-diversità ta’ nazzjonijiet parti mill-kuxjenza tagħna ta’ kuljum u wasslet għaċ-ċentralità tal-kultura fid-dixxerniment tal-fehmiet individwali u kollettivi tagħna tad-dinja. L-isfidi tagħna saru wkoll globali. Id-destini tan-nazzjonijiet saru profondament interkonnessi.. Irrispettivament minn fejn ngħixu fid-dinja, aħna jintmessu mis-suċċessi u l-fallimenti tal-ordni globali tal-lum. Iżda t-tweġibiet tagħna għall-problemi globali jibqgħu ferm differenti, mhux biss bħala riżultat ta’ rivalità u interessi konkorrenti,iżda l-aktar għax id-differenza kulturali tagħna hija l-lenti li permezz tagħha naraw dawn l-isfidi globali. Id-diversità kulturali mhix neċessarjament sors ta’ ġlied u kunflitt.. Fil-fatt, il-prossimità u l-laqgħat transkulturali ħafna drabi jġibu bidla kreattiva – bidla li ssir possibbli permezz ta’ kollaborazzjoni soċjali organizzata tajjeb. Il-kollaborazzjoni bejn il-fruntieri qed tikber primarjament fil-qasam tan-negozju u l-attività ekonomika. Netwerks kollaborattivi għall-innovazzjoni,il-produzzjoni u d-distribuzzjoni qed jitfaċċaw bħala l-aktar wieħed li jfassal l-ekonomija globali.

Demokrazija, Terroriżmu u Politika Amerikana fid-Dinja Għarbija

F. Gregory Gause

L-Istati Uniti daħlu fuq dik li l-President Bush u s-Segretarju tal-Istat Rice sejħu "sfida ġenerazzjonali" biex tinkoraġġixxi r-riforma politika u d-demokrazija fid-dinja Għarbija. L-Amministrazzjoni Bush u difensuri oħra tal-kampanja tad-demokrazija jsostnu li l-ispinta għad-demokrazija Għarbija mhijiex biss dwar it-tixrid tal-valuri Amerikani, iżda wkoll dwar l-assigurazzjoni tas-sigurtà Amerikana. Huma ipoteżi li hekk kif id-demokrazija tikber fid-dinja Għarbija, it-terroriżmu anti-Amerikan mid-dinja Għarbija se jonqos. Għalhekk, il-promozzjoni tad-demokrazija fid-dinja Għarbija mhix biss konsistenti mal-għanijiet tas-sigurtà Amerikana fiż-żona, iżda meħtieġa biex jintlaħqu dawk l-għanijiet.
Żewġ mistoqsijiet jippreżentaw lilhom infushom meta jikkunsidraw dan l-element tad-“Duttrina Bush” fid-dinja Għarbija: 1) Hemm relazzjoni bejn it-terroriżmu u d-demokrazija b'tali mod li aktar ma jsir demokratiku pajjiż, inqas ikun probabbli li jipproduċu terroristi u gruppi terroristiċi? Fi kliem ieħor, hija r-raġuni tas-sigurtà għall-promozzjoni tad-demokrazija fid-dinja Għarbija bbażata fuq premessa soda?; u 2) X'tip ta' gvernijiet x'aktarx ikunu ġġenerati minn elezzjonijiet demokratiċi fil-pajjiżi Għarab? Ikunu lesti li jikkooperaw mal-Istati Uniti dwar objettivi importanti ta' politika fil-Lvant Nofsani, mhux biss fiż-żamma tad-demokrazija imma wkoll fuq
Għarbi-Iżraeljani, Sigurtà tal-Golf u kwistjonijiet taż-żejt?
Dan id-dokument ser jikkunsidra dawn iż-żewġ mistoqsijiet. Hija ssib li hemm ftit evidenza empirika li torbot id-demokrazija ma’ nuqqas ta’ jew tnaqqis fit-terroriżmu.. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

Talba taċ-Ċentru: Islam politiku fi Transizzjoni

John L. Esposito

Fl-Islam politiku tad-disgħinijiet, dak li xi wħud isejħu “Fundamentaliżmu Iżlamiku,” jibqa’ preżenza ewlenija fil-gvern u fil-politika ta’ oppożizzjoni mill-Afrika ta’ Fuq sax-Xlokk tal-Asja. L-Iżlam politiku fil-poter u fil-politika qajjem ħafna kwistjonijiet u mistoqsijiet: “L-Islam huwa antitetiku għall-modernizzazzjoni?,” “L-Islam u d-demokrazija huma inkompatibbli?,” “X'inhuma l-implikazzjonijiet ta' gvern Iżlamiku għall-pluraliżmu, minoranzi u d-drittijiet tan-nisa,” “Kemm huma rappreżentattivi l-Iżlamisti,” “Hemm moderati Iżlamiċi?,” “Jekk il-Punent jibża' theddida Iżlamika transnazzjonali jew kunflitt taċ-ċiviltajiet?” Rivaliżmu Iżlamiku Kontemporanju Il-pajsaġġ tad-dinja Musulmana llum jiżvela l-emerġenza ta’ repubbliki Iżlamiċi ġodda (Iran, Is-Sudan, Afganistan), il-proliferazzjoni ta' movimenti Iżlamiċi li jiffunzjonaw bħala atturi politiċi u soċjali ewlenin fi ħdan is-sistemi eżistenti, u l-politika ta’ konfrontazzjoni ta’ estremisti vjolenti radikali._ B’kuntrast mas-snin tmenin meta l-Iżlam politiku kien sempliċement assimilat mal-Iran rivoluzzjonarju jew gruppi klandestini b’ismijiet bħall-Ġiħad Iżlamika jew l-Armata ta’ Alla., id-dinja Musulmana fis-snin disgħin hija waħda li fiha l-Iżlamisti pparteċipaw fil-proċess elettorali u huma viżibbli bħala Prim Ministri, uffiċjali tal-kabinett, kelliema tal-assembleji nazzjonali, parlamentari, u sindki f’pajjiżi differenti bħall-Eġittu, Is-Sudan, It-Turkija, Iran, Il-Libanu, Kuwajt, Jemen, Il-Ġordan, Pakistan, Bangladexx, Il-Malasja, L-Indoneżja, u Iżrael/Palestina. Fil-bidu tas-seklu wieħed u għoxrin, L-Iżlam politiku għadu forza ewlenija għall-ordni u d-diżordni fil-politika globali, wieħed li jipparteċipa fil-proċess politiku iżda wkoll f’atti ta’ terroriżmu, sfida għad-dinja Musulmana u għall-Punent. Nifhmu n-natura tal-Islam politiku llum, u b'mod partikolari l-kwistjonijiet u l-mistoqsijiet li ħarġu mill-esperjenza tal-passat riċenti, jibqa’ kritiku għall-gvernijiet, dawk li jfasslu l-politika, u studenti tal-politika internazzjonali bl-istess mod.

It’s the Policy, Stupid

John L. Esposito

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. Bush. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. Madankollu, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, terroriżmu, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Għalhekk, pereżempju, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?


Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma

Shadi Hamid

L-Istati Uniti. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, but, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 u 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. Madankollu, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, u, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt.

International Consultation of Muslim Intellectuals on Islam & Politika

Ċentru Stimson & Istitut tal-Istudji tal-Politika

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, L-Eġittu, India,L-Indoneżja, Kenya, Il-Malasja, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. Fl-aħħarnett, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

L-Eġittu: Background and U.S. Relations

Jeremy M. Jaqtgħu

In the last year, Egyptian foreign policy, particularly its relationship with the United States, hasbenefitted substantially from both a change in U.S. policy and from events on the ground. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as U.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. Furthermore, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (Diċembru 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. Fl-istess waqt, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.

TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS

JOOST LAGENDIJK

JAN MARINUS WIERSMA

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union [], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, madankollu. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Peress li 11 Settembru 2001, partikolarment, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.

BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL

ANTHONY BUBALO

GREG FEALY

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Illum, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Iżlamiżmu, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

Reform in the Muslim World: The Role of Islamists and Outside Powers

Shibley Telhami


The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, neither the regional discourse about theneed for political and economic reform nor the Americantalk of spreading democracy is new. Over the pasttwo decades, particularly beginning with the end of theCold War, intellectuals and governments in the MiddleEast have spoken about reform. The American policyprior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also aimedto spread democracy in the Arab world. But in that case,the first Gulf War and the need to forge alliances withautocratic regimes were one reason talk of democracydeclined. The other reason was the discovery that politicalreform provided openings to Islamist political groupsthat seemed very much at odd with American objectives.The fear that Islamist groups supported democracy onlybased on the principle of “one man, one vote, one time,”as former Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejianonce put it, led the United States to backtrack. Evenearly in the Clinton Administration, Secretary of StateWarren Christopher initially focused on democracy inhis Middle East policy but quickly sidelined the issueas the administration moved to broker Palestinian-Israelinegotiation in the shadow of militant Islamist groups,especially Hamas.

POLITICAL ISLAM and the West

JOHN L.ESPOSITO


At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Iran, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, L-Eġittu, L-Indoneżja,Il-Ġordan, Kuwajt, Il-Libanu,Il-Malasja, Pakistan, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Building bridges not walls

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 Settembru 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Madankollu, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

L-ISLAM, DEMOKRAZIJA & L-Istati Uniti

fondazzjoni Cordoba


In spite of it being both a perennial anda complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practicalgrounds, id-dibattitu importanti dwar ir-relazzjoni u l-kompatibilità bejn l-Islam u d-Demokrazija, kif imtenni fl-aġenda ta’ tama u bidla ta’ Barack Obama. Filwaqt li ħafna jiċċelebraw l-axxendent ta’ Obama fl-Uffiċċju Ovali bħala katarsi nazzjonali għall-Istati Uniti, othersremain less optimistic of a shift in ideologyand approach in the international arena.While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA canbe attributed to the approach of promotingdemocracy, typically favoring dictatorshipsand puppet regimes that pay lip-service todemocratic values and human rights, the aftershockof 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivingsfurther through America’s position onpolitical Islam. It has created a wall of negativityas found by worldpublicopinion.org,skond liema 67% of Egyptians believethat globally America is playing a “mainlynegative” role.America’s response has thus been apt. Byelecting Obama, many around the world arepinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent,but fairer foreign policy towards theMuslim world. It-test għal Obama, kif niddiskutu,huwa kif l-Amerika u l-alleati tagħha jippromwovu d-demokrazija. Se jkun qed jiffaċilita jew jimponi?Barra minn hekk, can it importantly be an honestbroker in prolonged zones of conflicts?