Gach Iontráil sa "Bráithreachas & Thiar" Catagóir
Athchóiriú Ioslamach
Adnan Khan
Islam in the West
Jocelyne Cesari
A Post-election Re-reading of Islamist Political Thought
Roxanne L. Euben
Islam and the West
Preface
Eoin J.. DeGioia
The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, politics, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. In fact, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.
Daonlathas, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World
F.. Gregory Gause
Ag éileamh an Ionaid: Ioslam Polaitiúil san Idirthréimhse
Eoin L.. Esposito
Sna 1990idí Ioslam polaitiúil, rud a ghlaonn cuid “Bunúsachas Ioslamach,” tá láithreacht mhór fós sa rialtas agus i bpolaitíocht fhreasúra ón Afraic Thuaidh go Oirdheisceart na hÁise. D'ardaigh Ioslam Polaitiúil atá i gcumhacht agus sa pholaitíocht go leor ceisteanna agus ceisteanna: “An bhfuil Ioslam frithbheathach don nuachóiriú?,” “An bhfuil Ioslam agus an daonlathas neamh-chomhoiriúnach?,” “Cad iad na himpleachtaí atá ag rialtas Ioslamach don iolrachas, cearta mionlaigh agus mná,” “Cé chomh ionadaíoch is atá Ioslamaigh,” “An bhfuil modhnóirí Ioslamacha ann?,” “Dá mbeadh eagla ar an Iarthar faoi bhagairt thrasnáisiúnta Ioslamach nó cic sibhialtachtaí?” Athbheochan Ioslamach Comhaimseartha Nochtann tírdhreach an domhain Mhoslamach inniu teacht chun cinn poblacht Ioslamach nua (An Iaráin, An tSúdáin, Afganastáin), iomadú gluaiseachtaí Ioslamacha a fheidhmíonn mar ghníomhaithe móra polaitiúla agus sóisialta laistigh de na córais atá ann cheana, agus polaitíocht achrannach antoisceach foréigneach radacach._ I gcodarsnacht leis na 1980idí nuair nach raibh Ioslam polaitiúil ach cothrom leis an Iaráin réabhlóideach nó le grúpaí folaitheach le hainmneacha mar jihad Ioslamach nó Arm Dé, is é an domhan Moslamach sna 1990idí ceann inar ghlac Ioslamaigh páirt sa phróiseas toghcháin agus ina bhfuil siad le feiceáil mar phríomh-airí, oifigigh comh-aireachta, cainteoirí tionóil náisiúnta, parlaiminteoirí, agus méaraí i dtíortha atá chomh héagsúil leis an Éigipt, An tSúdáin, turcaí, An Iaráin, Liobáin, Cuáit, Éimin, An Iordáin, An Phacastáin, An Bhanglaidéis, An Mhalaeisia, An Indinéis, agus Iosrael / an Phalaistín. Ag tús an aonú haois is fiche, Leanann Ioslam polaitiúil de bheith ina fhórsa mór d’ord agus neamhord sa pholaitíocht dhomhanda, ceann a ghlacann páirt sa phróiseas polaitiúil ach freisin i ngníomhartha sceimhlitheoireachta, dúshlán don domhan Moslamach agus don Iarthar. Nádúr an Ioslam polaitiúil a thuiscint inniu, agus go háirithe na saincheisteanna agus na ceisteanna a d’eascair as eispéireas an ama a chuaigh thart, fós ríthábhachtach do rialtais, lucht déanta beartas, agus mic léinn na polaitíochta idirnáisiúnta araon.
It’s the Policy, Stupid
Eoin L.. Esposito
US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. Bush. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. ach, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.
As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, sceimhlitheoireacht, and peace in the Middle East.
Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Dá bhrí sin, for example, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.
In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?
Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma
International Consultation of Muslim Intellectuals on Islam & Polaitíocht
Ionad Stimson & Institiúid an Léinn Bheartais
This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, An Éigipt, India,An Indinéis, Kenya, An Mhalaeisia, An Phacastáin, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. Ar deireadh, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.
An Éigipt: Background and U.S. Relations
Jeremy M.. Géar
In the last year, Egyptian foreign policy, particularly its relationship with the United States, hasbenefitted substantially from both a change in U.S. policy and from events on the ground. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as U.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. Furthermore, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (Nollaig 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. At the same time, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.
TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS
LAGENDIJK JOOST
“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, ach. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Since 11 Meán Fómhair 2001, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.
BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL
ANTHONY BUBALO
FEALY GREG
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Today, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Ioslamachas, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.
Reform in the Muslim World: The Role of Islamists and Outside Powers
Shibley Telhami
The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, neither the regional discourse about theneed for political and economic reform nor the Americantalk of spreading democracy is new. Over the pasttwo decades, particularly beginning with the end of theCold War, intellectuals and governments in the MiddleEast have spoken about reform. The American policyprior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also aimedto spread democracy in the Arab world. But in that case,the first Gulf War and the need to forge alliances withautocratic regimes were one reason talk of democracydeclined. The other reason was the discovery that politicalreform provided openings to Islamist political groupsthat seemed very much at odd with American objectives.The fear that Islamist groups supported democracy onlybased on the principle of “one man, one vote, one time,”as former Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejianonce put it, led the United States to backtrack. Evenearly in the Clinton Administration, Secretary of StateWarren Christopher initially focused on democracy inhis Middle East policy but quickly sidelined the issueas the administration moved to broker Palestinian-Israelinegotiation in the shadow of militant Islamist groups,especially Hamas.
ISLAM POLAITIÚIL agus an tIarthar
JOHN L.ESPOSITO
Ag tús an 21ú haois Ioslam polaitiúil, ormore common Islamicfundamentalism, láithreacht mhór i gcónaí i rialtais agus i bpolaitíocht shuíomhanna ó Oirdheisceart na hÁise Thuaidh. Tháinig poblacht Ioslamach nua chun cinn san Afganastáin,An Iaráin, agus an tSúdáin. Roghnaíodh Ioslamaigh chuig parlaimintí, sheirbheáil i gcaibinéid,agus bhí sé ina uachtaráin, príomh-airí,agus inniúlachtaí leas-phríomh-airí chomh héagsúil leis an Ailgéir, An Éigipt, An Indinéis,An Iordáin, Cuáit, Liobáin,An Mhalaeisia, An Phacastáin, agus Éimin. Ag an am céanna, rinne gluaiseachtaí freasúra agus grúpaí foircneacha foircneacha réimis a chobhsú i dtíortha Moslamacha agus san Iarthar. Tá Meiriceánaigh tar éis fianaise a fháil ar a n-ambasáidí óKenya go dtí an Phacastáin. Buaileann spriocanna sceimhlitheoireachta mar an WorldTrade Center i Nua Eabhrac leis an sceimhlitheoireacht thar lear. Le blianta beaga anuas, Tá an milliúnóir Araib Osama binLaden anois feathal ar iarracht foréigean idirnáisiúnta a scaipeadh
Building bridges not walls
Alex Glennie
Since the terror attacks of 11 Meán Fómhair 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. ach, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.
ISLAM, Daonlathas & AN SAM
bunús cordoba
In spite of it being both a perennial anda complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practicalgrounds, an díospóireacht thábhachtach faoin gcaidreamh agus comhoiriúnacht idir Ioslam agus an Daonlathas, mar a léirítear i gclár oibre dóchais agus athraithe Barack Obama. Cé go gceiliúrann go leor cinnt Obama san Oifig Oval mar chatharsis náisiúnta do na SA, othersremain less optimistic of a shift in ideologyand approach in the international arena.While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA canbe attributed to the approach of promotingdemocracy, typically favoring dictatorshipsand puppet regimes that pay lip-service todemocratic values and human rights, the aftershockof 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivingsfurther through America’s position onpolitical Islam. It has created a wall of negativityas found by worldpublicopinion.org,dá réir a 67% of Egyptians believethat globally America is playing a “mainlynegative” role.America’s response has thus been apt. Byelecting Obama, many around the world arepinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent,but fairer foreign policy towards theMuslim world. An tástáil le haghaidh Obama, agus muid ag plé,is é an chaoi a gcuireann Meiriceá agus a comhghuaillithe an daonlathas chun cinn. An mbeidh sé ag éascú nó ag impí?Thairis sin, can it importantly be an honestbroker in prolonged zones of conflicts?