همه ورودی ها در "برادر & غرب" دسته بندی
اصلاحات در جهان اسلام
عدنان خان
Islam in the West
جوسلین سزاری
A Post-election Re-reading of Islamist Political Thought
Roxanne L. Euben
Islam and the West
Preface
جان J. DeGioia
The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, politics, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. در حقیقت, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.
دموکراسی, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World
F. گرگوری گاس
Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition
جان L. اسپوزیتو
In the 1990s political Islam, what some call “Islamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (ایران, Sudan, افغانستان), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, بوقلمون, ایران, لبنان, Kuwait, Yemen, اردن, پاکستان, Bangladesh, مالزی, اندونزی, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.
It’s the Policy, Stupid
جان L. اسپوزیتو
US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. بوته. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. با این حال, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.
As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, تروریسم, and peace in the Middle East.
Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. بدین ترتیب, for example, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.
In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?
حل معضل اسلام گرای آمریکا
International Consultation of Muslim Intellectuals on Islam & سیاست
مرکز استیمسون & موسسه مطالعات سیاست
This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, مصر, India,اندونزی, Kenya, مالزی, پاکستان, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. سرانجام, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.
مصر: پیشینه و ایالات متحده. روابط
جرمی M. تیز
در سال گذشته, سیاست خارجی مصر, خصوصاً رابطه آن با ایالات متحده, به طور قابل توجهی از هر دو تغییر در ایالات متحده بهره مند شده است. و از حوادث موجود در زمین. دولت اوباما, همانطور که در ژوئن رئیس جمهور مشهود است 2009 سخنرانی در قاهره, اهمیت مصر را برای ایالات متحده افزایش داده است. سیاست خارجی در منطقه, به عنوان ایالات متحده. سیاست گذاران برای احیای روند صلح اعراب و اسرائیل تلاش می کنند. در انتخاب قاهره به عنوان محلی برای سخنرانی رئیس جمهور در جهان اسلام, مصریان احساس می کنند که ایالات متحده نسبت به قد و قامت درک شده خود در جهان عرب احترام کشور خود را نشان داده است. در همان زمان, تنش های مداوم با ایران و حماس موقعیت مصر را به عنوان نیروی تجاوز کننده در منطقه تقویت کرده و سودمندی دیپلماتیک این کشور را به ایالات متحده نشان داده است.. سیاست خارجی. براساس منافع خودش, مصر با مداخله ایران در شام و غزه مخالفت کرده است و اخیراً همکاری نظامی با اسرائیل را گسترش داده است تا عزم خود را در برابر تحریکات بعدی ایران نشان دهد., مانند مسلح کردن حماس یا اجازه دادن به حزب الله برای عملیات خاک مصر. علاوه بر این, عملیات سرب بازیگران اسرائیل (دسامبر 2008 تا ژانویه 2009) رفتار حماس را مورد نیاز تا حد متوسط قرار داد, رسیدن به وحدت فلسطین, و به یک تبادل طولانی مدت اسرائیل ، حماس سوز - آتش / زندانی برسند, اهدافی که مصر برای دستیابی به آنها تلاش کرده است, البته تاکنون با موفقیت محدود. علائم بهبود روابط دو جانبه به وضوح مشهود است. در شش ماه گذشته, انبوه مبادلات دیپلماتیک وجود داشته است, اوج سفر رئیس جمهور اوباما در ژوئن 2009 به مصر و سفر رئیس جمهور مصر حسنی مبارک به واشنگتن در آگوست 2009 ، اولین سفر وی به ایالات متحده در بیش از 5 سال. پس از سفر رئیس جمهور اوباما در ژوئن, دو دولت گفتگوی استراتژیک سالانه خود را برگزار می کردند. چندین ماه زودتر, ایالات متحده متعهد شد تجارت و سرمایه گذاری در مصر را گسترش دهد. علی رغم ظاهر فضای مثبت تر, تنش ها و تناقضات ذاتی در روابط ایالات متحده و مصر همچنان وجود دارد. برای ما. سیاست گذاران و اعضای کنگره, سوال چگونه می توان به طور همزمان روابط استراتژیک ایالات متحده و مصر را که از توافقنامه CampDavid و 1979 پیمان صلح ضمن ترویج حقوق بشر و دموکراسی در مصری ها یک چالش اساسی است و هیچ مسیر مشخصی ندارد. از آنجا که شخصیت های مخالف مصر سال ها درباره موضوعاتی مانند جانشینی رهبری ، بیشتر حرف می زدند, فساد, و نابرابری اقتصادی, و رژیم متعاقباً در پاسخ به درخواستهای بیشتر برای اصلاح سرکوبگرتر شده است,فعالان خواستار فشار آمریكا به مصر برای ایجاد فضای تنفس بیشتر برای مخالفان شده اند. دولت مصر در برابر هرگونه آمریکا مقاومت کرده است. تلاش می کند تا در سیاست داخلی خود دخالت کند و به شدت به ایالات متحده آشکار پاسخ داده است. خواستار اصلاحات سیاسی است. همزمان, همانطور که اوضاع اسرائیلی و فلسطین بیشتر خراب شده است, نقش مصر به عنوان واسطه برای ایالات متحده قابل ارزیابی است. سیاست خارجی در منطقه. مصر توافق نامه های آتش بس و مذاکرات میانجیگری با حماس در مورد آزادی زندانیان را تأمین کرده است, ترتیبات آتش بس, و سایر موارد. از آنجا که حماس یک سازمان تروریستی خارجی تعیین شده توسط ایالات متحده است (دعوت) و خواستار نابودی اسرائیل است, نه اسرائیل و نه دولت ایالات متحده مستقیماً با مقامات رسمی خود مذاکره نمی کنند, به جای استفاده از مصر به عنوان وسط. با همکاری دولت اوباما صلح مهم خاورمیانه را متعهد شد, این نگرانی وجود دارد که ایالات متحده. مقامات ممکن است به قیمت حقوق بشر و اصلاحات دموکراتیک اولویت بیشتری به نقش منطقه ای مصر قایل شوند.
TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS
جوست Lagendijk
“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, رومانو پرودی, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, با این حال. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. از آنجا که 11 سپتامبر 2001, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.
BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL
آنتونی BUBALO
گرگ FEALY
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Today, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : اسلام گرایی, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.
Reform in the Muslim World: The Role of Islamists and Outside Powers
شبلی Telhami
The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, neither the regional discourse about theneed for political and economic reform nor the Americantalk of spreading democracy is new. Over the pasttwo decades, particularly beginning with the end of theCold War, intellectuals and governments in the MiddleEast have spoken about reform. The American policyprior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also aimedto spread democracy in the Arab world. But in that case,the first Gulf War and the need to forge alliances withautocratic regimes were one reason talk of democracydeclined. The other reason was the discovery that politicalreform provided openings to Islamist political groupsthat seemed very much at odd with American objectives.The fear that Islamist groups supported democracy onlybased on the principle of “one man, one vote, one time,”as former Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejianonce put it, led the United States to backtrack. Evenearly in the Clinton Administration, Secretary of StateWarren Christopher initially focused on democracy inhis Middle East policy but quickly sidelined the issueas the administration moved to broker Palestinian-Israelinegotiation in the shadow of militant Islamist groups,especially Hamas.
POLITICAL ISLAM and the West
JOHN L.ESPOSITO
At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,ایران, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, مصر, اندونزی,اردن, Kuwait, لبنان,مالزی, پاکستان, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence
پل ساختمان دیوار
الکس گلنی
از زمان حملات تروریستی 11 سپتامبر 2001 در خاورمیانه و شمال آفریقا انفجار مورد علاقه اسلام گرایی غیرمذهبی رخ داده است (منا) منطقه. تا همین اواخر,تحلیلگران به طور واضح روی آن دسته از بازیگرانی که در پایان خشونت طیف اسلام گرایی فعالیت می کنند متمرکز شده اند, از جمله القاعده, طالبان, برخی از احزاب فرقه ای در عراق و گروه های سیاسی با بال های مسلح مانند حماس در سرزمین های اشغالی فلسطین (OPT)و حزب الله در لبنان, این واقعیت را مبهم کرده است که سیاست های معاصر در سراسر منطقه MENA توسط مجموعه ای بسیار متنوع تر از جریانات "جریان اصلی" اسلامی هدایت و شکل گرفته است.. ما این گروه ها را تعریف می کنیم که درگیر مشارکت و یا درگیری برای مشارکت در پروسه های سیاسی قانونی کشور های آنها هستند و در استفاده عموم از خشونت ها از اهداف خود در سطح ملی آگاه شده اند., حتی در مواردی که آنها بر علیه یا سرکوب شده تبعیض قائل هستند. این تعریف شامل گروه هایی مانند اخوان المسلمین در مصر می شود, حزب عدالت و توسعه (حزب عدالت و توسعه) در مراکش و جبهه اقدام اسلامی (IAF) در اردن. این جنبش ها یا احزاب غیر خشونت آمیز اسلامی اغلب نمایانگر بهترین سازمان یافته ترین و محبوب ترین عنصر مخالفت با رژیم های موجود در هر کشور هستند, و از آنجا که موجبات توجه سیاستگذاران غربی به نقشی که آنها می توانند در ارتقاء دموکراسی در منطقه بازی کنند ، افزایش یافته است.. با این حال ، به نظر می رسد که بحث در مورد این موضوع در مورد این سوال که آیا مناسب است با این گروه ها ارتباط مستقیمی و رسمی تر برقرار شود ، متوقف شده است, این نگرش تا حدودی با عدم تمایل به توجیه مشروعیت گروه هایی که ممکن است دیدگاه های ضد دموکراتیک در مورد حقوق زنان داشته باشند مرتبط است., کثرت گرایی سیاسی و طیف وسیعی از موضوعات دیگر. این همچنین ملاحظات عمل گرایانه در مورد منافع استراتژیک قدرت های غربی در منطقه منا را منعکس می کند که به نظر می رسد با افزایش محبوبیت و نفوذ اسلامگرایان مورد تهدید قرار می گیرند.. از طرف آنها, احزاب و جنبش های اسلام گرایانه ، نسبت به روابط نزدیک با آن دسته از قدرت های غربی که سیاست هایشان را در منطقه به شدت محاصره می کنند ، تمایلی آشکار نشان داده اند., نه تنها از ترس از چگونگی واکنش رژیمهای سرکوبگرانه در درون آنها. این تمرکز پروژه بر جنبشهای سیاسی غیر خشونت آمیز اسلامی نباید به غلط تفسیر شود بلکه حمایت ضمنی از برنامه های سیاسی آنها. تعهد به استراتژی مناسب تر برای تعامل با احزاب اصلی اسلامگرایانه ، خطرات و مبادلات قابل توجهی را برای سیاستگذاران آمریکایی و اروپایی شمالی دربر خواهد داشت.. با این حال, ما این موضع را اتخاذ می کنیم که تمایل هر دو طرف برای مشاهده تعامل به عنوان مبلغ صفر "همه یا هیچ چیز" بازی کمکی بوده است, و در صورت بروز گفتگوی سازنده تر در مورد اصلاحات در خاورمیانه و شمال آفریقا ، باید تغییر یابد.
ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA
پایه و اساس کوردوبا
In spite of it being both a perennial anda complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practicalgrounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, othersremain less optimistic of a shift in ideologyand approach in the international arena.While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA canbe attributed to the approach of promotingdemocracy, typically favoring dictatorshipsand puppet regimes that pay lip-service todemocratic values and human rights, the aftershockof 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivingsfurther through America’s position onpolitical Islam. It has created a wall of negativityas found by worldpublicopinion.org,according to which 67% of Egyptians believethat globally America is playing a “mainlynegative” role.America’s response has thus been apt. Byelecting Obama, many around the world arepinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent,but fairer foreign policy towards theMuslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss,is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?علاوه بر این, can it importantly be an honestbroker in prolonged zones of conflicts?