Alle poster i "Broderskab & Vest" Kategori
Islamisk reformation
Adnan Khan
Islam i Vesten
Jocelyne Cesari
A Post-election Re-reading of Islamist Political Thought
Roxanne L. Euben
Islam og Vesten
Forord
John J. DeGioia
Den bemærkelsesværdige følelse af nærhed mellem mennesker og nationer er den umiskendelige virkelighed i vores globaliserede verden. Møder med andre menneskers levevis, aktuelle anliggender, politik, velfærd og tro er hyppigere end nogensinde. Vi er ikke kun i stand til at se andre kulturer tydeligere, men også for at se vores forskelle mere skarpt. Informationsintensiteten i det moderne liv har gjort denne mangfoldighed af nationer til en del af vores daglige bevidsthed og har ført til, at kulturen er central i at skelne vores individuelle og kollektive syn på verden. Vores udfordringer er også blevet globale. Nationernes skæbner er blevet dybt forbundne.. Uanset hvor i verden vi bor, vi er berørt af succeserne og fiaskoerne i nutidens globale orden. Alligevel forbliver vores svar på globale problemer vidt forskellige, ikke kun som følge af rivalisering og konkurrerende interesser,men i høj grad fordi vores kulturelle forskel er den linse, hvorigennem vi ser disse globale udfordringer. Kulturel mangfoldighed er ikke nødvendigvis en kilde til sammenstød og konflikter. Faktisk, nærheden og tværkulturelle møder medfører meget ofte kreativ forandring – en forandring, der er muliggjort af et velorganiseret socialt samarbejde. Samarbejde på tværs af grænser vokser primært inden for erhvervslivet og økonomisk aktivitet. Samarbejdsnetværk for innovation,produktion og distribution fremstår som den mest magtfulde formgiver af den globale økonomi.
Demokrati, Terrorisme og amerikansk politik i den arabiske verden
F. Gregory Gause
Gør krav på centret: Politisk islam i overgang
John L.. Esposito
I 1990'erne politisk islam, hvad nogle kalder “Islamisk fundamentalisme,” er fortsat en stor tilstedeværelse i regeringen og i oppositionspolitik fra Nordafrika til Sydøstasien. Politisk islam ved magten og i politik har rejst mange spørgsmål og spørgsmål: “Er islam i modsætning til modernisering?,” “Er islam og demokrati uforenelige?,” “Hvad er implikationerne af en islamisk regering for pluralisme, mindretal og kvinders rettigheder,” “Hvor repræsentative er islamister,” “Er der islamiske moderate?,” “Skulle Vesten frygte en transnational islamisk trussel eller sammenstød mellem civilisationer?” Moderne islamisk genoplivning Landskabet i den muslimske verden i dag afslører fremkomsten af nye islamiske republikker (Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan), udbredelsen af islamiske bevægelser, der fungerer som store politiske og sociale aktører inden for eksisterende systemer, og radikale voldelige ekstremisters konfrontationspolitik._ I modsætning til 1980'erne, hvor politisk islam simpelthen blev sidestillet med revolutionært Iran eller hemmelige grupper med navne som islamisk jihad eller Guds hær, den muslimske verden i 1990'erne er en, hvor islamister har deltaget i valgprocessen og er synlige som premierministre, kabinetsofficerer, talere for nationalforsamlinger, parlamentarikere, og borgmestre i så forskellige lande som Egypten, Sudan, Kalkun, Iran, Libanon, Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesien, og Israel/Palæstina. Ved begyndelsen af det enogtyvende århundrede, politisk islam er fortsat en vigtig kraft for orden og uorden i global politik, en, der deltager i den politiske proces, men også i terrorhandlinger, en udfordring til den muslimske verden og til Vesten. At forstå karakteren af politisk islam i dag, og i særdeleshed de spørgsmål og spørgsmål, der er opstået fra erfaringerne fra den seneste fortid, forbliver kritisk for regeringerne, politiske beslutningstagere, og studerende i international politik.
Det er Politiken, Dum
John L.. Esposito
US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. Busk. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. Imidlertid, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.
As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, terrorisme, and peace in the Middle East.
Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Dermed, for eksempel, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.
In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?
Løsning af USAs islamistiske dilemma
International Consultation of Muslim Intellectuals on Islam & Politik
Stimson Center & Institut for Politikstudier
This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, Egypten, India,Indonesien, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. Langt om længe, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.
Egypten: Background and U.S. Relations
Jeremy M. Skarp
In the last year, Egyptian foreign policy, particularly its relationship with the United States, hasbenefitted substantially from both a change in U.S. policy and from events on the ground. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as U.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. Furthermore, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (december 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. På samme tid, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.
TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS
JOOST LAGENDIJK
“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, imidlertid. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Siden 11 september 2001, i særdeleshed, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.
BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL
ANTHONY BUBALO
GREG FEALY
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. I dag, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Islamisme, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.
Reform i den muslimske verden: Islamisters og eksterne magters rolle
Shibley Telhami
Bush-administrationens fokus på at udbrede demokrati i Mellemøsten har været meget diskuteret i løbet af de sidste mange år, ikke kun i USA og arabiske og muslimske lande, men også rundt om i verden. I sandhed, hverken den regionale diskurs om behovet for politiske og økonomiske reformer eller den amerikanske tale om at udbrede demokrati er ny. I løbet af de sidste to årtier, især begyndende med afslutningen af den kolde krig, intellektuelle og regeringer i Mellemøsten har talt om reform. Den amerikanske politik forud for den irakiske invasion af Kuwait i 1990 også rettet mod at udbrede demokrati i den arabiske verden. Men i så fald,den første Golfkrig og behovet for at indgå alliancer med autokratiske regimer var en af årsagerne til, at tale om demokrati faldt. Den anden grund var opdagelsen af, at politisk reform gav åbninger til islamistiske politiske grupper, der virkede meget underlige i forhold til amerikanske mål. Frygten for, at islamistiske grupper støttede demokrati, var kun baseret på princippet om "én mand"., én stemme, en gang,”som tidligere assisterende udenrigsminister Edward Djerejiance udtrykte det, fik USA til at trække sig tilbage. Endda i Clinton-administrationen, Udenrigsminister Warren Christopher fokuserede oprindeligt på demokrati i sin mellemøstlige politik, men satte hurtigt spørgsmålet til side, da administrationen flyttede til at formidle palæstinensisk-israelsk linjeforhandlinger i skyggen af militante islamistiske grupper,især Hamas.
POLITICAL ISLAM and the West
JOHN L.ESPOSITO
At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Iran, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Egypten, Indonesien,Jordan, Kuwait, Libanon,Malaysia, Pakistan, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence
Building bridges not walls
Alex Glennie
Since the terror attacks of 11 september 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Imidlertid, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.
ISLAM, DEMOKRATI & USA
cordoba fundament
In spite of it being both a perennial anda complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practicalgrounds, den vigtige debat om forholdet og foreneligheden mellem islam og demokrati, som gentaget i Barack Obamas dagsorden for håb og forandring. Mens mange fejrer Obamas opstigning til det ovale kontor som en national katarsis for USA, othersremain less optimistic of a shift in ideologyand approach in the international arena.While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA canbe attributed to the approach of promotingdemocracy, typically favoring dictatorshipsand puppet regimes that pay lip-service todemocratic values and human rights, the aftershockof 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivingsfurther through America’s position onpolitical Islam. It has created a wall of negativityas found by worldpublicopinion.org,ifølge hvilken 67% of Egyptians believethat globally America is playing a “mainlynegative” role.America’s response has thus been apt. Byelecting Obama, many around the world arepinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent,but fairer foreign policy towards theMuslim world. Testen for Obama, som vi diskuterer,er, hvordan Amerika og hendes allierede fremmer demokrati. Vil det være faciliterende eller påtvingende?i øvrigt, can it importantly be an honestbroker in prolonged zones of conflicts?