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Islámské reformace

Adnan Khan

Italský premiér, Silvio Berlusconi se po událostech chlubil 9/11:
„...musíme si být vědomi nadřazenosti naší civilizace, systém, který garantuje

pohoda, dodržování lidských práv a – na rozdíl od islámských zemí – úcta

za náboženská a politická práva, systém, který má své hodnoty a chápe rozmanitost

a tolerance...Západ si podmaní národy, jako by dobyl komunismus, i kdyby to

znamená konfrontaci s jinou civilizací, ten islámský, uvízl tam, kde byl

1,400 před lety…“1

A v a 2007 hlásí institut RAND:
„Boj probíhající ve velké části muslimského světa je v podstatě válkou

nápady. Jeho výsledek určí budoucí směřování muslimského světa.“

Budování umírněných muslimských sítí, Institut RAND

Pojem „islah“ (reforma) je pro muslimy neznámý pojem. Po celou dobu to nikdy neexistovalo

historie islámské civilizace; nikdy se o tom nediskutovalo a ani se o tom neuvažovalo. Letmý pohled na klasiku

Islámská literatura nám ukazuje, že když klasičtí učenci položili základy usul, a kodifikované

jejich islámská pravidla (fiqh) hleděli pouze na pochopení islámských pravidel, aby to dokázali

aplikovat je. Podobná situace nastala, když byla stanovena pravidla pro hadísy, tafseer a

arabština. Učenci, myslitelé a intelektuálové v celé islámské historii strávili mnoho času

porozumět Alláhovu zjevení – Koránu a aplikovat ayaat na realitu a vytvořenou

principy a disciplíny s cílem usnadnit porozumění. Korán tedy zůstal základem

studium a všechny disciplíny, které se vyvinuly, byly vždy založeny na Koránu. Ti, kteří se stali

zasaženi řeckou filozofií, jako jsou muslimští filozofové a někteří z řad Mut'azilah

byli považováni za lidi, kteří opustili záhyb islámu, protože Korán přestal být základem jejich studia. Tedy pro

každý muslim, který se pokouší odvodit pravidla nebo pochopit, jaký postoj by měl být zaujat ke konkrétnímu

vydání Koránu je základem této studie.

První pokus o reformu islámu se uskutečnil na přelomu 19. a 19. století. Na přelomu

století byla Ummah v dlouhém období úpadku, kdy se globální rovnováha sil posunula

z Khilafahu do Británie. Narůstající problémy zachvátily Khilafah, když byla západní Evropa uvnitř

uprostřed průmyslové revoluce. Ummah ztratila své původní chápání islámu, a

ve snaze zvrátit úpadek, který pohltil Uthmani (Osmané) někteří muslimové byli posláni do

Západ, a v důsledku toho byli uchváceni tím, co viděli. Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi z Egypta (1801-1873),

při návratu z Paříže, napsal životopisnou knihu s názvem Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The

Těžba zlata, nebo Přehled Paříže, 1834), chválit jejich čistotu, láska k práci, a výše

veškerou společenskou morálku. Prohlásil, že musíme napodobit to, co se děje v Paříži, obhajovat změny

islámské společnosti od liberalizace žen k systémům vládnutí. Tato myšlenka, a ostatním se to líbí,

znamenal počátek znovuobjevování trendu v islámu.

| září 07, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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Islám na Západě

Jocelyne Cesari

Imigrace muslimů do Evropy, Severní Amerika, a Austrálie a složitá socio-náboženská dynamika, která se následně rozvinula, učinila islám na Západě působivou novou oblastí výzkumu. Aféra Salmana Rushdieho, hidžábové kontroverze, útoky na Světové obchodní centrum, a rozruch nad dánskými karikaturami jsou příklady mezinárodních krizí, které odhalily spojení mezi muslimy na Západě a globálním muslimským světem. Tyto nové situace znamenají teoretické a metodologické výzvy pro studium současného islámu, a stalo se zásadním, abychom se vyhnuli esencializaci islámu nebo muslimů a bránili se rétorickým strukturám diskurzů, které se zabývají bezpečností a terorismem..
V tomto článku, Tvrdím, že islám jako náboženská tradice je terra incognita. Předběžným důvodem této situace je, že neexistuje konsensus o náboženství jako předmětu výzkumu. Náboženství, jako akademická disciplína, se rozpoltil mezi historickými, sociologický, a hermeneutické metodiky. S islámem, situace je ještě složitější. Na západě, studium islámu začalo jako odvětví orientalistických studií, a proto sledovalo samostatnou a odlišnou cestu od studia náboženství. I když kritika orientalismu byla ústředním bodem pro vznik studia islámu v oblasti společenských věd, napětí mezi islamisty a jak antropology, tak sociology zůstává silné. Téma islámu a muslimů na Západě je v tomto boji zasazeno. Jedním z důsledků tohoto metodologického napětí je, že studenti islámu, kteří začali svou akademickou kariéru studovat islám ve Francii, Německo, nebo Amerika ªnd to náročné prokázat důvěryhodnost jako učenci islámu, zejména v severoamerickém akademickém prostředí
kontext.

| září 07, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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Post-volby Re-čtení islámského politického myšlení

Roxanne L. Euben

Barack Obama’s post-election rhetoric regarding the “Muslim world” has signaled a critical paradigm shift from his predecessor. The new president’s characterization of the United States in his inaugural address as a “nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus and nonbelievers”; his formulation, invoked in several different contexts, that America will offer a hand of friendship to a Muslim world willing to “unclench [its] fist”; the emphasis on his own mixed lineage and experience living in Muslim countries; his pledge to close the Guantánamo Bay prison camp; his interview with Al Arabiya; and the promise to address the Muslim world from a Muslim capital during his first 100 days in office, all suggest a deliberate attempt to shift away from the hardening rhetoric of a new Cold War between the West and Islam and reframe American foreign policy toward Muslim societies.1 Obama’s rhetoric has enormous symbolic importance even if it has yet to issue in dramatic departures from previous U.S. foreign policies regarding, for example, Hamas or Iran’s nuclear program. At this particular juncture, its significance lies less in the specific policies it may presage or the greater sensitivity to Muslim sensibilities it reveals than in its underlying logic: implicit in these rhetorical gestures is the understanding that, as Obama put it in his interview with Al Arabiya, “the language we use matters,” that words and categories do not simply reflect but also create the world in which we live.
| Srpna 18, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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Islám a Západ

Preface

John J. DeGioia

The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, politika, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. Ve skutečnosti, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

| Srpna 11, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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Demokracie, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World

F. Gregory Gause

The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. Proto, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? Jinými slovy, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; a 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

| Srpna 06, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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Nárokování Centra: Politický islám v přechodu

John L. Edwards

V devadesátých letech politický islám, jak někteří říkají “islámský fundamentalismus,” zůstává významnou přítomností ve vládě a v opoziční politice od severní Afriky po jihovýchodní Asii. Politický islám u moci a v politice vyvolal mnoho problémů a otázek: “Je islám v rozporu s modernizací?,” “Jsou islám a demokracie neslučitelné?,” “Jaké jsou důsledky islámské vlády pro pluralismus?, práva menšin a žen,” “Jak reprezentativní jsou islamisté,” “Existují islámští umírnění?,” “Kdyby se Západ obával nadnárodní islámské hrozby nebo střetu civilizací?” Současné islámské obrození Krajina muslimského světa dnes odhaluje vznik nových islámských republik (Írán, Súdán, Afghánistán), šíření islámských hnutí, která fungují jako hlavní političtí a sociální aktéři v rámci stávajících systémů, a konfrontační politika radikálních násilných extremistů._ Na rozdíl od 80. let, kdy byl politický islám jednoduše ztotožňován s revolučním Íránem nebo tajnými skupinami s názvy jako islámský džihád nebo armáda Boží, Muslimský svět v 90. letech je světem, ve kterém se islamisté účastnili volebního procesu a jsou viditelní jako premiéři, kabinetní úředníci, řečníci národních shromáždění, poslanci, a starostové v zemích tak různorodých, jako je Egypt, Súdán, Turecko, Írán, Libanon, Kuvajt, Jemen, Jordán, Pákistán, Bangladéš, Malajsie, Indonésie, a Izrael/Palestina. Na úsvitu jednadvacátého století, politický islám je i nadále hlavní silou pro pořádek a nepořádek v globální politice, který se účastní politického procesu, ale také teroristických činů, výzvou pro muslimský svět a pro Západ. Pochopení podstaty politického islámu dnes, a zejména problémy a otázky, které vyplynuly ze zkušeností z nedávné minulosti, zůstává pro vlády rozhodující, tvůrci pravidel, i studenti mezinárodní politiky.

| Srpna 01, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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It’s the Policy, Stupid

John L. Edwards

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. Bush. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. Nicméně, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, terorismus, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Tím pádem, for example, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?


| Mar 28, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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Řešení amerického islamistického dilematu

Shadi Hamid

U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, but, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 a 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudská arábie, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. Nicméně, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, a, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt.

| Mar 07, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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International Consultation of Muslim Intellectuals on Islam & Politika

Stimson centrum & Institut politických studií

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, Egypt, India,Indonésie, Kenya, Malajsie, Pákistán, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. Konečně, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

| Mar 06, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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Egypt: Pozadí a USA. Vztahy

Jeremy M. Ostrý

In the last year, Egyptian foreign policy, particularly its relationship with the United States, hasbenefitted substantially from both a change in U.S. policy and from events on the ground. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, jako U.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. Dále, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (Prosinec 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. Ve stejnou dobu, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.

| Února 20, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS

Joost Lagendijk

Jan Marinus Wiersma

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, nicméně. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Since 11 Září 2001, zejména, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.

| Února 17, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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Mezi světovou a MÍSTNÍ

ANTHONY Bubalo

GREG FEALY

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Dnes, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Islamismus, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

| Února 17, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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Reform in the Muslim World: The Role of Islamists and Outside Powers

Shibley Telhami


The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, neither the regional discourse about theneed for political and economic reform nor the Americantalk of spreading democracy is new. Over the pasttwo decades, particularly beginning with the end of theCold War, intellectuals and governments in the MiddleEast have spoken about reform. The American policyprior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also aimedto spread democracy in the Arab world. But in that case,the first Gulf War and the need to forge alliances withautocratic regimes were one reason talk of democracydeclined. The other reason was the discovery that politicalreform provided openings to Islamist political groupsthat seemed very much at odd with American objectives.The fear that Islamist groups supported democracy onlybased on the principle of “one man, jeden hlas, one time,”as former Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejianonce put it, led the United States to backtrack. Evenearly in the Clinton Administration, Secretary of StateWarren Christopher initially focused on democracy inhis Middle East policy but quickly sidelined the issueas the administration moved to broker Palestinian-Israelinegotiation in the shadow of militant Islamist groups,especially Hamas.

| Února 17, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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POLITICAL ISLAM and the West

JOHN L.ESPOSITO


At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Írán, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Egypt, Indonésie,Jordán, Kuvajt, Libanon,Malajsie, Pákistán, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

| Února 17, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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Stavění mostů, ne zdí

Alex Glennie

Od teroristických útoků 11 Září 2001 došlo k explozi zájmu o politický islamismus na Blízkém východě a v severní Africe (MENA) kraj. Až poměrně nedávno,analytici se pochopitelně zaměřili na ty aktéry, kteří operují na násilném konci islamistického spektra, včetně Al-Káidy, Taliban, některé sektářské strany v Iráku a politické skupiny s ozbrojenými křídly jako Hamas na okupovaných palestinských územích (OPT)a Hizballáh v Libanonu.Nicméně, to zakrylo skutečnost, že v regionu MENA je současná politika řízena a formována mnohem rozmanitější sbírkou „mainstreamových“ islamistických hnutí.. Definujeme tyto skupiny, které se zapojují nebo se snaží zapojit do legálních politických procesů ve svých zemích a které se veřejně vyhýbají použití násilí, aby pomohly realizovat své cíle na národní úrovni., i tam, kde jsou diskriminováni nebo potlačováni. Tato definice by zahrnovala skupiny jako Muslimské bratrstvo v Egyptě, Stranou spravedlnosti a rozvoje (PJD) v Maroku a Islámská akční fronta (IAF) v Jordánsku. Tato nenásilná islamistická hnutí nebo strany často představují nejlépe organizovaný a nejpopulárnější prvek opozice vůči stávajícím režimům v každé zemi., a jako takový se zvyšuje zájem ze strany tvůrců západní politiky o roli, kterou by mohli hrát při podpoře demokracie v regionu. Zdá se však, že diskuse na toto téma se zastavily na otázce, zda by bylo vhodné zapojit se do těchto skupin na systematičtějším a formálnějším základě., Tento postoj je částečně spojen s ospravedlnitelnou neochotou legitimizovat skupiny, které by mohly zastávat antidemokratické názory na práva žen., Odráží také pragmatické úvahy o strategických zájmech západních mocností v regionu MENA, které jsou vnímány jako ohrožené rostoucí popularitou a vlivem islamistů.. Z jejich strany, Islamistické strany a hnutí projevily jasnou neochotu navázat užší vztahy s těmi západními mocnostmi, jejichž politice v regionu důrazně odporují., v neposlední řadě ze strachu, jak by mohly reagovat represivní režimy, v nichž působí. Zaměření tohoto projektu na nenásilná politická islamistická hnutí by nemělo být chybně vykládáno jako implicitní podpora jejich politických programů.. Zavázat se ke strategii promyšlenějšího jednání s mainstreamovými islamistickými stranami by pro tvůrce politik v Severní Americe a Evropě znamenalo značná rizika a kompromisy.. Nicméně, zastáváme stanovisko, že tendence obou stran pohlížet na zapojení jako na hru „všechno nebo nic“ s nulovým součtem nebyla užitečná., a potřebuje se změnit, má-li se objevit konstruktivnější dialog o reformě na Blízkém východě a v severní Africe.

| Února 16, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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ISLÁM, DEMOKRACIE & SPOJENÉ STÁTY AMERICKÉ

Cordoba nadace


In spite of it being both a perennial anda complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practicalgrounds, důležitá debata o vztahu a kompatibilitě mezi islámem a demokracií, jak se odráží v programu naděje a změny Baracka Obamy. Zatímco mnozí oslavují Obamův nástup do Oválné pracovny jako národní katarzi pro USA, othersremain less optimistic of a shift in ideologyand approach in the international arena.While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA canbe attributed to the approach of promotingdemocracy, typically favoring dictatorshipsand puppet regimes that pay lip-service todemocratic values and human rights, the aftershockof 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivingsfurther through America’s position onpolitical Islam. It has created a wall of negativityas found by worldpublicopinion.org,podle kterého 67% of Egyptians believethat globally America is playing a “mainlynegative” role.America’s response has thus been apt. Byelecting Obama, many around the world arepinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent,but fairer foreign policy towards theMuslim world. Test pro Obamu, jak diskutujeme,je to, jak Amerika a její spojenci prosazují demokracii. Bude to usnadňující nebo vnucující?navíc, can it importantly be an honestbroker in prolonged zones of conflicts?

| Února 16, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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