Totes les entrades al "germà & oest" Categoria

reforma Islàmica

Adnan Khan

Islam a Occident

Jocelyne Cesari

A Post-election Re-reading of Islamist Political Thought

Roxanne L. Euben

Islam and the West

Preface

John J. de Gioia

The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, política, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. De fet, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

democràcia, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World

F. Gregory Gause

Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition

John L. Esposito

In the 1990s political Islam, what some call “Islamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Iran, Sudan, Afganistan), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Turquia, Iran, Líban, Kuwait, Iemen, Jordània, Pakistan, Bangla Desh, Malàisia, Indonèsia, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, i en particular les qüestions i preguntes sorgides de l'experiència del passat recent, segueix sent fonamental per als governs, responsables polítics, i estudiants de política internacional per igual.

It’s the Policy, Stupid

John L. Esposito

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. arbust. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. malgrat això, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, terrorisme, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Així, for example, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?

Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma

International Consultation of Muslim Intellectuals on Islam & política

Stimson Center & Institut d'Estudis de Política

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, Egipte, India,Indonèsia, Kenya, Malàisia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. Finalment, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

Egipte: Background and U.S. Relations

jeremy M. Agut

In the last year, Egyptian foreign policy, particularly its relationship with the United States, hasbenefitted substantially from both a change in U.S. policy and from events on the ground. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as U.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. a més, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (desembre 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. Al mateix temps, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.

VIATGES ENTRE ELS VEINS MUSULMANS D'EUROPA

Joost Lagendijk

“Un anell d'amics al voltant de la Unió […], del Marroc a Rússia”. Així és com, a la tarda 2002, l'aleshores president de la Comissió Europea, Romano Prodi, va descriure el repte clau que s'enfronta Europa després de l'ampliació prevista de 2004. El procés d'adhesió havia agafat impuls, i els antics països comunistes de l'Europa central s'havien estabilitzat i es transformaven en democràcies. L'adhesió a la UE no estava directament a l'agenda dels països més enllà de l'horitzó de l'ampliació, malgrat això. Com podria Europa evitar que es formin noves línies divisòries a les seves fronteres?? Com podria la Unió Europea garantir l'estabilitat, seguretat i pau al llarg del seu perímetre? Aquestes preguntes eren potser més rellevants per als veïns del sud de la UE. Des de 11 setembre 2001, en particular, les nostres relacions amb el món islàmic han estat impregnades d'un sentit d'urgència. L'evolució política als nostres països veïns islàmics a la vora del Mediterrani podria tenir un impacte enorme en la seguretat europea. Tot i que la zona és a prop, la distància política és gran. Enmig d'un llenguatge amenaçador sobre un "xoc de civilitzacions", la UE va arribar ràpidament a la conclusió que la conciliació i la cooperació, més que enfrontament, constituïa la millor estratègia per tractar amb els seus veïns del sud.

BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL

ANTHONY Bubalo

GREG Fealy

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. avui, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : islamisme, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

Reform in the Muslim World: The Role of Islamists and Outside Powers

Shibley Telhami

The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, neither the regional discourse about theneed for political and economic reform nor the Americantalk of spreading democracy is new. Over the pasttwo decades, particularly beginning with the end of theCold War, intellectuals and governments in the MiddleEast have spoken about reform. The American policyprior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also aimedto spread democracy in the Arab world. But in that case,the first Gulf War and the need to forge alliances withautocratic regimes were one reason talk of democracydeclined. The other reason was the discovery that politicalreform provided openings to Islamist political groupsthat seemed very much at odd with American objectives.The fear that Islamist groups supported democracy onlybased on the principle of “one man, one vote, one time,", com va dir l'antic secretari d'estat adjunt Edward Djerejianonce, va portar els Estats Units a retrocedir. Fins i tot a l'administració Clinton, El secretari d'Estat Warren Christopher es va centrar inicialment en la democràcia en la seva política a l'Orient Mitjà, però ràpidament va deixar de banda la qüestió quan l'administració es va traslladar a negociar la negociació palestino-israeliana a l'ombra dels grups islamistes militants.,especialment Hamàs.

POLITICAL ISLAM and the West

JOHN L.ESPOSITO

At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Iran, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Egipte, Indonèsia,Jordània, Kuwait, Líban,Malàisia, Pakistan, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Construir ponts no murs

Àlex Glennie

Des dels atemptats terroristes de 11 setembre 2001 hi ha hagut una explosió d'interès per l'islamisme polític a l'Orient Mitjà i al nord d'Àfrica (MENA) regió. Fins fa força poc,Els analistes s'han centrat comprensiblement en aquells actors que operen a l'extrem violent de l'espectre islamista, inclosa Al-Qaeda, els talibans, alguns dels partits sectaris a l'Iraq i grups polítics amb braços armats com Hamàs als Territoris Palestins Ocupats (OPT)i Hezbollah al Líban. No obstant això, això ha enfosquit el fet que a tota la regió MENA la política contemporània està sent impulsada i modelada per una col·lecció molt més diversa de moviments islamistes "principals". Els definim com a grups que participen o busquen participar en els processos polítics legals dels seus països i que han evitat públicament l'ús de la violència per ajudar a assolir els seus objectius a nivell nacional., fins i tot quan són discriminats o reprimits. Aquesta definició inclouria grups com els Germans Musulmans a Egipte., el Partit de la Justícia i el Desenvolupament (PJD) al Marroc i el Front d'Acció Islàmica (IAF) a Jordània. Aquests moviments o partits islamistes no violents sovint representen l'element més ben organitzat i més popular de l'oposició als règims existents a cada país., i com a tal, hi ha hagut un interès creixent per part dels responsables polítics occidentals pel paper que poden tenir en la promoció de la democràcia a la regió.. No obstant això, les discussions sobre aquest tema sembla que s'han estancat sobre la qüestió de si seria oportú relacionar-se amb aquests grups d'una base més sistemàtica i formal., Aquesta actitud està en part lligada a una falta de voluntat justificada per legitimar grups que podrien tenir opinions antidemocràtiques sobre els drets de les dones., pluralisme polític i una sèrie d'altres qüestions. També reflecteix consideracions pragmàtiques sobre els interessos estratègics de les potències occidentals a la regió MENA que es veuen amenaçats per la creixent popularitat i influència dels islamistes.. Per la seva banda, Els partits i moviments islamistes han mostrat una clara reticència a establir vincles més estrets amb aquelles potències occidentals les polítiques de les quals s'oposen fermament a la regió., sobretot per por de com reaccionen els règims repressius en els quals operen. L'enfocament d'aquest projecte en els moviments polítics islamistes no violents no s'ha d'interpretar malament com a suport implícit a les seves agendes polítiques.. Comprometre's amb una estratègia de compromís més deliberat amb els principals partits islamistes implicaria riscos i compromisos significatius per als responsables polítics nord-americans i europeus.. malgrat això, assumim la posició que la tendència d'ambdues parts a veure el compromís com un joc de suma zero "tot o res" no ha estat útil, i ha de canviar si vol sorgir un diàleg més constructiu al voltant de la reforma a l'Orient Mitjà i el nord d'Àfrica.

ISLAM, DEMOCRÀCIA & ELS ESTATS UNITS D'AMÈRICA

Fundació Còrdova

In spite of it being both a perennial anda complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practicalgrounds, l'important debat sobre la relació i la compatibilitat entre l'islam i la democràcia, tal com es fa ressò a l'agenda d'esperança i canvi de Barack Obama. Mentre que molts celebren l'ascens d'Obama a l'Oficina Oval com a catarsi nacional dels EUA, othersremain less optimistic of a shift in ideologyand approach in the international arena.While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA canbe attributed to the approach of promotingdemocracy, typically favoring dictatorshipsand puppet regimes that pay lip-service todemocratic values and human rights, the aftershockof 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivingsfurther through America’s position onpolitical Islam. It has created a wall of negativityas found by worldpublicopinion.org,segons el qual 67% of Egyptians believethat globally America is playing a “mainlynegative” role.America’s response has thus been apt. Byelecting Obama, many around the world arepinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent,but fairer foreign policy towards theMuslim world. La prova per a Obama, mentre comentem,és com Amèrica i els seus aliats promouen la democràcia. Serà facilitador o imposant?A més, can it importantly be an honestbroker in prolonged zones of conflicts?