RSSУсе запісы ў "Брат & Захад" Катэгорыя

ісламская рэфармацыя

Аднан Хан

Прэм'ер-міністр Італіі, Сільвіо Берлусконі пахваліўся пасля падзей 9/11:
«...мы павінны ўсведамляць перавагу нашай цывілізацыі, сістэма, якая гарантавала

дабрабыт, павага да правоў чалавека і – у адрозненне ад ісламскіх краін – павага

за рэлігійныя і палітычныя правы, сістэма, якая мае свае каштоўнасці разумення разнастайнасці

і талерантнасць...Захад заваюе народы, як гэта перамагло камунізм, нават калі гэта

азначае супрацьстаянне з іншай цывілізацыяй, ісламская, затрымаўся там, дзе быў

1,400 гадоў таму ... »1

І ў 2007 справаздача інстытута RAND:
«Барацьба, якая вядзецца на большай частцы мусульманскага свету, па сутнасці з'яўляецца вайной

ідэі. Яго вынікі будуць вызначаць будучы кірунак мусульманскага свету ".

Стварэнне ўмераных мусульманскіх сетак, Інстытут RAND

Паняцце "іслам" (рэформа) - паняцце, невядомае мусульманам. Ён ніколі не існаваў на працягу

гісторыя ісламскай цывілізацыі; гэта ніколі не абмяркоўвалася і нават не разглядалася. Беглы погляд на класіку

Ісламская літаратура паказвае нам, што калі класічныя вучоныя заклалі асновы усула, і кадыфікаваны

іх ісламскія пастановы (фікх) яны толькі для таго, каб зразумець ісламскія правілы

ўжываць іх. Падобная сітуацыя адбылася, калі былі выкладзены правілы для хадзіса, тафсір і

Арабская мова. Вучоныя, мысляры і інтэлектуалы на працягу ўсёй ісламскай гісторыі правялі шмат часу

разуменне Аб'яўлення Алаха - Каран і прымяненне аят да рэчаіснасці і прыдуманага

прынцыпы і дысцыпліны, каб палегчыць разуменне. Такім чынам, Каран заставаўся асновай

вывучэнне і ўсе дысцыпліны, якія развіваліся, заўсёды грунтаваліся на Каране. Тыя, хто стаў

захоплены грэцкай філасофіяй, напрыклад, мусульманскімі філосафамі і некаторымі з ліку мутазілаў

лічыліся выйшлі з-пад ісламу, бо Каран перастаў быць асновай іх вывучэння. Такім чынам для

любы мусульманін, які спрабуе вывесці правілы альбо зразумець, якую пазіцыю трэба прымаць да канкрэтнага чалавека

выданне Карана з'яўляецца асновай гэтага даследавання.

Першая спроба рэфармаваць іслам адбылася на мяжы XIX стагоддзя. Па чарзе

стагоддзі Ума знаходзілася ў працяглым перыядзе заняпаду, калі глабальны баланс сіл змяніўся

ад Хілафа да Брытаніі. Праблемы з мантажом ахапілі Халафу, пакуль была Заходняя Еўропа

у разгар прамысловай рэвалюцыі. Ума страціла сваё першароднае разуменне ісламу, і

у спробе пераламаць спад, які ахапіў усманаў (Асманы) некаторыя мусульмане былі адпраўлены ў

Захад, і ў выніку былі ўражаны ўбачаным. Рыфаа Рафі аль-Тахтаві з Егіпта (1801-1873),

па вяртанні з Парыжа, напісаў біяграфічную кнігу пад назвай Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The

Здабыча золата, або Агляд Парыжа, 1834), хвалячы іх чысціню, любоў да працы, і вышэй

уся сацыяльная мараль. Ён заявіў, што мы павінны імітаваць тое, што робіцца ў Парыжы, выступаючы за змены ў

ісламскае грамадства ад лібералізацыі жанчын да сістэм кіравання. Гэта думка, і іншым падабаецца,

паклала пачатак аднаўленчай тэндэнцыі ў ісламе.

Іслам на Захадзе

Jocelyne Cesari

Іміграцыя мусульман у Еўропу, Паўночная Амерыка, і Аўстраліі, і складаная сацыяльна-рэлігійная дынаміка, якая развілася пасля, зрабіла іслам на Захадзе пераканаўчай новай сферай даследаванняў. Справа Салмана Рушдзі, спрэчкі аб хіджабе, атакі на Сусветны гандлёвы цэнтр, і фурор з-за дацкіх мультфільмаў - усё гэта прыклады міжнародных крызісаў, якія выявілі сувязі паміж мусульманамі на Захадзе і глабальным мусульманскім светам. Гэтыя новыя сітуацыі цягнуць за сабой тэарэтычныя і метадалагічныя праблемы для вывучэння сучаснага ісламу, і стала вельмі важным, каб мы пазбягалі эсэнцыялізацыі ні ісламу, ні мусульман і супраціўляліся рытарычным структурам дыскурсу, якія займаюцца бяспекай і тэрарызмам.
У гэтым артыкуле, Я сцвярджаю, што іслам як рэлігійная традыцыя з'яўляецца terra incognita. Папярэдняя прычына такой сітуацыі — адсутнасць кансенсусу адносна рэлігіі як аб'екта даследавання. Рэлігія, як вучэбная дысцыпліна, стала разрывацца паміж гістарычнымі, сацыялагічныя, і герменеўтычныя метадалогіі. З ісламам, сітуацыя яшчэ больш складаная. На Захадзе, вывучэнне ісламу пачалося як галіна ўсходазнаўства і таму ішло асобным і адметным шляхам ад вывучэння рэлігій. Нягледзячы на ​​тое, што крытыка арыенталізму была цэнтральнай у з'яўленні вывучэння ісламу ў галіне сацыяльных навук, напружанасць застаецца моцнай паміж ісламістамі і як антраполагамі, так і сацыёлагамі. У гэтую барацьбу закладзена тэма ісламу і мусульман на Захадзе. Адным з наступстваў гэтай метадалагічнай напружанасці з'яўляецца тое, што студэнты ісламу, якія пачалі сваю акадэмічную кар'еру, вывучаючы іслам у Францыі, Германіі, або Амерыка, і гэта складана стварыць давер да навукоўцаў ісламу, асабліва ў паўночнаамерыканскіх акадэмічных
кантэкст.

Перачытанне ісламісцкай палітычнай думкі пасля выбараў

Roxanne L. Euben

Barack Obama’s post-election rhetoric regarding the “Muslim world” has signaled a critical paradigm shift from his predecessor. The new president’s characterization of the United States in his inaugural address as a “nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus and nonbelievers”; his formulation, invoked in several different contexts, that America will offer a hand of friendship to a Muslim world willing to “unclench [its] fist”; the emphasis on his own mixed lineage and experience living in Muslim countries; his pledge to close the Guantánamo Bay prison camp; his interview with Al Arabiya; and the promise to address the Muslim world from a Muslim capital during his first 100 days in office, all suggest a deliberate attempt to shift away from the hardening rhetoric of a new Cold War between the West and Islam and reframe American foreign policy toward Muslim societies.1 Obama’s rhetoric has enormous symbolic importance even if it has yet to issue in dramatic departures from previous U.S. foreign policies regarding, напрыклад, Hamas or Iran’s nuclear program. At this particular juncture, its significance lies less in the specific policies it may presage or the greater sensitivity to Muslim sensibilities it reveals than in its underlying logic: implicit in these rhetorical gestures is the understanding that, as Obama put it in his interview with Al Arabiya, “the language we use matters,” that words and categories do not simply reflect but also create the world in which we live.

Іслам і Захад

Preface

John J. DeGioia

The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, палітыка, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. На самай справе, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

дэмакратыя, Тэрарызм і амерыканская палітыка ў арабскім свеце

F. Рыгор Gause

The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. Таму, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? Іншымі словамі, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; і 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

Прэтэндуючы на ​​Цэнтр: Палітычны іслам у пераходны перыяд

John L. Эспазіта

У 1990-я г. палітычны іслам, што некаторыя называюць “Ісламскі фундаменталізм,” застаецца значнай прысутнасцю ва ўрадзе і ў апазіцыйнай палітыцы ад Паўночнай Афрыкі да Паўднёва-Усходняй Азіі. Палітычны іслам ва ўладзе і ў палітыцы выклікаў шмат праблем і пытанняў: “Іслам супрацьстаіць мадэрнізацыі?,” “Хіба іслам і дэмакратыя несумяшчальныя?,” “Якія наступствы ісламскага ўрада для плюралізму, правы меншасцяў і жанчын,” “Наколькі прадстаўнічыя ісламісты,” “Ёсць ісламскія ўмераныя?,” “Ці варта Захаду баяцца транснацыянальнай ісламскай пагрозы або сутыкнення цывілізацый?” Сучаснае ісламскае адраджэнне Ландшафт сучаснага мусульманскага свету паказвае з'яўленне новых ісламскіх рэспублік (Іран, Судан, Афганістан), распаўсюджванне ісламскіх рухаў, якія функцыянуюць у якасці асноўных палітычных і сацыяльных суб'ектаў у рамках існуючых сістэм, і канфрантацыйная палітыка радыкальных гвалтоўных экстрэмістаў._ У адрозненне ад 1980-х гадоў, калі палітычны іслам проста атаясамлівалі з рэвалюцыйным Іранам або падпольнымі групамі з такімі назвамі, як ісламскі джыхад або армія Божая, мусульманскі свет 1990-х гадоў - гэта свет, у якім ісламісты ўдзельнічалі ў выбарчым працэсе і былі бачныя ў якасці прэм'ер-міністраў, кабінет афіцэраў, спікеры нацыянальных сходаў, парламентарыяў, і мэры ў такіх розных краінах, як Егіпет, Судан, Турцыя, Іран, Ліван, Кувейт, Емен, Іарданія, Пакістан, Бангладэш, Малайзія, Інданезія, і Ізраіль/Палестына. На світанку дваццаць першага стагоддзя, палітычны іслам працягвае заставацца галоўнай сілай парадку і бязладзіцы ў сусветнай палітыцы, які ўдзельнічае ў палітычным працэсе, але таксама і ў тэрарыстычных актах, выклік мусульманскаму свету і Захаду. Разуменне прыроды палітычнага ісламу сёння, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.

Гэта Палітыка, Дурны

John L. Эспазіта

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. буш. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. Аднак, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, тэрарызм, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Такім чынам, напрыклад, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?


Вырашэнне ісламісцкай дылемы Амерыкі

Шадзі Хамід

U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, але, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 і 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Саўдаўская Аравія, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. Аднак, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, і, тут, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt.

Міжнародная кансультацыя мусульманскай інтэлігенцыі па ісламу & палітыка

Стимсон цэнтр & Інстытут палітычных даследаванняў

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, Егіпет, India,Інданезія, Kenya, Малайзія, Пакістан, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. Нарэшце, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

Егіпет: Перадгісторыя і ЗША. Адносіны

Джэрэмі M. дыез

In the last year, Egyptian foreign policy, particularly its relationship with the United States, hasbenefitted substantially from both a change in U.S. policy and from events on the ground. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as U.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. Акрамя таго, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (снежні 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. Адначасова, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.

ПАДАРОЖЖЫ ПА МУСУЛЬМАНСКІХ СУСЕДЯХ ЕЎРОПЫ

Joost Lagendijk

Ян Марынус Вірсма

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union [], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Рамана Продзі, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, Аднак. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Паколькі 11 Верасень 2001, у прыватнасці, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.

ПАМІЖ ГЛАБАЛЬНЫМ І ЛАКАЛЬНЫМ

Антону Bubalo

GREG FEALY

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Сёння, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : ісламізм, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

Рэформы ў мусульманскім свеце: Роля ісламістаў і знешніх сіл

Шыблі Тельхами


The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, ні рэгіянальны дыскурс аб неабходнасці палітычных і эканамічных рэформаў, ні амерыканскія размовы аб пашырэнні дэмакратыі не новыя. За апошнія два дзесяцігоддзі, асабліва пачынаючы з заканчэннем халоднай вайны, інтэлектуалы і ўрады на Блізкім Усходзе казалі пра рэформы. Амерыканская палітыка напярэдадні ўварвання Ірака ў Кувейт 1990 таксама накіравана на пашырэнне дэмакратыі ў арабскім свеце. Але ў такім выпадку,Першая вайна ў Персідскім заліве і неабходнасць заключаць саюзы з аўтакратычнымі рэжымамі былі адной з прычын, па якой размовы аб дэмакратыі заняпалі. Другой прычынай было адкрыццё таго, што палітычная рэформа адкрыла шлях для ісламісцкіх палітычных груповак, што здавалася вельмі супярэчным амерыканскім мэтам., адзін голас, аднойчы,", як сказаў былы памочнік дзяржсакратара Эдвард Джэрэджыянанс, прывялі Злучаныя Штаты да адступлення. Нават у адміністрацыі Клінтана, Дзяржаўны сакратар Уорэн Крыстафер першапачаткова засяродзіўся на дэмакратыі ў сваёй палітыцы на Блізкім Усходзе, але хутка адышоў ад гэтага пытання, бо адміністрацыя перайшла да пасярэдніцтва ў палесціна-ізраільскіх перамовах у цені ваяўнічых ісламісцкіх груповак,асабліва ХАМАС.

ПАЛІТЫЧНЫ ІСЛАМ і Захад

JOHN L.ESPOSITO


At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Іран, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Егіпет, Інданезія,Іарданія, Кувейт, Ліван,Малайзія, Пакістан, і Емен. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Будаваць масты, а не сцены

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 Верасень 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (ПСР) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Аднак, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

ІСЛАМ, ДЭМАКРАТЫЯ & ЗША

падмурак Кордоба


In spite of it being both a perennial anda complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practicalgrounds, важныя дэбаты аб адносінах і сумяшчальнасці паміж ісламам і дэмакратыяй, як адбілася ў праграме надзеі і пераменаў Барака Абамы. У той час як многія адзначаюць прыход Абамы ў Авальны кабінет як нацыянальны катарсіс для ЗША, othersremain less optimistic of a shift in ideologyand approach in the international arena.While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA canbe attributed to the approach of promotingdemocracy, typically favoring dictatorshipsand puppet regimes that pay lip-service todemocratic values and human rights, the aftershockof 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivingsfurther through America’s position onpolitical Islam. It has created a wall of negativityas found by worldpublicopinion.org,паводле якога 67% of Egyptians believethat globally America is playing a “mainlynegative” role.America’s response has thus been apt. Byelecting Obama, many around the world arepinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent,but fairer foreign policy towards theMuslim world. Тэст для Абамы, як мы абмяркоўваем,як Амерыка і яе саюзнікі прасоўваюць дэмакратыю. Ці будзе гэта палягчэнне або навязванне?Прычым, can it importantly be an honestbroker in prolonged zones of conflicts?