Alle inskrywings in die "Ikhwan & Wes-" Kategorie
Islamitiese Hervorming
Adnan Khan
Islam in die Weste
Jocelyne Cesari
'N Post-verkiesing Re-lesing van Islamitiese politieke denke
Roxanne L. Euben
Islam en die Weste
Voorwoord
John J. DeGioia
Die merkwaardige gevoel van nabyheid tussen mense en nasies is die onmiskenbare werklikheid van ons geglobaliseerde wêreld. Ontmoetings met ander mense se lewenswyses, aktuele sake, politiek, welsyn en gelowe kom meer gereeld voor as ooit. Ons is nie net in staat om ander kulture duideliker te sien nie, maar ook om ons verskille skerper te sien. Die inligtingsintensiteit van die moderne lewe het hierdie diversiteit van nasies deel gemaak van ons daaglikse bewussyn en het gelei tot die sentraliteit van kultuur om ons individuele en kollektiewe sienings van die wêreld te onderskei. Ons uitdagings het ook wêreldwyd geword. Die lotgevalle van nasies het diep met mekaar verbind geraak.. Maak nie saak waar in die wêreld ons woon nie, ons word geraak deur die suksesse en mislukkings van vandag se globale orde. Tog bly ons reaksies op globale probleme baie verskillend, nie net as gevolg van wedywering en mededingende belange nie,maar grootliks omdat ons kulturele verskil die lens is waardeur ons hierdie globale uitdagings sien. Kulturele diversiteit is nie noodwendig 'n bron van botsings en konflik nie. In werklikheid, die nabyheid en kruiskulturele ontmoetings bring baie dikwels kreatiewe verandering teweeg - 'n verandering wat moontlik gemaak word deur goed georganiseerde sosiale samewerking. Samewerking oor grense heen groei hoofsaaklik op die gebied van besigheid en ekonomiese aktiwiteit. Samewerkende netwerke vir innovasie,produksie en verspreiding kom na vore as die enkele mees kragtige vormgewer van die globale ekonomie.
Demokrasie, Terrorisme en die Amerikaanse beleid in die Arabiese wêreld
F. Gregory Gause
Aanspraak maak op die Center: Politieke Islam in Transition
John L. Edwards
In die 1990's politieke Islam, wat sommige noem “Islamitiese fundamentalisme,” bly 'n groot teenwoordigheid in die regering en politiek oppositioneel uit Noord-Afrika te Suidoos-Asië. Politieke Islam in krag en in die politiek aan die orde het baie probleme en vrae: “Is Islam teenstelling tot modernisering?,” “Is Islam en demokrasie onversoenbaar?,” “Wat is die implikasies van 'n Islamitiese regering vir pluralisme, minderheids- en vroueregte,” “Hoe verteenwoordigend is Islamiete,” “Is daar Islamitiese gematigdes?,” “Sou die Weste 'n transnasionale Islamitiese bedreiging of botsing van beskawings vrees?” Hedendaagse Islamitiese Herlewing Die landskap van die Moslemwêreld vandag openbaar die opkoms van nuwe Islamitiese republieke (Iran, Soedan, Afghanistan), die verspreiding van Islamitiese bewegings wat as belangrike politieke en sosiale rolspelers binne bestaande stelsels funksioneer, en die konfronterende politiek van radikale gewelddadige ekstremiste._ In teenstelling met die 1980's toe politieke Islam eenvoudig gelykgestel is aan revolusionêre Iran of klandestiene groepe met name soos Islamitiese jihad of die Leër van God, die Moslemwêreld in die 1990's is een waarin Islamiete aan die verkiesingsproses deelgeneem het en as eerste ministers sigbaar is, kabinetsbeamptes, sprekers van nasionale vergaderings, parlementslede, en burgemeesters in lande so uiteenlopend soos Egipte, Soedan, Turkye, Iran, Libanon, Koeweit, Jemen, Jordaan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maleisië, Indonesië, en Israel/Palestina. Aan die begin van die een-en-twintigste eeu, politieke Islam bly 'n groot krag vir orde en wanorde in globale politiek, een wat deelneem aan die politieke proses, maar ook aan dade van terrorisme, 'n uitdaging vir die Moslemwêreld en die Weste. Verstaan die aard van politieke Islam vandag, en in die besonder die kwessies en vrae wat na vore gekom het uit die ervaring van die onlangse verlede, bly krities vir regerings, beleidmakers, en studente van internasionale politiek.
Dit is die beleid, Dom
John L. Edwards
US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. Bush. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. Egter, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.
As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, terrorisme, and peace in the Middle East.
Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Dus, byvoorbeeld, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.
In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?
Probleme Amerika se isla Dilemma
Internasionale Raadpleging van Moslem intellectuelen oor die Islam & Politiek
Stimson Sentrum & Instituut vir Policy Studies
Hierdie twee-dag gesprek bymekaar gebring kundiges en akademici uit Bangladesh, Egipte, Indië,Indonesië, Kenia, Maleisië, Pakistan, die Filippyne, Soedan en Sri Lanka verteenwoordig akademie,nie-regeringsorganisasies en think tanks. Onder die deelnemers is 'n aantal voormalige regeringsamptenare en een sitting wetgever. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. uiteindelik, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.
Egipte: Agtergrond en die VSA. Verhoudings
Jeremy M. Skerp
In die afgelope jaar, Egiptiese buitelandse beleid, veral sy verhouding met die Verenigde State, hasbenefitted aansienlik van beide 'n verandering in die VSA. beleid en van gebeure op die grond. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as V.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. Verder, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (Desember 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. Op dieselfde tyd, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.
TRAVELS TUSSEN EUROPE se Moslem BURE
JOOSTE LAGENDIJK
“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, egter. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Sedert 11 September 2001, in die besonder, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.
TUSSEN DIE globale en die PLAASLIKE
ANTHONY BUBALO
GREG FEALY
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Vandag, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Islam, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.
Hervorming in die Moslem wêreld: Die rol van die Islamiete en Buite Powers
Shibley Telhami
Die Bush-administrasie se fokus op die verspreiding van demokrasie in die Midde-Ooste is die afgelope paar jaar baie bespreek, nie net in die Verenigde Statesand Arabiese en Moslem-lande, maar ook om TheWorld. In waarheid, nóg die streeksdiskoers oor die behoefte aan politieke en ekonomiese hervorming nóg die Amerikaanse praatjies oor die verspreiding van demokrasie is nuut. Oor die afgelope twee dekades, veral begin met die einde van die Koue Oorlog, intellektuele en regerings in die Midde-Ooste het oor hervorming gepraat. Die Amerikaanse beleid voor die Irakse inval in Koeweit in 1990 ook daarop gemik om demokrasie in die Arabiese wêreld te versprei. Maar in daardie geval,die eerste Golfoorlog en die behoefte om alliansies te sluit met outokratiese regimes was een van die redes waarom sprake van demokrasie verwerp het. Die ander rede was die ontdekking dat politieke hervorming geleenthede gebied het vir Islamitiese politieke groepe wat baie vreemd gelyk het met Amerikaanse doelwitte. Die vrees dat Islamitiese groepe demokrasie ondersteun het slegs gebaseer op die beginsel van "een man"., een stem, een keer,"soos die voormalige assistent-sekretaris van buitelandse sake, Edward Djerejiance, dit gestel het, het daartoe gelei dat die Verenigde State teruggetrek het. Eers in die Clinton-administrasie, Warren Christopher, minister van buitelandse sake, het aanvanklik op demokrasie in sy Midde-Ooste-beleid gefokus, maar het die kwessie vinnig opsy gesit toe die administrasie beweeg het om Palestyns-Israeline-onderhandeling in die skadu van militante Islamitiese groepe te bemiddel.,veral Hamas.
Politieke Islam en die Weste
JOHN L.ESPOSITO
Aan die begin van die 21ste centurypolitical Islam, ormore algemeen Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa groot teenwoordigheid in regerings andoppositional politiek uit die Noord-Africato Suidoos-Asië. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Iran, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Egipte, Indonesië,Jordaan, Koeweit, Libanon,Maleisië, Pakistan, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence
Die bou van brûe nie mure
Alex Glennie
Since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Egter, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.
ISLAM, DEMOKRASIE & DIE VSA
cordoba fondament
Ten spyte daarvan dat dit beide 'n meerjarige en 'n komplekse debat is, Arches Quarterly herondersoek vanuit teologiese en praktiese gronde, die belangrike debat oor die verhouding en verenigbaarheid tussen Islam en Demokrasie, soos weergalm in Barack Obama se agenda van hoop en verandering. Terwyl baie Obama se opkoms na die Oval Office vier as 'n nasionale katarsis vir die VSA, ander bly minder optimisties oor 'n verskuiwing in ideologie en benadering in die internasionale arena. Terwyl baie van die spanning en wantroue tussen die Moslemwêreld en die VSA toegeskryf kan word aan die benadering om demokrasie te bevorder, tipies voorstander van diktature en marionetregimes wat lippediens lewer aan demokratiese waardes en menseregte, die naskok 9/11 het werklik die bekommernisse verder versterk deur Amerika se standpunt oor politieke Islam. Dit het 'n muur van negatiwiteit geskep soos gevind deur worldpublicopinion.org,waarvolgens 67% van Egiptenare glo dat Amerika wêreldwyd 'n "hoof-negatiewe" rol speel. Amerika se reaksie was dus gepas. Obama te kies, baie regoor die wêreld vestig hul hoop op die ontwikkeling van 'n minder strydlustige,maar regverdiger buitelandse beleid teenoor die Moslemwêreld. Die toets vir Obama, soos ons bespreek,is hoe Amerika en haar bondgenote demokrasie bevorder. Sal dit vergemaklik of opleidend wees?Verder, kan dit belangrik wees om 'n eerlike makelaar in langdurige sones van konflikte te wees?