RSSAlle inskrywings in die "Ikhwan & Wes-" Kategorie

Islamitiese Hervorming

Adnan Khan

Die Italiaanse premier, Silvio Berlusconi het gespog ná die gebeure van 9/11:
“... ons moet bewus wees van die superioriteit van ons beskawing, 'n stelsel wat gewaarborg is

welstand, respek vir menseregte en – in teenstelling met Islamitiese lande – respek

vir godsdienstige en politieke regte, 'n stelsel wat sy waardes verstaan ​​van diversiteit

en verdraagsaamheid ... Die Weste sal mense verower, soos dit die kommunisme verower het, selfs al is dit

beteken 'n konfrontasie met 'n ander beskawing, die Islamitiese een, vas waar dit was

1,400 jare gelede… ”1

En in 'n 2007 berig die RAND-instituut verklaar:
'Die stryd wat in 'n groot deel van die Moslem-wêreld aan die gang is, is in wese 'n oorlog

idees. Die uitkoms daarvan bepaal die toekomstige rigting van die Moslem-wêreld. ”

Bou matige Moslemnetwerke, RAND Instituut

Die konsep 'islah' (hervorming) is 'n konsep wat nie aan Moslems bekend is nie. Dit het nooit regdeur die

geskiedenis van die Islamitiese beskawing; daar is nooit gedebatteer of selfs oorweeg nie. 'N Vinnige blik op klassiek

Islamitiese literatuur wys ons dat die klassieke geleerdes die grondslag van usul gelê het, en gekodifiseer

hulle Islamitiese beslissings (fiqh) hulle het net gekyk na die begrip van die Islamitiese reëls om dit te doen

pas dit toe. 'N Soortgelyke situasie het voorgekom toe die reëls vir die hadith neergelê is, tafseer en die

Arabiese taal. Geleerdes, denkers en intellektuele gedurende die Islamitiese geskiedenis het baie tyd spandeer

om Allah se openbaring te verstaan ​​- die Koran en die ayaat toe te pas op die werklikhede en om te bedink

skoolhoofde en dissiplines om begrip te vergemaklik. Vandaar dat die Koran die basis van

studie en al die dissiplines wat ontwikkel het, was altyd gebaseer op die Koran. Die wat geword het

verslaan deur Griekse filosofieë soos Moslem-filosowe en sommige uit die Mut’azilah

word beskou as die uitbreiding van Islam omdat die Koran opgehou het om hul basis van studie te wees. Dus vir

enige Moslem wat reëls probeer aflei of verstaan ​​watter standpunt oor 'n bepaalde persoon ingestel moet word

kwessie die Koran is die basis van hierdie studie.

Die eerste poging om Islam te hervorm, het teen die draai van die 19de eeu plaasgevind. Teen die draai van die

eeu was die Ummah in 'n lang periode van agteruitgang waar die wêreldwye magsbalans verskuif het

van die Khilafah na Brittanje. Toenemende probleme het die Khilafah verswelg terwyl Wes-Europa in was

te midde van die industriële rewolusie. Die Ummah het haar ongerepte begrip van Islam verloor, en

in 'n poging om die agteruitgang van die Uthmani te keer (Ottomane) sommige Moslems is na die land gestuur

Wes-, en gevolglik het hulle geslaan deur wat hulle gesien het. Rifa’a Rafi ’al-Tahtawi van Egipte (1801-1873),

met sy terugkeer uit Parys, het 'n biografiese boek geskryf met die naam Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (Die

Onttrekking van goud, of 'n oorsig van Parys, 1834), prys hul netheid, liefde vir werk, En bo

alle sosiale moraliteit. Hy het verklaar dat ons dit wat in Parys gedoen word, moet naboots, pleit vir veranderinge aan

die Islamitiese samelewing, van die liberalisering van vroue tot die regstelsels. Hierdie gedagte, en ander hou daarvan,

was die begin van die herontdekkingstendens in Islam.

Islam in die Weste

Jocelyne Cesari

Die immigrasie van Moslems na Europa, Noord-Amerika, en Australië en die komplekse sosiaal-godsdienstige dinamika wat daarna ontwikkel het, het Islam in die Weste 'n dwingende nuwe navorsingsveld gemaak. Die Salman Rushdie-aangeleentheid, hijab kontroversies, die aanvalle op die World Trade Center, en die woede oor die Deense spotprente is almal voorbeelde van internasionale krisisse wat die verbande tussen Moslems in die Weste en die globale Moslemwêreld aan die lig gebring het.. Hierdie nuwe situasies behels teoretiese en metodologiese uitdagings vir die studie van kontemporêre Islam, en dit het deurslaggewend geword dat ons die essensialisering van óf Islam óf Moslems vermy en die retoriese strukture van diskoerse wat besig is met veiligheid en terrorisme weerstaan.
In hierdie artikel, Ek argumenteer dat Islam as 'n godsdienstige tradisie 'n terra incognita is. 'n Voorlopige rede vir hierdie situasie is dat daar geen konsensus is oor godsdiens as 'n voorwerp van navorsing nie. Godsdiens, as 'n akademiese dissipline, geword het verskeur tussen geskiedkundige, sosiologiese, en hermeneutiese metodologieë. Met die Islam, die situasie is selfs meer ingewikkeld. In die weste, die studie van Islam het begin as 'n vertakking van Oriëntalistiese studies en het dus 'n aparte en eiesoortige pad van die studie van godsdienste gevolg. Selfs al was die kritiek op Oriëntalisme sentraal tot die opkoms van die studie van Islam in die ªveld van sosiale wetenskappe, spanning bly sterk tussen Islamiste en beide antropoloë en sosioloë. Die onderwerp van Islam en Moslems in die Weste is ingebed in hierdie stryd. Een implikasie van hierdie metodologiese spanning is dat studente van Islam wat hul akademiese loopbaan begin het, Islam in Frankryk bestudeer het, Duitsland, of Amerika ª en dit is uitdagend om geloofwaardigheid as geleerdes van Islam te vestig, veral in die Noord-Amerikaanse akademiese
konteks.

'N Post-verkiesing Re-lesing van Islamitiese politieke denke

Roxanne L. Euben

Barack Obama se post-verkiesing retoriek oor die "Moslem-wêreld" het te kenne gegee 'n kritiese paradigmaskuif van sy voorganger. The new president’s characterization of the United States in his inaugural address as a “nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus and nonbelievers”; his formulation, invoked in several different contexts, that America will offer a hand of friendship to a Muslim world willing to “unclench [its] fist”; the emphasis on his own mixed lineage and experience living in Muslim countries; his pledge to close the Guantánamo Bay prison camp; his interview with Al Arabiya; and the promise to address the Muslim world from a Muslim capital during his first 100 days in office, all suggest a deliberate attempt to shift away from the hardening rhetoric of a new Cold War between the West and Islam and reframe American foreign policy toward Muslim societies.1 Obama’s rhetoric has enormous symbolic importance even if it has yet to issue in dramatic departures from previous U.S. foreign policies regarding, byvoorbeeld, Hamas or Iran’s nuclear program. At this particular juncture, its significance lies less in the specific policies it may presage or the greater sensitivity to Muslim sensibilities it reveals than in its underlying logic: implicit in these rhetorical gestures is the understanding that, as Obama put it in his interview with Al Arabiya, “the language we use matters,” that words and categories do not simply reflect but also create the world in which we live.

Islam en die Weste

Voorwoord

John J. DeGioia

Die merkwaardige gevoel van nabyheid tussen mense en nasies is die onmiskenbare werklikheid van ons geglobaliseerde wêreld. Ontmoetings met ander mense se lewenswyses, aktuele sake, politiek, welsyn en gelowe kom meer gereeld voor as ooit. Ons is nie net in staat om ander kulture duideliker te sien nie, maar ook om ons verskille skerper te sien. Die inligtingsintensiteit van die moderne lewe het hierdie diversiteit van nasies deel gemaak van ons daaglikse bewussyn en het gelei tot die sentraliteit van kultuur om ons individuele en kollektiewe sienings van die wêreld te onderskei. Ons uitdagings het ook wêreldwyd geword. Die lotgevalle van nasies het diep met mekaar verbind geraak.. Maak nie saak waar in die wêreld ons woon nie, ons word geraak deur die suksesse en mislukkings van vandag se globale orde. Tog bly ons reaksies op globale probleme baie verskillend, nie net as gevolg van wedywering en mededingende belange nie,maar grootliks omdat ons kulturele verskil die lens is waardeur ons hierdie globale uitdagings sien. Kulturele diversiteit is nie noodwendig 'n bron van botsings en konflik nie. In werklikheid, die nabyheid en kruiskulturele ontmoetings bring baie dikwels kreatiewe verandering teweeg - 'n verandering wat moontlik gemaak word deur goed georganiseerde sosiale samewerking. Samewerking oor grense heen groei hoofsaaklik op die gebied van besigheid en ekonomiese aktiwiteit. Samewerkende netwerke vir innovasie,produksie en verspreiding kom na vore as die enkele mees kragtige vormgewer van die globale ekonomie.

Demokrasie, Terrorisme en die Amerikaanse beleid in die Arabiese wêreld

F. Gregory Gause

Die Verenigde State het aangepak wat president Bush en die Sekretaris van Staat Rice het 'n sogenaamde "generasie uitdaging" politieke hervorming en demokrasie aan te moedig om in die Arabiese wêreld. Die Bush-administrasie en ander verdedigers van die demokrasie veldtog aanvoer dat die druk vir die Arabiese demokrasie is nie net oor die verspreiding van Amerikaanse waardes, maar ook oor die versekering van Amerikaanse sekuriteit. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. Daarom, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? Met ander woorde, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; en 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

Aanspraak maak op die Center: Politieke Islam in Transition

John L. Edwards

In die 1990's politieke Islam, wat sommige noem “Islamitiese fundamentalisme,” bly 'n groot teenwoordigheid in die regering en politiek oppositioneel uit Noord-Afrika te Suidoos-Asië. Politieke Islam in krag en in die politiek aan die orde het baie probleme en vrae: “Is Islam teenstelling tot modernisering?,” “Is Islam en demokrasie onversoenbaar?,” “Wat is die implikasies van 'n Islamitiese regering vir pluralisme, minderheids- en vroueregte,” “Hoe verteenwoordigend is Islamiete,” “Is daar Islamitiese gematigdes?,” “Sou die Weste 'n transnasionale Islamitiese bedreiging of botsing van beskawings vrees?” Hedendaagse Islamitiese Herlewing Die landskap van die Moslemwêreld vandag openbaar die opkoms van nuwe Islamitiese republieke (Iran, Soedan, Afghanistan), die verspreiding van Islamitiese bewegings wat as belangrike politieke en sosiale rolspelers binne bestaande stelsels funksioneer, en die konfronterende politiek van radikale gewelddadige ekstremiste._ In teenstelling met die 1980's toe politieke Islam eenvoudig gelykgestel is aan revolusionêre Iran of klandestiene groepe met name soos Islamitiese jihad of die Leër van God, die Moslemwêreld in die 1990's is een waarin Islamiete aan die verkiesingsproses deelgeneem het en as eerste ministers sigbaar is, kabinetsbeamptes, sprekers van nasionale vergaderings, parlementslede, en burgemeesters in lande so uiteenlopend soos Egipte, Soedan, Turkye, Iran, Libanon, Koeweit, Jemen, Jordaan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maleisië, Indonesië, en Israel/Palestina. Aan die begin van die een-en-twintigste eeu, politieke Islam bly 'n groot krag vir orde en wanorde in globale politiek, een wat deelneem aan die politieke proses, maar ook aan dade van terrorisme, 'n uitdaging vir die Moslemwêreld en die Weste. Verstaan ​​die aard van politieke Islam vandag, en in die besonder die kwessies en vrae wat na vore gekom het uit die ervaring van die onlangse verlede, bly krities vir regerings, beleidmakers, en studente van internasionale politiek.

Dit is die beleid, Dom

John L. Edwards

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. Bush. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. Egter, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, terrorisme, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Dus, byvoorbeeld, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?


Probleme Amerika se isla Dilemma

Shadi Hamid

VSA. pogings om demokrasie in die Midde-Ooste te bevorder is lank reeds verlam deur die "Islamistiese dilemma": in teorie, ons wil demokrasie hê, maar, in die praktyk, vrees dat Islamitiese partye die vernaamste begunstigdes van enige politieke opening sal wees. Die mees tragiese manifestasie hiervan was die Algerynse debakel van 1991 en 1992, toe die Verenigde State stil gestaan ​​het terwyl die stewige sekulêre weermag verkiesings gekanselleer het nadat 'n Islamitiese party 'n parlementêre meerderheid gewen het. Meer onlangs, die Bush-administrasie het teruggetrek van sy "vryheidsagenda" nadat Islamiete verbasend goed gevaar het in verkiesings in die hele streek, insluitend in Egipte, Saoedi-Arabië, en die Palestynse gebiede.
Maar selfs ons vrees vir Islamitiese partye - en die gevolglike weiering om met hulle te skakel - was self inkonsekwent, geld vir sommige lande maar nie vir ander nie. Hoe meer 'n land as noodsaaklik vir Amerikaanse nasionale veiligheidsbelange beskou word, hoe minder gewillig was die Verenigde State om Islamitiese groepe te aanvaar wat 'n prominente politieke rol daar het. Egter, in lande wat as minder strategies relevant beskou word, en waar minder op die spel is, die Verenigde State het soms 'n meer genuanseerde benadering gevolg. Maar dit is juis waar meer op die spel is dat die erkenning van 'n rol vir nie-gewelddadige Islamiete die belangrikste is, en, hier, Amerikaanse beleid skiet steeds tekort.
Regdeur die streek, die Verenigde State het aktief outokratiese regimes ondersteun en die groen lig gegee vir veldtogte van onderdrukking teen groepe soos die Egiptiese Moslem Broederskap, die oudste en mees invloedryke politieke beweging in die streek. In Maart 2008, gedurende wat baie waarnemers beskou as die ergste tydperk van anti-Broederskap-onderdrukking sedert die 1960's, Condoleezza Rice, minister van buitelandse sake, het afstand gedoen van a $100 miljoen kongres mandaat vermindering van militêre hulp aan Egipte.

Internasionale Raadpleging van Moslem intellectuelen oor die Islam & Politiek

Stimson Sentrum & Instituut vir Policy Studies

Hierdie twee-dag gesprek bymekaar gebring kundiges en akademici uit Bangladesh, Egipte, Indië,Indonesië, Kenia, Maleisië, Pakistan, die Filippyne, Soedan en Sri Lanka verteenwoordig akademie,nie-regeringsorganisasies en think tanks. Onder die deelnemers is 'n aantal voormalige regeringsamptenare en een sitting wetgever. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. uiteindelik, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

Egipte: Agtergrond en die VSA. Verhoudings

Jeremy M. Skerp

In die afgelope jaar, Egiptiese buitelandse beleid, veral sy verhouding met die Verenigde State, hasbenefitted aansienlik van beide 'n verandering in die VSA. beleid en van gebeure op die grond. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as V.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. Verder, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (Desember 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. Op dieselfde tyd, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.

TRAVELS TUSSEN EUROPE se Moslem BURE

JOOSTE LAGENDIJK

JAN Marinus Wiersma

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union [], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, egter. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Sedert 11 September 2001, in die besonder, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.

TUSSEN DIE globale en die PLAASLIKE

ANTHONY BUBALO

GREG FEALY

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Vandag, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Islam, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

Hervorming in die Moslem wêreld: Die rol van die Islamiete en Buite Powers

Shibley Telhami


Die Bush-administrasie se fokus op die verspreiding van demokrasie in die Midde-Ooste is die afgelope paar jaar baie bespreek, nie net in die Verenigde Statesand Arabiese en Moslem-lande, maar ook om TheWorld. In waarheid, nóg die streeksdiskoers oor die behoefte aan politieke en ekonomiese hervorming nóg die Amerikaanse praatjies oor die verspreiding van demokrasie is nuut. Oor die afgelope twee dekades, veral begin met die einde van die Koue Oorlog, intellektuele en regerings in die Midde-Ooste het oor hervorming gepraat. Die Amerikaanse beleid voor die Irakse inval in Koeweit in 1990 ook daarop gemik om demokrasie in die Arabiese wêreld te versprei. Maar in daardie geval,die eerste Golfoorlog en die behoefte om alliansies te sluit met outokratiese regimes was een van die redes waarom sprake van demokrasie verwerp het. Die ander rede was die ontdekking dat politieke hervorming geleenthede gebied het vir Islamitiese politieke groepe wat baie vreemd gelyk het met Amerikaanse doelwitte. Die vrees dat Islamitiese groepe demokrasie ondersteun het slegs gebaseer op die beginsel van "een man"., een stem, een keer,"soos die voormalige assistent-sekretaris van buitelandse sake, Edward Djerejiance, dit gestel het, het daartoe gelei dat die Verenigde State teruggetrek het. Eers in die Clinton-administrasie, Warren Christopher, minister van buitelandse sake, het aanvanklik op demokrasie in sy Midde-Ooste-beleid gefokus, maar het die kwessie vinnig opsy gesit toe die administrasie beweeg het om Palestyns-Israeline-onderhandeling in die skadu van militante Islamitiese groepe te bemiddel.,veral Hamas.

Politieke Islam en die Weste

JOHN L.ESPOSITO


Aan die begin van die 21ste centurypolitical Islam, ormore algemeen Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa groot teenwoordigheid in regerings andoppositional politiek uit die Noord-Africato Suidoos-Asië. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Iran, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Egipte, Indonesië,Jordaan, Koeweit, Libanon,Maleisië, Pakistan, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Die bou van brûe nie mure

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Egter, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

ISLAM, DEMOKRASIE & DIE VSA

cordoba fondament


Ten spyte daarvan dat dit beide 'n meerjarige en 'n komplekse debat is, Arches Quarterly herondersoek vanuit teologiese en praktiese gronde, die belangrike debat oor die verhouding en verenigbaarheid tussen Islam en Demokrasie, soos weergalm in Barack Obama se agenda van hoop en verandering. Terwyl baie Obama se opkoms na die Oval Office vier as 'n nasionale katarsis vir die VSA, ander bly minder optimisties oor 'n verskuiwing in ideologie en benadering in die internasionale arena. Terwyl baie van die spanning en wantroue tussen die Moslemwêreld en die VSA toegeskryf kan word aan die benadering om demokrasie te bevorder, tipies voorstander van diktature en marionetregimes wat lippediens lewer aan demokratiese waardes en menseregte, die naskok 9/11 het werklik die bekommernisse verder versterk deur Amerika se standpunt oor politieke Islam. Dit het 'n muur van negatiwiteit geskep soos gevind deur worldpublicopinion.org,waarvolgens 67% van Egiptenare glo dat Amerika wêreldwyd 'n "hoof-negatiewe" rol speel. Amerika se reaksie was dus gepas. Obama te kies, baie regoor die wêreld vestig hul hoop op die ontwikkeling van 'n minder strydlustige,maar regverdiger buitelandse beleid teenoor die Moslemwêreld. Die toets vir Obama, soos ons bespreek,is hoe Amerika en haar bondgenote demokrasie bevorder. Sal dit vergemaklik of opleidend wees?Verder, kan dit belangrik wees om 'n eerlike makelaar in langdurige sones van konflikte te wees?