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Islāms, Politiskais islāms un Amerika
Arābu ieskats
Vai ir iespējama “brālība” ar Ameriku?
halils al-anani
"nav iespēju sazināties ar kādu ASV. administrācija tik ilgi, kamēr ASV saglabā savu ilggadējo uzskatu par islāmu kā reālu briesmu, uzskats, kas nostāda ASV vienā laivā ar cionistu ienaidnieku. Mums nav nekādu iepriekšēju priekšstatu par amerikāņu tautu vai ASV. sabiedrība un tās pilsoniskās organizācijas un ideju grupas. Mums nav problēmu sazināties ar amerikāņu tautu, taču netiek veikti atbilstoši centieni, lai mūs tuvinātu,"teica Dr. Isams al Irjans, Musulmaņu brālības politiskā departamenta vadītājs telefona intervijā.
Al Irjana vārdi apkopo Musulmaņu brālības uzskatus par amerikāņu tautu un ASV. valdība. Citi Musulmaņu brālības locekļi tam piekristu, tāpat kā nelaiķis Hasans al Banna, gadā, kurš nodibināja grupu 1928. Al- Banna uzskatīja Rietumus galvenokārt par morālā pagrimuma simbolu. Citi salafi – islāma domas skola, kas paļaujas uz senčiem kā paraugiem – ir pauduši tādu pašu viedokli par ASV., taču trūkst ideoloģiskās elastības, ko atbalsta Musulmaņu brālība. Kamēr Musulmaņu brālība tic amerikāņu iesaistīšanai pilsoniskā dialogā, citas ekstrēmistu grupas neredz jēgu dialogam un apgalvo, ka spēks ir vienīgais veids, kā tikt galā ar ASV.
| sept 15, 2010 | Komentāri 0
ISLAMS, DEMOKRĀTIJA & AMERIKAS SAVIENOTĀS VALSTIS:
Kordovas fonds
Abdullah Faliq |
Ievads ,
Neskatoties uz to, ka tā ir gan daudzgadīga, gan sarežģīta diskusija, Arkas ceturkšņa izdevums atkārtoti pārbauda no teoloģijas un praktiskā viedokļa, svarīgās debates par islāma un demokrātijas attiecībām un savietojamību, kā tas atskanēja Baraka Obamas cerību un pārmaiņu programmā. Lai gan daudzi atzīmē Obamas ieņemšanu Ovālajā kabinetā kā nacionālo katarsi ASV, citi joprojām ir mazāk optimistiski par ideoloģijas un pieejas maiņu starptautiskajā arēnā. Lai gan lielu daļu spriedzes un neuzticības starp musulmaņu pasauli un ASV var saistīt ar demokrātijas veicināšanas pieeju., parasti dod priekšroku diktatūrām un marionešu režīmiem, kas runā par demokrātiskām vērtībām un cilvēktiesībām, gada pēcgrūdiens 9/11 ir patiesi nostiprinājis bažas, izmantojot Amerikas nostāju pret politisko islāmu. Tas ir izveidojis negatīvisma sienu, kā to atklāja worldpublicopinion.org, saskaņā ar kuru 67% ēģiptiešu uzskata, ka Amerika globāli spēlē “galvenokārt negatīvu” lomu.
Tādējādi Amerikas reakcija ir bijusi piemērota. Ievēlot Obamu, daudzi visā pasaulē saista savas cerības attīstīt mazāk kareivīgu, bet godīgāka ārpolitika pret musulmaņu pasauli. Pārbaudījums Obamam, kā mēs apspriežam, ir tas, kā Amerika un viņas sabiedrotie veicina demokrātiju. Vai tas atvieglos vai uzspiež?
Turklāt, vai tas var būt godīgs brokeris ilgstošās konfliktu zonās? Prolifi pieredzes un ieskatu piesaistīšana
c zinātnieki, akadēmiķi, pieredzējuši žurnālisti un politiķi, Arches Quarterly atklāj islāma un demokrātijas attiecības un Amerikas lomu, kā arī Obamas radītās izmaiņas., meklējot kopīgu valodu. Anas Altikriti, Th e Cordoba Foundation izpilddirektors nodrošina šīs diskusijas ievadu, kur viņš pārdomā cerības un izaicinājumus, kas ir Obamas ceļā. Sekojot Altikriti, bijušais prezidenta Niksona padomnieks, Dr Robert Crane piedāvā rūpīgu analīzi par islāma principu par tiesībām uz brīvību. Anvars Ibrahims, bijušais Malaizijas premjerministra vietnieks, bagātina diskusiju ar demokrātijas īstenošanas praktisko realitāti musulmaņu dominējošās sabiedrībās, proti, Indonēzijā un Malaizijā.
Mums ir arī Dr Shireen Hunter, Džordžtaunas universitātē, ASV, kurš pēta musulmaņu valstis, kas atpaliek demokratizācijas un modernizācijas jomā. To papildina rakstnieks par terorismu, Dr Nafeez Ahmed skaidrojums par postmodernitātes krīzi un
demokrātijas bojāeja. Doktors Dauds Abdulla (Tuvo Austrumu mediju monitora direktors), Alans Hārts (bijušais ITN un BBC Panorama korespondents; cionisma autors: Īstais ebreju ienaidnieks) un Asem Sondos (Ēģiptes iknedēļas Sawt Al Omma redaktors) koncentrēties uz Obamu un viņa lomu demokrātijas veicināšanā musulmaņu pasaulē, kā arī ASV attiecības ar Izraēlu un Musulmaņu brālību.
Ārlietu ministrs airē, Maldīvija, Ahmeds Šahīds spekulē par islāma un demokrātijas nākotni; Cllr. Gerijs Makločlains
– Sinn Féin biedrs, kurš izturēja četrus gadus cietumā par Īrijas republikāņu aktivitātēm un Gildfordas aizstāvis 4 un Birmingema 6, atspoguļo viņa neseno braucienu uz Gazu, kur viņš bija liecinieks pret palestīniešiem vērstās brutalitātes un netaisnības ietekmei; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Radikalizācijas un mūsdienu politiskās vardarbības pētījumu centra direktore apspriež izaicinājumus kritiski pētot politisko teroru; Dr Halids al Mubaraks, rakstnieks un dramaturgs, apspriež miera izredzes Darfūrā; un visbeidzot žurnālists un cilvēktiesību aktīvists Ašurs Šamiss kritiski skatās uz musulmaņu demokratizāciju un politizāciju mūsdienās.
Mēs ceram, ka tas viss radīs visaptverošu lasījumu un pārdomu avotu par jautājumiem, kas skar mūs visus jaunā cerību rītausmā.
Paldies
| sept 07, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Islamism revisited
MAHA AZZAM
There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 gadiem, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Jūlijs 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.
| sept 06, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Islamic Political Culture, Demokrātija, and Human Rights
Daniele. Cena
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. sekojoši, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, tomēr, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| sept 06, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Islamic Political Culture, Demokrātija, and Human Rights
Daniele. Cena
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the
values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. sekojoši, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, tomēr, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,
and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of
Islam on politics across eight nations.
| augusts 24, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Islamic Political Culture, Demokrātija, and Human Rights
Daniele. Cena
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the
values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. sekojoši, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, tomēr, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,
and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of
Islam on politics across eight nations.
| augusts 22, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Islāmistu opozīcijas partijas un ES iesaistīšanās potenciāls
Tobijs Ārčers
Heidija Huuhtanena
Ņemot vērā islāmistu kustību pieaugošo nozīmi musulmaņu pasaulē un
veids, kā radikalizācija ir ietekmējusi globālos notikumus kopš gadsimta sākuma, to
ir svarīgi, lai ES izvērtētu savu politiku attiecībā uz dalībniekiem, kas var būt brīvi
saukta par "islāma pasauli". Īpaši svarīgi ir jautāt, vai un kā iesaistīties
ar dažādām islāmistu grupām.
Tas joprojām ir pretrunīgs pat ES ietvaros. Daži uzskata, ka islāmi to vērtē
guļ aiz islāmistu partijām ir vienkārši nesavienojami ar rietumu demokrātijas ideāliem un
cilvēktiesības, savukārt citi uzskata, ka iesaistīšanās ir reāla nepieciešamība pieaugošā pieauguma dēļ
islāmistu partiju vietējā nozīme un to pieaugošā iesaiste starptautiskajā
lietas. Vēl viena perspektīva ir tāda, ka musulmaņu pasaulē palielināsies demokratizācija
Eiropas drošība. Šo un citu argumentu derīgums par to, vai un kā
ES vajadzētu iesaistīties var pārbaudīt tikai, pētot dažādas islāmistu kustības un
viņu politiskie apstākļi, valsts pēc valsts.
Demokratizācija ir ES kopējās ārpolitikas pasākumu galvenā tēma, kā likts
pantā 11 Līgumam par Eiropas Savienību. Daudzi no štatiem, kas ņemti vērā šajā
ziņojumi nav demokrātiski, vai nav pilnībā demokrātiska. Lielākajā daļā šo valstu, islāmists
partijas un kustības veido būtisku opozīciju valdošajiem režīmiem, un
dažos veidos lielāko opozīcijas bloku. Eiropas demokrātijām jau sen ir bijis
tikt galā ar autoritāriem režīmiem, bet tā ir jauna parādība, kas jāspiež
demokrātiskām reformām valstīs, kurās varētu būt vislielākie ieguvēji, no
ES viedoklis, dažādas un dažkārt problemātiskas pieejas demokrātijai un tai
saistītās vērtības, mazākumtautību un sieviešu tiesības un tiesiskums. Šīs maksas ir
bieži vērsta pret islāmistu kustībām, tāpēc Eiropas politikas veidotājiem tas ir svarīgi
ir precīzs priekšstats par potenciālo partneru politiku un filozofiju.
Dažādu valstu pieredze liecina, ka jo vairāk brīvības ir islāmists
ballītes ir atļautas, jo mērenāki viņi ir savā rīcībā un idejās. Daudzos
gadījumos islāmistu partijas un grupas jau sen ir novirzījušās no sava sākotnējā mērķa
par islāma valsts nodibināšanu saskaņā ar islāma likumiem, un ir sākuši pieņemt pamata
demokrātiskie principi vēlēšanu konkurencei par varu, citu politisko esamību
konkurentiem, un politiskais plurālisms.
| augusts 21, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Political Islam in the Middle East
Vai Knudsens
This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly
referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, iekšā
particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may
be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report
reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East
(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and
that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been
engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up
arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is
widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even
Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political
parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist
revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to
account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a
reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative
theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the
powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.
The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that
portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old
Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist
movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This
importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded
along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their
adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on
understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only
of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.
| augusts 20, 2010 | Komentāri 0
STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA KADLEC
Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarly, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. ASV. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.
| augusts 19, 2010 | Komentāri 0
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones
Neitans Dž. Brūns, Amrs Hamzavijs,
Marina Ottaway
During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, tomēr, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Džordana, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politika, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.
| augusts 18, 2010 | Komentāri 0
ISLAMS, ISLAMISTS, AND THE ELECTORAL PRINCIPLE I N THE MIDDLE EAST
Džeimss Piskatori
For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing
number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated
a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western
European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess
their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own
rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,
with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow
for flexible politics and participatory government?
The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative
that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story
concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary
story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual
baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has
become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,
the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,
and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.
| augusts 17, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Political Islam and European Foreign Policy
POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
MICHAEL EMERSON
RICHARD YOUNGS
Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .
| augusts 17, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Islāmistu partijas , ARE THEY DEMOCRATS? DOES it matter ?
Tareks Masouds
Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. Turklāt, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. For example, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (founded in 1928), but also Hamas, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.
| augusts 17, 2010 | Komentāri 0
The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood
Roberts S. Leikens
Stīvens Brūks
The Muslim Brotherhood is the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization. It is also the most controversial,
condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East. American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers “radical Islamists” and “a vital component of the enemy’s assault force … deeply hostile to the United States.” Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at them for “lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for elections … instead of into the lines of jihad.” Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy. These positions seem to make them moderates, the very thing the United States, short on allies in the Muslim world, seeks.
But the Ikhwan also assails U.S. ārpolitika, especially Washington’s support for Israel, and questions linger about its actual commitment to the democratic process. Over the past year, we have met with dozens of Brotherhood leaders and activists from Egypt, Francija, Džordana, Spānija, Sīrija,Tunisija, and the United Kingdom.
| augusts 16, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Energizing US-Syria Relations: Leveraging Ancillary Diplomatic Vehicles
Bendžamins E. Jauda,
Endrjū Ahlagi,
Stīvens Rotčtins
The prospect for greater stability in the Middle East largely hinges on the ability to bring Syria into diplomatic and security discussions as a productive stakeholder, necessitating a thaw in the less than normal state of U.S. – Syrian relations. While Syria’s
importance as a keystone state to a Middle East peace process was acknowledged in the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report,1 which called for a shift from disincentives to incentives in seeking constructive results, only in the past few months has there been a demonstrable shift in Washington’s disposition. Recent meetings between high-ranking U.S. officials and their counterparts in Damascus, and even the announcement of reinstating a U.S. ambassador to Syria, have led to widespread speculation in policy circles that a diplomatic thaw is afoot.
This report analyzes key trends in Syria’s domestic and regional socio-political situation that currently function to make Syria a natural ally of the United States.
| augusts 13, 2010 | Komentāri 0
No nemiernieku kustības līdz politiskajai partijai
Alastair Kruks
Daudzu Rietumos valda uzskats, ka pārejai no bruņotas pretošanās kustības par politisko partiju jābūt lineārai, pirms tam ir jāatsakās no vardarbības, Tas būtu jāveicina pilsoniskajai sabiedrībai un ar mērenu politiķu starpniecību, Islāma pretošanās kustības gadījumā ir maz realitātes. (Hamas). Tas nenozīmē, ka Hamas nav bijis pakļauts politiskai transformācijai: tā ir. Taču šī transformācija ir panākta, neskatoties uz Rietumu centieniem, un to nav veicinājusi šie centieni. Paliekot pretošanās kustībā, Hamas ir kļuvusi par Palestīnas pašpārvaldes valdību un ir mainījusi savu militāro nostāju. Taču šī transformācija ir mainījusies nekā tradicionālajos konfliktu risināšanas modeļos. Hamas un citas islāmistu grupas turpina uzskatīt sevi par pretošanās kustībām, taču arvien vairāk viņi redz iespēju, ka viņu organizācijas var attīstīties par politiskiem strāvojumiem, kas ir vērsti uz nevardarbīgu pretošanos. Standarta konfliktu risināšanas modeļi lielā mērā balstās uz Rietumu pieredzi konfliktu risināšanā un bieži vien ignorē pieejas atšķirības islāma miera veidošanas vēsturē.. Nav pārsteidzoši, Hamas pieeja politiskajām sarunām pēc stila atšķiras no Rietumu pieejas. Arī, kā islāmistu kustība, kurai ir plašāka Rietumu ietekmes uz viņu sabiedrību optika, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. In addition, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Daudz kas būs atkarīgs no Rietumu politikas kursa (tā "globālais karš pret terorismu") un kā šī politika ietekmē atdzimšanas islāmistu grupas, piemēram, Hamas, vēlēšanām apņēmušās grupas, reforma un laba pārvaldība.
| augusts 02, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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