All Entries in the "Moun lavil Aram MB" Category
Islam, Islam politik ak Amerik
Arab Insight
Èske "Fraternite" ak Amerik posib?
khalil al-anani
"pa gen okenn chans pou kominike ak nenpòt ki peyi Etazini. administrasyon an toutotan Etazini kenbe opinyon li depi lontan nan Islam kòm yon danje reyèl, yon pwennvi ki mete Etazini nan menm bato ak ènmi Siyonis la. Nou pa gen okenn lide pre-ansent konsènan pèp Ameriken an oswa US la. sosyete ak òganizasyon sivik li yo ak think tanks li yo. Nou pa gen pwoblèm pou kominike ak pèp Ameriken an men pa gen okenn efò adekwat yo ap fè pou pote nou pi pre,” te di Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chèf depatman politik Frè Mizilman an nan yon entèvyou telefòn.
Pawòl Al-Iryan yo rezime opinyon Frè Mizilman yo sou pèp Ameriken an ak peyi Etazini.. gouvènman an. Lòt manm nan Frè Mizilman yo ta dakò, menm jan ak defen Hassan al-Banna, ki te fonde gwoup la nan 1928. Al- Banna te konsidere Lwès la sitou kòm yon senbòl pouri moral. Lòt Salafis - yon lekòl Islamik nan panse ki depann sou zansèt kòm modèl egzanplè - te pran menm pwennvi nan Etazini., men manke fleksibilite ideyolojik Frè Mizilman yo te adopte. Pandan ke Frè Mizilman yo kwè nan angaje Ameriken yo nan dyalòg sivil, lòt gwoup ekstremis pa wè okenn pwen nan dyalòg epi kenbe fòs sa a se sèl fason pou fè fas ak Etazini.
ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq |
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Desizyon an pou transfere yo nan tribinal militè yo pa respekte vèdik tribinal sivil yo te kondane pa òganizasyon entènasyonal dwa moun., can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, sètadi, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, USA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you
Islamism revisited
MAHA AZZAM
There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Jiyè 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.
Kilti politik Islamik, Demokrasi, ak Dwa Moun
Daniele. Pri
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, sepandan, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, demokrasi, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
Kilti politik Islamik, Demokrasi, ak Dwa Moun
Daniele. Pri
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the
values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, sepandan, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
demokrasi, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,
and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of
Islam on politics across eight nations.
Kilti politik Islamik, Demokrasi, ak Dwa Moun
Daniele. Pri
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the
values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, sepandan, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
demokrasi, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,
and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of
Islam on politics across eight nations.
Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and
the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, it
is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely
termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage
with the various Islamist groups.
This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that
lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and
dwa moun, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing
domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international
affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase
European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the
EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and
their political circumstances, country by country.
Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid
out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this
report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamis
parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, epi
in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to
deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press
for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the
EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its
related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are
often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to
have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.
Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist
parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many
cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim
of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic
democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political
competitors, and political pluralism.
Political Islam in the Middle East
Èske Knudsen
This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly
referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, in
particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may
be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report
reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East
(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and
that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been
engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up
arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is
widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even
Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political
parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist
revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to
account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a
reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative
theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the
powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.
The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that
portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old
Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist
movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This
importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded
along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their
adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on
understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only
of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.ESTRATEJI POU ANGAJE ISLAM POLITIK
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA KADLEC
Islam politik se sèl fòs politik ki pi aktif nan Mwayen Oryan jodi a. Avni li se intimman lye ak sa ki nan rejyon an. Si Etazini ak Inyon Ewopeyen an pran angajman pou sipòte refòm politik nan rejyon an, yo pral bezwen elabore beton, estrateji koyeran pou angaje gwoup islamis yo. Poutan, Etazini. jeneralman pa t vle louvri yon dyalòg ak mouvman sa yo. Menm jan an tou, Angajman Inyon Ewopeyen ak Islamis yo te eksepsyon, pa règ la. Kote kontak ki ba-nivo egziste, yo sitou sèvi nan objektif pou rasanble enfòmasyon, pa objektif estratejik yo. Etazini an. ak Inyon Ewopeyen gen yon kantite pwogram ki adrese devlopman ekonomik ak politik nan rejyon an - pami yo Inisyativ Patenarya Mwayen Oryan an. (MEPI), Millennium Challenge Corporation la (MCC), Inyon pou Mediterane a, ak politik Ewopeyen an katye (ENP) – Men, yo pa gen anyen pou di sou fason defi opozisyon politik islamis la anfòm nan objektif rejyonal ki pi laj yo. Etazini. ak asistans ak pwogram demokrasi Inyon Ewopeyen yo dirije prèske antyèman swa gouvènman otoritè tèt yo oswa gwoup eksklizyon sosyete sivil ak sipò minimòm nan pwòp sosyete yo..
Lè a se mi pou yon reevalyasyon politik aktyèl yo. Depi atak teworis yo nan mwa septanm nan 11, 2001, sipòte demokrasi Mwayen Oryan an te pran yon pi gwo enpòtans pou mizisyen politik Lwès yo, ki wè yon lyen ant mank demokrasi ak vyolans politik. Pi gwo atansyon yo te konsakre nan konpreyansyon varyasyon yo nan Islam politik. Nouvo administrasyon Ameriken an pi ouvè pou elaji kominikasyon ak mond Mizilman an. Pandan se tan, a vas majorite nan òganizasyon islamis endikap - ki gen ladan Frè Mizilman an nan peyi Lejip, Fwon Aksyon Islamik lòt bò larivyè Jouden an (IAF), Pati Jistis ak Devlopman Mawòk la (PJD), Mouvman Konstitisyonèl Islamik Kowet, ak Yemeni Islah Party - te de pli zan pli fè sipò pou refòm politik ak demokrasi yon eleman santral nan platfòm politik yo.. An plis, anpil moun te siyale gwo enterè nan ouvèti dyalòg ak U.S. ak gouvènman Inyon Ewopeyen yo.
Avni relasyon ant nasyon oksidantal yo ak Mwayen Oryan an ka detèmine pa degre ansyen an angaje pati islamis san vyolans yo nan yon dyalòg laj sou enterè ak objektif pataje.. Te gen yon pwopagasyon resan etid sou angajman ak islamis yo, men kèk klèman adrese sa li ta ka enplike nan pratik. Kòm Zoe Nautre, vizite parèy nan Konsèy Alman an sou Relasyon Etranje, mete li, "Inyon Ewopeyen an ap panse sou angajman men li pa vrèman konnen ki jan."1 Nan espwa nan klarifye diskisyon an, nou fè distenksyon ant twa nivo "angajman,” yo chak ak diferan mwayen ak fen: kontak ba nivo, dyalòg estratejik, ak patenarya.
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones
Natan J.. Brown, Amr Hamzawy,
Marina Ottaway
During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, an patikilye, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Kòm yon rezilta, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, sepandan, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Lòt bò larivyè Jouden, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politik, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.
ISLAM, ISLAMISTS, AND THE ELECTORAL PRINCIPLE I N THE MIDDLE EAST
James Piscatori
For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing
number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated
a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western
European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess
their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own
rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,
with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow
for flexible politics and participatory government?
The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative
that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story
concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary
story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual
baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has
become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,
the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,
and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.
Islam politik ak politik etranjè Ewopeyen an
ISLAM POLITIK AK POLITIK PWOZINAT Ewopeyen an
MICHAEL EMERSON
RICHARD YOUNGS
Depi 2001 ak evènman entènasyonal yo ki te swiv nati a nan relasyon ki genyen ant Lwès la ak Islam politik te vin tounen yon pwoblèm defini pou politik etranjè.. Nan dènye ane yo, yon kantite lajan konsiderab nan rechèch ak analiz yo te eskize sou pwoblèm nan nan Islam politik. Sa a te ede korije kèk nan sipozisyon senplist ak alarmis yo te deja te fèt nan Lwès la sou nati valè ak entansyon Islamis yo.. Paralèl ak sa a, Inyon Ewopeyen an (Inyon Ewopeyen) te devlope yon kantite inisyativ politik prensipalman politik Ewopeyen an katye(ENP) ki nan prensip angaje nan dyalòg ak pi fon angajman tout(ki pa vyolan) aktè politik ak òganizasyon sosyete sivil nan peyi Arab yo. Men, anpil analis ak mizisyen politik kounye a plenyen de yon sèten trofe nan tou de deba konseptyèl ak devlopman politik. Li te etabli ke Islam politik se yon peyizaj k ap chanje, pwofondman afekte pa yon seri sikonstans, men deba souvan sanble yo te kole sou kesyon an senplist nan 'Èske Islamis yo demokratik?' Anpil analis endepandan te defann angajman ak islamis yo, men rapwòchman aktyèl ant gouvènman Lwès yo ak òganizasyon islamis yo rete limite .
Pati Islamis yo , ARE THEY DEMOCRATS? DOES it matter ?
Tarek Masoud
Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. Desizyon an pou transfere yo nan tribinal militè yo pa respekte vèdik tribinal sivil yo te kondane pa òganizasyon entènasyonal dwa moun., as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. For example, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (founded in 1928), but also Hamas, Fwon Aksyon Islamik lòt bò larivyè Jouden an, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.
Frè Mizilman Modere a
Robert S.. Leiken
Steven Brooke
Frè Mizilman an se pi ansyen nan mond lan, pi gwo, ak òganizasyon islamis ki pi enfliyan. Li se tou ki pi kontwovèsyal la,
kondane pa tou de opinyon konvansyonèl nan Lwès la ak opinyon radikal nan Mwayen Oryan an. Kòmantatè Ameriken yo te rele Frè Mizilman yo "Islamis radikal" ak "yon eleman enpòtan nan fòs atak lènmi an. … pwofondman ostil ak Etazini yo." Ayman al-Zawahiri Al Qaeda a pase yo nan betiz pou "lur[ing] dè milye de jèn gason Mizilman nan liy pou eleksyon yo … olye pou yo antre nan liy jiad yo. Jihadists deteste Frè Mizilman yo (li te ye nan arab kòm al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) pou rejte jiad mondyal ak anbrase demokrasi. Pozisyon sa yo sanble fè yo modere, bagay la anpil nan Etazini, kout sou alye nan mond Mizilman an, chache.
Men, Ikhwan la tou atake U.S. politik etranjè, espesyalman sipò Washington pou pèp Izrayèl la, ak kesyon ki rete sou angajman aktyèl li nan pwosesis demokratik la. Pandan ane ki sot pase a, nou te rankontre ak plizyè douzèn lidè Fratènite ak aktivis nan peyi Lejip, Lafrans, Lòt bò larivyè Jouden, Espay, Siri,Tinizi, ak Wayòm Ini a.
Energizing US-Syria Relations: Leveraging Ancillary Diplomatic Vehicles
Benjamen E. Pouvwa,
Andre Akhlaghi,
Steven Rotchtin
The prospect for greater stability in the Middle East largely hinges on the ability to bring Syria into diplomatic and security discussions as a productive stakeholder, necessitating a thaw in the less than normal state of U.S. – Syrian relations. While Syria’s
importance as a keystone state to a Middle East peace process was acknowledged in the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report,1 which called for a shift from disincentives to incentives in seeking constructive results, only in the past few months has there been a demonstrable shift in Washington’s disposition. Recent meetings between high-ranking U.S. officials and their counterparts in Damascus, and even the announcement of reinstating a U.S. ambassador to Syria, have led to widespread speculation in policy circles that a diplomatic thaw is afoot.
This report analyzes key trends in Syria’s domestic and regional socio-political situation that currently function to make Syria a natural ally of the United States.
From Rebel Movement to Political Party
Alastair Crooke
The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Epitou, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. An plis, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.
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