RSSMaingizo zote "Masuala ya" Kundi

Usahihi katika vita vya ulimwengu juu ya hofu:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; na (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

KUJADILI DEMOKRASIA KATIKA ULIMWENGU WA WARABU

Ibtisam Ibrahim

What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, imani, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracyin addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participationcontains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Hata hivyo, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Hata hivyo, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elementsaccountability, competition, and some degree of participationwhich have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.

Demokrasia, Uchaguzi na Udugu wa Kiislamu wa Misri

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. Na sisi. na msaada wa Ulaya, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, kuendeleza sababu zao na kutoa makubaliano kutoka kwa serikali. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, ikiwa ni pamoja na serikali ya Marekani, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, na pengine pia katika kutokomeza ugaidi wa Kiislamu. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) na Chama cha Haki ya Ufanisi cha Indonesia (PKS), two Islamist parties that, kulingana na baadhi ya wachambuzi, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, kwa mtiririko huo, Ulaya na Asia "ya kipagani".?
Nakala hii inachunguza jinsi MB imejibu ukweli mpya, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? Nini malengo yake na maono yake ya utaratibu wa kisiasa? How has it reacted to U.S. mabadiliko na kampeni ya mageuzi na demokrasia?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, wakati nchi inaelekea kwenye chaguzi mbili za vuli 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

NDUGU WAISLAMU WA MISRI: KUPINGANA AU KUUNGANISHWA?

Utafiti

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, serikali inapaswa kuchukua hatua za awali za kuhalalisha ushiriki wa Ndugu wa Kiislamu katika maisha ya kisiasa. Ndugu Waislam, ambao shughuli zao za kijamii zimevumiliwa kwa muda mrefu lakini nafasi yao katika siasa rasmi ni ndogo sana, alishinda isiyo na kifani 20 asilimia ya viti vya ubunge 2005 uchaguzi. Walifanya hivyo licha ya kuwania theluthi moja tu ya viti vilivyokuwepo na licha ya vikwazo vingi, ikiwa ni pamoja na ukandamizaji wa polisi na udanganyifu katika uchaguzi. Mafanikio haya yalithibitisha msimamo wao kama nguvu ya kisiasa iliyojipanga vizuri na iliyokita mizizi. kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., ilisisitiza udhaifu wa vyama vya upinzani kisheria na chama tawala. Huenda serikali ilisema kwamba ongezeko la wastani la uwakilishi bungeni la Muslim Brothers lingeweza kutumiwa kuzua hofu ya kunyakuliwa kwa Waislam na hivyo kuwa sababu ya kusimamisha mageuzi.. Ikiwa ndivyo, mkakati uko katika hatari kubwa ya kurudisha nyuma.

Iraq na Baadaye ya Uislamu wa Kisiasa

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Uislamu na Demokrasia

ITAC

kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia. inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia. inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia: inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia. inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia. kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia.
kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia. kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia. kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia (kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia) kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Uislamu na Islamism nchini Afghanistan

Christine Mendoza

The last half-century in particular has seen the recurrent use of religious Islam as

itikadi, often referred to as political Islam or Islamism, in groups espousing the

establishment of an Islamic state. Attention was drawn to Afghanistan when it became

the rallying point for Islamists in the 1980s. Hata hivyo, the earlier appearance of an

Islamist movement in Afghanistan in the 1960s and its subsequent development offer an

instructive, unique lesson in understanding Islam and Islamism in Afghan society.

This overview of the Islamist movement in Afghanistan is divided into three

parts: It begins by defining the differing manifestations of Islam in Afghanistan,

indicating how Islamism differs from or draws upon each manifestation in constructing

its own vision. Then, the broader context of Islamism elsewhere in the Muslim world is

discussed and analyzed. Although the theoretical basis for Islamism was constructed in

the 1960s by Abu ‘Ala Mawdudi in Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, this paper will

show that the Islamist movement in Afghanistan did not mirror those in either of these

countries. To this end, this paper reviews the thought of the above-mentioned

theoreticians of Islamism, and outlines historical and social conditions that colored the

implementation of their models in their respective countries. This leads back to a

discussion of the Afghan context, which makes up the final part of the paper. It is

necessary to review salient aspects of the traditional structure of Afghan society, and the

role Islam has historically played in Afghanistan to understand how the Islamist

experience was shaped and constrained by this structure, as well as how the Islamist

experience has altered it.
As Afghanistan is now faced with the monumental task of rebuilding a state and

legal system, Islamists are attempting to influence the reconstruction. This overview will

underscore for those observing and participating in this process the importance of

understanding the Afghan Islamist perspective, its historical underpinnings, and current

demands.


UTANDAwazi NA UISLAMU WA KISIASA: MISINGI YA KIJAMII YA CHAMA CHA USTAWI WA TURKI

Haldun Gulalp

Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, kisha, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. This paper will, kwa hiyo, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, kwa 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. Hata hivyo, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.

Utawala wa changamoto, Ukoloni, na Disunity: Siasa ya Kiislamu ya Kurekebisha Harakati ya Afghani al-na Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Hasa, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Kwa hiyo, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, lakini
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). Hata hivyo, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. Kwa upande mmoja,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Kwa upande mwingine, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Kwa kweli,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Hata hivyo, they disagreed on certain aspects

na mbinu, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, ambayo

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Misri kwenye Kituo cha Tipping ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 kwa 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja ($7 umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja) umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja. umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja, umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja.

Kuendelea kwa Shirika katika Udugu wa Waislam wa Misri

Tess Lee Eisenhart

umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja, umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja

Muslim Brothers, umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja, umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja
umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja
umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja. umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja 1928, umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja (Ndugu) umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja
umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja, umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja
umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja, hata hivyo, umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Hotuba ya Dk,MUHAMMAD BADIE

Dk,Muhammad Badie

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Praise be to Allah and Blessing on His messenger, companions and followers
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
I greet you with the Islamic greeting; Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings;
It is the will of Allah that I undertake this huge responsibility which Allah has chosen for me and a request from the MB Movement which I respond to with the support of Allah. With the support of my Muslim Brothers I look forward to achieving the great goals, we devoted ourselves to, solely for the sake of Allah.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
At the outset of my speech I would like to address our teacher, older brother, and distinguished leader Mr. Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh leader of the MB group a strong, dedicated and enthusiastic person who led the group’s journey amid storms and surpassed all its obstacles, thus providing this unique and outstanding model to all leaders and senior officials in the government, associations and other parties by fulfilling his promise and handing over the leadership after only one term, words are not enough to express our feelings to this great leader and guide and we can only sayMay Allah reward you all the best”.
We say to our beloved Muslim brothers who are spread around the globe, it is unfortunate for us to have this big event happening while you are not among us for reasons beyond our control, however we feel that your souls are with us sending honest and sincere smiles and vibes.
As for the beloved ones who are behind the bars of tyranny and oppression for no just reason other than reiterating Allah is our God, and for seeking the dignity, pride and development of their country, we sincerely applaud and salute them for their patience, steadfastness and sacrifices which we are sure will not be without gain. We pray that those tyrants and oppressors salvage their conscience and that we see you again in our midst supporting our cause, may Allah bless and protect you all.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
As you are aware, the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (MB) is comprehensive modification, which deals with all kinds of corruption through reform and change. “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can only come from Allah.” (Hud-88) and through cooperation with all powers of the nation and those with high spirits who are sincere to their religion and nation.
The MB believes that Allah has placed all the foundations necessary for the development and welfare of nations in the great Islam; kwa hiyo, Islam is their reference towards reform, which starts from the disciplining and training of the souls of individuals, followed by regulating families and societies by strengthening them, preceded by bringing justice to it and the continuous jihad to liberate the nation from any foreign dominance or intellectual, spiritual, cultural hegemony and economic, political or military colonialism, as well as leading the nation to development, prosperity and assuming its appropriate place in the world.

KATI YA JANA NA LEO

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, na provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
Afterwards, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. The Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

Visiwa vya Waislamu

Max L. Jumla

This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.

Demokrasia katika Mawazo ya Kisiasa ya Kiislamu

Azzam S. Tamimi

Demokrasia imewashughulisha wanafikra wa kisiasa wa Kiarabu tangu mwanzo wa mwamko wa kisasa wa Waarabu yapata karne mbili zilizopita.. Tangu wakati huo, dhana ya demokrasia imebadilika na kukuzwa chini ya ushawishi wa aina mbalimbali za maendeleo ya kijamii na kisiasa.Mjadala wa demokrasia katika fasihi ya Kiislamu ya Kiarabu unaweza kufuatiliwa nyuma hadi Rifa'a Tahtawi., baba wa demokrasia ya Misri kulingana na Lewis Awad,[3] ambaye muda mfupi baada ya kurejea Cairo kutoka Paris alichapisha kitabu chake cha kwanza, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, ndani 1834. Kitabu hiki kilifanya muhtasari wa uchunguzi wake wa adabu na desturi za Wafaransa wa kisasa,[4] na kusifu dhana ya demokrasia kama alivyoiona Ufaransa na huku akishuhudia utetezi na utetezi wake kupitia 1830 Mapinduzi dhidi ya Mfalme Charles X.[5] Tahtawi alijaribu kuonyesha kwamba dhana ya kidemokrasia aliyokuwa akiwaeleza wasomaji wake ilikuwa inaendana na sheria ya Uislamu.. Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu:
Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu, Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu, Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu . . . Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu, Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu. Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu: Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu[6] Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu (1810- 99), Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu, Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu, ndani 1867, alitengeneza mpango wa jumla wa mageuzi katika kitabu kiitwacho Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al.- kurudi (Njia Iliyo Nyooka ya Kurekebisha Serikali). Kushughulishwa kuu kwa kitabu hicho ilikuwa katika kushughulikia suala la mageuzi ya kisiasa katika ulimwengu wa Kiarabu. Huku akitoa wito kwa wanasiasa na wasomi wa wakati wake kutafuta njia zote zinazowezekana ili kuboresha hadhi ya
jamii na kuendeleza ustaarabu wake, alionya umma wa Kiislamu kwa ujumla dhidi ya kuepuka uzoefu wa mataifa mengine kwa msingi wa dhana potofu kwamba maandishi yote., uvumbuzi, uzoefu au mitazamo ya wasio Waislamu inapaswa kukataliwa au kupuuzwa.
Khairuddin zaidi alitoa wito wa kukomeshwa kwa utawala wa utimilifu, ambayo alilaumu kwa ukandamizaji wa mataifa na uharibifu wa ustaarabu.

Ilani ya Kisiasa ya Hizbollah 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .