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PRECIZNOST U GLOBALNOM RATU PROTIV TERORA:

Šerifa zuhur

Sedam godina nakon rujna 11, 2001 (9/11) napadi, mnogi stručnjaci vjeruju da je al-Qa'ida ponovno ojačala i da su njezini imitatori ili podružnice smrtonosniji nego prije. Nacionalna obavještajna procjena 2007 ustvrdio da je al-Qa'ida sada opasnija nego prije 9/11.1 Al-Qa'idini emulatori nastavljaju prijetiti Zapadu, Srednji istok, i europskih naroda, kao u zavjeri osujećenoj u rujnu 2007 u Njemačkoj. Bruce Riedel navodi: Uvelike zahvaljujući spremnosti Washingtona da ode u Irak umjesto da lovi vođe Al Qaide, organizacija sada ima solidnu bazu operacija u pustoši Pakistana i učinkovitu franšizu u zapadnom Iraku. Njegov doseg se proširio po muslimanskom svijetu i Europi . . . Osama bin Laden je pokrenuo uspješnu propagandnu kampanju. . . . Njegove ideje sada privlače više sljedbenika nego ikada.
Istina je da se razne selefijsko-džihadističke organizacije još uvijek pojavljuju diljem islamskog svijeta. Zašto se odgovori na islamistički terorizam koji zovemo globalni džihad nisu pokazali iznimno učinkovitima?
Prelazak na alate „meke moći,” što je s učinkovitošću zapadnih nastojanja da podupre muslimane u Globalnom ratu protiv terorizma (GWOT)? Zašto su Sjedinjene Države osvojile tako malo “srca i umova” u širem islamskom svijetu? Zašto američke strateške poruke o ovom pitanju tako loše igraju u regiji? Zašto, usprkos širokom muslimanskom neodobravanju ekstremizma kao što je prikazano u anketama i službenim izjavama ključnih muslimanskih vođa, je zapravo porasla podrška bin Ladinu u Jordanu i Pakistanu?
Ova monografija neće se ponovno baviti podrijetlom islamističkog nasilja. Umjesto toga, bavi se vrstom konceptualnog neuspjeha koji krivo konstruira GWOT i koji obeshrabruje muslimane da ga podrže. Ne mogu se identificirati s predloženim transformativnim protumjerama jer prepoznaju neka od svojih temeljnih uvjerenja i institucija kao mete u
ovaj pothvat.
Nekoliko duboko problematičnih trendova zbunjuje američke konceptualizacije GWOT-a i strateških poruka osmišljenih za vođenje tog rata. Ovi se razvijaju iz (1) postkolonijalni politički pristupi muslimanima i muslimanskim većinskim narodima koji se uvelike razlikuju i stoga proizvode proturječne i zbunjujuće dojmove i učinke; i (2) zaostalo generalizirano neznanje i predrasude prema islamu i subregionalnim kulturama. Dodajte ovome američki bijes, strah, i tjeskoba zbog smrtonosnih događaja 9/11, a pojedini elementi koji, unatoč nagovaranjima hladnijih glava, smatrati muslimane i njihovu vjeru odgovornima za nedjela njihovih istovjeraca, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD

Ibtisam Ibrahim |

What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, vjera, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracyin addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participationcontains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Međutim, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Međutim, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elementsaccountability, competition, and some degree of participationwhich have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.

Demokracija, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) odbijanje popuštanja stiska riskira pogoršanje napetosti u vrijeme političke neizvjesnosti oko nasljeđivanja predsjednika i ozbiljnih socioekonomskih nemira. Iako će to vjerojatno biti produljeno, postupan proces, režim bi trebao poduzeti preliminarne korake za normalizaciju sudjelovanja Muslimanske braće u političkom životu. Muslimanska braća, čije su se društvene aktivnosti dugo tolerirale, ali čija je uloga u formalnoj politici strogo ograničena, osvojio neviđenu 20 posto zastupničkih mjesta u 2005 izbori. Učinili su to unatoč tome što su se natjecali za samo trećinu raspoloživih mjesta i unatoč značajnim preprekama, uključujući policijsku represiju i izbornu prijevaru. Ovim uspjehom potvrdili su svoju poziciju izuzetno dobro organizirane i duboko ukorijenjene političke snage. U isto vrijeme, ona je naglasila slabosti i legalne oporbe i vladajuće stranke. Režim se mogao kladiti da bi se skromno povećanje zastupljenosti Muslimanske braće u parlamentu moglo iskoristiti za raspirivanje straha od islamističkog preuzimanja vlasti i time poslužiti kao razlog za odugovlačenje reforme. Ako je tako, strategija je pod velikim rizikom od povratnog učinka.

Iraq and the Future of Political Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Islam i demokracija

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Islam and Islamism in Afghanistan

Kristin Mendoza

The last half-century in particular has seen the recurrent use of religious Islam as

ideologija, often referred to as political Islam or Islamism, in groups espousing the

establishment of an Islamic state. Attention was drawn to Afghanistan when it became

the rallying point for Islamists in the 1980s. Međutim, the earlier appearance of an

Islamist movement in Afghanistan in the 1960s and its subsequent development offer an

instructive, unique lesson in understanding Islam and Islamism in Afghan society.

This overview of the Islamist movement in Afghanistan is divided into three

parts: It begins by defining the differing manifestations of Islam in Afghanistan,

indicating how Islamism differs from or draws upon each manifestation in constructing

its own vision. Then, the broader context of Islamism elsewhere in the Muslim world is

discussed and analyzed. Although the theoretical basis for Islamism was constructed in

the 1960s by Abu ‘Ala Mawdudi in Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, this paper will

show that the Islamist movement in Afghanistan did not mirror those in either of these

countries. To this end, this paper reviews the thought of the above-mentioned

theoreticians of Islamism, and outlines historical and social conditions that colored the

implementation of their models in their respective countries. This leads back to a

discussion of the Afghan context, which makes up the final part of the paper. It is

necessary to review salient aspects of the traditional structure of Afghan society, i

role Islam has historically played in Afghanistan to understand how the Islamist

experience was shaped and constrained by this structure, as well as how the Islamist

experience has altered it.
As Afghanistan is now faced with the monumental task of rebuilding a state and

legal system, Islamists are attempting to influence the reconstruction. This overview will

underscore for those observing and participating in this process the importance of

understanding the Afghan Islamist perspective, its historical underpinnings, and current

demands.


GLOBALIZACIJA I POLITIČKI ISLAM: SOCIJALNE OSNOVE TURSKE STRANKE BLAGOSTANJA

Haldun Gulalp

Politički islam je posljednjih desetljeća u Turskoj dobio povećanu vidljivost. Velik broj studentica počeo je pokazivati ​​svoju predanost nošenjem zabranjenog islamskog pokrivala za glavu u sveučilišnim kampusima, i utjecajna proislamistička TV
kanali su se proširili. Ovaj rad se fokusira na dobrobit (blagostanje) Stranka kao najistaknutiji institucionalni predstavnik političkog islama u Turskoj.
Kratak boravak Stranke blagostanja na vlasti kao vodećeg koalicijskog partnera od sredine 1996. do sredine 1997. bio je vrhunac desetljeća postojanog rasta koji su potpomogle druge islamističke organizacije i institucije. Ove organizacije i ustanove
uključivao je novine i izdavačke kuće koje su privlačile islamističke pisce, brojne islamske zaklade, islamistička konfederacija radničkih sindikata, i islamističko udruženje poslovnih ljudi. Ove su institucije radile u tandemu s, i u prilog, Welfare kao neprikosnoveni vođa i predstavnik političkog islama u Turskoj, iako su imali svoje partikularističke ciljeve i ideale, koji su često odudarali od političkih projekata Welfarea. Fokusirajući se na Stranku blagostanja, zatim, omogućuje analizu šire društvene baze na kojoj je izrastao islamistički politički pokret u Turskoj. Od svrgavanja Welfarea s vlasti i njegovog konačnog zatvaranja, islamistički pokret bio je u rasulu. Ovaj će rad, stoga, ograničiti na razdoblje stranke blagostanja.
Prethodnik Welfare-a, stranka nacionalnog spasa, djelovao je 1970-ih, ali ga je zatvorio vojni režim u 1980. godine osnovan je Welfare 1983 a veliku popularnost stekao je 1990-ih. Počevši s a 4.4 posto glasova na općinskim izborima u 1984, Stranka blagostanja stalno je povećavala svoje rezultate i umnožila svoje glasove gotovo pet puta u dvanaest godina. To je prvo uznemirilo turski sekularni establišment na općinskim izborima u 1994, s 19 posto svih glasova u cijeloj zemlji i gradonačelnička mjesta u Istanbulu i Ankari, zatim na općim izborima od 1995 kada je osvojio pluralitet sa 21.4 posto nacionalnih glasova. Štoviše, Stranka blagostanja je samo nakratko mogla voditi koalicijsku vladu u partnerstvu s desničarskom Strankom pravog puta Tansua C¸ illera.

izazovan autoritarizam, Kolonijalizam, i nejedinstva: Pokreti Islamski političke reforme al-Afgani i Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. In particular, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Therefore, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, ali
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). Međutim, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. S druge strane, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Doista,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Međutim, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Egypt at the Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 to 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.

Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Bratstvo) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, međutim, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
režim: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Umjesto toga, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Speech of Dr,MUHAMMAD BADIE

Dr,Muhammad Badie

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Praise be to Allah and Blessing on His messenger, companions and followers
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
I greet you with the Islamic greeting; Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings;
It is the will of Allah that I undertake this huge responsibility which Allah has chosen for me and a request from the MB Movement which I respond to with the support of Allah. With the support of my Muslim Brothers I look forward to achieving the great goals, we devoted ourselves to, solely for the sake of Allah.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
At the outset of my speech I would like to address our teacher, older brother, and distinguished leader Mr. Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh leader of the MB group a strong, dedicated and enthusiastic person who led the group’s journey amid storms and surpassed all its obstacles, thus providing this unique and outstanding model to all leaders and senior officials in the government, associations and other parties by fulfilling his promise and handing over the leadership after only one term, words are not enough to express our feelings to this great leader and guide and we can only sayMay Allah reward you all the best”.
We say to our beloved Muslim brothers who are spread around the globe, it is unfortunate for us to have this big event happening while you are not among us for reasons beyond our control, however we feel that your souls are with us sending honest and sincere smiles and vibes.
As for the beloved ones who are behind the bars of tyranny and oppression for no just reason other than reiterating Allah is our God, and for seeking the dignity, pride and development of their country, we sincerely applaud and salute them for their patience, steadfastness and sacrifices which we are sure will not be without gain. We pray that those tyrants and oppressors salvage their conscience and that we see you again in our midst supporting our cause, may Allah bless and protect you all.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
As you are aware, the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (MB) is comprehensive modification, which deals with all kinds of corruption through reform and change. “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can only come from Allah.” (Hud-88) and through cooperation with all powers of the nation and those with high spirits who are sincere to their religion and nation.
The MB believes that Allah has placed all the foundations necessary for the development and welfare of nations in the great Islam; stoga, Islam is their reference towards reform, which starts from the disciplining and training of the souls of individuals, followed by regulating families and societies by strengthening them, preceded by bringing justice to it and the continuous jihad to liberate the nation from any foreign dominance or intellectual, spiritual, cultural hegemony and economic, political or military colonialism, as well as leading the nation to development, prosperity and assuming its appropriate place in the world.

BETWEEN YESTERDAY AND TODAY

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in to, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, i provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
Poslije toga, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. The Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

Muslimanski arhipelag

Max L. Bruto

Ova knjiga nastajala je mnogo godina, kako autor objašnjava u svom Predgovoru, iako je većinu stvarnog teksta napisao tijekom godine u kojoj je bio viši znanstveni suradnik u Centru za strateška obavještajna istraživanja. Autor je bio dugogodišnji dekan Škole za obavještajne studije na Združenom vojnom obavještajnom učilištu. Iako se može činiti da je knjigu mogao napisati bilo koji dobar povjesničar ili regionalni stručnjak za jugoistočnu Aziju, ovo je djelo osvijetljeno autorovim više od tri desetljeća službe unutar nacionalne obavještajne zajednice. Njegova regionalna stručnost često se primjenjivala na posebne procjene za Zajednicu. S poznavanjem islama bez premca među svojim vršnjacima i neutaživom žeđu za određivanjem kako bi se ciljevi ove religije mogli odvijati u područjima daleko od fokusa trenutne pažnje većine kreatora politike, autor je maksimalno iskoristio ovu priliku da upozna obavještajnu zajednicu i šire čitateljstvo sa strateškom procjenom regije u jeku pomirenja sekularnih i vjerskih snaga.
Ured za sigurnosnu provjeru odobrio je ovu publikaciju za neograničenu distribuciju, Ministarstvo obrane.

Demokracija u islamskoj političkoj misli

Azzam S. Tamimi

Demokracija je zaokupljala arapske političke mislioce od zore moderne arapske renesanse prije otprilike dva stoljeća. Od tad, koncept demokracije se promijenio i razvio pod utjecajem raznih društvenih i političkih razvoja. Rasprava o demokraciji u arapskoj islamskoj literaturi može se pratiti unatrag do Rifa'a Tahtawija, otac egipatske demokracije prema Lewisu Awadu,[3] koji je nedugo nakon povratka u Kairo iz Pariza objavio svoju prvu knjigu, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, u 1834. Knjiga je sažela njegova zapažanja o manirama i običajima modernih Francuza,[4] i hvalio koncept demokracije kako ju je vidio u Francuskoj i kako je svjedočio njezinoj obrani i ponovnom utvrđivanju kroz 1830 Revolucija protiv kralja Charlesa X.[5] Tahtawi je pokušao pokazati da je demokratski koncept koji je objašnjavao svojim čitateljima kompatibilan s islamskim zakonom. Usporedio je politički pluralizam s oblicima ideološkog i jurisprudencijalnog pluralizma koji je postojao u islamskom iskustvu:
Vjerska sloboda je sloboda vjerovanja, mišljenja i sekte, pod uvjetom da nije u suprotnosti s osnovama vjere . . . Isto bi se odnosilo na slobodu političke prakse i mišljenja vodećih administratora, koji nastoje tumačiti i primjenjivati ​​pravila i odredbe u skladu sa zakonima svojih zemalja. Kraljevi i ministri imaju dopuštenje u području politike da slijede različite rute koje na kraju služe jednoj svrsi: dobra uprava i pravosuđe.[6] Jedan važan orijentir u ovom pogledu bio je doprinos Khairuddina At-Tunisija (1810- 99), vođa reformnog pokreta 19. stoljeća u Tunisu, WHO, u 1867, formulirao opći plan reforme u knjizi pod naslovom Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- povratak (Ravni put do reformskih vlada). Glavna preokupacija knjige bila je bavljenje pitanjem političke reforme u arapskom svijetu. Apelirajući na političare i znanstvenike svoga vremena da traže sva moguća sredstva kako bi se poboljšao položaj
zajednicu i razvijati njenu uljuđenost, upozorio je opću muslimansku javnost da se kloni iskustava drugih naroda na temelju zablude da su svi spisi, izumi, iskustva ili stavove nemuslimana treba odbaciti ili zanemariti.
Khairuddin je nadalje pozvao na kraj apsolutističke vladavine, koje je optuživao za ugnjetavanje nacija i uništenje civilizacija.

Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .